Case Information
*1 Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY SABRINA HARROLD, Plaintiff Civil Action No. 19-9566 V. OPINION CITY OF JERSEY CITY, et aL, Defendants. John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff SabHna Harrold sues Defendants City of Jersey City (“Jersey City”), Mark Bunbury, Scott Carbone, Mark Albiez, and Stacey Flanagan (“Individual Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. D.E. 1. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. D.E. 7. The Court reviewed the parties’ submissions’ and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1 (1,). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. ‘Defendants’ brief in support of their motion will be referred to as “Defs.’ Br.” (D.E. 7); PlaintifFs opposition will be referred to as “Pl.’s Opp.” (D.E. 8); Defendants’ reply will be referred to as “Defs.’ Reply” (D.E. 11).
I.
*2 BACKGROUND2
Since 2014, Plaintiff served as the Assistant Department Director of the Department of Recreation (the “Department”) for Jersey City. Compl. at 3, ¶ i. In September 2015, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer and took medical leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Id. at 3, ¶ 2. While on leave, Plaintiff was informed that other Department employees attempted to access her locked office. Id. In February 2016, the Department’s Director, Kevin Williamson (“Williamson”), informed Plaintiff that she was no longer Assistant Director. Id. at 4, ¶ 3. Plaintiff claims she was “demoted and placed into a non-essential function.” Id. In May Id. at 4, ¶ 5. Plaintiff 2017, surveillance cameras were installed outside of Plaintiffs office. complained about the cameras to a coworker. Id. Director Williamson and Defendant Bunbury4 disciplined Plaintiff regarding her comments about the surveillance cameras. Id. at 4, ¶ 6.
In or about January 2018, Arthur Williams (“Williams”)5 became the new Director of the [2] The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs Complaint, D.E. 1. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, a district court may consider “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” as well as “an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are based on the document.” Pension Ben. Guatt Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff restarts the numbering of her paragraphs at the beginning of each new section in her Complaint. See D.E. 1. As such, the Court cites first to the corresponding page number of the Complaint and then to the paragraph number on that page. “Defendant Bunbury is described as the “HR Director.” Compl. at 4, ¶ 6.
Arthur Williams is not a named defendant in this matter. Plaintiff, however, refers to Arthur Williams as a defendant on at least three occasions throughout the Complaint. See Compi. at 1; id. at 5, ¶ 9; id. at 9, ¶ 3. It also appears that, in connection with her § 1983 claim, Plaintiff references a “Stacey Williams,” perhaps conflating Stacy Flanagan and Arthur Williams. Id. at 10, ¶ 3. That said, should Plaintiff choose to amend her Complaint, she must clearly identifS’ the parties against whom she asserts her claims. *3 Department. Id. at 5, ¶ 9. In February 2018, Williamson, the former Director, informed Plaintiff that the new Director, Williams, planned to transfer her out of the Department. Id. at 5, ¶ 10. In March 2018, Director Williams asked Plaintiff to assist with a payroll audit of the Department. Id. at 5, ¶ 11. Plaintiff and two other employees assisted with the audit, during which Plaintiff discovered that some employees were receiving paychecks to which they were not entitled. Id. at 5-6, ¶J 12-13. Plaintiff reported her findings to Director Williams. Id. at 6, ¶ 13. Based on her initial findings, Director Williams instructed Plaintiff to do a more extensive audit on the Id. at 6, ¶ 14. Plaintiff completed this subsequent audit and again reported her Department. findings to Director Williams. Id. at 6-7, ¶J 15-16. Director Williams informed Plaintiff that he would elevate Plaintiffs findings to the mayor of Jersey City, along with Defendant Albiez6 and Id. at 7, ¶ 16. Director Williams also met with other members in Jersey City’s government. Defendants Carbone and Bunbuiy to discuss Plaintiffs findings, but Defendants Carbone and Bunbury “appeared to be more concerned about Plaintiffs qualifications to conduct a[n] audit than Plaintiffs findings,” Id. at 7, ¶ 18.
On or about April 6, 2018, an article was published in a local news outlet regarding the Department’s alleged misappropriation of ffinds. Id. at 8, ¶ 19. Later that day, Director Williams informed Plaintiff that he had received a text message from the mayor “threatening [Director Williams’] job and threatening to conduct an investigation” into the Department to uncover who “was responsible for leaking the information” to the press. Id. On or about April 11, 2018, a second article appeared on social media regarding the Department’s alleged misappropriation of Id. at 8, ¶ 20. Later that day, Defendant Bunbury informed Plaintiff that she was being finds. transferred to a different department. Id. Plaintiff claims that her transfer “was done in retaliation [6] Defendant Albiez is described as the “Chef [sic] of Staff.” Id. at 7, ¶ 16. *4 for Plaintiffs discovery and reporting of the misappropriation of finds” in the Department. Id. at 8,J2l.
On or about April 16, 2018, Defendant Flanagan requested Plaintiffs “private medical FMLA information” from the payroll department and allegedly “conducted an examination of Plaintiffs medical information.” Id. at 8-9, ¶ 22. Defendant Flanagan allegedly told another employee that she “was going to take care of Plaintiff and get rid of Plaintiff when Plaintiff returned to work.” Id. at 9, ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges that “since [her] whistleblowing activities,” Plaintiff has “had her duties stripped, []her office taken from her and placed in confined quarters, [and] been accused of faking illnesses[.]” Id. at 9, ¶ 24.
