ORDER
Plаintiff James Harris, an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institutions (“ACI”), is challenging a Rhode Island Department of Corrections (“RIDOC”) policy that allows him to wear his religious head covering only when he is in his cell or when he is attending religious services. (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff, a Sunni Muslim, is seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that he be allowed to wear a kufi without restriction throughout the ACI. (Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj. 1, ECF No. 3.) Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan held a hearing on Plaintiffs motion in July 2016 and filed a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (see attached) on August 15, 2016, recommending that the Court issue a limited, ninety-day injunction “directing RIDOC to expand its headwear policy to permit Plaintiff to wear a kufi of a specified design while exercising in the prison yard, subject to all of the existing limits on the wearing of secular head coverings.” (R & R 547, 562, ECF No. 27.) The R & R also recommended that the narrow injunction “be subject to immediate cancellation and withdrawal of the privilege if, in practice, it exacerbates RIDOC’s identified security concerns.” (Id. at 547.)
Defendant filed an objection to the R & R, arguing that the R & R erred by rec
The R & R recommended the narrow injunction after carefully considering each of the elements for granting a preliminary injunction. By recommending such a narrow injunction, the R & R focused on accommodating two competing public policies: ensuring security and safety at the ACI and protecting Plaintiffs practice of his religion from overly-intrusive government interference pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
The R & R clearly acknowledged the serious and legitimate security and safety concerns identified by the RIDOC about permitting Plaintiff to wear his kufi without restriction anywhere within the ACI facilities, concluding that “except for the narrow circumstances of the prison yard where secular caps are already allowed, the balance of the hardships tilts dramatically against the issuance of an injunction.” (R & R 561, ECF No. 27.) The R & R gave appropriate deference to the professional judgment of the ACI administrators while also acknowledging that RIDOC had failed to demonstrate that its complete ban on religious headwear is the least restrictive way to achieve its compelling interest in a safe and secure prison facility where existing RIDOC policy already allows for secular headwear (e.g., a baseball cap in summer and a knit cap in winter) during inmate time in the prison yard.
Ultimately, this Court agrees with the findings and reasoned conclusions in the R & R, and hereby accepts the R & R in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED IN PART, as follows: Defendant A.T. Wall, in his official capacity as the Director of RIDOC, shall alter the RIDOC’s headwear policy to allow Plaintiff to wear a solid color, close-fitted, seamless, crocheted kufi when he is exercising in the prison yard in addition to when he is in his cell. The altered policy shall be subject to all of the existing limits on the wearing and use of secular head coverings, and the policy shall be subject to withdrawal if any of RIDOC’s identified security concerns are realized from permitting Plaintiff to wear his kufi while exercising in the prison yard. The effect of this Order will be stayed for a period of thirty days from today’s date, during which time RIDOC shall make any necessary amendments to its policies, regulations or search protocols to conform with the limited mandatory injunction imposed by this Order. Once the injunction takes effect, it shall be in effect for ninety days pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Other than the limited injunction ordered above, Plaintiffs motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pro se
Before the Court for report and recommendation, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), are Plaintiff’s motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction; a hearing on the motions was conducted on July 1,2016. Also pending is Plaintiffs oral motion for appointment of counsel, which has been referred for determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the Plaintiffs motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be granted in part by the issuance of a limited injunction directing RIDOC to expand its headwear policy to permit Plaintiff to wear a kufi of a specified design while exercising in the prison yard, subject to all of the existing limits on the wearing of secular head coverings. I further recommend that this slightly more-liberal policy be subject to immediate cancellation and withdrawal of the privilege if, in practiсe, it exacerbates RIDOC’s identified security concerns. Beyond this narrow injunction, I recommend that Plaintiffs motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be denied. In a separate memorandum and order, I have also denied the motion for counsel, subject to Plaintiffs right to renew the motion if this matter proceeds to the discovery phase, and subject to the acceptance of the case by a member of the Court’s pro bono panel.
