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Harris v. State
947 S.W.2d 156
Tenn. Crim. App.
1996
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*1 Declaratory Department suf- petition the Petition for Order were to first file a with the regarding declaratory the stat- under Code Annotated sec- for a order ficient Tennessee Thus, may 4-5-223, question. only ute in the Court not aid Petitioner tion it would declaratory judg- declaratory an action for attempt obtaining entertain a Davis’ peti- under section 4-5-224 either.- judgment complainant ment must because the agency petitioners Shelton and tion the order, chancery After court entered its attempt to file a Chadwick did not even a enti- copy Petitioners filed a document § declaratory 4- petition for order. See id. Declaratory Peti- tled “Petition for Order.” 224(b). Second, opinion is the of this it chancery court tioners contended that 5— petition not court that Petitioner Davis did judgment on this amend its based should requested a de- proper agency when he they complied had with because document Sundquist. claratory order from Governor 4-5-223.- Code Annotated section Tennessee Thereafter, Finally, give not the Governor Petitioners did motion. The court denied the sixty required days within which set timely appeal. a notice of Petitioners filed hearing. a case petition for contested affirm. We Declaratory Order is dated The Petition for Proce Administrative Uniform February Petitioners filed their provides jurisdictional prereq dures Act April chancery on 6 petition court agency’s seeking review of an uisites for Thus, agency has there is no which 1995. declaratory judgment pro through a actions declaratory as a order is refused issue declaratory judgment “A shall not ceeding. required by sec- Tennessee Code Annotated concerning validity appli or be rendered 4-5-224(b). tion statute, cability a rule or order unless complainant petitioned agency for a has Therefore, judgment of it results that the declaratory agency has affirmed, order and the refused chancery the cause declaratory Tenn. Code necessary pro- to issue a order.” for further is remanded 5—224(b)(1991). § proper agency Ann. ceedings. Costs on are taxed 4— declaratory petition Davis, which to file a for with David petitioners/appellants, Monroe primary jurisdic which has Tracey order is one Shelton Chadwick. rule, statute, at issue. tion over the order 4-5-223(a). addition, agency § id. KOCH, JJ., See concur. CANTRELL and to have refused to issue declara is deemed petition for a

tory if it fails to set the order sixty days of hearing within

contested case 4-5-223(c). §

receipt petition. Id. seeking judicial agency’s review of the

Before

action, petitioner attempt to resolve must through agency grievances proce

his or her declaratory pre judgment action is A

dures. directly proceeds petitioner if the mature Appellant, Leroy HARRIS, Edward seeking an adminis judicial without review trative determination. Tennessee, Appellee. STATE case, Petitioners did present In the prior to the dismissal that allege not Tennessee, Appeals of Court Criminal declaratory agency sought order from at Knoxville. jurisdiction over primary which exercised Feb. 40-20- Annotated section Tennessee Code addition, the “Petition for Declarato 112. In Appeal Denied Permission satisfy requirements ry Order” fails 3,1997. Supreme Court Feb. 4-5- Annotated section Code Tennessee 224(b) First, Mon following reasons. for the only complainant named is the

roe Davis Declaratory if Order. the Petition *5 Mehler, Nash- Brock

Paul J. Morrow ville, Appellant. for Burson, Attorney General Charles W. Chevalier, Assistant Reporter, S. Christian Division, General, Justice Attorney Criminal Schmutzer, Nashville, Jr., At- District Al C. (7) General, Vance, jury from torney prevented District Richard Asst. Whether General, Sevierville, by offenses Attorney Appellee. considering lesser included for instruction; sequential

the use of OPINION (8) penalty Tennessee’s death Whether HAYES, Judge. constitutional. statute is Harris, appellant, Leroy alias Edward record, reviewing the we affirm the After Eddie,” post-conviction relief “Tattoo seeks post-conviction court. judgment of the