On April Ii, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, alleging claims for violations of: (1) New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1, et seq.; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3)42 U.S.C. § 1985. D.E. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(6). D.E. 7. Plaintiff filed opposition, D.E. 8, to which Defendants replied. D.E. 11.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
H.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I 2(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a count for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Ad. Coiy,. i’. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft i’. Iqbat, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawflilly.” *5 C onn e ll y v. L a n e C’onsL C o r p ., 809 F . 3d 780 , 786 ( 3d C i r . 2016 ) ( i n t e r n a l quo t a ti on s a nd c it a ti on s o m itt e d ) . A s a r e s u lt , a p l a i n ti ff m u s t “a ll e g e s u ff i c i e n t f ac t s t o r a i s e a r ea s on a b l e e xp ec t a ti on t h a t d i s c ov e r y w ill un c ov e r p r oo f o f h e r c l a i m s . ” Id. a t 789 .
In e v a l u a ti ng t h e s u ff i c i e n c y o f a c o m p l a i n t , a d i s t r i c t c ou r t m u s t acce p t a ll f ac t u a l a ll e g a ti on s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t as t r u e a nd d r a w a ll r ea s on a b l e i n f e r e n ce s i n f a vo r o f t h e p l a i n ti ff . P h illi p s i& Ctv. o f A ll e gh e ny , 515 F . 3d 224 , 231 ( 3d C i r . 2008 ) . A c ou r t , ho w e v e r , is “ no t c o m p e ll e d t o acce p t un w a rr a n t e d i n f e r e n ce s , un s uppo r t e d c on c l u s i on s o r l e g a l c on c l u s i on s d i s g u i s e d a s f ac t u a l a l l e g a ti o n s . ” B a r a k a v. M c G r ee v e y , 4 8 1 F . 3 d 1 8 7 , 2 1 1 ( 3 d C i r . 2 0 07 ) . If, a f t e r v i e w i ng t h e a ll e g a ti on s i n t h e c o m p l a i n t m o s t f a vo r a b l e t o t h e p l a i n ti ff , it a pp ea r s t h a t no r e li e f c ou l d b e g r a n t e d und e r a ny s e t o f f ac t s c on s i s t e n t w it h t h e a ll e g a ti on s , a c ou r t m a y d i s m i ss t h e c o m p l a i n t f o r f a il u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m . D e F az i o v. L ea d i ng E dg e R ec ov e r y S o l s ., 2010 W L 5146765 , a t *1 ( D . N . J . D ec . 13, 2010 ) . L A W AND ANA L Y S I S I ll .
P l a i n ti ff b r i ng s t h r ee C oun t s a g a i n s t D e f e nd a n t s : ( 1 ) v i o l a ti on o f C E P A ; ( 2 ) v i o l a ti on o f h e r c on s tit u ti on a l r i gh t s pu r s u a n t t o 42 U . S . C . § 1983 ; a nd ( 3 ) a c on s p i r ac y t o v i o l a t e h e r c on s tit u ti on a l r i gh t s pu r s u a n t t o 42 U . S . C . § 1985 . P l a i n ti ff a pp ea r s t o a ll e g e a ll C oun t s a g a i n s t D e f e nd a n t J e r s e y C it y as w e ll a s t h e I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s .
A. C oun t T w o - § 1983 P l a i n ti ff b r i ng s C oun t T w o pu r s u a n t t o 42 U . S . C . § 1983 . S p ec i f i ca ll y , P l a i n ti ff a ll e g e s
t h a t D e f e nd a n t s v i o l a t e d h e r (I) du e p r o ce s s r i gh t s und e r t h e F i f t h a nd F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t s ,
D
*6 a nd ( 2 ) fr ee s p eec h a nd a ss o c i a ti on r i gh t s und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t . 7 C o m p i . a t 10, ¶JJ 1-4. S ec ti on 1983 , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , p r ov i d e s a s f o ll o w s :
E v e r y p e r s on w ho , und e r c o l o r o f a ny s t a t u t e , o r d i n a n ce , r e gu l a ti on , c u s t o m , o r u s a g e , o f a ny S t a t e o r T e rr it o r y .. . s ub j ec t s , o r ca u s e s t o b e s ub j ec t e d , a ny c iti ze n o f t h e U n it e d S t a t e s o r o t h e r p e r s on w it h i n t h e j u r i s d i c ti on t h e r e o f t o t h e d e p r i v a ti on o f a ny r i gh t s , p r i v il e g e s , o r i mm un iti e s s ec u r e d by t h e C on s tit u ti on a nd l a w s , s h a ll b e li a b l e t o t h e p a r t y i n j u r e d i n a n ac ti on a t l a w , s u it i n e qu it y , o r o t h e r p r op e r p r o cee d i ng f o r r e d r e ss [ . ]
S ec ti on 1983 do e s no t p r ov i d e s ub s t a n ti v e r i gh t s ; r a t h e r , it p r ov i d e s a v e h i c l e f o r v i nd i ca ti ng v i o l a t i o n s o f o t h e r f e d e r a l r i g h t s . G r a h a m v C ’ on n o r , 4 9 0 U . S . 3 8 6 , 3 9 3 - 9 4 ( 1 9 89 ) . In o r d e r t o s t a t e a c l a i m und e r § 1983 , a p l a i n ti ff m u s t d e m on s t r a t e t h a t “ U ) a p e r s on d e p r i v e d [ h e r] o f a f e d e r a l r i gh t; a nd ( 2 ) t h e p e r s on w ho d e p r i v e d [ h e r] o f t h a t r i gh t ac t e d und e r c o l o r o f s t a t e o r t e rr it o r i a l l a w . ” B u r t v . C F G H ea lt h S y s ., N o . 15 - 2279 , 2015 W L 1646849 , a t *2 ( D . N . J . A p r . 14, 2015 ) .
