ELEANOR A. HARRIS еt al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TROJAN FIREWORKS COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
Civ. No. 23938
Fourth Dist., Div. Two.
June 8, 1981.
121 Cal. App. 3d 157
ELEANOR A. HARRIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. TROJAN FIREWORKS COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
Peach, Shapiro & Peach and Timothy W. Peach for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Morris, Polich, Jr., & Purdy, Theodore P. Polich, Jr., and Suzan R. Flamm for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
GARST, J.*—
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. The order of dismissal was entered at the request of defendant Trojan Fireworks Company after defendant‘s demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint had been sustained. Plaintiffs were granted 30 days to amend their complaint which they declined to do.
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Since the appeal arose from an order dismissing the complaint, the facts stated are the facts which are alleged in the complaint.
The complaint is brought in four counts. The first count seeks damages for the wrongful death of James Harris and is brought by his parents. Counts 2 and 3 are brought by two minor children for their personal injuries and count 4 is brought by the mother of the minor children, for rеimbursement of medical expenses which were incurred for medical care required for the children as a result of the injuries which they sustained. The children were riding in a car driven by James Harris when it was involved in an accident with a car driven by Anthony Barajas (Barajas).
Barajas was an employee of defendant Trojan Fireworks Company (Trojan).
On Friday, December 21, 1979, at the Trojan manufacturing plant in Rialto, commencing at noon and continuing until 4 p.m., Trojan held a Christmas party for its employees at which, it is alleged, the employees were caused to attend and caused to imbibe large quantities of alcoholic beverages.
Barajas attended the party and became intoxicated to the extent that his ability to drive an automobile was substantially impaired. Nevertheless, he attempted to drive home. In this attempt he was involved in the аccident which resulted in the death of James Harris and injury to Dawn and Steven Griffin.
Plaintiffs allege the death of Harris and the injuries of Dawn and Steven Griffin were the result of the accident which was proximately caused by the Barajas’ advanced state of intoxication.
CONTENTIONS
Plaintiffs contend that their complaint is sufficient. They contend that Barajas’ intoxication, which was the proximate cause of the accident and resulting injuries and death, occurred in the course and scope of his employment so that under the doctrine of respondeat superior his employer, defendant Trojan, is liable for the resulting injuries and wrongful death.
The issue presented is whether, as a matter of law, the complaint states facts which would support a judgment against Trojan under any theory of liability.
We are of the opinion that the demurrer should have been overruled.
DISCUSSION
Respondeat Superior
As a general rule, a principal is responsible for the acts of his agent; however, an employer is often exempted from liability for injury caused to or by the employee while the employee is traveling to or from work.
However, there are numerous exceptions to the foregoing rules.2 Defendant urges that we should not look to the rationale of workers’
The propriety of applying the rationale of workers’ compensation cases to third party injury fact situations and vice versa is now well established. “Although the test of workmen‘s compensation law of ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ (
minated their shift. Apparently the employees of the subcontractor had remained at the jobsite, and drank beer while they worked on the personal pickup of one of the employees. The employee of the general contractor was assaulted when he refused to give a ride on a bulldozer to one of the employees of the subcontractor. (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608.)
In Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, an order granting a new trial to the employer was reversed in a case where a verdict was rendered in favor of a third party injured by the employer‘s intoxicated employee who was on his way home from a company banquet.
In Richards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1941) 19 Cal.2d 236, a judgment of nonsuit in favor of an employer was reversed where a negligent insurance salesman, on his way to work, injured a third party. The evidence reflected that there were days when the insurance salesman would call on customers, sell policies, collect premiums, deliver policies, etc. before proceeding to work.
Similarly, liability of an employer to an innocent third party for an accident which occurred on an employee‘s way to work was upheld in Brelend v. Traylor Eng. etc., Co. (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 415. In that case the employer had sent an employee to California from Pennsylvania to assist in the construction of a kiln. The employer drove, and on the way had an automobile accident, injuring plaintiffs. Travel and subsistence expenses were paid by the employer while the employee was en route to California and the employer also paid the employee for use of the employee‘s personal car while traveling to the jobsite.
