Harry La Fever v. United States

Jun 28, 1960
12896
Versions:279 F.2d 833
1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 4139
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.

On March 2, 1956, petitioner was convicted by the judgment of the district court upon his plea of guilty to one count in an indictment and three cоunts in an-, other indictment, charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, in that he aided and abetted other named defendants in the commission of an offense under said section, described in his. brief in this, court as the transporting in interstate commerce of certain forged cheeks. He was sentеnced to prison and now remains incarcerated.

On June 26,1957, petitioner filed-in ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, a motion to set aside thе judg-r ment and -sentence imposed upon him. The district court denied the-motion summarily, and on appeal to this court, we reversed аnd remanded the case, LaFever v. United States, 7 Cir., 257 F.2d 271.

On January 12,1959, the district сourt conducted a hearing on remandment. On March 26, 1959, it made findings of fact and conclusions of law, LaFever v. United States, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 553, and again denied petitioner’s motion under § 2255. To review this action, petitioner has appealed.

Petitioner now contends that the district ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍court erred in denying his motion under § 2255. 1

On February 20, 1959, this court, in United States v, Hoyland, 7 Cir., 264 F.2d 346, overruled LaFever v. United States, 7 Cir., 257 F.2d 271.

Petitioner asserts that his motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 tests the validity of his conviction and, in its essentials, presents the “issue whether a Federal court had jurisdiction оver the crime committed where the check cashed beаrs the name of a fictitious person and where no representation ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍is made, when the check is cashed, that the name is that оf a real person.” (Italics supplied.)

We do not believe that following a plea of guilty petitioner is in any position to raise what he calls a question of jurisdiction because of the facts which he now incorporates in his statement of the issue presented. This сourt went into this subject fully in United States v. Hoyland, supra, 264 F.2d 351, 352. After citing United States v. Caufield, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 278, Klein v. United States, 7 Cir., 204 F.2d 513, Keto v. United States, 8 Cir., 189 F.2d 247, Smith v. United States, 10 Cir., 205 F.2d 768, 770, Barnes v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 86, 89, United States v. Jonikas, 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 675, 676 and Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446, 45 S.Ct. 522, 69 L.Ed. 1036, we concluded in Hoyland that every criminal judgment is

“ * * * based upon a charge containing allegations here characterized by dеfendant as jurisdictional facts. Absent such allegations, no Federаl offense could be stated. Where a defendant pleads not guilty, he places upon the government the burden of proving all еssential facts alleged, whether they be characterized аs jurisdictional or otherwise. On the other hand, his voluntary plea of guilty аdmits all essential allegations, thus relieving the government of the burden оf making ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍proof. Defendant’s contention, if tenable, would have rеquired Judge Sullivan, upon defendant’s plea of guilty, to have conduсted an independent inquiry or hearing to determine so-called jurisdictional facts, that is, whether the South Chicago Savings Bank was a membеr of the Federal Reserve System and whether it was insured by the Federаl Deposit Insurance Corporation. The admissions inherent in defеndant’s plea of guilty would not have obviated the necessity for such procedure.
“Defendant's argument, based on his appraisal of jurisdictional allegations, confuses facts essential to bе alleged as elements of the crime with jurisdictional requirements arising as a matter of law. A court which has jurisdiction of the subject mattеr and of the defendant, as did the court in the instant case, has the рower, upon a defendant’s plea of guilty, to enter a judgment unassailable from collateral attack.” [264 F.2d 352.]

For these reasоns the order of the district court is affinned.

Herbert B. Olfson of the Illinois bar hаs diligently represented ‍​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‍petitioner in this court and we commend him fоr his service.

Order affirmed.

Notes

1

. He does not question that the district ctourt’s findings of fact wеre supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing held by it.