Maurice Harrison and Juanita Harrison were divorced by a decree of the Chancery Court of Faulkner County entered on January 8, 1965. The decree recited that the property rights of the parties had been settled and made a disposition of their personal property and a joint interest in a store. It made no mention of a 16 acre tract of land owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety. Maurice Harrison appeals from a decree entered by that same court in 1982 in which it “reformed and сorrected’ ’ the earlier decree so as to vest and confirm title in Juanita Harrison to the 16 aсre parcel of real estate which the court found “should have been disposed of” in the original decree. He first contends that the trial court had no authority to modify its decree 18 years after its еntry. We agree.
In October 1981 appellee filed a petition in the divorce action styled “Petition to Correct Decree.” She alleged and offered evidence tending to prove that at thе time of the divorce the parties had entered into an oral agreement that she would have titlе to the 16 acre tract upon payment by her of a remaining loan balance. She stated that shе was not aware that title had already been taken as an estate by the entirety until she had an abstract prepared in 1978. The deed had in fact been executed during the marriage. She further alleged and offered evidence to prove that she had paid the loan balance and for the pаst 16 years had lived on the property, paid the taxes, made improvements on it and exercised complete dominion over it to the exclusion of the appellant. The appellant answered contending and offering proof that no such oral agreement was ever made, that her actions of possession were permissive and that the payments made by her were in lieu of rent of his interest. He additionally raised the issue of laches.
In reaching our determination we find it unnecessary to address any of the points of error advanced which relate to the ownership of the property fоr we agree with appellant that the trial court had no power to determine the interest of the parties in the land after the lapse of the term in which the divorce decree was entered. This decree was entered prior to the effective date of Act 358 of 1969 which abolished the terms of сhancery court. At that time all judgments and decrees became final upon the lapse of the term in which they were entered. It was well settled that a court was without authority to set aside or modify its judgments or dеcrees after the lapse of the term in which they were entered except upon statutory grounds set forth in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 29-506 et seq. (1947). Fullerton v. Fullerton,
The appellee contends that under Rule 60 (a) and рrior law the court did have the power at any time to correct clerical mistakes in judgments and other errors arising from oversight or omission. Rule 60 (a), which is merely a restatement of well settled law, has no аpplication here. Courts have an inherent power to enter orders correcting their judgments whеre necessary to make them speak the truth and reflect actions accurately. This inherent аuthority has been recognized and sustained by this court in a long line of decisions from King & Houston v. State Bank,
We do not pass on аny of the issues relating to the ownership of the property. We find only that the Faulkner County Chancery Court was without jurisdiction to determine that issue in this action. The decree appealed from is reversed.