The law now recognizes that the entire subject of torts is a reflection of social policies which fix financial responsibility for harm done. As we depart from liability for one‘s own act or conduct and enter into the arena of vicarious liability, the quest of liability is frequently determined by who is best able to spread the risk of loss through the prices charged for its product or liability insurance. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d 956, 959-960; Fields v. Sanders (1947) 29 Cal.2d 834.) The underlying philosophy which holds an employer liable for an employee‘s negligent acts is the deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise should not be able to disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be the result of its activity. (Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States (2d Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 167; see also Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts (1959) 72 Harv.L.Rev. 401.)
In the case of Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 608, this court stated: “Under the modern rationale for respondeat superior, the test for determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of his employee is closely related to the test applied in workers’ compensation cases for determining whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment. [Citations.] This must necessarily be so because the theoretical basis for placing a loss on the employer in both the tort and workers’ compensation fields is the allocation of the economic cost of an injury resulting from a risk incident to the enterprise.” (50 Cal.App.3d at p. 619.)
Thus, we think it can be fairly said that liability attaches where a nexus exists between the employment or the activity which results in an injury that is foreseeable.4 Foreseeable is here used in the sense that the employee‘s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among the other costs of the employer‘s business. (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 619.)
It may be inferred that the party was for the benefit of the employer. It may be argued that the purpose of the party was to improve employer/employee relations or to increase the continuity of employment by providing employees with the fringe benefit of a party, or to improve relations between the employees by providing them with this opportunity for social contact. (Boynton v. McKales, supra, 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 789.) That Trojan intended for Barajas to attend the party is indicated by the fact that the party was held at work during work hours and Barajas was paid to attend. That Trojan intended for Barajas to consume alcohol is implied from the fact that the employer furnished the alcoholic beverages and it is further alleged that Trojan, its agents and employees caused him to imbibe large quantities of alcoholic beverages. It is further allegеd that he became intoxicated at the party, to such an extent that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was substantially impaired. The complaint further alleges that while in this intoxicated condition, and at his place of employment, he entered his automobile and commenced his attempt to drive home.
These facts are very similar to those found in Boynton v. McKales, supra, which defendant seeks to distinguish. The plaintiff in the Boynton case recovered a judgment against the employer of an intoxicated driver who struck the plaintiff while the employee was on his way home from a company banquet. Defendant attempts to distinguish the Boynton case by pointing to the fact that the company banquet in the Boynton case occurred after normal working hours thus requiring the
We hold that plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts, which, if proved, would support a jury‘s determination that Barajаs’ intoxication occurred at the Christmas party and that his attendance at the party as well as his state of intoxication occurred within the scope of his employment. That he would attempt to drive home while still intoxicated and might have an accident was foreseeable as that term is used in Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 618-619.7
Reversed.
Gardner, P. J., and Morris, J., concurred.
GARST, J.,* Concurring.—I believe that, in addition to stating a cause of action based upon the theory of respondeat superior, the plain-
*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
The complaint alleges that Barajas was caused by Trojan to attend the Christmas party and was caused by Trojan to imbibe large quantities of alcoholic beverages knowing that he would be driving home after the party.
It is clear that the trial judge sustained the defendant‘s demurrer because he felt that subdivisions (b) and (c) of
This principle of equal protection preserved by both state and federal Constitutions does not preclude the state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that, at a minimum, persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment. (Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 861)
Legitimate State Purpose
That the State of California has a legitimate purpose in regulating the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages seems clear.
The dimensions of the cost of alcohol-related accidents and the catastrophic personal and economic impact are profoundly disturbing social phenomena. (Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144, 154)
Nationally, alcohol is associated with over half of the deaths and major injuries suffered in automobile accidents each year. In California alone during 1976 alcohol was found to be the primary collision factor in 28 percent of all fatalities. (Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, 154.)
Current figures of the National Safety Council and Department of Transportation show that alcohol-related accidents now account for about 25,000 deaths annually and represent an estimated annual economic cost of over $5 billion. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 899.)
Development of the Law
Prior to 1971, decisional law did not allow recovery to those injured by an intoxicated person as against the negligent supplier of alcoholic beverages. That decisional law was overturned in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153. The Vesely court stated: “To the extent that the common law rule of nonliability is based on concepts of proximate cause, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the cases that have abandoned that rule. The decisions in those jurisdictions which have abandoned the common law rule invoke principles of proximate cause similar to those established in this state by cases dealing with matters other than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages. [Citations.] Under these principles an actor may be liable if his negligence is a substantial factоr in causing an injury, and he is not relieved of liability because of the intervening act of a third person if such
” . . . . . . . . . .
