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Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1
730 N.E.2d 61
Ill. App. Ct.
2000
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*1 HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, CONNIE v. HARDIN COUNTY COMMU NITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT No. Defendant-Appellee. Fifth District No. 5 — 99—0225 May 9, Opinion filed WELCH, J., dissenting. Marion, Stone, Harris, Lambert, Dorris, &

Stephen Howerton W. *2 appellant. Solverson, Brandon, Schmidt, Car- Wilzbach, Goffinet & S.

Matthew bondale, appellee. of the court: opinion delivered the

JUSTICE MAAG filed defendants against Harrison a civil action (plaintiff) Connie Davis, grandfather Jimmy Davis, County Com- Joshua his Hardin injuries 1 for in a motor ve- munity School District No. she sustained Davis, against hicle Joshua who his accident. Claims was vehicle, grandfather’s car he struck plaintiffs lost control and also grandfather County his were settled. Plaintiff sued Hardin (School District), Community alleging School No. that school District personnel refusing were willful Joshua Davis’s wanton request deteriorat- early to leave school due inclement weather and ing summary conditions. The filed a road ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍School District motion judgment claiming it under section immunity that was entitled Local Tort Employees Governmental and Governmental (West (the Act) (745 1994)). ILCS The trial Immunity now grаnted summary judgment plaintiff appeals. court 8, 1995, pertinent appeal facts to this follow. On December Joshua, who grandfather’s Joshua Davis drove his car to school. had at Hardin recently birthday, celebrated his sixteenth was oper- County is owned and County High High School. Hardin School of freez- ated the On a mixturе School District. ing rain, sleet, County. in Hardin began falling snow his During period, lunch about

Joshua Davis testified follows: a.m., principal, Brumley, his Ron asked approached 11:40 Joshua Brumley if he he wanted to early. leave school Joshua told that could “he didn’t want to snowing heavily it started because before all of the students whо Brumley have a wreck.” told Joshua that early, at a time after lunch. drove be dismissed certain ended, class and lunch went his next period After the Joshua parents get if to call phone teacher he could use the his asked his told Joshua to sit down permission early. to leave The teacher testified that sсhool was would be dismissed Joshua school p.m. day. dismissed at 1 Accompanied by students, three other proceeded grandfather’s to drive his car from school. Joshua passed route, home and drove girlfriend’s toward his house. En vehicle, Joshua lost control of the line, crossed center and struck of plaintiffs the front vehicle. incident,

At time of Brumley Ron was principal County High Hardin Brumley regard- School. testified that decisions ing dismissal are made superintendent School District. The principal Brumley does not make those decisions. testi- that, typically, superintendent fied once the notified him that school early, should dismissed he wоuld principal advise elementary school, building. which shared the same Those students who drove to school would then be Brumley at least 15 minutes earlier than those students who rode the bus. These dis- missal approved by superintendent. had been Brumley that, during testified he principal, time there procedure by parents was a could call school and early. Brumley that their children be dismissed said that if an individ- requested weather, ual student early due inclement usually permission parent. school required from The school al- lowed students to call home to ask their if they could leave practice This was in before place Brumley became principal. Brumley might deny testified that he student’s *3 call if going shortly. home school was to be dismissed

Brumley testified that he could not he spoke recall or not 8, leaving early with Joshua about on 1995. He stated the decision dismiss an individual student was not a deci- “policy sion,” an but “individual call.” He said that Josh was a whо ask to 8 in go morning “would home at o’clock the if he could.” He commented, “Anybody also who seen Josh in Hardin has ever drive drive, of him I County letting be critical for him a send him give didn’t car and to school.” plaintiff’s she the and her complaint, alleged that accident injuries proximately by ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍following were the willful “directly cаused personnel: on of school and wanton acts behalf Refused to Davis to was safe a. allow Joshua when it roads; given deteriorating to do so the weather conditions on local Permitted Davis to in motor property b. Joshua leave school a ve- difficulty having by hicle after been advised the student that he had conditions; in inclement weather adult parents, Failed to call Davis’ grandparents, c. and/or up him from guardian picked to have school.” claimed summary judgment, the School District In its motion for

705 liability under section immune from absolutely that it is only if immunity the argued provides Act. Plaintiff this section of determination еmployee is both the by act or omission decision did claims that this exercise discretion. Plaintiff of not involve determination of granted a properly circuit court determining whether the novo review. See White exercise de summary judgment,

motion for we (1996). 496, N.E.2d 1092 Homewood, 285 673 App. v. Ill. Village of nonmoving party and favorably All toward the is construed evidence 501, White, App. Ill. 3d at 673 moving party. 285 strictly against the fact or is if material of at 1095. A reversal issue N.E.2d warranted White, Ill. of law exists. See 285 interpretation an inaccurate 501, 3d at 673 N.E.2d at 1095. court erred