I. FACTS
A. RIDOC’s Policies and Compelling Penological Interest
The RIDOC policies at issue in this case exist to protect the well-being and security of correctional staff, inmates and the public. Aceto Aff. ¶ 61. These policies were not adopted in a vacuum: during the 1970s, violence and other conditions at the ACI resulted in the judicial holding that it was an institution “unfit for human habitation and shocking to the conscience of a reasonably civilized person,” Palmigiano v. Garrahy,
As the Galligan and Aceto affidavits make clear, in formulating its policies, RI-DOC strives to anticipate what might increase the risk of violence or danger and
A second serious danger that RIDOC must constantly address is the smuggling of contraband, particularly drugs, weapons, notes and food, into the ACI and from place to place within the institution. Galligan Aff. ¶ 15. RIDOC takes “proactive measures to stem the tide of this destructive practice,” while acknowledging that is it virtually impossible entirely to eliminate contraband trafficking from any prison. Aceto Aff. ¶¶ 5, 9; see Galligan Aff. ¶ 15. Based on experience, RIDOC is аware that contraband is smuggled into the institution through a wide range of creative methods, including in sneakers, under hats, in sock bands, in body orifices and in the seams of clothing. Galligan Aff. ¶ 16. RIDOC has also observed that clothing can be switched, for example during family visits, to smuggle contraband. Aceto Aff. ¶¶ 7-9.
To prevent contraband smuggling RI-DOC conducts frequent inmate searches. Aceto Aff. ¶ 9. However, while RIDOC relies on both random and key-time searches, its resources are finite and at some point extensive searches become impracticable without a significant reallocation of resources. Aceto Aff. ¶ 9; see id. ¶ 18 (due to infeasibility of searching inmates constantly, inmates moving within ACI are searched either randomly or not at all). In addition, RIDOC’s knowledge of the dangers of singling out a discrete group has caused it to conclude that religious tensions, and the related potential for violence, would increase if believers are targeted for searches. See Aceto Aff. ¶¶ 19-21 (if religious head coverings, such as the kufi, are permitted throughout ACI, additional searches would increase costs, add to burden on RIDOC staff, complicate searching, increase religious tension and detract from searches of other inmatеs). Based on these considerations, RIDOC believes that permitting the wearing of the kufi or other religious head coverings without limitation would tax its limited resources, undermine its strict uniform policy and hinder its ability to combat contraband smuggling. Aceto Aff. ¶ 21.
To address these serious safety concerns while minimizing the need for additional searches (and the costs and tensions such searches would cause), RIDOC has implemented interconnected policies,
A critical strand woven into the fabric of these interconnected policies is RIDOC’s strict prohibition against inmates wearing any head covering—religious or otherwise—anywhere inside any RIDOC facility or outside in the prison yard. Galligan Aff. ¶ 11; Aceto Aff. ¶¶ 11, 25. The only exception is that inmates may wear a uniform knit cap in winter and a uniform baseball cap in summer while they are outside in the prison yard. Because of security concerns, inmates must carry the cap until they are outside and remove it immediately upon reentering the facility.
RIDOC’s affiants aver that these policies have been very successful. The amount of searching has been reducеd, permitting more productive deployment of resources. And the gang violence of the 1990s has been brought under control “due to steps DOC took to reduce gang activity, such as implementing standard prison uniforms.” Galligan Aff. ¶ 19. As Lieutenant Galligan noted, “[a]s a result, DOC facilities are now one of the best in the country at reducing and managing gang activity.” Id. Plaintiff disputes the efficaciousness of
To accommodate the religious beliefs of inmates whose religion calls for the wearing of a head covering, while not compromising the safety and security of inmates, staff and the public, RIDOC has relaxed the headwear policy in limited circumstances. See Galligan Aff. ¶ 11; Aceto Aff. ¶ 11. Specifically, all inmates whose beliefs call for head coverings, no matter the religious affiliation, are allowed to weаr religious headwear in their cells and during religious services. See Galligan Aff. ¶ 11; Compl. If 17; Pl. Dec. II ¶ 23. However, when mingling with the rest of the inmate population, moving through the institution, exercising in the yard, researching in the library, working at a job, taking a class, or visiting with family and friends, all inmates must conform to the basic policy of wearing the specially-designed uniform with no head covering and no other visible apparel or adornment, except to the limited extent that a cap is necessary for protection from the cold or the sun while exercising outdoors.