“Insofar as proximate cause is concerned, we find no basis for a distinction founded solely on the fact that consumption of an alcoholic beverage is a voluntary act of the consumer and is a link in the chain of causation from the furnishing of the beverage to the injury resulting from intoxication. Under the above principles of proximate cause, it is clear that the furnishing of an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by that individual upon a third person. If such furnishing is a proximate cause, it is so because the consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are fоreseeable intervening causes, or at least the injury-producing conduct is one of the hazards which makes such furnishing negligent.” (5 Cal.3d 153, at pp. 163-164.)
In response to Vesely and its progeny, the Legislature amended
These amendments seek to accomplish their objective of denying compensation to persons injured by drunk drivers as against those who supplied the drunk driver with alcoholic beverage by modifying the common law which provides that all persons are liable for all injuries proximately occasioned by their negligent conduct. These subdivisions provide immunity to those who supply alcohol to others by eliminating the furnishing of alcohol as a proximate cause of the resulting injury inflicted by the drunken driver.
Having satisfied myself that there is a legitimate state interest in rendering the highways safer for the general public by regulating the distribution and consumption of alcohol, I now address the scope of review to be accorded these statutоry amendments to the
Traditionally, both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have applied a two-tiered test in their constitutional analysis of state legislative acts. In equal protection cases which do not involve suspect classifications or the alleged infringement of a fundamental interest, a statute is presumed valid and is upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose; however, if the statutory scheme imposes a suspect classification, or a classification which infringes on a fundamental interest, the classification is closely scrutinized and is upheld only if it is necessary for the furtherance of a compelling state interest. (Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 958-959)
The United States Supreme Court has also recently adopted an intermediate standard of review. In Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190, 197, it was held that “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”4
Nature of the Right Involved
Essentially two rights are infringed by the amendments to
The right to recover full compensation from all persons negligently responsible for one‘s injuries has not been held to be a fundamental interest so that its infringement alone would invite close constitutional analysis of the infringing legislative act.5 Nevertheless, this right, at least to the catastrophically injured individual is a substantial right based on sound public policy and it has frequently been the intended victim of legislation which has been found to be violative of the equal protection clauses.
The expression of public policy favoring full compensation from all persons contributing to one‘s injury or damage is found in
That our courts have considered this right to be substantial is reflected in the decisions which have discussed it. It was the impetus of this right to adequate compensation for injury that resulted in the decision which abolished the fine distinctions in the standard of care owed by a landowner to different сategories of persons on his property (Rowland v. Christian (1969) 69 Cal.2d 108); and to the abolishment of interspousal immunity (Klein v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692), governmental immunity (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211), and charitable immunity (Malloy v. Fong (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, 366; Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland (1939) 14 Cal.2d 762).
In Jess v. Herrmann (1979) 26 Cal.3d 131, our Supreme Court reasoned that the main objective of the financial responsibility law was to assure monetary protection to that tragically large group of persons who suffer grave injury through the
This public policy of California favoring full compensation for negligently inflicted injuries was the motivating force behind the Supreme Court‘s decision in Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d 855, which held the guest statute unconstitutional.
In the case of American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, the California Supreme Court retained the joint and several liability rule for joint tortfeasors in order that injured persons might have a better opportunity to obtain full recovery for their injury from all persons negligently responsible for their injuries.
Similarly, the Supreme Court reasoned that “fundamentаl justice” required abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence because it worked as a bar to fair recovery for injuries inflicted as a result of the joint negligence of the claimant and another negligent party. (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 812-813.)
In fact, it was the dual objective of affording adequate and full compensation to those injured by drunk drivers and the objective of promoting highway safety that resulted in Vesely, Bernhard and Coulter which are now sought to be abrogated by the recent amendments to
Improper Classification
First, it creates a favored class consisting of those who supply or furnish alcoholic beverages and it creates the disfavored class of those injured by drunken drivers.
The suppliers of alcohol are favored because they are provided with immunity from the consequences of their negligent conduct.
One who supplies another with drugs other than alcohol is liable for the foreseeable consequences of injury inflicted by the person under the influence of drugs. If one who provides a known reckless driver with an automobile (Rocca v. Steinmetz (1923) 61 Cal.App.102, 109) or a juvenile with a firearm (Reida v. Lund (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 698, 704) cannot escape liability by saying that the reckless driver or juvenile caused the resulting injury, how then can immunity be provided to a negligent supplier of alcohol who thereby renders the driver of a car incompetent to drive it?
