22 Haw. 51 | Haw. | 1914
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
This is a statutory action to quiet the title to a certain tract of land known as “Mokapu” and situate in the district of Koolaupoko on this island. The plaintiff claims an undivided one-half interest under a lease for a term of twenty-five years from June 1, 1910. At the trial he adduced evidence tending to show the following facts: that on August 16, 1892, John K. Sumner conveyed the land in question to Bruce Cartwright in trust “in the first place to pay the rents, issues and profits arising therefrom or thereout so long as the lease now in existence is in force” to the grantor “and upon the expiration of the present lease or other sooner determination thereof to pay the rents, issues and profits arising from or out of said land” to the grantor’s nephew Robert Wyllie Davis, the present defendant, “during the term of his natural life or in the discretion of the said Robert Wyllie Davis to permit him to reside upon said premises and while so residing to use the same for grazing or agricultural purposes; and in the second place from and after the death of the said Robert Wyllie Davis to convey the said premises to the heirs of the body of said Robert W. Davis lawfully begotten and failing such heirs of his body, then to the wife if living of the said Robert W. Davis, and failing such wife, then to convey the said premises unto the heirs at law of the said Robert W. Davis share and share alike”; that Cartwright resigned as trustee and that John D. Holt Jr., was on August 29, 1902, appointed as his successor by a court of equity; that on June 1, 1910, Holt as trústee executed a lease of the property to A. Y. Gear for 25 years from June 1, 1910, the lessor consenting that the lessee should “have peaceable and quiet possession of said land during said term”; that not later than August 4, 1910, the defendant signed and acknowledged the following statement, apparently as a part of
At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case the defendant moved for a non-suit on the following grounds: “(1) that the evidence of the plaintiff showed affirmatively that there was a lease oxxtstanding when the lease to Gear, under which plaintiff claimed, was made by Holt, Trastee; (2) that plaintiff had failed to deraign his title from the government; (3) that the Statute of Uses had executed the trust, and that the defendant was the owner of a life interest in the property, and that therefore the lease to Holt, Trustee, was invalid; (4) that'the plaintiff had failed to show, nor is there any evidence- tending to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an undivided half for a term of years until June, 1935, of the land of Mokapu as set forth in Paragraph 1 of the Complaint; (5) that the plaintiff has failed to show and there is no evidence either competent or otherwise tending to show that plaintiff had any interest in the land known as Mokapu aforesaid”. The motion was granted on the first and second grounds. Plaintiff excepts. The grounds of the motion will be considered in their order.
1. The deed of tx'ust introduced in evidence by the plaintiff
2. Ordinarily, upon an issue of title, the plaintiff introduces evidence to prove that his title was in its inception derived from the government and thence passed to him by mesne conveyances, devise, descent or adverse possession. In the case at bar there was no evidence tending to show how the title passed from the government to Sumner. The plaintiff’s claim is that it was not necessary for him to deraign title from the government, because by the introduction of this defendant’s answer, already referred
3. Under the third ground of the motion for a non-suit
4 and 5. In the light of the rulings above made the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of ownership of at least an undivided ■one-half interest in the lease from Holt. It need only be added
The exceptions are sustained, the judgment set aside and the-cause remanded with directions to deny the motion for a non-suit and to take such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate.
Concurrence Opinion
CONCURRING OPINION OF
I concur in the opinion1 of the majority of the court but desire to place my concurrence on the second point upon a different ground. In an action of ejectment or to quiet title to-land it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove title and he ordinarily does that by deraigning the title from its origin. But where there is a subsequent common source from which both plaintiff and defendant claim title to the premises in. dispute the state of the title anterior to that source is immaterial since though it be defective the defendant would be estoj>ped from taking any advantage of the defect. The fact that the parties claim title from a common source may be made to appear by stipulation as- in the case of Nahaolelua v. Heen, 20 Haw. 613, or by evidence adduced by the defendant as in the case of McCandless v. Honolulu Plant. Co., 19 Haw. 239. In the case at bar there was no stipulation between the parties, but counsel fo.r the plaintiff contend that the plaintiff could and did show prima facie that he and the defendant do claim from a.
The statement contained in the answer of the defendant in the partition suit that he entered and took possession of the land pursuant to the trust deed to Cartwright was evidence that the deed is the source of title under which he claims as well as being the source of the plaintiff’s claim. In other words, a common source of title was shown. The defendant may, if he can, show in defense that his title from the common source is as good or better than that of the plaintiff, or that he has and claims under another and superior title. But when the plaintiff rested he had made out a prima facie case, and the non-suit should not have been granted.