1. § 1983 C l a i m s A g a i n s t J e r s e y C it y P l a i n ti ff a ll e g e s C oun t T w o a g a i n s t D e f e nd a n t J e r s e y C it y und e r t h e do c t r i n e o f r e s pond ea t
s up e r i o r . C o m p i . a t 10, ¶ 3. D e f e nd a n t s a r gu e t h a t P l a i n ti ff s c l a i m s und e r C oun t T w o a r e M on e ll c l a i m s 8 t h a t s hou l d b e d i s m i ss e d b eca u s e P l a i n ti ff f a il s to i d e n ti & a m un i c i p a l po li c y o r c u s t o m t h a t l e d to P l a i n ti ff s i n j u r i e s . D e f s . ’ B r . a t 14.
T h e C ou r t no t e s , as do D e f e nd a n t s , t h a t P l a i n ti ff s oppo s iti on do e s no t a dd r e s s h e r § 1983 c l a i m s i n s o f a r as t h e y r e l a t e t o v i o l a ti on s o f h e r r i gh t t o du e p r o ce s s und e r t h e F i f t h a nd F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t s o r h e r r i gh t t o a ss o c i a ti on und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t . R a t h e r , it a pp ea r s t h a t P l a i n ti ff on l y a dd r e s s e s h e r F i r s t A m e nd m e n t r e t a li a ti on c l a i m .
In M on e ll v. D e p ‘t S o c . S e n ’ s . o f C it y o f N. Y., “ t h e S up r e m e C ou r t e s t a b li s h e d t h a t m un i c i p a liti e s a nd o t h e r gov e r n m e n t e n titi e s w e r e ‘ p e r s on s ’ s ub j ec t to li a b ilit y und e r 42 U . S . C . § 1983 . ” N ob l e i& C it y o f C a m d e n , 112 F. S upp . 3d 208 , 221 ( D . N . J . 2015 ) ( c i f i ng M on e ll , 436 U . S . 658 , 690 - 92 ( 1978 )) .
*7 While a municipality may be liable under § 1983, it cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. See Thomas v. cwnberland (‘ouizo’, 749 F.3d 217,222 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). Rather, “[a] municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff identifies a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury.” Jewel! 1’. Ridley Twp., 497 F. App’x 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “In other words, the plaintiff must show that the municipality, through one of its policymakers, affirmatively proclaimed the policy, or acquiesced in the widespread custom, that caused the violation.” Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 221 (D.N.J. 2015) (internal citation omitted). “A plaintiff may show the existence of a policy when a decision-maker with final authority issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Id. A “[c]ustom may be established by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Additionally, a plaintiff must show that the unlawful policy or custom was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. In that regard, the United States Supreme Court has observed the following:
As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, [1 it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate the municipality was the that, through its deliberate conduct, ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
Bd. of CEy. Comm rs of Btyan Cry., OkL v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); see also Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007); Bielevicz i’. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).
*8 H e r e , P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m a g a i n s t J e r s e y C it y i s p r e m i s e d on t h e ac t s o f it s e m p l oy ee s und e r t h e t h e o r y o f r e s pond ea t s up e r i o r . C o m p l . a t 10 , ¶ 3 . A s no t e d . r e s pond ea t s up e r i o r no t a p e r m i ss i b l e b a s i s f o r a § 1983 c l a i m a g a i n s t a m un i c i p a lit y . S ee T ho m a s , 749 F . 3d a t 222 . R a t h e r , P l a i n ti ff m u s t d e m on s t r a t e t h a t t h e a ll e g e d d e p r i v a ti on o f h e r f e d e r a l r i gh t s w a s t h e r e s u lt o f a m un i c i p a l po li c y o r c u s t o m . I d . P l a i n ti ff , ho w e v e r , f a il s t o p l a u s i b l y a ll e g e a ny po li c y o r c u s t o m t h a t d e p r i v e d P l a i n ti ff o f a ny f e d e r a l r i gh t . I n s t ea d . P l a i n ti ff a ll e g e s i n c on c l u s o z y f a s h i on t h a t h e r a ll e g e d c on s tit u ti on a l v i o l a ti on s “ w e r e m a d e by a n o ff i c i a l d ec i s i on o r d ec i s i on s m a d e . . . by on e
. t o m a k e s u c h d ec i s i o n s ” o n b e h a l f o f J e r s e y C it y . o r m o r e i n d i v i du a l s v e s t e d w i t h a u t ho r i t y . . C o m p l . a t 10 , ¶ 2 . S u c h a ll e g a ti on s a r e i n s u ff i c i e n t . S ee , e . g .. P un ’ i s v . Q ti ’ o f N e w a r k , N o . 16 - 1830 , 2017 W L 1032991 , a t *3 ( D . N . J . M a r . 16 , 2017 ) ( d i s m i ss i ng c l a i m a g a i n s t c it y b eca u s e p l a i n ti ff f a il e d t o p l a u s i b l y p l ea d f ac t s d e m on s t r a ti ng a po li c y o r c u s t o m ) ; B e n j a m i n v . E . O r a ng e P o li ce D e p ’ t , 937 F . S upp . 2d 582 , 596 ( D . N . J . 2013 ) ( s a m e ) .