While the standard of care owed to others is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, when that standard is prescribed by statute, conduct below the standard is negligence per se. (
This section “was adopted for the purpose of protecting members of the general public from injuries to person and damage to property resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor.” (Vesely v. Sager, supra, 5 Cal.3d 153, 165.)
Ordinarily, civil liability would accrue to the person who violates this statute and thereby causes harm to another. By statutory classification, subdivisions (b) and (c) provide suppliers of alcoholic beverages with civil immunity for their criminal acts.
A number of cases have held legislation unconstitutional when the result of the legislation was to accord a privilege to a favored class. In
In State Board v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 443-444, the Supreme Court condemned legislation6 which promoted the welfare of “a special class of the body politic” and which promoted only “the private advantage of a small group, not a class, composing a small percentage of the population.”
An act exempting certain motor vehicles from insurance requirements was held unconstitutional in Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283 U.S. 553; an act allowing certain milk dealers to sell at lower than the regulated price was held unconstitutional in Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck (1936) 297 U.S. 266; a statute permitting mutual, but not stock, insurance companies to act through salary representatives was held unconstitutional in Hartford Co. v. Harrison (1937) 301 U.S. 459; a statute regulating motels, but not hotels, with respect to outdoor rate advertising was held unconstitutional in Gawzner Corp. v. Minier (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 777; a statute which permitted only certain types of business entities to engage in foreign currency transactions was held unconstitutional in O‘Kane v. Catuira (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 131.
Other states have held that arbitrary and discriminatory classifications which limit the right of tort victims (i.e., make this class disfavored) are violative of constitutional standards. (See, e.g., Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1968) 41 Ill.2d 336 (damage limitation of $10,000 for tort action against a nonprofit school held unconstitutional); Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist. No. 84 (1968) 39 Ill.2d 136
In a recent trilogy of cases the United States Supreme Court addressed the problem of statutes limiting the rights of illegitimate survivors and the survivors of illegitimates.
In Levy v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 68, the United States Supreme Court held a state statute which denied illegitimates a cause of action for the wrongful death of mother unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause. (Levy v. Louisiana, supra, at p. 71.)
In Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 73, it held unconstitutional a state statute which denied the mother of an illegitimate child a сause of action for the wrongful death of her child.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 406 U.S. 164, it held constitutionally invalid a statute which denied workmen‘s compensation benefits to the illegitimate survivors of a workman killed on the job.
That subdivisions (b) and (c) of
It bears repetition that the basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in
As in Newton‘s law of physics, which tells us that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction,” so also in our society when one class is favored there is a corresponding class which is disfavored. In creating a favored class of persons to whom immunity is granted for their negligent acts a disfavored class, is created. This class consists of the persons injured by drunk drivers. These innocent and injured third persons are denied in their right to recover full compensatory damages from all persons who have negligently contributed to their injury because they have no cause of action against the nеgligent suppliers.
“In determining the scope of the class singled out for special burdens or benefits, a court cannot confine its view to the terms of the specific statute under attack, but must judge the enactment‘s operation against the background of other legislative, administrative and judicial directives which govern the legal rights of similarly situated persons. As the United States Supreme Court recognized long ago: ‘The question of constitutional validity is not to be determined by artificial standards [confining review ‘within the four corners’ of a statute]. What is required is that state action, whether through one agency or another, or through one enactment or more than one, shall be consistent with the restrictions of the Federal Constitution.’ [Citations.] ...” (Brown v. Merlo, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 862; original italics; fns. omitted.)
Therefore, I conclude that subdivisions (b) and (c) of
Rational Connection
Even where legislation does not fall within a classification which subjects it to close scrutiny it is unconstitutional, when on analysis, it can
While a state has broad powers when it comes to making classifications it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class. “Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one.” (Levy v. Louisiana, supra, 391 U.S. 68, 71.)
If we accept as the laudible objective of these amendments the protection of the general public from injury and damage resulting from the excessive use of alcohol, we come to the heart of the issue, which is, “Does providing immunity to the one who furnishes alcoholic beverages reduce the likelihood that an injury will result to an innocent user of the highway or otherwise?” I believe that the contrary is true.