from his convictions of one count of armed robbery premeditated counts of first two BACKGROUND FACTS murder, degree entered Court the Circuit Sep- appellant was of the convicted County May, and the con Sevier 13, 1986, employees murders of two tember imposition of life sequent of one sentence Gatlinburg. Rocky Top Village Inn imprisonment and two sentences of death Kimberly murders were charged Also electrocution. The convictions and sentences Joseph De- Pelley, appellant’s girlfriend; appeal by were affirmed on the Tennessee Modica, penitentiary acquain- Georgia state Harris, Supreme Court. State v. transvestite, Ru- appellant; and tance of the (Tenn.1992), Ashley At Doby, fus also known as Silvers. 1368,122 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 746 key for the sources of evidence two 10, 1993, August On filed a co-defendant, testimony were the State petition relief. No- On DeModica, implicated which 29, 1993, post-conviction court vember murders, describing mur- and a letter hearing conducted a on the merits of the ders, near the phone recovered booth appellant’s petition. At the conclusion of the Valley, Maggie North Car- police station *6 post-conviction the court denied the olina. petition. judgment A written of dismissal that, trial, Joseph DeModica testified on At 6,1993. was filed on December murders, he, Doby, Pelley, day and the of the appellant following eight raises the Following Gatlinburg. appellant drove to the appeal: issues on Smoky Mountains Na- a visit to the Great (1) appellant Whether the received the ef- Park, Rocky group drove to the tional the at trial fective assistance of counsel the Village Inn. DeModica observed Top appeal; and on victims, Pelley, appellant, and one (2) post-conviction court Whether the Hill, the motel room which Melissa enter by denying appellant’s mo- erred the body subsequently discovered. Hill’s was parte hearing sup- and tion for an ex Pelley knife in her hand. DeModi- carried a services; port He heard parking the lot. ca remained in (3) the court Whether Troy security guard, A several screams. denying discretion in the abused its arrived, ap- Valentine, the but encountered recuse; appellant’s motion to out of the motel room. pellant, who had come began fight. appellant and the

(4) Valentine post-conviction court Whether room, took Pelley out of the motel also came denying abused its discretion him over flashlight, and struck guard’s continuance; appellant’s motion for a Pelley appellant and it. The the head with (5) at tri- presented the evidence Whether motel room. dragged into the then Valentine the ele- al was sufficient to establish gunshots. He testified two DeModica heard premeditation and delibera- ments of Pelley again that, appellant and when the instructions to tion and whether room, if they as looked came out of the motel delibera- jury premeditation on and paint. red sprayed them with someone had jury; tion misled the to corrobo- (6) presented evidence felony murder The State the use of the Whether testimo- aspects of DeModiea’s rate various circumstance violated the aggravating knife Middlebrooks; respect example, with ny. For holding in State However, hand, sufficiency of the reviewing the Pelley’s observed that DeModica appeal, supreme court car- evidence on direct appellant acquaintance testified overwhelming evidence hunting knife remarked that “the knife and a a lock-blade ried Har jury_” each victim edge. supported the verdict awith serrated ris, post- Similarly, deep neck wound from serrated S.W.2d at suffered observed, proof shot in the had also been “And knife. Each victim conviction proof of blood at the to come The massive amount in. The continued head. came injuries in, in- the number of crime scene and in.... This evidence as it rolled was with were consistent upon each victim overwhelming.” flicted appellant description of the DeModica’s penalty phase of the State At Finally, De- Pelley the murders. following appellant’s prior convictions introduced the been knew that had Modiea Valentine involving person and other- violence to flashlight. This information clubbed with his during proof introduced relied wise would to the media and was not released initially guilt phase.1 Defense counsel only the killers. have known been proof no dur- indicated that would offer letter, Valley Maggie which was found However, phase. following a ing penalty murders, days also contained three after chambers, judge the trial conference with only the killers would have information which appellant on his own behalf. testified ex- examiner known. The State’s document years old that he stated DeModica, Pelley, and as the Silvers cluded in- grew up North Carolina. He testimony fur- Expert writer of letter. completed only he formed the had strong indications that the ther established neither grade in school and could third girl- A former appellant wrote this letter. his admitted that diffi- nor write. He read Jones, Antonia identi- appellant, friend of the largely from lack culties in school stemmed handwriting Maggie Valley fied the further testi- of motivation. The being appellant. that of the letter as that, relationship during youth, his fied his troubled, that he parents with his arrest, made a Following age of 14. The left home at the to Tennessee Bureau of series of statements guilty pled he he admitted when was agents Georgia law en- Investigation spent Georgia and several offenses Initially, forcement officers. years Georgia penitentiary. While However, in the. Gatlinburg. going denied *7 in- appellant became penitentiary, compan- subsequently that he and his stated boxing program in the Golden Gloves volved Pigeon eaten in restaurant ions had appellant The tes- trophies. and won several that, Pelley Forge, were in and while he and by prior two children Silvers, that he has tified Gatlinburg with DeModica and marriage, he visited on occasion. whom purchased Pelley. had a chain for He denied conclusion, jury spare his he asked implied killings participating in the and life. DeModica and Silvers were murderers. death, punishment of guilt imposed The testify at the appellant did not circumstances, defense, finding aggravating three Essentially, his

