74 So. 40 | Ala. | 1917
In May v. Mayor & Aldermen of Birmingham, 123 Ala. 306, 318, 26 South. 537, it was held, with respect to the italicized clause as above noted that it plainly required for the passage of an amendment the affirmative vote of a majority of those who voted at the election in general.
Section 284 of the Constitution of 1901 has clearly súbstituted a different requirement in this regard, and declares that: “If it shall appear that a majority of the qualified voters who voted at said election upon the proposed amendments voted in favor of same, such amendments shall be valid to all intents and purposes as parts of this Constitution.”
The only question of doubt suggested by this language is whether the vote for each individual amendment, where two or more are submitted, at the same election, must be a majority of the highest number voting upon any amendment, or merely a majority of those voting upon the single amendment in question.
We can discover no reason either of subjective relevancy or of objective policy which would render probable a purpose on the part of the makers of the Constitution to so concatenate a number of separate and unrelated amendments as to make the highest vote on any amendment the basis for the adoption of all of the others; nor does the language of the ordinance require, by any reasonable intendment deducible therefrom, such a narrow construction. It is usual in the construction of statutes, a contrary intention not appearing, to hold that singlar and plural forms are interchangeablé (36 Cyc. 1123, 1), and section 1 of our Code so provides.
We think that “the qualified voters who voted at said election upon the proposed amendments” means, with respect to each of the proposed amendments, a majority of those voting on that particular amendment. We hold, therefore, that the proposed
This rule of construction clearly forbids the intendment of retrospective operation in the adoption of this amendment. But, even if such intendment could be imputed, such a construction
Since the right of these depositors of this insolvent bank who did not stipulate for interest to be satisfied in full before other creditors are paid arises out of their contract with the bank as controlled by the constitutional guaranty then in force, it is in
It results that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for, and the petition was properly dismissed. Let the judgment be affirmed.