Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Dickson City Borough, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
January 17, 1966
373 Pa. 631 | 96 A. 2d 740 | 414 Pa. 182 | 418 Pa. 446 | 366 Pa. 374 | 394 Pa. 466
On January 5, 1965, the chancellor signed another decree which specifically referred to and amended the prior decree of December 16, 1964. The provisions of this decree are hereinabove set forth. On February 5, 1965, defendants appealed from what appears to have been the Court‘s amended decree. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to quash the appeal.
Appeal quashed, costs on appellant.
John E. V. Pieski, for appellant.
Morey M. Myers, with him Gelb, Carey & Myers, for appellee.
OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE JONES, January 17, 1966:
This appeal involves a challenge, successful in the court below, to the validity of a borough ordinance which seeks to regulate, within the territorial limits of the borough, the future mining of anthracite coаl by the strip mine method.
Since 1950, Harris-Walsh, Inc. (Harris-Walsh), has been engaged in the removal of anthracite coal1 by strip mining within the limits of the Borough of Dickson City (Borough), Lackawanna County. On June 28, 1963, the Borough adopted an ordinance, later amended on December 17, 1963, regulating future strip mining operations within the Borough limits. In accordance with the provisions of §5 of this ordinance, the Borough, by resolution on February 10, 1964, required that Harris-Walsh furnish a bond in the amount of $80,666 on or before February 17, 1964.2
On February 18, 1964, Harris-Walsh, averring that thе ordinance was “illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional” for seventeen stated reasons and that it had been advised that, if the required bond was not posted,
Initially, we must consider whether the court below, sitting as a court of equity, had jurisdiction to entertain this action to restrain the enforcement оf this ordinance. Although none of the parties to this action question equity‘s jurisdiction—in fact, the parties agree equity has jurisdiction—nevertheless, it is our duty to inquire into the existence of jurisdiction. We have recently said: “Jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even at the appellate level and by the appellate court itself: [citing authorities]“: (Emphasis supplied) Balazick v. Dunkard-Bobtown Municipal Authority, 414 Pa. 182, 185, 199 A. 2d 430.
If at law there exists a remedy, complete and adequate in nature, equity will not assume jurisdiction; absent such a remedy, equity may act. A remedy at law may be provided under the statute or the ordinance the validity of which is attacked, but, unless such statute or ordinance provides a remedy adequate “to the task of resolving plaintiffs’ objections,” the mere existence of such remedy will not preclude the assumption
In the case at bar, does an adequate remedy at law exist? The only section of this ordinance which might be construed as remedy-providing is §8 which provides criminal penalties4 for violation of the ordinance but such remedy, which would require subjection to a criminal prosecution, is not of such adequacy as to oust equity of jurisdiction.5 No other remedy would be available to adequately meet this challenge to the validity of the ordinance.6
By way of contrast, recently in Bliss Excavating Co. v. Luzerne County, 418 Pa. 446, supra, a group of strip mine operators instituted an action in equity which challenged the validity of a county zoning ordinance which, inter alia, purported to regulate strip mining within the territorial limits of the county. In Bliss, both the zoning ordinance and the enabling statute provided administrative and judicial procedures sufficient to adequately determine all possible questions raised by the strip mine operators; we, therefore, held equity lacked jurisdiction to entertain that action. Unlike Bliss, the instant ordinance provides no such adequate remedy; therefore, equity does have jurisdiction7 to entertain this action.
Although the mining of anthracite coal by the strip mine method has been in progress for many years, it was not until 1947 that the legislature took steps to protect the public‘s interests by a regulation of such industry. In the meantime the strip mining of anthracite coal had created in the anthracite coal field in Northeastern Pennsylvania an intolerable situation. In disregard of the interests of the public, the strip mine operators scarred and defaced the region, removed the overburden from the coal and piled it in huge and unsightly refuse banks which constituted potential fire hazards, created holes, open pits and huge craters in the terrain which were left unfilled and in such condition as to constitute potentially dangerous traps for unwary children and adults, converted vast areas of scenic beauty into unsightly and ugly surroundings and even conducted their mining operations in close proximity to the yards and homes of the public: in short, these operators created a situation which adversely affected the properties, the safety and the general welfare of the public in the area. The complete indifference of government on the state level to the creation and existence of this intolerable situation up until 1947 is beyond understanding; even now, the condition remains but slightly alleviated.