I n h e r oppo s iti on , P l a i n ti ff a r gu e s t h a t “ [ e ] v e n a s i ng l e d ec i s i on m a d e by a ‘f i n a l po li c y . ca n c on s tit u t e a ‘ po li c y ’ und e r S ec ti on 1983 . ” P l . ’ s O pp . a t 13 ( c iti ng m a k i ng a u t ho r it y ’ . . P e m b a u r v . C it y o f C i n c i nn a ti , 475 U . S . 469 , 483 ( 1986 )) . P l a i n ti ff i s c o rr ec t t h a t , “ [ u j nd e r a pp r op r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n ce s , [] a s i ng l e ac t o r d ec i s i on by a m un i c i p a l po li c y m a l ce r ca n i m pu t e li a b ilit y t o t h e m un i c i p a lit y . ” M a j e r v . T o w n s h i p o f L ong B eac h , N o . 06 - 2919 , 2009 W L 3208419 , a t [*] 17 ( D . N J . S e p t . 30 , 2009 ) ( quo ti ng S t o m e l v . C ’ it y o f ca m d e n , 927 A . 2d 129 , 134 ( N . J . 2007 )) . A s e xp l a i n e d by t h e S up r e m e C ou r t , ho w e v e r :
[ N j o t e v e r y d ec i s i on by m un i c i p a l o ff i ce r s a u t o m a ti ca ll y s ub j ec t s t h e m un i c i p a lit y t o § 1983 li a b ilit y . M un i c i p a l li a b ilit y a tt ac h e s on l y w h e r e t h e d ec i s i on m a k e r po ss e ss e s f i n a l a u t ho r it y t o e s t a b li s h m un i c i p a l po li c y w it h r e s p ec t t o t h e ac ti on o r d e r e d . T h e f ac t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r o ff i c i a l — e v e n a p o l i c y m a k i n g o ff i c i a l — h a s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f p a r ti c u l a r f un c ti on s do e s no t , w it hou t m o r e , g i v e r i s e t o m un i c i p a l li a b ilit y b a s e d on a n e x e r c i s e o f t h a t d i s c r e ti on . T h e o ff i c i a l m u s t a l s o b e r e s pon s i b l e f o r e s t a b li s h i ng f i n a l gov e r n m e n t *9 po li c y r e s p ec ti ng s u c h ac ti v it y b e f o r e t h e m un i c i p a lit y ca n b e h e l d li a b l e .
P e m b a u r , 475 U . S . a t 481 - 83 ( i n t e r n a l c it a ti on s a nd f oo t no t e s o m itt e d ) . H e r e , P l a i n ti ff f a il s to a ll e g e s u ff i c i e n t f ac t s fr o m w h i c h t h e C ou r t c ou l d r ea s on a b l y i n f e r t h a t a ny o f t h e I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s h a d s u c h a u t ho r it y t o b e d ee m e d a “ d ec i s i on m a k e r po ss e ss [ i ng ] f i n a l a u t ho r it y t o e s t a b li s h m un i c i p a l po li c y w it h r e s p ec t t o [ a ny ] ac ti on ” c o m p l a i n e d o f by P l a i n ti ff I d . a t 481 . A cc o r d i ng l y , P l a i n ti ff h a s no t s u ff i c i e n tl y p l e d a M on e ll c l a i m as to a ny o f h e r a ll e g e d c on s tit u ti on a l d e p r i v a ti on s , a nd t h e r e f o r e , t h e C ou r t d i s m i ss e s C oun t T w o a g a i n s t D e f e nd a n t J e r s e y C it y .
2 . § 1983 C l a i m s A g a i n s t I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s A s a n i n iti a l m a tt e r , P l a i n ti ff do e s no t i nd i ca t e w h e t h e r s h e is s u i ng t h e I nd i v i du a l
D e f e nd a n t s i n t h e i r o ff i c i a l ca p ac iti e s , p e r s on a l ca p ac iti e s , o r bo t h . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t P l a i n ti ff i s s u i ng t h e I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s i n t h e i r o ff i c i a l ca p ac iti e s , t h e C ou r t d i s m i ss e s P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s a s b e i ng dup li ca ti v e o f P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m a g a i n s t m un i c i p a l D e f e nd a n t J e r s e y C it y . S ee R od r i gu ez v. C it y o f C a m d e n , N o . 09 - 1909 , 2011 W L 345918 , a t *5 ( D . N . J . F e b . 2 , 2011 ) ( “ A s u it a g a i n s t a gov e r n m e n t o ff i c i a l i n h i s o r h e r o ff i c i a l ca p ac it y is s ynony m ou s w it h a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e gov e r n m e n t e n tit y t h a t e m p l oy s h i m o r h e r . C l a i m s a ss e r t e d a g a i n s t bo t h a go v e r n m e n t e n t it y a nd t h e e n t it y ’ s a g e n t s i n t h e i r o ff i c i a l ca p ac it y w a rr a n t d i s m i ss a l o f t h e r e dund a n t o ff i c i a l - ca p ac it y s u it s . ” ) ( quo ti ng D u ll v. W. M a n c h e s t e r Tp. P o li ce D e p t ., N o 07 - 0307 , 2008 W L 717836 , a t *7 ( M . D . P a . M a r . 17, 2008 )) . F o r t h e s a k e o f c o m p l e t e n e s s , ho w e v e r , t h e C ou r t c on s t r u e s P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e I nd i v i du a l D e f e nd a n t s i n t h e i r p e r s on a l ca p ac iti e s , a nd a dd r e s s e s t ho s e c l a i m s i n t u r n .
