27 Conn. 567 | Conn. | 1858
The general principle applicable to trials in whatever form, is that the utmost practicable fairness should be observed. No trick or surprise should be allowed, and no evidence or argument admitted on one side which the other party may not have an opportunity to meet and deny, or refute, or explain. As the mode of trial before a highway committee is very different from that before a jury, much less strictness is required in relation to the intercourse between parties or counsel and the triers in one case than in the other. But the same great object should be kept in view, and the same principle substantially maintained.
Whether such has been the fact in the present instance, is the question before the court. It appears from the finding, that after the ease had been fully heard and submitted, Mr. Tillinghast, of the committee, was decidedly in favor of laying out a portion of the road, Mr. Gallup was decidedly opposed to it, and Mr. Lockwood was in doubt. It was then agreed that they should meet again at a future day, and in the mean time should review the proposed road by themselves.
It is indeed testified by said Lockwood, and found by the court on his testimony, that the new evidence did not conduce to the change of his views. But the operations of the human mind are so subtle, and the influences which affect it so difficult to be appreciated, that it is utterly improbable, not to say impossible, for him to have known that the additional weight did not contribute to incline an opinion confessedly on the equipoise. All that he must be understood to have meant and the court to have found, is, that he was unconscious of the influence.
It is said that from the finding it appears that the survey was substantially correct, and it is claimed that the result would have been the same if the new evidence had been presented during the trial. The finding speaks of the accuracy of the survey on the principle adopted. But the principle itself was partial and calculated to mislead, inasmuch as it exhibited the elevations of the new road as they' then
The case of Wethersfield v. Humphrey, (20 Conn., 218,) has little resemblance to this ; but the principles laid down in Hickox v. Parmelee, (21 Conn., 86,) seem directly in point.
Without intending therefore to impugn the motives of the persons who have been named, it is sufficient to say that their course was unusual, contrary to the policy of the law, tending to impair public confidence in legal tribunals, and dangerous in fact to the purity of trials.
For these reasons the superior court is advised to reject the report of the committee.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Advice that report of committee be rejected.