B. Plaintiffs Religious Beliefs
Plaintiff has been an inmate at the ACI since March 23, 2006. Galligan Aff. ¶ 5. In 2005, a year prior to the commencement of his sentence, Plaintiff converted to Islam. Three years later, in 2008 (while serving his current sentence), he began wearing a kufi. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated that the ACI’s policy limiting the wearing of the kufi (and other religious headwear) was in place when he first chose to wear it. Consequently, over the last eight years, Plaintiff has worn his kufi only in his cell and at religious services. See PL Dec. I ¶ 7; Galligan Aff. ¶ 11; Aceto Aff. ¶ 11.
In his declarations and filings, as well as in his statements made during the hearing, Plaintiff explains that he wears the kufi based on his belief as a Sunni Muslim that he must follow the Islamic dress code as expressed in the “hadiths,” or sayings of the prophet Muhammad, which require that men wear a turban or kufi to express respect and deference to Allah. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9, 14-15; ECF No. 8-1 at 3, 9, 11. Plaintiff believes that wearing a kufi at all times
Plaintiff attributes the delay between the time when he began wearing a kufi at the ACI in 2008, and September 29, 2015,
C. Plaintiffs Other Relevant Background
Plaintiffs current sentence is twenty years, with sixteen years to serve, for felony assault, conspiracy, carrying a pistol without a license, discharging a firearm and firing in a compact area. In public filings earlier this year in connection with a Superior Court matter,
Because of his high security status, Plaintiff currently spends nineteen to twenty-one hours a day in his cell and is not allowed to attend religious services. At the hearing, he admitted that these restrictions significantly limit the impact of the headwear policy. Galligan Aff. ¶¶ 8, 11. Presently, he is allowed out of his cell for one hour of outside recreation five days a week, a ten minute phone call once a week, one hour of programming two to three times a week, and two to three hours six times a week to work as a porter. Galligan Aff. ¶¶ 9-10. During the hearing, Plaintiff added the three to four hours per week that he spends in the law library; he also stated that, if permitted to do so, he would prefer to wear his kufi while exercising in the prison yard, but would accept a ban on wearing the kufi during classes and visits from friends and family.
At the hearing, the parties confirmed that Plaintiffs current status at the ACI may change in the near future. First, Plaintiffs security risk group level was recently lowered because he is no longer actively involved with a gang. PI. Dec. II ¶ 24. Based on this determination, Plaintiff stated (and RIDOC did not disagree) that he expects soon to be permitted to leave his cell for a greater portion of each day, which would result in the heаdwear policy imposing an increased burden on the practice of his religious faith. Second, Plaintiff will be eligible for parole in September 2016; therefore, it is possible he will be released from the ACI, potentially mooting his prayer for injunctive relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a request for interim injunctive relief, the court must be guided by the traditional equity doctrine that preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right. Letourneau v. Aul, No. CA 14-421L,
The four factors are not weighted equally; “likelihood of success is the main bearing wall of this framework” and of primary importance. W Holding Co. v. AIG Ins. Co.-Puerto Rico,
Interim injunctive relief is typically used to “preserve the status quo, freezing an existing situation so as to permit the trial court, upon full adjudication of the case’s merits, more effectively to remedy discerned wrongs.” Letourneau,
Plaintiffs status as a prisoner triggers an additional restriction on the availability of interim injunctive relief that is set forth in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 18 U.S.C. § 3626. PLRA provides that the court shall not enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction unless it finds that the injunctive relief is “narrowly drawn, extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Further, the court considering an interim injunction “shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” In addition, the court must respect principles of state and federal comity. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). In
III. ANALYSIS
This case implicates two competing but important matters of public concern; it juxtaposes the interest in the security and safety of prisons against the important interest in the protection of religious practice from governmental interference codified in RLUIPA. To set the balance right, the Court must be guided by the Supreme Court’s seminal RLUIPA decision, Holt v. Hobbs, — U.S.—,
A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under RLUIPA,
Plaintiffs averments and other evidence of the religious foundation for his belief easily satisfy his initial burden of establishing that the relief sought in these motions is animated by a sincere religious conviction. This is not a case where the claimant’s religious assertions amount to no more than vague allegations or “conelu-sory” arguments. See Al-Fuyudi v. Correction Corp. of America, CIV-12-1170-D,
The second leg of Plaintiffs burden is to demonstrate that the policy forbidding him from wearing his kufi except ixi his cell and at religious services amounts to a substantial burden on religious exercise. Plaintiff supports his claim with the uncontroverted averment that he has tried not to leave his cell, eschewing outdoor exercise, to the detriment of his mental health, in an attempt to comply with the religious duty to wear a kufi. See Holt,