*10 a. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments — Due Process Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for violation of her due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Compi. at 10, ¶ 2. From the outset, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim insofar as it concerns the Fifth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment is applicable only to federal officials, not municipal officials such as the Individual Defendants. See Bergdoll v. City o f York, 515 F. App’x 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the “Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials” and not to state or local officials) (citing Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983)). As such, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim for violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment is dismissed with prejudice.
With respect to Plaintiffs claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff does not allege — much less adequately explain — how she suffered any deprivation o f due process. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even indicate whether she is asserting violations of procedural or substantive due process. See Compl. at 10, ¶ 2. Nonetheless, the Court will address both possible components. To state a claim that she was denied procedural due process, Plaintiff must allege that ‘ ii ) [she was] deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures afforded [her] did not constitute ‘due process of l a w . ” Houston v. Twp. o f Randolph, 934 F. Supp. 2d 711, 733 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Borough o f Kutztown, 455 F.3d 255, 234 (3d Cir. 2006)). Thus, the first step is to “determine whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property.” Id. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. [She] must have more than
[She] must, instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” a unilateral expectation of it. Baraka, 481 F.3d at 205.
*11 H e r e , t h e C o m p l a i n t do e s no t i d e n ti & a ny i nd i v i du a l i n t e r e s t upon w h i c h P l a i n ti ff b a s e s h e r p r o ce du r a l du e p r o ce ss c l a i m . P l a i n ti ff s oppo s iti on , m o r e ov e r , f a il s t o a dd r e ss P l a i n ti ff s p r o ce du r a l du e p r o ce ss c l a i m , m u c h l e ss e xp l a i n h e r b a s i s f o r it . R a t h e r , t h e C o m p l a i n t m e r e l y . t o D u e P r o ce ss und e r a ss e r t s i n c on c l u s o r y f a s h i on t h a t “ [ D ] e f e nd a n t s v i o l a t e d P l a i n ti ff s r i gh t s . . t h e [ J F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t [ . ] ” C o m p l . a t 10 , ¶ 2 . S u c h c on c l u s o r y s t a t e m e n t s a r e i n s u ff i c i e n t . A s s u c h , P l a i n ti ff s p r o ce du r a l du e p r o ce ss c l a i m und e r t h e F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t i s d i s m i ss e d .
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t P l a i n ti ff a ss e r t s a s ub s t a n ti v e du e p r o ce ss c l a i m und e r t h e F ou r t ee n t h A m e n d m e n t , h e r c l a i m f a i l s f o r s i m i l a r r ea s o n s . “ S ub s t a n ti v e d u e p r o ce ss i s a d o c t r i n e r e s e r v e d f o r e g r e g i ou s o ff i c i a l c ondu c t t h a t t r e n c h e s upon t h e m o s t f und a m e n t a l o f c i v il li b e r ti e s . ” A r m b r u s t e r v . C ’ a v a n a ugh , 410 F . A pp ’ x 564 , 567 ( 3d C i r . 2011 ) . A cc o r d i ng l y , “ liti g a n t s f ace s ub s t a n ti a l bu r d e n s t o s ho w v i o l a ti on s o f s ub s t a n ti v e du e p r o ce ss . ” C h il d r e ss v. C it y o f O r a ng e T o w n s h i p , N o . 14 - 4354 , 2018 W L 1378722 , a t *13 ( D . N . J . M a r . 19 , 2018 ) . F o r a s ub s t a n ti v e du e p r o ce ss c l a i m c h a ll e ng i ng t h e v a li d it y o f non - l e g i s l a ti v e s t a t e ac ti on , a p l a i n ti ff m u s t f i r s t e s t a b li s h t h a t s h e h a s a p r o t ec t e d , f und a m e n t a l p r op e r t y i n t e r e s t . N i c ho l a s v . P e nn . S t a t e U n i v ., 227 F . 3d 133 , 139 - 42 ( 3d C i r . 2000 ) . A s no t e d , P l a i n ti ff f a il s t o i d e n tit S ’ a ny s u c h p r op e r t y i n t e r e s t , m u c h l e ss a f und a m e n t a l on e . A cc o r d i ng l y , P l a i n ti ff s s ub s t a n ti v e du e p r o ce ss c l a i m und e r t h e F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t i s a l s o d i s m i ss e d .
I n s u m , P l a i n ti ff h a s no t s u ff i c i e n tl y p l e d a ny v i o l a ti on o f du e p r o ce s s , a nd t h e r e f o r e , P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m i s d i s m i ss e d i n s o f a r a s it i s p r e m i s e d on du e p r o ce s s v i o l a ti on s und e r t h e F i f t h a nd F ou r t ee n t h A m e nd m e n t s .