phase of his trial. (7) 39-2-203(i)(2), (5), § and Ann. through appellant’s state- Tenn.Code as advanced arrest, (1982),2 any mitigating circum- outweigh police following ments was stances. any participation a denial of the crime. heinous, (5) especially atro- prior murder 1. The convictions were for offenses cious, torture or rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated it involved sod- or cruel in and mind; omy. depravity (7) the de- committed while The murder was 39-2-203(i)(2), (5), (7) § committing,

2. Tenn.Code Ann. engaged or was an fendant accomplice provide of, as follows: at- or was commission commit, fleeing after commit- tempting or was (2) convicted of previously The defendant was commit, degree any ting murder, arson, attempting first felonies, present other than the one or more larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, charge, use of vio- which involve the or threat person; lence challenged INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE counsel’s conduct on the facts of case, OF particular COUNSEL viewed as of the time of Strickland, counsel’s conduct.” at 466 U.S. a claim When of ineffective assis 689-690, Finally, at S.Ct. 2065-2066. we raised, tance of counsel is the burden is per note that defendants are not entitled to (1) per to show that counsel’s representation, only constitutionally fect ade (2) formance was deficient and that the defi State, quate representation. Harries v. No. performance prejudiced cient the defense. 833, (Tenn.Crim.App. at WL 687, Washington, 668, Strickland v. 466 U.S. Knoxville, 29, 1990), August perm, appeal (1984). 2052, 2064, 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 denied, (Tenn.1991). prove must that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not prejudice, In order to establish functioning guaranteed as ‘counsel’ appellant must show that there is a reason by Amendment,” defendant the Sixth probability able but for counsel’s defi must demonstrate that coun performance, proceed cient the result of the sel’s errors “were deprive so serious as to Strickland, ing would been different. have defendant aof fair a trial whose result 694, 104 at at A U.S. S.Ct. 2068. reason reliable.” Id. The must estab probability able is one sufficient to under performance lish both prejudice deficient mine confidence in the outcome. Id. prevail. order to A reviewing Id. court need not prongs consider the two of Strick At hearing the conclusion of the in any particular land order. Id. at 104 case, court entered the S.Ct. if the followingfindings of fact: prong, reviewing fails to establish one (1) Sexton, Goddard, Mr. Mr. and Mr. need not consider the other. Id. counsel) (appointed appellate Strand resources, supporting had staff and in- respect perfor With to deficient cluding Capital Case Resource mance, proper attorney per measure of Center, preparation to utilize in the formance prevailing is reasonableness under anticipated appeal. trial and the professional norms. Id. at words, attorney’s 2065. In other perfor (2) every Defense counsel utilized advan- range mance must be within the compe tage available them under the law attorneys tence demanded of in criminal they and the facts as found them. De- Rose, cases. Baxter v. investigated every fense counsel fact (Tenn.1975); State, Wright v. No. 01C01- petitioner, pur- related to them the 9105-CR-00149, (Tenn. 1994 WL 115955 every prepared sued lead and as best Nashville), Crim.App. perm, de as were enabled the defendant. nied, (Tenn.1994), (3) defendant/petitioner did not at 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 *8 time furnish information to defense indulge strong presump This “must justified would have seek- tion that counsel’s conduct falls within the services, ing special support they and range professional of wide reasonable assis diligent pursuing were in not a mental tance; is, the defendant must overcome investigation. that, presumption the under the circum (4) they Defense counsel did all could to stances, challenged ‘might the action con be prevent the introduction of incrimina- Strickland, strategy.’” sidered trial sound ting evidence and to discredit it to the 689, 104 at 2065. We they extent could when it was intro- strategy should defer to trial or tactical timely objection. duced over if choices are informed ones based adequate preparation. Wright, denying appellant’s petition, post- In No. 01C01- the the State, (citing per- 9105-CR-00149 Hellard v. court described counsel’s trial conviction (Tenn.1982)). 4, Additionally, following manner: “... S.W.2d formance the Ably Diligently “distorting court should avoid the effects of tried. tried. tried. [W]ell hindsight” “judge Conscientiously and the of tried....” reasonableness the law.5 Both and proceedings, criminal areas of Sexton post-conviction proving appellant the of their has the burden of utilized various members Goddard by a allegations petition preponderance firms, in his respective primarily law in the area of State, S.W.2d of the evidence. McBee v. research, throughout legal the course of the (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). also See appellant’s trial. (Tenn. Buford,

