Harrison v. StateHarrison v. State
The appellant was convicted of the distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of
I
The appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilt. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he committed an “overt act” to support the charge, and, therefore, he argues, he cannot be considered an “aider or abettor” to the sale.
The evidence presented by the State tended to show the following: Police Officer Yolanda Murphy testified that she was assigned to a Mobile County drug task force when she approached a group of five men in an attempt to purchase drugs. The appellant, a member of the group, asked her what she needed. Murphy responded by saying that she needed “a $20 piece of crack.” The appellant told her: “I know who to buy from.” Officer Murphy testified that she then bought the cocaine from a third party, and not from the appellant.
“(a) A person commits the crime of unlawful distribution of controlled substances if, except as otherwise authorized, he sells, furnishes, gives away, manufactures, delivers or distributes a controlled substance enumerated in schedules I through V. •
“(b) Unlawful distribution of controlled substances is a Class B felony.”
In Greenwald v. State,
“ ‘Furnish’ means to supply by any means, by sale or otherwise, .and a sale need not be shown. McKissick v. State,522 So.2d 3 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). The ordinary meaning of ‘furnish’ is to provide or supply. Walker v. State,428 So.2d 139 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). Moreover, the participation of a defendant in, or his or her criminal linkage with, a ‘sale’ is the basis of criminal liability, and not the actual act of the defendant in physically transferring the controlled substance to the buyer. Martin v. Alabama,730 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1984).”
Here, the appellant, by suggesting where Officer Murphy could purchase illicit drugs, “participated” in the sale, and thereby provided a criminal linkage sufficient to support his conviction under
II
The appellant argues that sentencing under
Ill
The State suggests that this case should be remanded for a new sentencing proceeding because of a conflict in the record concerning the exact sentence the appellant received. The record reveals that the trial judge orally imposed a five-year sentence at the sentencing hearing. The State objected on grounds that it should be allowed to prove that the distribution took place within three miles of a school and, therefore, that the sentence should be enhanced pursuant to
In Benedict v. State,
“Alabama has a long-established rule that where there is a conflict in the record between the court reporter’s transcript and a written judgment entry, the judgment entry controls. Keeton v. State,280 Ala. 140 ,190 So.2d 694 (1966); Tuberville v. State,348 So.2d 868 (Ala. Cr.App.), cert. denied,348 So.2d 870 (Ala. 1977). This is especially true when the sentence according to the court reporter’s transcript might be unlawful, while the judgment entry reflects a valid sentence. Williams v. State,27 Ala.App. 542 ,176 So. 471 , cert. denied,234 Ala. 622 ,176 So. 472 (1937).”
Ex parte Hammond,
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.