In this we must determine whether trial for ac immunity in Act finding provided that section 2—201 of the im personnel. sovereign The оf tions of the school district doctrine by Illinois Court in 1959. See munity Supreme was abolished Community Molitor v. Kaneland Unit District No. 18 (1959). The Illinois abolished N.E.2d Constitution also except of sovereign immunity, Assembly doctrine General may XIII, § art. Consequently, law. Ill. Const. (745 (West 1994)) Act ILCS et controls whether and in seq. 10/1—101 units immune civil li what situations local are from Education, ability. Epstein Chicago See Board (1997). N.E.2d 1042 Section the Act 2—201 of states: Statute,

“Except public employee provided as otherwise in or serving position involving the determination of injury resulting from his exercise discretion not hable acting the exercise of act omission (West though such even abused.” 745 ILCS discretion 1994). Suрreme interpreted provision has Illinois immunity plaintiffs injury mean that not attach ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍unless the results will and in employee from an act or omission a determina exercising discretion. The act or omission must be both tion 161 North and an exercise of discretion. See Harinek v. (1998). Ltd. Partnership, Clark Street provides immunity discretionary While section 2—201 furnish in the it does not policy, acts undertaken determination *4 In statutory “policy.” a definition for the terms “discretion” or definitions, employ continued to statutory absence of our courts have Ill. Township, See v. Curran 167 2d Snyder common law definitions. (1995). 988, 466, 473, 657 992 N.E.2d

706 law, discretionary

Under common acts of a public, are those legislative, quasi-judicial particular or character that are to a unique public office. Ministerial are person performs acts those that a aon given facts, manner, state of in prescribed legal a to obedience authority, and without reference to the official’s discretion as to the propriety Snyder, of act. 474, See 167 2d at N.E.2d Ill. 657 at 993. For example, discretion, a unit municipal judicially, acts or exercises when it selects and a adopts plan public in the improve of ments, begins soon carry plan, as as it out that it acts ministeri ally and is reasonably bound see that the work is carried in a out safе and skillful Chicago Litigation, manner. See re Flood Ill. 176 (1997). 179, 265, 194, 680 N.E.2d 272 contrast sharp appellate to the vast number of decisions defin ing describing acts,” or “discretionary there are offer few that a basic “policy” policy.” definition of or of “determination Black’s Law Dictio nary “policy” “general defines set оf principles which government guided management public its affairs.” Black’s (7th 1999). Dictionary Law ed. The Supreme Illinois described made by municipality decisions as “those decisions require the municipality competing to balance interests make a call judgment as to what solution will each best serve of those Kirkham, 1, interests.” West 588 N.E.2d (1992); Harinek, way, N.E.2d 1177. Stated another a “policy requires determination” considered and judgment evaluation unit, utilizing particular own expertise, its formulate principles procedures directed toward the achievement general goals community’s common and for the During benefit. factors, benefit, еvaluation process, including public several practicability procedure, plan the best methods to be resources, costs, employed considering safety available must State, 233-34, Mora v. considered. See (1977). difficulty no accepting superintendent’s We have deci sion to call on dismissal cоnstituted an exercise of discretion in the policy. determination for inclement weather had been established the School District. implement Procedures had also been established. were established students, faculty, staff, surrounding Deciding community. given day conditions on a fall within weather at and in definition inclement аnd what time what body discretionary manner the would be released are deci are sions based the inclement weather But these not the complains. which plaintiff decisions about *5 upon conduct based and wanton alleged willful Plaintiff has Davis, to student, one personnel permit of school refusal to leаve permission early or to contact decision not that the briefs, agree the parties upon Based their disagree as to They an exercise of discretion. involved dismiss Joshua before the deny Joshua’s the decision whether determination. students was also other an earlier request for view, to refuse Joshua’s the decision our in the determination not an exercise of discretion dismissal was they related to whether personnel school policy. The decision one existing student. exception procedure to the create an It did not involve level.” “planning a decision at the This was not Presum- public a common benefit. to achieve principles formulation considers a dismissal, the District ordering early School ably, before and the forecast factors, conditions such as current weather number of future, road conditions immediate the current conditions for the clear deterioration, community resources to and the the likelihood of day, hours of the roads, patterns traffic at various the local travel, and there would be must distance each student bus transported is home. available once the student parental supervision early at what time regarding whether to dismiss The decision evaluation of the of the entire student involves a considered that the decision to refuse body community. Any suggestion and the as to judgment a considered evaluation and involved school, community, early posed risks that his dismissal to the community by unsupported in the Hardin is other commuters is, judgment, in our ludicrous. testimony made the decisions as to whether superintendent time it would be dismissed. and what school would be faculty executed the principal superintendent the directive from the they once received had to determine Here, personnel school as to time and manner. This an individual student to leave permit whether to one some discretion exercised may call. While there have been judgment should be determining whether Joshua Davis personnel school do not think those parents, or to call his we permitted depart early This decision made in the course of decisions were procedure. See Cour carrying discretion in out an established involved 301 Ill. son v. Danville School District No. (1998); Chicago Litigation, Flood re also a determination every discretionary act is

