62 Wash. 464 | Wash. | 1911
This is an action to recover money on a check and notes which were lost. The complaint, among other things, alleged that on the 17th day of January, 1908, plaintiff sold to the defendant a certain gasoline traction engine, for a consideration of $2,500, which sum it was agreed should be paid to the plaintiff according to the terms of defendant’s written obligation and contract, a copy of which was made a part of the complaint; that the plaintiff delivered the engine in due time, and that the defendant has since said time had the same in his possession and under his control, and has kept and used said engine for the purpose of plowing and other purposes since the delivery thereof; that on the date of the delivery, the defendant, in settlement therefor and in compliance with the terms and conditions of the written obligation, executed and delivered to the plaintiff a certain written check and promissory notes for a certain amount of money as stated in the complaint, and at the said time, to secure the payment of the same, executed and delivered to plaintiff a certain chattel mortgage in writing, covering the said gasoline engine sold and delivered as aforesaid; that the said papers were delivered to one C. A. Bellinger, the agent of the plaintiff, who placed them in an envelope and put them in his grip or satchel, which was then placed in defendant’s barn, where it was left while said agent went into defendant’s field to assist in properly starting the engine; that upon returning from the field, Bellinger discovered that the check, notes and mortgage were missing from the grip; that the same had not been found up to the hour of the commencement of this action, and that they are lost or stolen, and cannot be found; that the plaintiff had demanded- and requested of the defendant the giving of other notes and checks, upon security to the effect that he would not be held responsible for the notes and check so lost; that this action, in short, was brought to reestablish such lost papers, that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to exercise its option declaring said notes and mortgage due and payable at once, and that it recover the amount due as specified
The defendant, answering generally, denied the allegations of the complaint, and in substance, by way of affirmative defense, alleged that the notes, check and mortgage mentioned in the complaint were delivered conditionally to Bellinger, and were not to be of any force or effect whatever unless the engine did as Bennett, the agent of the respondent, and the appellant agreed it should do before the notes, mortgage and check would be effective; that the engine did not develop the power it was agreed it should before the check, notes and chattel mortgage were to be effective, and that they never did become effective or of any force or value, and that they never were delivered. The second affirmative defense was that another action was pending in the same court between the same parties for the same cause of action, and was still undetermined. The third affirmative defense was a counterclaim or set-off, the defendant claiming that, by breach of the contract upon which the plaintiff sued, he incurred a loss of $150 by reason of the loss of time; that the engine was not worth more than $1,250 at any time, by reason of the insufficiency of its power, and that defendant was damaged thereby in the sum of $1,250; and asked that the same be allowed as a counterclaim to anything that might be recovered in favor of the plaintiff. Thereupon the plaintiff made a motion, requiring the defendant to elect on which one of his defenses he would rely at the trial, on the ground that they were inconsistent. The court made an order granting the motion and requiring the defendant to elect; to which ruling the defendant excepted, and thereupon elected in open court to stand upon its first affirmative defense, which we have mentioned above. The plaintiff filed a reply to this. A jury was demanded by the defendant and refused by the court. The court proceeded to trial of the cause upon the first affirmative defense, and found against the defendant on
From a perusal of these pleadings we are forced to the conclusion that the third affirmative defense is inconsistent with the first affirmative defense. It is doubtless true that, under the letter and the spirit of the code, as announced by the court and cited by appellant, there is no classification of answers or defenses as at the common law; that pleas in abatement and at bar may be joined; and that defendant can, and should, unite all the defenses he has in one answer. But all these privileges are subject to the vital requirement that the defenses must not be inconsistent; that is to say, that the establishment of the truth of one defense must not establish the falsity or impossibility of the other. This question was exhaustively examined and discussed by this court in Seattle Nat. Bank v. Carter, 13 Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331, 48 L. R. A. 177, and after an examination and analysis of all the available authorities, it was held that inconsistent defenses were not permissible under the code; that the plaintiff would not be compelled to establish the truth of an allegation in his complaint to which such defenses were set up, and that defenses were inconsistent when one or the other must necessarily be untrue; and this doctrine has never been departed from by this court.
'It is true that the doctrine should be applied with caution, and that not all seemingly inconsistent defenses are actually inconsistent; for it is sometimes necessary to make a denial which is in reality a denial of a conclusion of law instead of a fact. For instance, there may be a denial of delivery of certain property because, in the opinion of the pleader, the acts surrounding the circumstances do not constitute a legal delivery, and on that question he has a right to the holding of the court. The same rule applies to a denial of the execution of certain contracts, where it develops that the contract which
Upon the second proposition, there is a conflict of authority, but we think it is well established that an action of this kind is an equitable action. It was originally exclusively an equitable action; and notwithstanding the encroachment of "the law courts by statutory enactments, these have not had the effect, under the great weight of authority, of ousting the equity court of jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction is at least concurrent and exclusive in many jurisdictions. In discussing this proposition, it is said in Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 2, § 832:
“Able judges have denied that the equitable jurisdiction extends to suits upon non-negotiable instruments and other unsealed contracts, since an action at law could always be maintained, and no indemnity was necessary. The jurisdiction is sustained, however, by the decided weight of authority in suits upon lost non-negotiable instruments and simple contracts, as well as in suits upon negotiable and sealed instruments. The reason seems to be that the remedy at law is not adequate; a court of equity alone can fully protect the defendant by its decree from all liabilities which may arise.”
In 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), p. 564, after announcing the doctrine that formerly the courts of equity in such cases had exclusive jurisdiction, it is said that:
“Though actions on lost specialties may now be maintained in the courts of common law, equity is not thereby ousted of its ancient jurisdiction, but may still exercise it concurrently with the courts of law.”
In this case it will be noticed that this.action was for the reestablishment of a check, notes and mortgage, and while there was no judgment of foreclosure on the mortgage, and the plaintiff was satisfied to take personal judgment, the defendant was placed in no worse position by reason of the fact that the plaintiff did not ask for all the relief to which he was entitled under the pleadings. Conceding the concurrent juris
The judgment is affirmed.
Parker, Mount, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.