86 Pa. 153 | Pa. | 1878
delivered the opinion of the court,
This was an action by the defendant in error to recover damages for injuries which he sustained by falling into a coal-hole of the plaintiffs in error. They were sugar refiners, occupying buildings on Swanson street, in the city of Philadelphia. They purchased two large iron coolers, to use in their business. The coolers were brought by rail to within about one hundred feet of their works. They then employed John Connor, a rigger, to take thé coolers from the cars and place them in their building. He was to be paid four dollars per day for his own services, and for each of his three assistant riggers. On each off these three men he made a profit of fifty cents per day. He was to furnish the ropes, hoisting apparatus, and all the necessary machinery incident to his occupation. Yet for the use of these he appears to have received an additional sum. The distance to move the coolers being so short, he moved them with skids and rollers, over the sidewalk. While so moving them he uncovered the coal-hole, and left it open, by reason of which the defendant was injured. The question presented is, whether the plaintiffs in error are liable for the injury thus sustained.
As one general principle pervades all the assignments, they will be considered together. The learned judge thought it unimportant whether Connor was merely the servant or agent of the plaintiffs, or whether his employment was an independent one; that if he
It is well settled in England and in this country, that persons not personally interfering or giving directions respecting the manner of the work, but contracting with a third person to do it, are not responsible for a wrongful or negligent act in the performance of the contract, if the act agreed to be done is legal: Gray & Wife v. Hubble & Pullen, Law Jour. Rep., vol. 32, part 8, N. S.; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray 349; Blake v. Ferris, 1 Selden 48; Painter v. The Mayor, &c., supra. The fact that the contractor is paid by the day does not necessarily destroy the independent character of an employment: Forsyth v. Hooper, 11 Allen 419; Corbin v. America Mills, 27 Conn. 274. If one renders service, in the course of an occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished, it is an independent employment: Shearman & Redfield on Neg., sec. 74; Pack v. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 Selden 432; Barry v. The City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121.
In the present case the evidence was most ample to submit to the jury to find that Connor's employment was an independent one. It does not appear that the plaintiffs in error reserved any right to advise or direct as to the manner in which the coolers should be moved, nor that they assumed or exercised any such authority during the progress of the work. It is not pretended that the moving was an unlawful work. As to Connor it was a distinct employment in the line of his occupation. His employers stipulated for the result only. He alone superintended and directed the manner in which his assistant riggers should work. He had the exclusive control and direction of the plaintiffs’ men, who assisted him. He testifies that he did the job according to his own' views. Under his directions the coal-hole was opened. It is not shown that the plaintiffs in erroi’, or any one acting under their directions, were present, or had knowledge that it was opened. It is not claimed to have been opened by their express authority. How could their permission be implied ? We see no necessary connection between the work to be done and the use of this coal-hole in performing it. If the jury should think there was no reasonable presumption that
The coal-hole appears to have been in all respects constructed and protected according to the city ordinance. Its cover was of solid cast-iron, weighing about sixty pounds. At the bottom it was securely fastened. Certain it is that the coal-hole was not made nor maintained for any such use as it was subjected to by Con-nor. If, then, it should be found that his employment was an independent one, and that he had no implied permission to use it in the manner in which he did use it, or if Connor was a trespasser while so using it, the plaintiff would not be liable for an injury sustained by the defendant, on the instant that Connor ceased to use it. While it is true, as the learned judge said, “the instant that he ceased to use it, its control reverted to the” plaintiffs in error; yet it does not follow “from that instant they were bound to protect it.” This is imposing too harsh terms on them. If they had no expectation that the hole would be uncovered or thus used, and no knowledge that it was, they should not be held liable until such reasonable time had elapsed, under all the circumstances, that a careful and prudent man ought to have discovered its dangerous condition. If, after such reasonable time had elapsed, and they failed to make the hole secure, they cannot be relieved from the consequences of their own negligence, by showing the previous trespass of Connor. It then follows that the assignments, except the last, are substantially sustained.
Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.