It is my opinion that removing liability from one who serves or furnishes alcoholic beverage to a habitual or common drunk or to an obviously intoxicated person works against the objective of providing safe highways. I believe that the terms habitual or common drunkards, used in the statute, have reference to alcoholics, who by definition are people who have lost their individual ability to control or regulate their consumption of alcohol. If the consumer of alcohol has no ability to regulate his consumption of alcohol, how is the public protected from the harm to be occasioned by him when he becomes intoxiсated unless the person who supplies or furnishes him with alcohol is held responsible?
A rule which holds a supplier of alcoholic beverage liable does not render the consumer less liable. A drunk driver remains fully responsible for the consequences of his driving. Such a rule merely provides that where both the driver and the supplier are negligent, they are jointly and severally responsible for damages occasioned to an innocent third party. (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578.)
That a rule of liability, rather thаn immunity, fosters responsible conduct and achieves the legislative objective of providing safe highways, is shown in the reasoning of Justice Richardson where he says: “We think, in short, that the policy of preventing future harm identified by us in Rowland is served by requiring the exercise of reasonable restraint by the social host....” (Coulter v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 144, 154.)
Fairness
I perceive the rule of liability for fault to be fair. In all other areas of conduct the negligent wrongdoer is liable for the injury and damage that occurs to others as the result of the foreseeable consequences of his negligent conduct.
In fact, in many areas, liability has attached without fault, as a socially desirable means of allocating the loss. In such instances it has been reasoned that the industry which enjoys the profits, and can best distribute the loss should initially bear the loss. (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63.)
A supplier will be able to distribute the loss occasioned by his negligent conduct by the acquisition of insurance, the premiums of which will be distributed to his customers by increased prices. By this method the industry which enjoys the profits and occasions the risk, shoulders a share of the responsibility for harm occasioned by that risk. By imposing financial liability to persons injured, the responsibility for insuring that alcoholics and intoxicated persons are not served will be placed on a person who is capable of, and has the ability to exercise restraint and judgment, the provider of the alcoholic beverages.
For the foregoing reasons I would hold subdivisions (b) and (c) of
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 30, 1981.
Notes
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in such cases as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah‘s Club (16 Cal.3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (21 Cal.3d 144) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah‘s Club (16 Cal.3d 313), and Coulter v. Superior Court (21 Cal.3d 144) and to reinstate the prior judicial interpretation of this section as it rеlates to proximate cause for injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
(c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person shall be held legally accountable for damages suffered by such person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of such beverages. See footnote 1 to the main opinion.
In cases concerning liability to third persons injured by a negligent employee, courts have found many reasons to impose liability on the employer.
A judgment of nonsuit in favor of the employer was reversed where an employee who was hired to work in Yuma, Arizona, as a cement finisher, struck a bicyclist on his way back to his home in Pasadena, California. On occasion the negligent employee had brought equipment to the jobsite in Yuma in his truck at the employer‘s request; however, at the time of the accident he was not transporting any supplies for his employer. He was, however, transporting a fellow employee whom he had hired at the employer‘s request. Apparently it had been difficult to obtain cement finishers in Yuma, Arizona, and the employer had requested that he solicit people in Pasadena to come to work in Yuma. Also the employer had furnished gas to the employee for the trip home. Under these circumstances the court held that it was a jury question as to whether or not the trip incidentally or indirectly benefitted the employer so that liability would attach to the employer under the special errand exception. (Harvey v. D & L Construction Company (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 48, 52.)
A jury verdict in favоr of two employees of a general contractor was sustained as against a subcontractor based upon an assault committed by the employees of the subcontractor on two employees of the general contractor. The assault occurred at a construction site approximately four hours after the subcontractor‘s employees had ter- The full text is set forth in footnote 1 of the main opinion.
Califоrnia Statutes 1978, chapter 929, which added subdivisions (b) and (c) to
New Hampshire appears to have departed from the traditional two-tiered approach in holding unconstitutional, as violative of the equal protection clause, a state statute which sought to limit recoveries in medical malpractice cases. (Carson v. Maurer (1980) 120 N.H. 925.)
In the Boynton case, attendance at the party was optional; the party occurred after work, employees were not paid to attend, and presumably the party took place at some location other than the employee‘s place of employment. (A statute purporting to fix the minimum price that could be charged by dry cleaners.)