HARRIS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 34.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 12, 13, 1946. Decided May 5, 1947.
331 U.S. 145
Frederick Bernays Wiener аrgued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Robert S. Erdahl, Beatrice Rosenberg and Leon Ulman.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted on sixteen counts of an indictment1 charging the unlawful possession, concealment and
Two valid warrants of arrest were issued. One charged that petitioner and one Moffett had violated the
Five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting under the authority of the two warrants, went to the apartment of petitioner in Oklahoma City and there arrested him. The apartment consisted of a living room, bedroom, bathroom and kitchen. Following the arrest, which took place in the living room, petitioner was handcuffed and a search of the entire apartment was undertaken. The agents stated that the object of the search was to find two $10,000.00 canceled checks of the Mudge Oil Company which had been stolen from that company‘s office and which were thought to have been used in effecting the forgery. There was evidence connecting petitioner with that theft. In addition, the search was said to be for the purpose of locating “any means that might
One agent was assigned to each room of the apartment and, over petitioner‘s protest, a careful and thorough search proceeded for approximately five hours. As the search neared its end, one of the agents discovered in a bedroom bureau drawer a sealed envelope marked “George Harris, personal papers.” The envelope was torn open and on the inside a smaller envelope was found containing eight Notice of Classification cards and eleven Registration Certificates bearing the stamp of Local Board No. 7 of Oklahoma County. It was this evidence upon which the conviction in the District Court was based and against which the motion to suppress was directed. It is conceded that the evidence is in no way related to the crimes for which petitioner was initially arrested and that the search which led to its discovery was not conducted under the authority of a search warrant.9
In denying the motion to suppress, the District Court wrote no opinion. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
If it is true, as petitioner contends, that the draft cards were seized in violation of petitioner‘s rights under the
This Court has also pointed out that it is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms. “Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931).
The
The opinions of this Court have clearly recognized that the search incident to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control. Thus in Agnello v. United States, supra, at 30, it was said: “The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.”14 It is equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise reasonable, is not automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a dwelling place, as contrasted to a business premises, is subjected to search.15
Nor can support be found for the suggestion that the search could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner was arrested.16 Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four-room apartment. His control extended
Similar considerations are applicable in evaluating petitioner‘s contention that the search was, in any event, too intensive. Here again we must look to the particular circumstances of the particular case. As was observed by the Circuit Court of Appeals: “It is not likely that the checks would be visibly accessible. By their very nature they would have been kept in some secluded spot. . . .” The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search for two small canceled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen automobile or an illegal still. We do not believe that
This is not a case in which law enforcement officials have invaded a private dwelling without authority and seized evidence of crime. Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 73 App. D. C. 85, 115 F. 2d 690 (1940). Here the agents entered the apartment under the authority of lawful warrants of arrest. Neither was the entry tortious nor was the arrest which followed in any sense illegal.
Nor is this a case in which law-enforcement officers have entered premises ostensibly for the purpose of making an arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory search for merely evidentiary materials tending to connect the accused with some crime. Go-Bart Company v. United States, supra; United States v. Lefkowitz, supra. In the present case the agents were in possession of facts indicating petitioner‘s probable guilt of the crimes for which the warrants of arrest were issued. The search was not a general exploration but was specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crimes charged had been committed, particularly the two canceled checks of the Mudge Oil Company. The Circuit Court of Appeals found and the District Court acted on the assumption that the agents conducted their search in good faith for the purpose of discovering the objects specified. That determination is supported by the record. The two canceled checks were stolen from the offices of the Mudge Oil Company. There was evidence connecting petitioner with that theft. The search which followed the arrest was appropriate for the discovery of such objects. Nothing in the agents’ conduct was inconsistent with their declared purpose.
Nor is it a significant consideration that the draft cards which were seized were not related to the crimes for which petitioner was arrested. Here during the course of a valid search the agents came upon property of the United States in the illegal custody of the petitioner. It was property of which the Government was entitled to possession.19
The dangers to fundamental personal rights and interests resulting from excesses of law-enforcement officials committed during the course of criminal investigations are not illusory. This Court has always been alert to protect against such abuse. But we should not permit our knowledge that abuses sometimes occur to give sinister coloration to procedures which are basically reasonable. We conclude that in this case the evidence which formed the basis of petitioner‘s conviction was obtained without violation of petitioner‘s rights under the Constitution.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, with whom MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concur, dissenting.