State denied, Crim.App.1983), perm. appeal to I. Phase Guilt (Tenn.1984). Moreover, findings of “[t]he by the trial fact and conclusions of law made Sexton testified at evidentiary hearing are afford that, court after an preparation guilt for the hearing verdict; this court weight of a scene, ed phase of the he visited the crime trial judgment will not aside the witnesses, set potential obtained interviewed and court unless the evidence contained concern- discovery information and reviewed findings.” against its preponderates record handwriting exemplars autopsy re- ing (Tenn. Dick, State v. proof Additionally, hearing es- ports. (Tenn. perm. appeal Crim.App.), pre- trial counsel conducted tablished Harries, 1993); appel see also No. 833. The all of the State’s materi- trial interviews with preponder lant contends that the evidence Final- on at least one occasion. al witnesses against judgment entered ates great ly, spent he deal Sexton testified that post-conviction court that the ease, on between Janu- of time afforded effective assistance counsel. very few ary May of “there were portion post-conviction hearing, appel- days that at least some At the went Sexton, dealing day spent of the some lant called Charles one wasn’t with of the attorneys. appointed Strand, Benjamin lant’s trial Sexton was God- issue on case.” immediately fol- represent partner, who assisted in former law dard’s lowing arraignment death, in Decem- testified after Goddard’s ber, prac- has licensed to 1987.3 Sexton been spent great of time also deal Goddard At law the time tice in this state since 1979. fact, and, in devoted appellant’s case on the serving he was as the appointment, of his exclusively prior to trial the two weeks pro- attorney indigent for a local defender preparation. trial gram by private act for Sevier Coun- created Nevertheless, argues that tri- ty. Additionally, active in remained Sexton guilt phase performance al counsel’s practice partner as in a private of law a range compe- the trial was not within He criminal local firm. had an extensive law Specifically, attorneys. tence demanded and, averaging practice, failed defense counsel he contends that twenty twenty-five felony each term cases authorship reasonably investigate the appointment to this of court. Before properly Valley note and failed Maggie case, represented ten or more Sexton had consequences of advise degree of charged with some defendants handwriting provide additional his refusal to homicide, including charged cap- several with asserts exemplars. Shortly degree after the ital first murder.4 investigate adequately that counsel failed represent ap- appointment of Sexton to background and DeModica’s the co-defendant its intention to pellant, the announced State Fi- autopsy crime scene evidence. trial court penalty, and the seek the death (cid:127) per- nally, counsel’s that defense contends as co-counsel. William Goddard appointed *9 counsel failed formance was deficient an that Goddard was record reflects testimony concerning Dr. object to Blake’s lawyer in both the civil and trial experienced 16, testify post-conviction at the did not December 5.Goddard arrested on 3. The was 1987, Atlanta, Georgia. acci- in an automobile as he was killed comple- eight days approximately after the dent the case before us is 4. indicates that The record appellant’s trial. tion capital ver- to culminate the first case during County this centu- death in Sevier dict of reasonably the victims’ opinions, wounds and failed to move to counsel could determine suppress statements to the possibility obtaining a favorable police.6 We conclude that the has expert opinion outweighed by the risk was carry proof, failed to his burden of and