109 Iowa 631 | Iowa | 1899
A street railway of the defendant is laid through a considerable portion of First avenue, in the city of Oedar Rapids. The avenue extends from the business part of the city, in a northeasterly direction, and is intersected at right angles by Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and other streets. The portion of the track between the streets specified is used by Central Park and Kenwood Park cars. On the 8th day of December, 1895, the plaintiff, her daughter, Mrs. Watts, and Rev. McCauley were riding’ in a carriage drawn by two horses, driven by 0. F. Shurtliff. The team was being driven in a northeasterly direction otn First avenue south of the street railway. At about the time the team reached Fifteenth street, a Central Park oar passed, going in a northeasterly direction. The team was then turning to cross the railway, and when the carriage was on it a Kenwood Park car, approaching from the southwest, struck it, and Mrs. Hart and Mrs. Watts received serious injuries. Mrs. Watts assigned her claim for damages which accrued from the injuries thus received to the plaintiff, and she seeks to recover for the injuries received by both.
The defendant is alleged to have been negligent (1) in not giving notice of the approach of the Kenwood car by means of the proper signals; (2) in running the car at a high and dangerous rate of speed; (3) in running the car at a rate of speed exceeding six miles an hour, in violation of the ordi
I. The plaintiff was permitted to introduce in evidence a rule of the defendant of which the following is a copy. “Rule 25. Sounding Gongs. The ringing of the gong is a
II. The defendant contends that the court erroneously submitted to the jury allegations of negligence in regard to which there was no evidence, as follows: (2) In running the
III. The defendant complains of the fourth paragraph of the charge, which is as followa: “The basis of this action is ‘negligence,’ which is defined by the law to be the omitting to do something that a reasonably prudent person would do, or the doing of something that such person would not do. Under the circumstances of this case, and as applied to this case, if you find from the evidence that the defendant, by its employes, has omitted to do something that a reasonably prudent person would do, or has done something that such
IY. The defendant complains of the fifth paragraph of the charge to- the jury on several grounds. The paragraph is as follows: “If you find from the evidence that- the employes of the defendant, operating the car which caused the injury, were running .said car too near to the Central Park Car ’for safety, and in an unusual
V. The defendant complains of certain rulings of the superior court on the admission of evidence, and of its refusal to give certain instructions to the jury which were asked. We do not find any error in any of these matters to which our attention has been directed.
It is said a verdict for the defendant should have been directed. There was not such a lack of evidence to sustain the material averments of the petition as would authorize us to award a new trial om that ground. The most that can be said is that the jury might well have found for the defendant. There is much ground for the claim made by it that the plaintiff, her daughter, and the driver were guilty of contributory negligence. There was nothing to prevent the occupants of the carriage from seeing the approach of the Kenwood car excepting the carriage top and the curtains.