Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins., 59 F. 732

Harrison v. Hartford Fire Ins.

59 F. 732 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa | 1894

WOOLSOA, District Judge,

(orally.) An examination of the policy in suit shows that, in the event of a disagreement as to the amount of the loss, the same shall be ascertained by two competent and disinterested appraisers, the assured and the company each «(decting one, and the two so chosen shall first Select a competent, and disinterested umpire. The appraisers together shall then estimate and appraise the loss. The policy further provides that no suit or action on the policy for the recovery of any claim shall he sustainable in any court, of law or equity until after a full compliance by the assured with all the foregoing requirements, etc. The agreement executed herein for submission to appraisers and the evidence show that two appraisers were chosen, who entered upon *734their duties, but that they did not first choose a third person to act as umpire, and that the agreement expressly provides that a third person shall be chosen by these appraisers only if necessary to decide upon matters of difference. The appraisers, being unable to agree as to the amount of the damages, thereafter attempted to choose a third person as umpire. There has been no evidence submitted to the jury of any disagreement as to the amount of the loss taldng place prior to the appointment of the appraisers; and it appears from the evidence that an umpire was not first chosen; neither was there any attempt, at first, to choose an umpire. The agreement for submission does not, therefore, follow the terms and conditions of the policy; and while the supreme court of the United States has held, in the case of Hamilton v. Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 242, 10 Sup. Ct. 945, that an appraisement and an award is a condition precedent to maintaining an action where the policy so provides, yet in this case, as the terms and conditions of the policy were not followed, I am of the opinion that this agreement for submission, under the terms and conditions under the facts -proven, do not constitute a condition precedent to the bringing of this suit. This was held, also, in the case of Adams v. Insurance Co., (Iowa,) reported in 51 N. W. 1149.

As to whether the fact that the parties had entered into a contract of appraisement and chosen appraisers (which appraisers entered upon their duties as such, and, at,the time suit was brought, were endeavoring to agree upon an umpire) would prevent a suit from being maintained, I do not here decide. It is conceded by counsel for plaintiffs that such a condition of affairs, if properly pleaded, would authorize the court to suspend the suit, and order the appraisement to proceed; but as to whether it would be an actual bar or not it is not necessary here to decide.

It appears from the undisputed evidence in this case that the local recording agent of the defendant resided at the place of the fire, and was present at the time of the fire, on the 4th of October, 1892, and that on the same day he notified the general managers of the defendant in Chicago of the occurrence of the fire, and soon after, within two or three days, the managers advised the agent that an adjuster would be sent to give the matter attention as soon as he could do so consistently with other duties, which message was delivered to the assured orally. About the 14th of October the local agent of the defendant informed the plaintiff that the adjuster would be there on the 20th, and for him to get his appraiser ready for appraisement. On the • 20th of the month the adjuster came upon the ground, and, in connection with an adjuster of another company who had issued a policy upon the property destroyed, entered into an appraisement agreement with the assured, and appraisers were appointed, who entered upon their duties as such on the 20th day of October. It is insisted by the plaintiff that these acts constituted a waiver of proofs of loss on the 14th of October, and, if the proofs of loss were in fact' waived on the 14th of October, then this action is not prematurely brought. The statutes of Iowa *735provide (section 1734, McClain’s Code) that no action shall be begun within 90 days after proofs of loss have been furnished. If proofs of loss are waived at a given date, the 90 days would begin to run from the date of the waiver of proofs of loss. In this case less than 90 days had elapsed between the 20lh of October and the 16th of January, 1893, when the suit was brought. I am of the opinion that the acts of the local agent, whose powers were general, within the scope of his authority, did not constitute a waiver of proofs of loss, and that the facts do not constitute a waiver of proofs prior to the 20th of October, 1892. The case of Wilhelim v. Insurance Co., (Iowa,) reported in 53 N. W. 233, is a strong case in point. In that case the record shows that tire loss was verbally reported to the general officers of the company, who caused immediate examination to be made of the premises, and made request for duplicate bills of invoice, but this was held not to constitute a waiver of proofs. 1 The case of Von Genechtin v. Insurance Co., reported in 75 Iowa, 544, 39 N. W. 881, is also a case in point. There the local agent who issued policies promised the assured that his loss would be paid, and repeatedly so assured him. This action by the local agent was held, however, not to constitute a waiver of proofs of loss. The following cases decided by the supreme conn of Iowa clearly establish the doctrine that an action brought within 90 days after proofs of loss have been furnished is premature, and that courts are without jurisdiction of an action thus prematurely brought. Quinn v. Insurance Co., 71 Iowa, 615, 33 N. W. 130; Von Genechtin v. Insurance Co., 75 Iowa, 544, 39 N. W. 881; Christie v. Investment Co., 82 Iowa, 360, 48 N. W. 94; Wilhelim v. Insurance Co., (Iowa,) 53 N. W. 233; Woodruff v. Insurance Co., (Iowa; Jan. Term, 1894,) 57 N. W. 592; Vore v. Insurance Co., 76 Iowa, 548, 41 N. W. 309; Taylor v. Insurance Co., 83 Iowa, 402, 49 N. W. 994; Moore v. Insurance Co., 72 Iowa, 414, 34 N. W. 183.

It is insisted that the case of Harris v. Insurance Co., (Iowa,) reported in 52 N. W. 128, is in point, and that under that authority there was a waiver of proofs of loss. In that case, however, a general adjuster of the company, with full authority, visited the home of the assured, and in substance promised the assured’s wife to pay the loss. Xo case has been cited where a waiver has been based upon a set of facts similar to those presented in the case at bar. On all the facts, I am therefore of the opinion that this case is prematurely brought, and the jury are instructed to return a verdict for the defendant.