Li. F i r s t A m e nd m e n t - F r ee S p eec h R e t a li a ti on P l a i n t i ff n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t D e f e n d a n t s v i o l a t e d h e r r i g h t t o fr e e d o m o f s p e ec h u n d e r t h e F i r s t
A m e nd m e n t . C o m p l . a t 10 , ¶ 2 . P l a i n ti ff s c l a i m i s p r e m i s e d on t h e t h e o r y t h a t D e f e nd a n t s *12 r e t a li a t e d a g a i n s t h e r f o r r e po r ti ng t h e f i nd i ng s o f t h e a ud it to h e r s up e r v i s o r . 9 i d . a t 8, ¶ 21 ( a ll e g i ng t h a t P l a i n ti ff s “ t r a n s f e r w a s don e i n r e t a li a ti on f o r P l a i n ti ff s d i s c ov e r y a nd r e po r ti ng o f t h e m i s a pp r op r i a ti on o f f und s i n t h e [] D e p a r t m e n t ” ) ; s ee a l s o P l . ’ s O pp . a t 12 ( e xp l a i n i ng t h a t D e f e nd a n t s ’ a ll e g e d r e t a li a t o r y ac ti on w a s t a k e n “a f t e r P l a i n ti ff s r e po r t o f fr a udu l e n t c ondu c t w h i c h w a s a m a tt e r o f pub li c c on ce r n ” ) .
T o b r i ng a F i r s t A m e nd m e n t r e t a li a ti on c l a i m und e r § 1983 , P l a i n ti ff “ m u s t s ho w (I) t h a t [ s h e ] e ng a g e d i n a p r o t ec t e d ac ti v it y , ( 2 ) t h a t d e f e nd a n t s ’ r e t a li a t o r y ac ti on w a s s u ff i c i e n t t o d e t e r a p e r s o n o f o r d i n a r y f i r m n e ss f r o m e x e r c i s i n g [1 h e r r i g h t s , a n d ( 3 ) t h a t t h e r e w a s a ca u s a l c onn ec ti on b e t w ee n t h e p r o t ec t e d ac ti v it y a nd t h e r e t a li a t o r y ac ti on . ” L a u r e n W c x r e t J ea n W v. D e F l a m i n i s , 480 F . 3d 259 , 267 ( 3d C i r . 2007 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , “ t o e s t a b li s h t h e r e qu i r e d ca u s a l c onn ec ti on , a p l a i n ti ff u s u a ll y m u s t p r ov e e it h e r ( 1 ) a n unu s u a ll y s ugg e s ti v e t e m po r a l p r ox i m it y b e t w ee n t h e p r o t ec t e d ac ti v it y a nd t h e a ll e g e d l y r e t a li a t o r y ac ti on , o r ( 2 ) a p a tt e r n o f a n t a gon i s m c oup l e d w it h ti m i ng t o e s t a b li s h a ca u s a l li nk . ” R i nk i’. N e . E du c . I n t e r m e d i a t e U n it 19 , 717 F. A pp ’ x 126 , 133 ( 3d C i r . 2017 ) ( c iti ng L a u r e n I i ., 480 F . 3d a t 267 ) .
R e g a r d i ng t h e r e qu i r e m e n t t h a t t h e s p eec h b e p r o t ec t e d , t h e S up r e m e C ou r t h a s ca u ti on e d t h a t “ [ w ] h e n a pub li c e m p l oy ee s u e s a gov e r m n e n t e m p l oy e r und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t ’ s S p eec h C l a u s e , t h e e m p l oy ee m u s t s ho w t h a t h e o r s h e s pok e as a c iti ze n on a m a tt e r o f pub li c c on ce r n . ” B o r ough o f D u r v ea , P a . i’. G u a r n i e r i , 564 U . S . 379 , 386 ( 2011 ) ( c it a ti on o m itt e d ) . T h i s i s a qu e s ti on o f l a w . M ill e r v. C li n t on ‘ oun G ’ , 544 F . 3d 542 , 548 ( 3d C i r . 2008 ) . “ If an e m p l oy ee do e s no t s p ea k as a c iti ze n , o r do e s no t a dd r e s s a m a tt e r o f pub li c c on ce r n , a f e d e r a l c ou r t is no t t h e a pp r op r i a t e f o r u m i n w h i c h t o r e v i e w t h e w i s do m o f a p e r s onn e l d ec i s i on t a k e n by a pub li c
P l a i n ti ff b r i e f l y m e n ti on s t w o n e w s a r ti c l e s r e g a r d i ng t h e D e p a r t m e n t ’ s a ll e g e d m i s a pp r op r i a ti on , bu t s h e do e s no t c onn ec t h e r s e l f i n a n y w a y t o t h e a r ti c l e s . S ee C o m p l . a t 8, ¶11 19 - 20 . A cc o r d i ng l y , t h e a r ti c l e s ca nno t s e r v e a s t h e f ac t u a l b a s i s f o r h e r r e t a li a ti on c l a i m . *13 agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.” Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 386 (internal
Importantly, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their quotation omitted). official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti .. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421(2006).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the protected speech in which she engaged was her reporting to Director Williams the results of her audit, i.e. the suspected misappropriation of public ifinds. See Compl. at 7-8, ¶ 16-21. However, Plaintiff was specifically instructed by Director Williams to It follows that Plaintiffs perform the audit that uncovered the misappropriation. Id. at 5, ¶ 11. reporting of the audit’s findings to Director Williams was an act taken pursuant to her official duty. In other words, Plaintiff’s reporting was speech taken “pursuant to [Plaintiff’s] official duties,” meaning that Plaintiff was “not speaking as [a] citizen[] for First Amendment purposes[.]” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; see also Morris v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 487 F. App’x 37, 40 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal of plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim where plaintiff to his duties, noting that “because [plaintiff] reported suspected embezzlement pursuant complained to his superiors [] about matters arising in the scope o f his employment duties, his speech did not have a ‘relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.”) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs speech is not covered by the First Amendment, and therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs § 1983 claim premised on retaliation under the First Amendment.