that merely provide that counsel would the State preponderates the evidence in the record expert opinion. an adverse See Dees v. Cas favor judgment. (8th court’s 452, Cir.), piri, 904 F.2d cert. de nied, 436, U.S. S.Ct. respect investiga With to counsel’s (1990). L.Ed.2d 419 letter, Maggie Valley initially tion of the we [Strategic thorough choices after in- made afforded, note that the at the vestigation of law and facts relevant level, trial opportunity to exonerate him plausible options virtually unchallenge- are letter, Maggie Valley self as the author of the able; strategic choices made after less Indeed, opportunity rejected. which he complete investigation than are reasonable Court, Supreme appeal, Tennessee on direct precisely pro- extent reasonable observed: judgments support fessional the limitations It is clear from the record that from at words, investigation. In on other counsel February least late three months duty investiga- has a to make reasonable trial, before the defendant knew that the tions or to make a reasonable decision that seeking handwriting samples State was investigations particular makes unneces- consulting expert. and was an The Defen- case, sary. any In partic- ineffectiveness significance dant ... was aware of investigate ular decision not to must be handwriting issue. When directly assessed for reasonableness all samples, ordered additional the Defendant circumstances, applying heavy measure comply. refused to judgments. of deference to counsel’s Harris, appel 67. 794, 107 Burger Kemp, lant perfor cannot now attribute to counsel’s (1987). 3114, 3126, 97 he, himself, L.Ed.2d Defense mance a situation which created. 36(a); strategic counsel made a decision Tenn.R.App.P. reasonable see also Waterhouse v. forgo investigation rely Perry, 195 further at trial Tenn. upon the cross-examination of the State’s expert witness. Moreover, the record reveals investigation Unfortunately, defense counsel’s counsel was in- was constitution ally case, only days adequate. prior Prior trial formed a few to trial of in this Jones, witness, defense another Antonia fa- handwriting counsel contacted a ex who was pert, Kelly, agent Georgia appellant’s handwriting. James an miliar with the with the When, Investigation, day Bureau of and filed a motion on the first defense coun- However, Kelly. for a certificate of need for sel learned that both Antonia Jones and Vas- testify, the information that requested obtained from Kel triek counsel an were ly ultimately opportunity independent expert no more conclusive than the to have opinion Valley expert, Maggie of the State’s Thomas examine the letter and the Vas triek, appellant’s handwriting. a document examiner with the United court de- request, holding request States Postal Service. The record reflects nied the event, that defense counsel reviewed re came too late. Vastriek’s defense ports, vigorously and that Goddard interviewed cross-examined Jones. Vastrick respect on at least one able to occasion. With counsel was locate interview mother, opinion, Mrs. tes- Vastrick’s Sexton testified that de Jones’ Julia Jones. Jones very attempt “felt defense in an to dis- fense counsel comfortable what tified for the position daughter’s testimony. That Based Mr. Vastriek’s was. credit her say foregoing, couldn’t that Mr. the author we cannot conclude that coun- Harris was performance of that note.” Faced with two inconclusive sel’s was deficient. fully alleges stages proceedings. these We ad- also counsel failed to late *10 adequately investigate penalty appellant’s in our of the mental dress this issue discussion guilt, penalty, phase. condition at the and direct counsel, prudent not address what is or appellant ‘[w]e