Because I deem the implications of the Court‘s decision to have serious threats to basic liberties, I consider it important to underscore my concern over the outcome of this
If I begin with some general observations, it is not because I am unmindful of Mr. Justice Holmes’ caution that “General propositions do not decide concrete cases.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76. Whether they do or not often depends on the strength of the conviction with which such “general propositions” are held. A principle may be accepted “in principle,” but the impact of an immediate situation may lead to deviation from the principle. Or, while accepted “in principle,” a competing principle may seem more important. Both these considerations have doubtless influenced the application of the search and seizure provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus, one‘s views regarding circumstances like those here presented ultimately depend upon one‘s understanding of the history and the function of the
The provenance of the
“XIV. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.”
In the meantime, Virginia, in her first Constitution (1776), incorporated a provision on the subject narrower in scope:
“X. That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.”
When Madison came to deal with safeguards against searches and seizures in the United States Constitution, he did not draw on the Virginia model but based his proposal on the Massachusetts form. This is clear proof that Congress meant to give wide, and not limited, scope to this protection against police intrusion.
“conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment .”
To be sure, that was said by him in a dissenting opinion in which he, with Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Stone applied the prohibition of the
It is significant that the constitution of every State contains a clause like that of the
The
“With the fresh recollection of those stirring discussions [respecting writs of assistance], and of the revolution which followed them, the article in the Bill of Rights, respecting searches and seizures, was framed and adopted. This article does not prohibit all searches and seizures of a man‘s person, his papers, and possessions; but such only as are ‘unreasonable,’ and the foundation of which is ‘not previously supported by oath or affirmation.’ The legislature were not deprived of the power to authorize search warrants for probable causes, supported by oath or affirmation, and for the punishment or suppression of any violation of law.” Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329, 336.
The plain import of this is that searches are “unreasonable” unless authorized by a warrant, and a warrant
It is noteworthy that Congress has consistently and carefully respected the privacy protected by the
The whole history of legislation dealing with search and seizure shows how warily Congress has walked precisely because of the
This is the historic background against which the undisputed facts of this case must be projected. For me the background is respect for that provision of the Bill of Rights which is central to enjoyment of thе other guarantees of the Bill of Rights. How can there be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your house and mine from garret to cellar merely because they are executing a warrant of arrest? How can men feel free if all their papers may be searched, as an incident to the arrest of someone in the house, on the chance that something may turn up, or rather, be turned up? Yesterday the justifying document was an illicit ration book, tomorrow it may be some suspect piece of literature.
The Court‘s reasoning, as I understand it, may be briefly stated. The entry into Harris’ apartment was lawful because the agents had a warrant of arrest. The ensuing search was lawful because, as an incident of a lawful arrest, the police may search the premises on which the arrest took place since everything in the apartment was in the “possession” of the accused and subject to his control. It was lawful, therefore, for the agents to rummage the apartment in search for “instruments of the crime.” Since the search was lawful, anything illicit discovered in the course of the search was lawfully seized. In any event, the seizure was lawful because the documents found were property of the United States and their possession was a continuing crime against the United States.
To find authority for ransacking a home merely from authority for the arrest of a person is to give a novel and ominous rendering to a momentous chapter in the history of Anglo-American freedom. An Englishman‘s home, though a hovel, is his castle, precisely because the law secures freedom from fear of intrusion by the police except under carefully safeguarded authorization by a magistrate.
But even if the search was reasonable, it does not follow that the seizure was lawful. If the agents had obtained a warrant to look for the cancelled checks, they would not be entitled to seize other items discovered in the process. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 196.6 Harris would have been able to reclaim them by a motion to suppress evidence. Such is the policy of the
These principles are well established. While a few of the lower courts have uncritically and unwarrantedly extended the very limited search without warrant of a person upon his lawful arrest, such extension is hostile to the policy of the Amendment and is not warranted by the precedents of this Court.