With Plаintiffs RLUIPA burdens satisfied, I turn next to RIDOC,
A far more difficult question is presented by the second prong of the burden imposed on RIDOC—whether the he-adwear policy is the least restrictive way that it can achieve its compelling goal of a safe and secure prison facility. Holt counsels that this analysis requires scrutiny of the prison’s stated security interest in the context of the inmate’s circumstances and that courts must not defer blindly to the prison’s stated security justification.
Many pre- and post-Holt decisions have found that the prisons seeking to justify protocols similar to RIDOC’s headwear policy stumble at this last leg of the analy
Other pre- and post-Holt сases hold that the state’s compelling interest in the safety and security of prisoners and staff is so great, and the need to defer to the prison officials’ expertise is so compelling, that a policy that places limits on when a Muslim prisoner may wear the kufi “appears to qualify as the least restrictive way of furthering that compelling interest.” Phillips v. Cobb, No. 3:14CV3109,
In response, RIDOC’s affidavits and arguments compellingly establish that the headwear policy is part of a larger solution to an array of important penological concerns, fueled by a past when the ACI was plagued by serious and dangerous gang activity and based on RIDOC’s judgment as to what was needed to form an integrated set of protocols calibrated to address anticipated safety risks. While RIDOC readily concedes that none of its policies are perfect at eliminating the risks they are designed to address, they do not appear to be based on mere speculation or on what Holt condemned as the “classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history; If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”
However, RIDOC has failed to comply with Holt’s other mandate, see
Based on foregoing, I find that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of demonstrating that he is likely to succeed on the merits to the limited extent that RIDOC has failed to establish that its ban on a uniform kufi, designed to minimize identified risks and worn only at the same times and , with the
B. Balancing of Harms and Public Policy
The remaining factors that the Court must consider in determining whether interim injunctive relief is appropriate are the risk of irreparable harm to the party seeking the injunction, as balanced against the harm to the party opposing it, and the public policy interests implicated by the issuance (or not) of an injunction. Winter v. NRDC, Inc.,
In this case, Plaintiff has enhanced his showing of irreparable harm with his averment that he experienced severe anxiety when he felt forced to choose his religious practice over leaving his cell, including for outdoor recreation. See id. at 25,
Balanced against these considerations is RIDOC’s strong showing that its headwear policy is in furtherance of a compelling public interest in prison safety and security. The affidavits of RIDOC’s two high ranking officers, Lieutenant Galligan and Deputy Warden Aceto, establish their belief based on years of correctional experience that the elimination of the headwear policy would create a more dangerous prison environment. See Letourneau v. Aul,
C. Scope of Narrow Interim Injunction
RIDOG has raised legitimate security concerns that counsel against the entry of preliminary injunctive relief that would require RIDOG to dramatically change its headwear policy before this case is resolved on the merits. Mindful that this Court “must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them,” Overton v. Bazzetta,
I note that the proviso permitting RI-DOC to withdraw the privilege is included partly in light of the troubling evidence of Plaintiffs history of involvement with contraband smuggling and his former participation in gang-related aсtivities. Holt,
I add a coda to address RIDOC’s fear that an interim injunction in this case would cause it to be inundated with demands for various forms of religious garb. The limited interim injunction that I am recommending is consistent with a policy that is strictly limited to (a) religious head-wear for which RIDOC has established a uniform standard; (b) headwear appropriate to be worn while exercising; and (c) headwear that covers no more of the head, face or body than is covered by the secular stocking and baseball caps already permitted. It is not consistent with more.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that Plaintiffs motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be granted by the issuance of a ninety-day limited injunction directing defendant A.T. Wall in his official capacity as the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (not in his individual capacity) to alter its headwear policy to pеrmit Plaintiff to wear a uniform close-fitted, seamless, crocheted kufi, available in only one color, only while exercising in the prison yard, subject to all of the limits on the wearing and use of secular head coverings and subject to the withdrawal of the privilege if the wearing of the kufi concretely implicates any of RIDOC’s identified security concerns. Otherwise, I recommend that the motions be denied. I further recommend that the implementation of this interim injunction be stayed until thirty days following this Court’s adoption of this recommendation to allow RIDOC time to adjust its policies, regulations or search protocols.