c. First Amendment - Right to Association Plaintiff also brings a § 1983 claim for violation of her right to associate under the First
Amendment. Compl. at 10, ¶ 2. “The Supreme Court has long recognized that implicit in the tight *14 t o e ng a g e i n ac ti v iti e s p r o t ec t e d by t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t i s a r i gh t t o ‘ a ss o c i a t e w it h o t h e r s i n pu r s u it o f a w i d e v a r i e t y o f po liti ca l , s o c i a l , ec ono m i c , e du ca ti on a l , r e li g i ou s , a nd c u lt u r a l e nd s . ” C o l e s v. C a r li n i , 162 F . S upp . 3d 380 , 394 ( D . N . J . 2015 ) ( quo ti ng R ob e r t s i’. u . s . J a y cee s , 468 U . s . 609 , 622 ( 1984 )) . T h i s “e xp r e ss i v e a ss o c i a ti on a l r i gh t i s r e s e r v e d f o r g r oup s t h a t e ng a g e i n s o m e f o r m o f p r o t ec t e d e xp r e ss i on , a nd ‘ t h e r e i s no c on s tit u ti on a l r i gh t t o a ss o c i a t e f o r a pu r po s e t h a t i s no t p r o t ec t e d by t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t . ” I d . a t 394 ( quo ti ng S a l v a ti on A r m y v. D e p ‘t o f o m t v . A ff a i r s o f N e w J e r s e y , 919 F . 2d 183 , 199 ( 3d C i r . 1990 )) .
H e r e , P l a i n t i ff f a i l s t o i d e n t i & i n h e r C o m p l a i n t — o r o p po s i t i o n — w h a t “a ss o c i a t i o n a l r i g h t ” D e f e nd a n t s pu r po r t e d l y v i o l a t e d . R a t h e r , t h e C o m p l a i n t m e r e l y a ss e r t s t h e c on c l u s o r y a ll e g a ti on t h a t “ [ D J e f e nd a n t s v i o l a t e d P l a i n ti ff s ... a ss o c i a ti on a l r i gh t s und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t [ j ” C o m p l . a t 10 , ¶ 3 . A g a i n , s u c h c on c l u s o i y s t a t e m e n t s a r e i n s u ff i c i e n t t o p l a u s i b l y p l ea d a v i o l a ti on o f on e ’ s r i gh t t o a ss o c i a t e und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t . A cc o r d i ng l y , t h e C ou r t d i s m i ss e s P l a i n ti ff s § 1983 c l a i m p r e m i s e d on a r i gh t t o a ss o c i a ti on und e r t h e F i r s t A m e nd m e n t .
I n s u m , P l a i n ti ff h a s no t s u ff i c i e n tl y p l e d a ny o f h e r c l a i m s pu r s u a n t t o § 1983 . T h e C ou r t t h e r e f o r e d i s m i ss e s C oun t T w o i n it s e n ti r e t y a s t o a ll D e f e nd a n t s . B . C oun t T h r ee - § 1985 P l a i n ti ff a l s o b r i ng s a c l a i m f o r c on s p i r ac y t o i n t e rf e r e w it h c i v il r i gh t s pu r s u a n t t o 42
U . S . C . § 1985 . C o m p l . a t 11 , ¶ I J 1 - 4 . T o s u ff i c i e n tl y p l ea d a § 1985 ( 3 ) c l a i m , a p l a i n ti ff m u s t e s t a b li s h :
( 1 ) a c on s p i r ac y ; ( 2 ) f o r t h e pu r po s e o f d e p r i v i ng a p e r s on o r c l a s s o f p e r s on s e qu a l p r o t ec ti on und e r t h e l a w o r e qu a l p r i v il e g e s a nd i n f u r t h e r a n ce o f t h e i mm un iti e s und e r t h e l a w ; ( 3 ) a n ac t c on s p i r ac y ; a nd ( 4 ) i n j u r y t o a p l a i n ti ff s p r op e r t y o r h i s p e r s on , o r d e p r i v a t i o n o f a r i g h t o r p r i v i l e g e o f a U . S . c i t i z e n .
*15 M e A r d l e v. H u f n a g e l , 588 F . A pp ’ x 118 , 120 ( 3d C i r . 2014 ) . S ec ti on 1985 ( 3 ) 10 ac ti on s a r e li m it e d t o c on s p i r ac i e s p r e d i ca t e d on “ r ac i a l , o r p e r h a p s o t h e r w i s e c l a ss b a s e d , i nv i d i ou s l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a n i m u s . ” L a k e v. A r no l d , 112 F . 3d 682 , 685 ( 3d C i r . 1997 ) ; F a l a t v c oun t y o f H un t e r don , N o . 12 - 6804 , 2014 W L 6611493 , a t *13 ( D . N . J . N ov . 21 , 2014 ) ( “ T h e c on s p i r ac y m u s t b e d i r ec t e d a t t h e p l a i n ti ff b eca u s e h e b e l ong s t o a g i v e n c l a ss . ” ) . A dd iti on a ll y , a c l a i m f o r c on s p i r ac y “ m u s t c on t a i n s uppo r ti v e f ac t u a l a ll e g a ti on s . ” i v a n v. c oun w o f M i dd l e s e x , 595 F . S upp . 2d 425 , 484 ( D . N . J . 2009 ) . M e r e c on c l u s o r y a ll e g a ti on s t h a t a c on s p i r ac y e x i s t s w ill no t s u r v i v e a m o ti on t o d i s m i s s . G a r l a n g e r v. V e r b e k e , 2 2 3 F . S up p . 2 d 5 9 6 , 6 0 5 ( D . N . J . 2 0 02 ) .