“It is important to keep clear the distinction between prohibited searches on the one hand and improper seizures on the other. See Mr. Justice Miller, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 638, 641. Thus, it is unconstitutional to seize a person‘s private papers, though the search
“The course of decisions here has observed these important distinctions. The Court has not been indulgent towards inroads upon the Amendment. Only rarely have its dicta appeared to give undue scope to the right of search on arrest, and Marron v. United States, supra [275 U. S. 192], is the only decision in which the dicta were reflected in the result. That case has been a source of confusion to the lower courts. Thus, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit felt that the Marron case required it to give a more restricted view to the prohibitions of the
If the search is illegal when begun, as it clearly was in this case if past decisions mean anything, it cannot retrospectively gain legality. If the search was illegal, the resulting seizure in the course of the search is illegal. It is no answer to say that possession of a document may itself be a crime. There is no suggestion here that the search was based on even a suspicion that Harris was in possession of illicit documents. The search was justified and is justified only in connection with the offense for which there was a warrant of arrest. But unless we are going to throw to the winds the latest unanimous decisions of this Court on the allowable range of search without warrant incidental to lawful arrest, Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, this was an unlawful search which rendered unavailable as evidence everything seized in the course of it. That the agents might have obtained a warrant to make the search only emphasizes the illegal-
The only exceptions to the safeguard of a warrant issued by a magistrate are those which the common law recognized as inherent limitations of the policy which found expression in the
In our case, five agents came to arrest Harris on a charge of violating the Postal Laws and the National Stolen Property Act. Though the arrest was consummated in
Again, in the Lefkowitz case, the Marron case was carefully defined and limited:
“There, prohibition officers lawfully on the premises searching for liquor described in a search warrant, arrested the bartender for crime openly being committed in their presence. He was maintaining a nuisance in violation of the Act. The offense involved the element of continuity, the purchase of liquor from time to time, its sale as a regular thing for consumption upon the premises and other transactions including the keeping of accounts. The ledger and bills being in plain viеw were picked up by the officers as an incident of the arrest. No search for them was made.” 285 U. S. at 465.
Surely no comparable situation is now here. There was no search warrant, no crime was “openly being committed” in the presence of the officers, the seized documents were not “in plain view” or “picked up by the officers as an incident of the arrest.” Here a “thorough search” was made, and made without warrant.
To say that the Go-Bart and the Lefkowitz cases—both of them unanimous decisions of the Court—are authority for the conduct of the arresting agents in this case is to find that situations decisively different are the same.
Of course, this may mean that it might be more difficult to obtain evidence of an offense unexpectedly uncovered in a lawless search. It may even mean that some offenses may go unwhipped of the law. If so, that is part of the cost for the greater gains of the
Stooping to questionable methods neither enhances that respect for law which is the most potent element in law enforcement, nor, in the long run, do such methods promote successful prosecution. In this country police testimony is often rejected by juries precisely because of a widely entertained belief that illegal methods are used to secure testimony. Thus, dubious police methods defeat the very ends of justice by which such methods are justified. No such cloud rests on police testimony in England. Respect for law by law officers promotes respect generally, just as lawlessness by law officers sets a contagious and competitive example to others. See IV Reports of the National Commission on Law Enforcement and Observance (“Lawlessness in Law Enforcement“) passim, especially pp. 190-92. Moreover, by compelling police officers to abstain from improper methods for securing evidence, pressure is exerted upon them to bring the resources of intelligence and imagination into play in the detection and prosecution of crime.
No doubt the
It is vital, no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and that all relevant evidence should be secured and used. On the other hand, it cannot be said too often that what is involved far transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is involved than that which makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repression for society as a whole. The dangers are not fanciful. We too readily forget them. Recollection may be refreshed as to the happenings after the first World War by the “Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States Department of Justice,” which aroused the public concern of Chief Justice Hughes (then at the bar), and by the little book entitled “The Deportations De- 8
More than twenty years ago, before democracy was subjected to its recent stress and strain, Judge Learned Hand, in a decision approved by this Court in the Lefkowitz case, expressed views that seem to me decisive of this case:
“After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that one‘s papers are safe only so long as one is not at home. Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go pari passu with the supposed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past. Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition.” United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203.
[For dissenting opinions of MURPHY and JACKSON, JJ., see post, pp. 183, 195.]
