Harry L. Weatherford was employed in a GS-14 position as a Deputy Chief of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Radar Approach Control/Air Traffic Control Tower. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted a special evaluation of the Oklahoma City Tower. After a week-long evaluation, the FAA found safety problems throughout the operations of the Oklahoma City Tower, and, as a result thereof, various personnel in the Tower were reassigned, including Weatherford. Specifically, the FAA advised Weatherford that it proposed to reassign him to its Dallas-Fort Worth Control Tower in another GS-14 position, to the end that his reassignment would be without reduction in grade or pay.
Weatherford first objected to the proposed transfer in an FAA administrative grievance proceeding in which the examiner found that the reassignment was not arbitrary or capricious. During the course of this administrative proceeding, Weather-ford separately requested to be transferred to a GS-13 position in Tulsa for “personal reasons and not at the request of the Agency.” Such request was granted in April, 1980, and the proposed reassignment to Dallas-Fort Worth never occurred.
*393 In October, 1981, Weatherford filed the instant proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, seeking reinstatement to the position of Deputy Chief at the Oklahoma City Tower and damages in the sum of $12,000. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 5 U.S.C. § 702 * . Weatherford asserted claims that he had been deprived of both liberty and property interests in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied certain appeal rights under FAA regulations. The district court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action over which the district court had jurisdiction. Weatherford now appeals the judgment dismissing the action.
In dismissing Weatherford’s action, the district court relied on the recent case of
Broadway v. Block,
The central issue in Broadway, as in the instant case, is whether a district court has jurisdiction over a cause of action based on the reassignment of a federal employee to another position where there is no change in grade or pay. In Broadway, an employee of the Farmer’s Home Administration was reassigned from the position as County Office Assistant to the position of County Office Clerk. The reassignment did not involve any change in grade or pay, the employee at all times retaining her classification as a GS-4 clerk typist. Without attempting to exhaust any administrative remedies, she brought suit in federal district court requesting reinstatement to her former position and damages in the sum of $15,000. The reassigned employee alleged that her new position had fewer supervisory functions and benefits than her old job, and that the reassignment cast a stigma of incompetency upon her and caused embarrassment and mental anguish. She further alleged in her complaint that she was not informed of any rights to a grievance procedure or appeal, and that she was not given a hearing before the reassignment. Her claims for relief were grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and on the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Civil Service Reform Act.
In
Broadway,
the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of action on summary judgment. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit “examined each possible basis for judicial relief ... and [found] that under no set of facts has the plaintiff asserted claims cognizable in federal district court.”
In short, like the district court, we believe the present case to be almost a carbon copy of the
Broadway
case. We see no reason to repeat here that which, in our opinion, is well said in
Broadway.
It is sufficient to simply state that we approve of both the reasoning and result of
Broadway,
as have several other circuits which have considered similar claims based on minor personnel decisions.
See, e.g., Pinar v. Dole,
Some fifty-six days after the district court entered its judgment of dismissal, plaintiff in the instant case filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. We find no error in this regard. Appellee argues that this was a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59; and hence, had to be filed within ten days after judgment, which it was not. Appellant argues that this was a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, and therefore timely filed. It would appear to us that in reality this is not a motion based on newly discovered evidence and therefore within the purview of Rule 60(b). Regardless, we see no merit in the motion. In this regard, there is apparently some dispute as to just what administrative rules and regulations were in effect when Weatherford’s reassignment was proposed to the end that his reassignment might be considered “adverse action” and therefore subject to administrative review through the Merit System Protection Board. We fail to see how such would confer jurisdiction in the district court to Weatherford’s cause of action as set out in his complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
In this Court, counsel, in his brief, appears to rely principally upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for conferring jurisdiction on the district court.