680 N.E.2d 265. Not Courson, 2—201. See and thus immunized ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍section App. 3d at 704 N.E.2d at

We find that the trial court erred in finding that section 2—201 of the Act provided immunity for actions of school personnel in granting summary judgment finding. based

Accordingly, judgment granting circuit court summary judgment in favor of reversed, the defendant and the cause is remanded.

Reversed; cause remanded.

CHAPMAN, J., concurs. WELCH,

JUSTICE dissenting: Is a principal a decision respect with individual single student on a I so; occasion? think the majority thinks otherwise. *6 question answer, we are called upon today, is whether

Principal Brumley was when denying Joshua’s request to be dismissed The elements of discretion and рublic employment are conceded in parties our determination of tort immunity. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, (1998) (745 (interpreting section 2—201 ILCS 10/2— (West 1994)), regarding determination of policy and exercise of discretion under the Local Governmental and Employ Governmental Act)). Immunity ees Tort Act (Immunity ‍​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍Kirkham, In (1992), West supreme our court ad dressed policy decisions the context of municipal tort immunity for provide failure to signs traffic and signals under section (Ill. 3—104 of the Immunity Rev. Stat. ch. par. 3 — 104 (now (West 1998))). 745 ILCS The court reasoned that require decisions the balancing competing of a host of interests and of a judgment as to what solution will best sеrve each of Kirkham, Thus, those interests. 147 Ill. 2d at 11. Kirkham instructs interest, us to consider interests, each multiple balance the then to at a arrive conclusion. Harinek, the court applied reasoning Kirkham’s regarding (745 decisions section 2—201 of the Immunity Act ILCS 10/ (West 1994)). Harinek,

2—201 Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342. In an office worker was injured during struck door and a fire drill after а fire marshal told her to stand near the door. The court held that fire marshal “determining department was fire policy” planning, con trolling, operating, Harinek, and implementing the fire drill. 181 Ill. 2d at 342. The court reasoned that the fire responsible marshal was for planning conducting drills, fire in doing so the marshal efficiency interests, including the interests competing balanced department. of the and resources for the time safety, competed which fire drill of the placement regarding decisions The marshal’s interests, marshal’s “acts and the those to balance participants served determining policy within undertaken and omissions were Harinek, 342-43. 181 Ill. at the statute.” meaning of District, Park v. Decatur Johnson injured in a fall group was (1998), power in a tumbler’s a student coach, willfully had district, hired his had alleged park that the certain and failed to danger wantonly failed warn Appellate The Fourth District safety and measures. equipment in favor of the summary judgment grant сourt’s affirmed the circuit It Immunity Act. pursuant to section park coach, what district, its determined park via reasoned was whether a tumbler tumbling performed, be maneuvers would maneuver, equipment and what capable performing the abilities of Thus, the coach considered precautions were needеd. the resources of tumbler, against those interests each balanced perform district, decision as to how best park and made coaching duties. existing policy regarding individual

In this the school had an Generally, requests such were dismissal. requests the individual student’s Exceptions permitted denied. were or when the indi- called the school to parent parental permission to seek vidual student called to call home early. Brumley testified that a student’s if the entire school was to exception might under the second be denied Joshua, Brumley respect with circumstance, competing to balance called to сonsider *7 early, and to come to a to dismiss Joshua deciding interests he was called Brumley’s thoughts, not but conclusion. We do know safety, the weather consider, among things, other Joshua’s upon to conditions, time, future expected at the weather conditions questionable Joshua’s driving experience, Joshua’s lаck of the lack of a abilities, early, prior requests Brumley grandfather. or from his telephone call from Joshua’s entire school’s against the was to then balance Joshua’s discretion, exercising Thus, Brumley was not early dismissal. he decision when told he was the entire school to be dismissed he have to wait for Joshua that would Therefore, properly court acted I believe that the circuit of the defendant. granting summary judgment favor

Case Details

Case Name: Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1
Court Name: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date Published: May 9, 2000
Citation: 730 N.E.2d 61
Docket Number: 5-99-0225
Court Abbreviation: Ill. App. Ct.
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