Analysis of Decisions Involving Searches and Seizures, from Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, up to Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582*
| 1. Name of case | 2. Charge on arrest | 3. Authority for arrest | 4. Articles seized | 5. Articles seized under warrant | 6. Articles seized incident to lawful arrest | 7. Articles seized incident to authorized search for other articles | 8. Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). | Use of mails to distribute lottery tickets. | Arrested without a warrant and not during commission of crime. | Personal papers and lottery tickets, taken from defendant‘s home. | None. | None. | None. | District court had improperly admitted in evidence some of articles seized; conviction reversed. |
| Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). | Conspiracy to violate Espionage Act of 1917. | Indictment. | Leaflets counseling draft evasion. | Leaflets counseling draft evasion. Warrant was directed to search of Socialist headquarters from which leaflets were mailed by defendant. | None. | None. | Evidence properly admitted by trial court for use against defendant. |
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). | Contempt of court for failure to produce books and documents required by subpoena. (One of defendants was a corporation.) Order was based on evidence secured as indicated in columns 3-7. | No arrest. | Books and papers seized under color of invalid subpoena. | None. | None. | None. | Order directing production of evidence, which was based on knowledge secured in violation of Fourth Amendment, was error, and conviction for failure to obey order reversed. (White, C. J., and Pitney, J., dissenting.) |
| Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921). | Conspiracy and use of mails to defraud United States. | Indictment. | Four documents taken from defendant‘s office. | Three of the papers. (The other was taken by stealth from the office by a government agent.) | None. | None. | On certification, held that papers were inadmissible. Search warrant may issue only when interest of public or complainant in the article is primary, or when its possession is unlawful; it may not issue merely to secure evidence. |
| Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921). | Removal of whiskey without payment of tax; sale of whiskey on which no tax had been paid. | None. | Whiskey in question, as result of search without a warrant in defendant‘s absence. (Officers admitted by defendant‘s wife.) | None. | None. | None. | Evidence improperly admitted; conviction reversed. |
| Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921). | Civil suit for return of property in hands of Assistant to Attorney General. | No arrest. | Plaintiff‘s books and papers had been stolen from plaintiff‘s possession by a party unrelated to the Federal Government. | None. | None. | None. | District court had held that retention of paper for use as evidence was in violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendments; this Court reversed. (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting.) |
*For cases related but not immediately pertinent, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186.
| 1. Name of case | 2. Charge on arrest | 3. Authority for arrest | 4. Articles seized | 5. Articles seized under warrant | 6. Articles seized incident to lawful arrest | 7. Articles seized incident to authorized search for other articles | 8. Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923). | Violation of import laws. (Corporate and individual defendants; only latter, of course, were arrested.) | Warrants. | Corporate papers and books. | Corporate papers and books produced under subpoena. | None. | None. | District court admitted evidence against both corporate and individual defendants. This Court affirmed. |
| Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). | Transportation of alcoholic beverages. | Arrested during commission of crime. | Alcoholic beverages. | None. | Whiskey uncovered during search of car in which it was being transported at time of arrest. | None. | Evidence was properly admitted; conviction affirmed. (McReynolds and Sutherland, JJ., dissenting.) |
| Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498, 505 (1925) (two cases). | 1. Action for return of seized liquor. | 1. No arrest. | 1. Liquor. | 1. Liquor. (Warrant was directed to address not specifically stated to be that of building searched.) | 1. None. | 1. None. | 1. Evidence properly secured and need not be returned. |
| 2. Possession of liquor in violation of Prohibition Act. | 2. Information. | 2. Liquor. | 2. Liquor. (Warrant was directed to prohibition officer. Question of reasonable cause for its issuance was not left to jury.) Alcoholic wines. | 2. None. | 2. None. | 2. Evidence properly secured and properly admitted by district court; judgment affirmed. | |
| Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435 (1925). | Motion to quash search warrant. | No arrest. | Alcoholic wines. | Alcoholic wines. | None. | None. | Warrant proрerly issued on reasonable ground; refusal of district court to quash search warrant affirmed. |
| Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925). | Possession and sale of cocaine without registration or payment of tax. | Arrested during commission of crime. | Can of cocaine seized at home of one of defendants while he was being arrested several blocks away. | None. | None. | None. | Evidence improperly admitted; conviction, affirmed by the C. C. A., here reversed. |
| Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927). | Possession of counterfeit alcoholic beverage stamps. | Indictment. | Counterfeit alcoholic beverage stamps. | No Federal warrant issued. But warrant was issued by state judge to state officers to search for liquor. Federal officer accompanied them on search and uncovered stamps. | None. | Counterfeit alcoholic beverage stamps. (See column 5.) | Conviction in district court, affirmed in the C. C. A., here reversed, because evidence was improperly admitted. |
| McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95 (1927). | Possession of intoxicating liquor. | Information. | Intoxicating liquor. | Intoxicating liquor. (Most of liquor thus seized was immediately destroyed, with only samples retained for evidence.) | None. | None. | On certificate from C. C. A. after conviction, held that evidence was properly admitted. Butler, J., concurring in result. |
| United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927). | Conspiracy to violate Prohibition Act. | Arrested while engaging in crime. | 71 cases of grain alcohol. Cases were seized on American vessel more than 12 miles from shore. | None. | 71 cases of grain alcohol. | None. | Defendant‘s conviction, reversed by the C. C. A. on grounds of illegal search, sustained by this Court. |
| 1. Name of case | 2. Charge on arrest | 3. Authority for arrest | 4. Articles seized | 5. Articles seized under warrant | 6. Articles seized incident to lawful arrest | 7. Articles seized incident to authorized search for other articles | 8. Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106 (1927). | Transportation of intoxicating liquor. | Arrested during commission of crime. | Intoxicating liquor. | None. | The liquor. | None. | Conviction, affirmed by C. C. A., affirmed by this Court. |
| United States v. Berkness, 275 U. S. 149 (1927). | Civil suit to abate nuisance. | No arrest. | Liquor. | Liquor. Warrant was invalid for failure of allegation of sale on the premises as basis for its issue. | None. | None. | District court judgment excluding evidence, affirmed by C. C. A., affirmed by this Court. |
| Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927). | Violation of Prohibition Act. | Indictment. (Crime committed in presence of arresting officers. Articles seized, as described in columns 4-7, were taken at time of arrest.) | Intoxicating liquor, ledger, and papers. (Ledger was in closet in back of bar which contained some of the liquor; papers (bills) were on table near cash register.) | The intoxicating liquor. | Ledger and bills. Court held that, while seizure was not authorized by the warrant, ledger and bills were properly seized as within the “immediate possession and control” of offender. | See explanation in 282 U. S. at 358, that the articles “wеre visible and accessible” and that there was no “rummaging of the place.” And see 285 U. S. at 465. | Evidence properly admitted; conviction sustained by C. C. A. affirmed here. |
| Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927). | Transportation of intoxicating liquor. | Crime committed in presence of arresting officers (state police). | Intoxicating liquor. | None. | Liquor seized as result of search of car in which defendants were when arrested. But Court found no probable cause for arrest. | None. | Evidence improperly admitted; conviction, affirmed by the C. C. A., reversed here. |
| Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931). | Possession, transportation, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquor. | Invalid warrant. | Office papers and records secured by use of keys taken from defendants at time of their arrest, and on false statement that they had a warrant for the papers. | None. | None. (See column 3.) | None. | Evidence must be returned to defendants; judgments of district court and the C. C. A. reversed. |
| Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931). | Possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor. | Arrested during commission of crime. | Intoxicating liquor. | None. | Intoxicating liquor uncovered during search of automobile reasonably believed to contain such contraband. | None. | Movable vehicle authorizes search on probable cause. Evidence properly admitted. |
| United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). | Conspiracy to violate Prohibition Act, including use of premises for sale and solicitation of orders. | Warrant of U. S. Commissioner. | Variety of papers taken from desks, cabinets, and wastebasket. Among these papers were lists of names and addresses, stationery, bills directed to customers, letters of solicitation, etc. | None. | None. (Papers in wastebasket were, of course, in open view.) | None. | District court denied motions for return of papers; C. C. A. reversed, and this Court affirmed judgment of C. C. A. |
| 1. Name of case | 2. Charge on arrest | 3. Authority for arrest | 4. Articles seized | 5. Articles seized under warrant | 6. Articles seized incident to lawful arrest | 7. Articles seized incident to authorized search for other articles | 8. Decision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1 (1932). | Illegal possession of intoxicating liquor. | Arrest made on basis of evidence uncovered during search. | 122 cases of liquor. Agents investigated and noticed odor of alcohol coming from garage. Defendant had been under suspicion. Agents broke into garage and uncovered cache of liquor. Defendant was arrested when he came to garage during searсh. | None. | None. | None. | Evidence of seized liquor improperly admitted; conviction and C. C. A. affirmance reversed. |
| Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124 (1932). | Unlawful manufacture and possession of liquor. | Indictment. | Still, its appurtenances, and 350 gallons of whiskey. | Still, its appurtenances, and 350 gallons of whiskey. But warrant issued on mere allegations that defendant had been seen hauling cans often used for liquor, and bringing cane sugar onto premises; that full cans were removed from premises; and that odors of fumes of cooking mash were noticeable. There was no allegation of any sale on premises. | None. | None. | Evidence of seized goods improperly admitted; conviction in trial court and affirmance of C. C. A. reversed. (Stone and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.) |
| Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206 (1932). | Possession and sale of intoxicating liquor. | Information. | Intoxicating liquor. | Intoxicating liquor. But warrant was invalid. When first issued, it was not executed within 10 days; reissued without new evidence or affidavits. | None. | None. | Evidence of seized liquor improperly admitted; conviction and its affirmance by C. C. A. reversed. (McReynolds, J., concurring in special opinion; Stone and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.) |
| Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). | Importation of liquor without payment of import duties. | Information, filed after seizure. | None. | Intoxicating liquor. But warrant issued by state judge at request of customs agent on mere allegation of belief by customs agent that defendant had violated the law. | None. | None. | Evidence of seized liquor improperly admitted; conviction and affirmance by C. C. A. reversed. |
| Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 (1938). | Possession and transportation of distilled alcohol on which tax had not been paid. | Arrest during commission of crime. | Distilled alcohol on which tax had not been paid. | None. | Liquor seized during search of car which officers had followed into garage adjoining defendant‘s house. | None. | Evidence properly admitted; conviction and judgment of C. C. A. affirmed. |
The Court today has resurrected and approved, in effect, the use of the odious general warrant or writ of assistance, presumably outlawed forever from our society by the
That this decision converts a warrant for arrest into a general search warrant lacking all the constitutional safeguards is demonstrated most plainly by the facts. Two valid warrants were issued for the arrest of petitioner and one C. R. Moffett. The first warrant charged them with a violation of the mail fraud statute,
Two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation went to petitioner‘s apartment, armed with these warrants for arrest. Petitioner was placed under arrest in the living room of his apartment and was safely handcuffed. The agents, together with three others who had arrived in the meantime, then began a systematic ransacking of the
The agents testified that they were searching for “two $10,000 canceled checks of the Mudge Oil Company which our investigation established had been stolen from the offices of the Mudge Oil Company” and which might have been used in connection with forging the $25,000 check in issue. It was also admitted that they were searching “for any means that might have been used to commit these two crimes [charged in the warrants for arrest], such as burglar tools, pens, or anything that could be used in a confidence game of this type“; “we thought we might find a photostatic copy [of the $25,000 check]“; “anything which would indicate a violation of the mail fraud statute and the National Stolen Property Act“; “anything you could find in connection with the violation of the law for which he [petitioner] was then arrested.” One of them also admitted that they were “searching for goods, wares, merchandise, articles, or anything in connection with the use of the mails to defraud, and also in connection with the violation of
Suffice it to say that they found no checks. The agents admitted seizing seven pens, tissue paper and twenty-seven pieces of celluloid, the latter being found wrapped in a towel in a drawer of the bedroom dresser. Petitioner charges, and it is undenied, that the agents also seized blank stationery of various hotels, blank ruled sheets of paper, several obsolete fountain pens, expense bills and
Most significant of all, however, was the unexpected discovery and seizure, at the end of this long search, of a sealed envelope marked “Georgе Harris, personal papers.” This envelope, which was found in a dresser drawer beneath some clothes, contained eleven draft registration certificates and eight notices of draft classification. Petitioner was then charged with the unlawful possession, concealment and alteration of these certificates and notices and found guilty. Nothing has ever developed as to the forged $25,000 check, which was the basis of petitioner‘s original arrest. No evidence of the crimes charged in the warrants for arrest has been found; no prosecution of petitioner for those crimes has developed.
It is significant that the crime which was thus unexpectedly discovered—namely, the illegal possession of the draft certificates and notices—could not have been brought to light in this case through the use of ordinary constitutional processes. There was no prima facie evidence to support the issuance of a warrant for petitioner‘s arrest for the crime of possessing these items. Nor was there any probable cause or any basis for an oath or affirmation which could justify a valid search warrant for these items. Their presence in petitioner‘s apartment could be discovered only by making an unlimited search for anything and everything that might be found, a search of the type that characterizes a general search warrant or writ of assistance. And it was precisely that type of search that took place in this case.
The Court holds, however, that the search was justified as an incident to petitioner‘s lawful arrest on the mail fraud and stolen property charges. It is said that law enforcement officers have the right, when making a valid arrest, to search the place and to seize the fruits and in
It is undoubtedly true that limited seizures may be made without the benefit of search warrants under certain circumstances where a person has been arrested in his home. Due accommodation must be made for the necessary processes of law enforcement. Seizure may be made of articles and papers on the person of the one arrested. And the arresting officer is free to look around and seize those fruits and evidences of crime which are in plain sight and in his immediate and discernible presence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30. But where no properly limited search warrant has been issued, this Court has been scrupulously insistent on confining very narrowly the scope of search and seizure. The mere fact that a man has been validly arrested does not give the arresting officers untrammeled freedom to search every cranny and nook for anything that might have some relation to the alleged crime or, indeed, to any crime whatsoever. Authority to arrest, in other words, gives no authority whatever to search the premises where the arrest occurs and no authority to seize except under the most restricted circumstances.
