12 Neb. 152 | Neb. | 1881
The petition in the court below — after setting out the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiff against one John M. Grant, in the district court of York county, at the ■January term, 1879; that there had previously issued an ■order of attachment in said cause, which order of attachment had been levied upon certain, real estate of
A general demurrer to the petition was overruled, and such further proceedings had that a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. '
It will readily be seen that the plaintiff does not attack the bona fieles of the execution or delivery of the deed, either on the part of the grantor or grantee, but only the acknowledgment of the same. Bo that, as it appears to us, the case turns upon the single question— does the title to real estate pass by the proper execution
The other provision referred to, section one, of chap. 73, Comp. Statutes, provides that: “Deeds of real estate or of any interest therein in this state, except leases for one year or for a less time, must be signed by the grantor, being of lawful age, in the presence of at least one competent witness, who shall subscribe his name as a witness thereto and be acknowledged or proved, and recorded, as directed in this chapter.”
The most that can be said of this provision is that it adds one to the requisite qualities of a deed at common law — that it be witnessed. A deed thus executed ami delivered is clearly good and effectual to pass the title as between the parties and those having actual notice thereof. And such deed with immediate actual and notorious physical possession of the granted premises under it, is good against all the world. The office of the words: “and be acknowledged or proved and recorded, as directed in this chapter” is directory, for the purpose of making-such deed notice to persons not having actual notice
As before stated the petition contains no allegation impeaching the conveyance as between the parties thereto, nor does it contain the necessary allegations to give the plaintiff a standing in a court of equity, being deficient for that purpose in many respects. We are of the opinion therefore that the' court erred in'its judgment, overruling the demurrer to the petition, and the same is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Reversed and Remanded.