43 Md. 140 | Md. | 1875
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the order of Court, passed on the application of the parties, all matters of dispute involved in the pending cause, were referred to three named arbitrators, in the usual way, and upon the usual terms. An award was subsequently filed, signed by but two of the arbitrators named in the order of reference, the third dissenting, and filing a separate statement, as to his views of the subject; and one of the arbitrators signing the award, in a subsequent statement, which has been filed in the cause, gives such explanations of his views and understanding of the matter, as to make it doubtful, if his explanations could be received as evidence, whether the award is a fair exponent of his judgment of the matters referred.
But, without deciding any question as to the admissibility of the statements and explanations of either the dissenting or concurring arbitrator, for the purpose of impeaching the award, we think the award fatally defective, and therefore was properly set aside by the Court below.
Apart from all other objections, as the order of reference, that being the only evidence of the submission, did not provide that a less number than the three named referees might make an award that should be binding upon the parties, the authority ■ delegated has not been well exe% cuted. The delegation of such power is for a mere private
In this case, the award having failed by reason of the dissension of the arbitrators, the reference is at an end, unless renewed by agreement of the parties, The Court has no power, unless given by statute, or the agreement of the parties, to appoint new arbitrators ; and oidinarily it has no power to refer the matters back to the same arbitrators, after setting aside their award, unless such power be one of the terms of the submission. Among what are known as the “usual terms” of reference, which should in all cases be reduced to writing and filed in the cause, is a clause stipulating, that in the event of either of the parties disputing the .validity of the award, or moving the Court to set it, or any part of it aside, the Court shall have power to remit the matters referred, or any of them, to the
Under the circumstances, the Court below pursued the only course that it could pursue, and that was to set aside the award, and re-instate the cause. Crawshay vs. Collins, 3 Swanst., 90; Calvert vs. Carter, 18 Md., 106.
Order affirmed.