Illustrative of the strict limitations which this Court has placed upon searches and seizures without a warrant in connection with a lawful arrest are the three cases of Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192; Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452. In the Marron case, an individual was arrested while actually engaged in running an illegal saloon in pursuance of a conspiracy; a prohibition agent secured a warrant for a search of the premises and for the
The Marron case at first was widely misunderstood as having held that most of the restrictions had been removed on searches of premises incident to arrests. United States v. Gowen, 40 F. 2d 593; United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911. This misunderstanding was removed by the Go-Bart case, which made it clear that the items seized in the Marron case were visible and accessible and in the offender‘s immediate custody; it was further pointed out that there was no threat of force or general search or rummaging of the place in the Marron case. The inherent limitations of the Marron holding were demonstrated by the facts and decision in the Go-Bart case. There the defendant Bartels was placed under lawful arrest in his office on a charge of conspiracy to sell intoxicating liquors. Gowen, the other defendant, arrived and he also was placed under lawful arrest. Gowen was then forced to open a desk and a safe, which were searched by the agents along with other parts of the office. A large quantity of papers belonging to the defendants was seized. This Court held that such a seizure was unconstitutional, the search being general and unlimited in scope and being undertaken in the hope that evidence of the crime might be found.
In the Lefkowitz case, the defendants were placed under lawful arrest in their office on a charge of conspiracy to violate the liquor laws. The arresting officers then pro
Tested in the light of the foregoing principles and decisions, the search in the instant case cannot be justified. Even more glaring than the searches in the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases, the search here was a general exploratory one undertaken in the hope that evidence of some crime might be uncovered. The agents were searching for more than the fruits and instrumentalities of the crimes for which the arrest was made. By their own repeated testimony, they were searching for “anything” in connection with the alleged crimes, for “anything” that would indicate a violation of the laws in question. And their seizure of the draft certificates and notices demonstrates that they were also on the lookout for evidence of any other crime. In the absence of a valid warrant, such an unlimited, ransacking search for “anything” that might turn up has been condemned by this Court in constitutional terms time and time again. Nothing in any of the previous decisions of this Court even remotely approves or justifies this type of search as an incident to a valid arrest; in this respect, today‘s decision flatly contradicts and, in effect, overrules the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases.
Moreover, even if we assume that the agents were merely looking for the fruits and instrumentalities of the crimes for which the arrest was made, the Constitution has bеen violated. There are often minute objects connected with the commission of a crime, objects that can
Thus when a search of this nature degenerates into a general exploratory crusade, probing for anything and everything that might evidence the commission of a crime, the Constitution steps into the picture to protect the individual. If it becomes evident that nothing can be found without a meticulous uprooting of a man‘s home, it is time for the law enforcement officers to secure a warrant. And if such a search has any reasonableness at all, it is a reasonableness that must be determined through the informed and deliberate judgment of a magistrate. “Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.” United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, 464.
To insist upon a search warrant in the circumstances of this case is not to hobble the law enforcement process. Here there was no necessity for haste, no likelihood that the contents of the apartment might be removed or destroyed before a valid search warrant could be obtained. Indeed, the agents did get a warrant to search petitioner‘s office and automobile. It would have been no undue burden on them to obtain a warrant to search the apartment,
The decision of the Court in this case can have but one meaning so far as searches are concerned. It effectively takes away the protection of the
The holding that the search in this case was proper and reasonable thus expands the narrow limitations on searches incident to valid arrests beyond all recognition.