H e r e , P l a i n ti ff h a s no t p l a u s i b l y p l e d t h e e x i s t e n ce o f a c on s p i r ac y und e r § 1985 . I n f ac t , P l a i n ti ff do e s no t a ll e g e a c on c l u s o i y c l a i m o f c on s p i r ac y , m u c h l e ss t h e n ece ss a r y p l a u s i b l e f ac t s t o p r op e r l y a ll e g e s u c h a c on s p i r ac y . M o r e ov e r , P l a i n ti ff f a il s t o p l ea d a ny “ i nv i d i ou s l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a n i m u s ” d r i v i ng t h e pu r po r t e d c on s p i r ac y , o r t h e pu r po s e o f s u c h c on s p i r ac y . P u t s i m p l y , P l a i n ti ff do e s no t s u ff i c i e n tl y p l ea d a ny o f t h e e l e m e n t s n ece ss a r y f o r a § 1985 c on s p i r ac y a nd t h e C o m p l a i n t i s d e vo i d o f f ac t s s ugg e s ti ng t h a t t h e e v e n t s o f w h i c h P l a i n ti ff c o m p l a i n s w e r e m o ti v a t e d by a r ac i a l o r o t h e r w i s e i nv i d i ou s l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a n i m u s . A cc o r d i ng l y , P l a i n ti ff s §1985 c l a i m i s d i s m i ss e d a s t o a ll D e f e nd a n t s . ‘° P l a i n ti ff do e s no t s p ec il S ’ und e r w h i c h s ub s ec ti on o f § 1985 s h e b r i ng s h e r c l a i m . S ee C o m p l . a t 11 . H o w e v e r , it a pp ea r s t h a t t h e on l y p r ov i s i on a pp li ca b l e t o P l a i n ti ff s a ll e g a ti on s i s § 1985 ( 3 ) . ‘ P l a i n ti ff r a i s e s f o r t h e f i r s t ti m e i n h e r oppo s iti on t h a t s h e i s a “ b l ac k w o m a n ” a nd t h e i nd i v i du a l s h e r e po r t e d a s r e s pon s i b l e f o r m i s a pp r op r i a ti ng i f i nd s i s “ non - b l ac k . ” P l . ’ s O pp . a t 10 . T o t h e e x t e n t P l a i n ti ff s “a n i m u s t h e o r y ” r e s t s upon s u c h f ac t s , ho w e v e r , “ it i s a x i o m a ti c t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t m a y no t b e a m e nd e d by t h e b r i e f s i n oppo s iti on t o a m o ti on t o d i s m i ss . ” O tt e r s v. J on e s L a n g L a S a l l e A m e r i ca s , I n c . , N o . 1 3 - 7 7 3 4 , 2 0 14 W L 4 7 93 0 2 1 , a t *3 ( D . N . J . S e p t . 2 5 , 2 0 14 ) ( quo ti ng C o m . o f P a . a r e L Z i m m e r m a n i’. P e p s i C o , I n c . , 836 F . 2d 173 , 181 ( 3d C i r . 1988 )) . A s s u c h , t h e C ou r t w ill no t c on s i d e r n e w c l a i m s o r f ac t u a l a ll e g a ti on s i n P l a i n ti ff s oppo s iti on b r i e f t h a t w e r e no t i n c l ud e d i n h e r C o m p l a i n t .
*16 C. Count One - CEPA Plaintiffs remaining claim is for violation of CEPA. However, Plaintiffs only basis for
subject matter jurisdiction rests on federal question jurisdiction)2 While the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law CEPA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), § 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline to hear state law claims that they would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over through § 1367(a). Specifically, § 1367(c)(3) provides that a “district court[j may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” When federal claims are dismissed at an early stage of litigation, courts generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Here, at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, the Court is dismissing Plaintiffs federal claims, which provided the Court with federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court uses its discretion pursuant to § 1367(c) and declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law CEPA claim. Therefore, Count One is dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, D.E. 7. Plaintiff has thirty (30) days to file an Amended Complaint, if she so chooses, consistent with this Opinion. If [12] The Court notes that the Complaint appears to base its subject matter jurisdiction upon diversity jurisdiction. Compl. at 1, ¶ I (“This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000.00.”). However, at a minimum, both Plaintiff and Defendant Jersey City are citizens of New Jersey. Id. at 1. Plaintiff does not indicate the domiciles of the Individual Defendants, instead conflating their domiciles with the address of Defendant Jersey City. See id. ¶J 3-7. As such, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 and § 1985, the Court does have federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. *17 Plaintiff fails to do so, then the dismissal of the Complaint will be with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. Date: March 24th 2020
Jolm’Michael Vazque US.D.J.