10 N.C. 122 | N.C. | 1824
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of a majority of the Court.
Evidence is of two kinds; that, which if true, directly .proves the fact in issue, and that which proves another fact, from which the fact in issue may be inferred. The rules regarding competency, only apply to the first kind of competency, and relevancy to the second. The Court protects the Jury, both from incompetent and irrelevant evidence: the farther removed the fact to be inferred is, from the fact proven, the less is the probability, for, iu each inference, there may be an error; and the rules of evidence are framed more with a view to exclude falsehood, than to let in the truth. They are said in this particular, not to be unlike the rule of descent in excluding the half blood, which is subsidiary to the grand canon, that none shall succeed to the inheritance but one of the blood of the first purchaser: the subsidiary rule deprives many who are of the blood of the fir st purchaser of the inheritance ; but by a rigid adherence to it, none but one of the blood can succeed. That the fact to be inferred, often accompanies the fact proven, is not sufficient, it should. most usually accompany it; and I would say,'in the absence of all circumstances, that it should rarely otherwise happen. But the strong objection in this case is, that there must be two"infe-rences draw n, to wit; the wife saw and fed the slave, ergo, she knew he was diseased; that the wife knew it, ergo, the husband knew it, being
Lead Opinion
Evidence is of two kinds: that which, if true, directly proves the fact in issue, and that which proves another fact from which the fact in issue may be inferred. The rules regarding competency only apply to the first kind of competency, and relevancy to the second. The court protects the jury both from incompetent and irrelevant evidence. The farther removed the fact to be inferred is from the fact proven the less is the probability, for in each inference there may be an error; and the rules of evidence are framed more with a view to exclude falsehood than to let in the truth. They are said in this particular not to be unlike the rule of descent in excluding the half-blood, which is subsidiary to the grand canon that none shall succeed to the inheritance but one of the blood of the first purchaser. The subsidiary rule deprives many who are of the blood of the first purchaser of the inheritance; but by a rigid adherence to it none but one of the blood can succeed. That the fact to be inferred often accompanies the fact proven is not sufficient; it should most usually accompany it; and I would say, in the absence of all circumstances, that it should rarely otherwise happen. But the strong objection in this case is that there must be two inferences drawn to wit: the wife saw and fed the slave, ergo she knew (124) he was diseased; that the wife knew it, ergo the husband knew it, being informed by her. An error in either inference, which might very well happen, would introduce a falsehood; which, as I have before said, is an object of more solicitude than the exclusion of the truth. The judge, I think, was right in refusing the evidence. The rule for a new trial must be discharged. *67
Dissenting Opinion
dissentiente. — 1 am inclined to think that proof of the wife’s acts, in this respect, ought to have been received in evidence: when received, they are not at'all decisive of the question; but the Jury are at liberty to draw such inferences from them as they may think right and just. One reason given why the wife shall not be a witness for or against the husband, is, that perjury might be committed in suffering a person to give evidence who la-bours under so great a bias; that reason does not hold good in this case.
It appears to me also, to be relevant, for the defence made by the Defendant was, that the Plaintiff was as well acquainted with the slave as the Defendant was. If the Plaintiff was proved to have seen and fed the negro, when run away, and just before ho bought him, it would certainly be proper evidence to be left to the Jury. If the wife was proved to have acted in the same way, although weaker evidence, it appears to me to be evidence of the same character. It is not conclusive, but a circumstance of which the Jury ought properly to judge.
I therefore, think, the rule for a new trial, should be made absolute.