Any objection to this report and recommendation must be specific and must be served and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days after its service on the objecting party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); DRI LR Cv 72(d). Failure to file specific objections in a timely manner constitutes waiver of the right to review by the district judge and the right to appeal the Court’s decision. See United States v. Lugo Guerrero,
Notes
. As required in this Circuit, based on Plaintiffs pro se status, his filings have been liberally construed. Hughes v. Rowe,
. Because Director Wall is named in his official capacity, Plaintiff has named the proper defendant for purрoses of injunctive relief under RLUIPA. See Kuperman v. Wrenn,
. In addition to RLUIPA, Plaintiff’s complaint states that it is a "civil action authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... under color of state law, of rights secured by the constitution and acts of congress of the United States.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. ("Compl.”), In a subsequent filing and at the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that he is asserting only a claim for declaratory and in-junctive relief to redress the RLUIPA violation. ECF No. 16 at 8 ¶ 18 ("Plaintiff has only specifically raised an RLUIPA claim and not a First Amendment Claim.”). Accordingly, this report and recommendation does not address whether Plaintiff’s motions would fare differently if the Court were considering a First Amendment claim. Cf. Staples v. Gerry, Civil No. 14-cv-473-JL,
."A Kufi is a ‘close-fitting brimless cylindrical or round hat.’ ” Malik v. Ozmint, Civil Action No. 8:07-387-RBH-BHH,
. These facts are drawn from the verified complaint, declarations, affidavits and other evidence that Plaintiff and RIDOC submitted. Plaintiff's verified complaint (ECF No. 1) is referred to as “Compl.,” while Plaintiffs declarations are referred to as “PI. Dec. I” (ECF No. 3-1) and “PL Dec. II” (ECF No. 18). The parties’ document submissions are referred to by ECF number. During the hearing, Plaintiff made representations about the motions, his Muslim faith and status at the ACI, which are referenced in the text. In support of its opposition to the motions, Defendant proffered affidavits from two RIDOC officials, Lieutenant William Galligan, whose affidavit is at ECF No. 14-1 and will be referred to as "Galligan Aff.,” and Deputy Warden Jeffrey Aceto, whose affidavit is at ECF No. 14-2 and will be referred to as "Aceto Aff.”
.For example, RIDOC's experiеnces with the real and extremely serious risks created when inmates are permitted to form subgroups or cliques have resulted in the implementation of policies keeping cell blocks and prison jobs integrated so that they are not dominated by inmates of one race or religion. Aceto Aff. ¶ 39. The same concerns have resulted in a policy requiring that religious jewelry (such as a religious symbol worn around the neck) be concealed under the clothing so that it cannot be seen by other inmates. Aceto Aff. ¶ 48.
. Plaintiff disputes part of this averment, pointing out that the uniform shirt has pockets. PL Dec. II ¶ 16.
. Plaintiff claims that the knit caps are offered in three colors, which he alleges undermines RIDOC’s claim of uniformity, while RIDOC avers that the knit cap is black. Compare PL Dec. II ¶ 20, with Aceto Aff. ¶ 23. Plaintiff also alleges that it is easier to hide contraband in a carried cap than in a worn cap so that the policy of requiring that the caps must be carried, not worn, to the prison yard is counterintuitive. Pl. Dec. II ¶ 21.