Nor is the flagrant violation of the
The seizure here, as noted, did not occur during the course of a reasonable, constitutional search. Nor did it result from the ready observance of the surrounding premises; the draft certificates and notices were discovered only after a most meticulous ransacking. It is said, however, that the possession of these items by petitioner constituted a continuing offense committed in the presence of the arresting officers. This may be a dialectical way of putting the matter, but it would not commend itself to the common understanding of men. From a practical standpoint, these certificates and notices were not being possessed in the presence of the officers. They were hidden away in the bottom of a dresser drawer beneath some clothes. No arresting officer could possibly be aware of their existence or location unless he pоssessed some supernatural faculty. Indeed, if an arresting officer is to be allowed to search for and seize all hidden things the possession of which is unlawful, on the theory that the possession is occurring in his presence, there would be nothing
The key fact of this case is that the search was lawless. A lawless search cannot give rise to a lawful seizure, even of contraband goods. And “good faith” on the part of the arresting officers cannot justify a lawless search, nor support a lawless seizure. In forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution made certain procedural requirements indispensable for lawful searches and seizures. It did not mean, however, to substitute the good intentions of the police for judicial authorization except in narrowly confined situations. History, both before and after the adoption of the
Now it may be that the illegality of the search and of the seizure in this case leads to the immunizing of petitioner from prosecution for the illegal possession of the draft certificates and notices. But freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is one оf the cardinal rights of free men under our Constitution. That freedom belongs to all men, including those who may be guilty of some crime. The public policy underlying the constitutional guarantee of that freedom is so great as to outweigh the desirability of convicting those whose crime has been revealed through an unlawful invasion of their
It is likely that the full impact of today‘s decision will not be apparent immediately. Petitioner is not an important or notorious criminal; and the investigation may have been undertaken with the best of motives. But apart from the fact that the Constitution was designed to protect the unimportant as well as the important, including those of criminal tendencies, the implications of what has been done in this case can affect the freedom of all our people. The principle established by the Court today can be used as easily by some future government determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition as it can be used by a government determined to undo forgers and defrauders. See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203. History is not without examples of the outlawry of certain political, religious and economic beliefs and the relentless prosecution of those who dare to entertain such beliefs. And history has a way of repeating itself. It therefore takes no stretch of the imagination to picture law enforcement officers arresting those accused of believing, writing or speaking that which is proscribed, accompanied by a thorough ransacking of their homes as an “incident” to the arrest in an effort to uncover “anything” of a seditious nature. Under the Court‘s decision, the
As Judge Learned Hand recently said, “If the prosecution of crime is to be conducted with so little regard for that protection which centuries of English law have given to the individual, we are indeed at the dawn of a new era; and much that we have deemed vital to our liberties, is a delusion.” United States v. Di Re, 159 F. 2d 818, 820.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join this dissent.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
This case calls upon the Court to say whether any right to search a home is conferred on officers by the fact that within that home they arrest one of its inhabitants. The law in this field has not been made too clear by our previous decisions. I do not criticize the officers involved in this case, because this Court‘s decisions afford them no clear guidance.
The
The Amendment, having thus roughly indicated the immunity of the citizen which must not be violated, goes on to recite how officers may be authorized, consistently with the right so declared, to make searches: “. . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
Here endeth the command of the forefathers, apparently because they believed that by thus controlling search warrants they had controlled searches. The forefathers, however, were guilty of a serious oversight if they left open another way by which searches legally may be made without a search warrant and with none of the safeguards that would surround the issuance of one.
Of course, a warrant to take a person into custody is authority for taking into custody all that is found upon his person or in his hands. Some opinions have spoken in generalities of this right to search such property incidentally to arrest of the person as including whatever was in the arrested person‘s “possession.”
Repeated efforts have been made to expand this search to include all premises and property in constructive possession by reason of tenancy or ownership. While the language of this Court sometimes has been ambiguous, I do not find that the Court heretofore has sustained this extension of the incidental search. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452. In this respect, it seems to me, the decision of today goes beyond any previous one and throws a home open to search on a warrant that does not in any respect comply with the constitutional requirements of a search warrant and does not even purport to authorize any search of any premises.
The decision certainly will be taken, in practice, as authority for a search of any home, office or other premises if a warrant can be obtained for the arrest of any occupant and the officer chooses to make the arrest on the premises. It wоuld seem also to permit such search incidentally to an arrest without a warrant if the circumstances make such arrest a lawful one. It would also appear to sanc
The difficulty with this problem for me is that once the search is allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon him or in his immediate physical control, I see no practical limit short of that set in the opinion of the Court—and that means to me no limit at all.
I am unable to suggest any test by which an incidental search, if permissible at all, can in police practice be kept within bounds that are reasonable. I hear none. I do not agree with other Justices in dissent that the intensity of this search made it illegal. It is objected that these searchers went through everything in the premises. But is a search valid if superficial and illegal only if it is thorough? It took five hours on the part of several officers. But if it was authorized at all, it can hardly become at some moment illegal because there was so much stuff to examine that it took оvertime. It is said this search went beyond what was in “plain sight.” It would seem a little capricious to say that a gun on top of a newspaper could be taken but a newspaper on top of a gun insulated it from seizure. If it were wrong to open a sealed envelope in this case, would it have been right if the mucilage failed to stick? The short of the thing is that we cannot say
I cannot escape the conclusion that a search, for which we can assign no practicable limits, on premises and for things which no one describes in advance, is such a search as the Constitution considered “unreasonable” and intended to prohibit.
In view of the long history of abuse of search and seizure which led to the
Of course, this, like each of our constitutional guaranties, often may afford a shelter for criminals. But the forefathers thought this was not too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers and effects which is indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect. They may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their command at naught.