I. Facts
In 2010, defendant Gingko Rose Ltd. (Gingko Rose) aсquired a house occupied by six tenants, including plaintiffs Wayne Hart (Hart) and Carlos Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Defendants David and Barbara Darwish own part of Gingko Rose, and defendant Logerm LLC is Gingko Rose's general partner. Defendants Lisa Rosenthal and her law firm, Rosenthal & Associates, represented Gingko Rose.
In May 2012, Gingko Rose filed six unlawful detainer lawsuits, one agаinst each tenant, for not paying rent. The cases against Hart and Rodriguez proceeded to a bench trial first, with the remaining cases trailing behind. After Gingko Rose rested its case-in-chief, Hart and Rodriguez moved for a "directed verdict" on several grounds, including that (1) the house was not properly registered with thе rent-control authorities, (2) Gingko Rose was trying to collect rent for periods when the house was not registered, (3) the notices preceding the lawsuits did not spell out the alleged breaches of the rental agreement, and (4) the dilapidated condition of the house vitiated any duty to pay rent. The unlawful detainer court pointed
II. Procedural Background
All six tenants sued Gingko Rose, the Darwishes, Logerm LLC, Rosenthal and her law firm (collectively, defendants) fоr malicious prosecution of the unlawful detainer lawsuit. They sought compensatory damages, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the unlawful detainer court's denial of the motion for judgment in Hart and Rodriguez's trial mandated a finding that defendants had probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer lawsuit, thereby dictating dismissal of the malicious prosecution action.
The trial court granted the motion as to Hart and Rodriguez. The court found that the unlawful detainer court had "weighed the evidence and denied
Hart and Rodriguez filed timely notices of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Hart and Rodriguez challenge the trial сourt's dismissal of their malicious prosecution lawsuit through its grant of judgment on the pleadings and its subsequent denial of a new trial. We generally review the grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014)
Our review of these rulings requires us to resolve three specific questions: (1) Did the trial court err in taking judicial notice of the minute orders and transcript in the unlawful detainer lawsuit to evaluate whether and on what basis the unlawful detainer court granted the motion for judgment?; (2) Does the rule equating certain actions in a prior lawsuit in favor of the prior plaintiff-namely, a summary judgment ruling, a nоnsuit ruling following the presentation of evidence, or a verdict-with a finding that the prior plaintiff had probable cause to prosecute the prior lawsuit apply to the denial of a motion for judgment under section 631.8 ?; and (3) Is there any impediment to applying this rule to the denial of the section 631.8 motion in this case, either (a) because the denial was procured by fraud, or (b) because this court, in affirming the denial of defendants' anti-SLAPP
We review the first question for an abuse of discretion (CREED-21 v. City of San Diego (2015)
I. Judicial Notice
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer. (Harris , supra ,
As a general matter, courts may takе judicial notice of the "[r]ecords of ... any court of this state" (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) ), although their ability to do so may be limited by the hearsay rule. (North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2007)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the unlawful detainer court's denial of Hart and Rodriguez's section 631.8 motion and the basis for that denial. Those facts were contained in the unlawful detainer court's minute orders and in its statements from the bench as reflected in the reporter's transcript; the minute orders and transcripts are "records" of a "court of this state." (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) ; Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015)
Hart and Rodriguez raise two challenges to this analysis. First, they urge that judicial notice is inappropriate because the unlawful detainer court's ruling on the section 631.8 motion is set forth in a court document with the caption "Trial Minutes" rather than the caption "Minute Order." However, the document correctly reports what happened, as verified by the transcripts. Because the document is "a trustworthy сhronicle of events" that "accurately and officially reflects the work of the court," it is a "record" of "a court of this state" and is properly subject to judicial notice. (Smith v. Smith (1952)
Second, Hart and Rodriguez point out that the hearsay rule generally precludes a court from taking judicial notice of the truth of statements contained in a court file, including the truth of a prior court's factual findings. (Vicks , supra ,
II. Interim Adverse Judgment Rule
To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a person must demonstrate that its adversary initiated a prior action (1) that was terminated in the person's favor, (2) that the adversary brought the prior action "without probable cause," and (3) that the adversary did so with "malice." (Siebel v. Mittlesteadt (2007)
In assessing whether a prior lawsuit was legally tenable, even when it wаs ultimately terminated in favor of the person who is later suing for malicious prosecution, courts have looked to what happened in the proceeding prior to its termination. Courts have developed a rule deeming certain events in the earlier proceeding to be
Among these evеnts are (1) a ruling denying the prior defendant's summary judgment motion (Wilson , supra ,
This proof is conclusive as long as the prior verdict or ruling was "on the merits" (rather than on "procedural or techniсal grounds") and was not induced "by the knowing use of false and perjured testimony." (Wilson , supra ,
Does the interim adverse judgment rule apply-and thus, in the absence of fraud, conclusively establish that a prior lawsuit was legally tenable-when a prior court denies, on the merits, the prior defendant's motion for judgment under section 631.8 ? We conclude that it does. A motion for judgment is to be granted if thе court concludes, after "weighing the evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case," that "the plaintiff has failed to sustain the
Hart and Rodriguez do not contest the applicability of the interim adverse judgment rule to the denial of section 631.8 motions generally, but argue that it is inapplicable in this case because the unlawful detainer court never denied their section 631.8 motion on its merits. They raise two arguments.
First, they assert that the unlawful detainer court never said its ruling was based on any weighing of the evidencе. This argument lacks merit because the record shows that the court expressly noted its power to "weigh the
Second, Hart and Rodriguez suggest that the unlawful detainer court never denied their section 631.8 motion; instead, they argue, the court effectively granted their motion when it took part of it under submission until the close of all evidence and then issued a stаtement of decision in their favor. We reject this argument. The argument requires us to ignore what the unlawful detainer court said it was doing-that is, denying part of the motion prior to Hart and Rodriguez's presentation of evidence and denying the remainder at the close of all evidence. It also requires us to ignorе the law, which provides that a court's ruling on a motion for judgment encompasses only the evidence presented at the time the motion is made , even if the court takes the matter under submission and issues its ruling after the defense has presented additional evidence. (People v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1983)
III. Impediments To Applying Interim Adverse Judgment Rule
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The order denying Hart and Rodriguez's motion for new trial is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their сosts on appeal.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, Acting P.J.
GOODMAN, J.
Notes
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
The so-called anti-SLAPP statute (short for strategic lawsuit against public participation) creates a procedural mechanism for quickly disposing of meritless claims based on а person's "valid exercise of constitutional rights." (PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009)
At one time, courts also treated a ruling denying an anti-SLAPP motion in the prior lawsuit as proof of the existence of probable cause to prosecute, at least where the denial rested on the trial court's finding that the prior plaintiff was likely to prеvail on its claims in the prior lawsuit. (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 821-822,
See footnote *, ante.
Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.