delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases were consolidated for trial in the district court and from adverse judgments plaintiffs in error, to whom we shall refer as plaintiffs, bring the action here for review on writ of error. Identical questions are involved concerning the valuation placed by the assessor of Baca County, Colorado, on the respective elevators owned by plaintiffs.
Both cases involve a contest of the 1952 assessment of general real property taxes against the elevator properties of plaintiffs. Protest was made in each case to the County Assessor under provisions of Chapter 191, S.L. Colo. ’53, which permitted protest of 1952 assessments during the year 1953. The protests were denied by the County Assessor and appeal was taken to the Board of County Commissioners. After hearing before that Board the relief demanded was denied. Thereafter and prior to January 1, 1954, notice of appeal to the district court was filed.
On January 4, 1954, complaints denominated “An Appeal from the Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Baca County, Colorado” were filed in the district court setting forth the proceedings before the Board of County Commissioners; that relief had been
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the appeals for the reason that such appeals were not authorized-by statute. These motions were initially overruled by the trial judge, but on trial of the consolidated actions he held that the court had no power to review the decision of the Board of County Commissioners, and also held that plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proof by showing that the assessment was manifestly fraudulent, erroneous or oppressive.
It is here contended by counsel for plaintiffs that the district court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters involved, and secondly that plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to enable the trial court to make findings of fact “to the effect that the increases were manifestly erroneous or oppressive.”
Under Chapter 191, S.L. Colo. ’53, proceedings were authorized for a redetermination of assessed valuations of property under the broad reappraisal program put into effect by the Colorado Tax Commission. The petition for such redetermination could be presented to the County Assessor and if denied in whole or in part by him, could be appealed.to the Board of County Commissioners. Pursuant thereto plaintiffs filed their petitions for a reappraisal. The Assessor and the Board of County Commissioners denied relief. The actions in the district court followed.
Chapter 191, S.L. Colo. ’53, is specific in its terms.
Plaintiffs proceeded under this Act, which obviously was intended by the General Assembly to give a. property owner an opportunity to demonstrate if possible to the assessor, and, on appeal, to the Board of County Commissioners,- that “his property, or any parcel thereof, has been assessed too high” under the 1952 appraisal.
In Northcutt, et al. v. Burton, County Assessor, et al.
Citizens of Pueblo, Colorado challenged the tax reappraisal made in 1952 in Citizens’ Committee for Fair Property Taxation, et al. v. Warner, et al.
When the General Assembly by the 1953 Act provided an additional method of review of 1952 assessments after the normal time allowed for review had expired, did the Legislature intend that the decision of the Board of County Commissioners should be final? Or stated otherwise, can we spell out of the special 1953 Assembly that the owner of property should have in addition to the special relief afforded, an appeal to the district court for a review of the action of the Board of County Commissioners? We believe that the first of these inquiries must be answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative. Nothing is said in the statute about a review in the district court. The 1953 Act provided that the appeal to the Board of County Commissioners should be determined before September 15, 1953. No further appeal is provided for nor is any further proceeding mentioned in the Act. To sustain the position of counsel for plaintiffs we would have to read something into the special remedial Act of 1953. This, we cannot do. We must, therefore, conclude that the district court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters involved in the consolidated cases.
The remedial act which governed these cases related only to the 1952 assessment. Any protests or objections to subsequent assessments were not covered by the 1953 Act, which by its terms expired in that year.
The judgments are affirmed.
Mr. Justice Clark not participating.