. Lieutenant Galligan controverts Plaintiffs professed need to wear a kufi at all times in his affidavit with the testimony that he has seen Plaintiff in his cell without his kufi "[o]n multiple occasions.” Galligan Aff. ¶ 13. Plaintiff responds that he does not wear the kufi while shaving, applying hygiene products or sleeping. Pi. Dec. II ¶ 9. The Galligan affidavit also avers that Plaintiff’s block officer has said that Plaintiff does not wear his kufi roughly thirty percent of the time when in his cell. Galligan Aff. ¶ 14. Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the hearsay from the block officer, asserting that he (Plaintiff) spoke to his block officer, who said that his words had been twisted because the block officer rarely sees Plaintiff in his cell without a kufi, and the reference to “30% of the time” included times when Plaintiff was not in his cell. PI. Dec. II ¶ 10. With no affidavit from the block officer to counter Plaintiff’s averment, I have disregarded the hearsay and accept for purposes of these motions Plaintiff’s claim that he wears his kufi in his cell as much as he can.
. On September 29, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a Level I grievance in which he asked to wear his kufi throughout the ACI without restriction. Compl. Ex. A (ECF No. 1-3). After denial, on November 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Level II grievance. It was denied on November 30, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 28-30. Presumably in light of this history, RIDOC has not challenged Plaintiffs RLUIPA claim based on the failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. See Collins v. Hobbs, No. 5:13CV00060-SWW-JTK,
. Plaintiff filed a Superior Court petition to change his birth name to a Muslim name. PL Dec. II ¶ 32. Following briefing and a hearing, the petition was denied on security grounds based on RIDOC’s uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff’s criminal record has twenty-one criminal entries, he is subject to a no-contact order extending to 2026 and he has had twenty-two disciplinaiy infractions since entering the ACI in 2006. Harris v. Rhode Island, No. PP-2016-0520 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 3, 2016); see Pl. Dec. II ¶ 32.
.After this Court rejected his § 1983 claim challenging the severity of the consequence imposed for this infraction, Harris v. Perry, No. CA 15-222-ML,
. Plaintiff disputes that his release will moot his claim, arguing that his parole could be revoked, which would bring him back to the ACI, and reassert the burden on his religious beliefs imposed by the headwear policy.
. The principal distinction between a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is that a temporary restraining order can be issued quickly at the outset of the litigation without notiсe to the opposing party, or when a litigant is facing a threat of irreparable harm before a preliminary injunction can be held. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1) (preliminary injunction can issue "only on notice to the adverse party”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (temporary restraining order can issue with or without notice to opposing party). When, as here, the opposing party has notice, the opportunity to respond, and an adversarial hearing is held, the standards for issuing a temporary restraining order are substantively similar to those for a preliminary injunction. San Juan Cable LLC v. Telecommunications Regulatory Bd. of Puerto Rico,
. RLUIPA states in pertinent part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1) and (2).
. See n.9 supra.
. Plaintiff presents an array of reasons why this suggestion presents a less restrictive means of furthering RIDOC’s goals without compromising safety or security. For example, hе points out that the increased risk of contraband is minimized by limiting inmates to a see-through crocheted kufi that hugs the skull. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 27; Pl. Dec. II ¶¶ 11-12. Such a kufi style also eliminates the ability of an inmate to hide his face to evade identification. Compl. ¶ 26. The risk of gang signaling is reduced by a permitting a single style of kufi available in limited colors with no seam to prevent turning the seam in a certain direction as a gang signal. See Aceto Aff, ¶ 35.
. Even RIDOC's stated reason that it has not altered the headwear policy to allow the kufi partly due to its fear that allowing the kufi would force it to make many other exceptions
. Because the PLRA only permits a ninety-day preliminary injunction unless there is further fact finding by the court, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1-2), Plaintiff’s suggestion that he might be allowed out of his cell more in the future is less pertinent to this analysis.