Prior to 1947, the only legislative step taken in connection with strip mining was the passage of a statute in 1941; the purpose of that statute was to protect “the health and safety of persons employed” in stripping
On August 13, 1963, the legislature extensively revised and amended the 1947 statute and amendments thereto by a statute entitled the “Anthracite Strip Mining and Conservation Act” (Act of August 13, 1963, P. L. 781, §1 et seq.,
The thrust of the Borough‘s contention is that, even though it has enacted legislation dealing with the regu-
of August 24, 1951, P. L. 1364, §1,
In a landmark case, Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 380, 381, 77 A. 2d 616, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) STERN, enunciated the appropriate criteria for determining whether the Commonwealth, to the exclusion of its political subdivisions, has preempted by legislation the regulation of certain activities:
“(1) There are statutes which expressly provide that nothing contained therein should be construed as prohibiting municipalities from adopting appropriate ordinances, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act or the rules and regulations adopted thereunder, as might be deemed necessary to promote the purpose of the legislation. On the other hand there аre statutes which expressly provide that municipal legislation in regard to the subject covered by the State act is forbidden. Then there is a third class of statutes which, regulating some industry or occupation, are silent as to whether municipalities are or are not permitted to enact supplementary legislation or to impinge in any manner upon the field entered upon by the State; in such cases the question whether municipal action is permissible must be determined by an analysis of the provisions of the act itself in order to ascertain the probable intention of the legislature in that regard. It is of course self-evident that a municipal ordinance cannot be sustained to the extent that it is contradictory to, or inconsistent with, a state statute: [citing an authority]. . . . municipalities in the exercise of the police power may regulate certain occupations by imposing restrictions which are in addition to, and not
in conflict with, statutory regulations: [citing authorities]. But if the genеral tenor of the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature that it should not be supplemented by municipal bodies, that intention must be given effect and the attempted local legislation held invalid: [citing authorities].”10 In Department of Licenses v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 468, 469, 147 A. 2d 326, Mr. Justice MUSMANNO, speaking for this Court said: “Of course, it is obvious that where a statute specifically declares it has planted the flag of preemption in a field, all ordinances on the subject die away as if they did not exist. It is also apparent that, even if the statute is silеnt on supersession, but proclaims a course of regulation and control which brooks no municipal intervention, all ordinances touching the topic of exclusive control fade away into the limbo of ‘innocuous desuetude‘. However, where the Act is silent as to monopolistic domination and a municipal ordinance provides for a localized procedure which furthers the salutary scope of the Act, the ordinance is welcomed as an ally, bringing reinforcements into the field of attainment of the statute‘s objectives.”
Through an examination of the state‘s legislation on the subject, we must seek to determine, if possible, whether the legislature has manifested an intention to preempt the field of regulation of the anthracite strip mining industry.
Section 10 of the “Anthracite Strip Mining and Conservation Act” (Act of 1963, supra, §10,
What does the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” commonly and ordinarily connote or mean? Almost a half-century ago, the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Supt. House of Correction, 64 Pa. Superior Ct. 613, 623, interpreting “exclusive jurisdiction” as used in a statute, said: “Nor can there be any doubt as to the meaning the legislature intended to give to the word exclusive. In its usual and generally accepted sense, as given by lexicographers, and in the ordinary speech of the people, it means, — possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone, individual, sole; to confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court deprives all other courts of such jurisdiction, whether therefore exclusivе or concurrent, conferred by statute. 3, Words and Phrases, 2550; possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation and enjoy-
Both by statute and decisional law we are required to construe words and phrases according to their common and approved usage; statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday sense and the popular meaning of such words must prevail unless the statute defines them otherwise or unless the context of the statute requires another meaning: Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, §33,
It is clear that the legislature hаs not specifically defined the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” in the statute. Therefore, as it must, the Borough relies upon the provisions and context of the statute as mandating the assignment to the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” a meaning other than its usual and ordinary meaning. The Borough contends that, when the legislature employed the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” in §10 of the statute, an examination of the statute reveals that it intended to grant an undivided and exclusive jurisdiction (a) only in respect to the rulеs and regulations which affect the health and the safety of workers in the industry or (b) only to administer the provisions of the 1963 statute.
The Borough would limit the exclusive jurisdiction of the state to the area of the safety of the workers in the industry by reason of what might be termed a grammatical argument. The important sentence in §10 con-
Neither the 1963 statute nor any prior statutes which it amends, either by title or by provisions, purports to provide measures for the protection of the workers in the industry; the whole thrust of the 1963 statute and its predecessors is the protection of the public. A reading of the provisions of these statutes makes clear beyond any question the purpose of these statutes. Viewed in such light, it would be absurd to
The Borough next contends that the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction” must be confined to the administration of the provisions of the statute and, since the Borough does not by its ordinance intend to administer the provisions of the state statute, the field in which the Borough intends to act has not been preempted. In this connection another provision of the 1963 statute must be noted. Section 10 provides, inter alia, for the creation within the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries of the Commonwealth of a new Bureau to be known as the “Bureau of Anthracite Conservation and Reclamation“. To this Bureau, §10 expressly commits the “power” and “duty” to “administer all of the laws of this Commonwealth governing and relating to the mining of anthracite coal by the open pit or strip method and, subject to the approval of the secretary, to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties by law vested in and imposed upon said secretary in relation to such open pit or strip mining“. (Emphasis supplied). Act of 1963, supra, §10,
In view of the conclusion reached, we need not seek whether the statute by implication has preempted the field nor whether the statute and the ordinance so conflict that the latter must fall. Moreover, we need not inquire into the validity of the rejection by the court below of the evidence as to backfill conditions within and without the Borough, the second question raised on this appeal.
It may not be inappropriate to note that the reason why the Bоrough passed this ordinance was its belief that the Commonwealth has not acted adequately in attempting to regulate this industry and that the legislation enacted was simply a “half measure“, weak and supine. The belief of the Borough may be well founded. However, the adequacy of the legislation to cope with the problem and the wisdom or the lack thereof on the part of the legislature in framing this legislation is not for us to determine. Such questions are solely for the legislature to determine and upon their province we must not encroach.
Decree affirmed. Each party to pay own costs.
Mr. Chief Justice BELL and Mr. Justice ROBERTS concur in the result.
I concur in and join in the opinion of the majority because there is no indication in the opinion that a properly enacted zoning ordinance which would prohibit strip mining in a zoned area would not be effective. A properly enacted zoning ordinance is not preempted by the Act.