The also claims coun only constitutionally properly appropriate, sel failed him the conse but what is to advise of quences comply Burger, his to with compelled.’” of refusal U.S. at omitted). (citation to hand provide trial court’s order additional at 3126 issue, writing exemplars. appellant This nothing is in the record that would there contends, trial significant is view of the investigation by triggered further de- have ruling court’s that his refusal could be con background.7 of fense counsel DeModica’s guilt. an of sidered as inference Thus, we cannot conclude that further inves- However, post-conviction court found constitutionally tigation compelled. was of the appellant was advised conse appellant in The contends that counsel quences “repeatedly, his refusal of supports finding request to tently.” failing The record ineffective for funds was post-con-' findings At post-conviction expert court. of Dr. for an to review the Blake, patholo vietion was asked whether he expert Sexton in forensic the State’s informing appellant the infer However, recalled gy. appellant does not state from ences that could be drawn the what, anything, report if in Dr. Blake’s to additional sam failure submit findings explain why his are erroneous ples. responded, Trial counsel “I believe we that, prior The reflects suspect. record I talked about it at the bench on the 11th. trial, examined Dr. Blake’s defense counsel probably that it talked about at believe was Again, Dr. Blake. reports and interviewed hearing Dandridge.... We talked perfor that counsel’s we cannot conclude I it. And know it was with Mi’.Harris about deficient. mance was I brought up on And believe this occasion. probably one or two other occasions appellant also claims that coun proceedings.” This contention is without object Dr. erroneously failed to Blake's sel merit. of the testimony at trial that two victims’ margins.” The record wounds had “serrated complains next fact, did, in counsel ob reveals that defense in reasonably failed to that defense counsel testi ject to of Dr. Blake’s the introduction co-defendant, background of vestigate the comply mony, citing State’s failure post- testified at the Joe DeModica. Counsel trial, discovery defense rules. Prior with hearing that he examined DeModi conviction requested addi repeatedly counsel had appellant contends ca’s record. The criminal Blake, yet by Dr. no additional reports tional in have further that defense counsel should trial, At until trial. reports furnished were vestigated past in order deter DeModica’s counsel for the delivered to defense the State propensity whether DeModica has mine Blake, describing report Dr. first time argues that such violence. crime scene. Dr. Blake’s observations DeModica’s would have rebutted information counsel’s defense judge The trial overruled he afraid of the claim that testimony, conclud objection to Dr. Blake’s remain with the was “forced” to ordinary witness Dr. Blake ing that episode. Sexton throughout this criminal matters contained respect with hearing that testified at the However, judge the de invited report. investigate back not DeModica’s did objection Dr. Blake’s if to renew their fense thoroughly Mr. Demo ground “because more expertise testimony on an area touched many parts of the had been around dica received notice. defense had not areas, which the many country, lived and had did, trial, fact, testify con Dr. Blake At many this coun from areas of had a record analysis, only a few cerning conducted Nevertheless, wound appellant asserts try.” “sharp, saw- prior and the days requested have counsel should that defense markings” surrounding two Initially, “in con toothed investigator. for an funds a con- failed make The defense wounds. sidering of ineffective assistance claims in fact incident reveal whether this does not in his brief DeMo- mentions 7. The occurred, were during or whether defense exploded at his counsel and struck dica incident, assuming that it occurred. sentencing hearing. before us aware The record *11 167 temporaneous objection. However, adequately investigate counsel that counsel failed to vigorously Blake, cross-examined Dr. regarding who and obtain available evidence n compared conceded that he had not the vic- appellant’s background and mental condi- tim’s wounds to knife involved in the tion.8 investigation. even if defense coun- penalty phase, At defense sel’s failure to contemporaneously object con- proof, ap than the counsel offered no other performance, stituted deficient we conclude pellant’s testimony, support mitigation. unduly that such error prejudice did not supreme Our court has that there is observed defense. legal requirement no and no established Finally, appellant complains practice that the accused must offer evidence attempt counsel did not suppress state penalty capital phase at the of a trial. State appellant ments made to law enforce Melson, 417, (Tenn.), v. 772 421 cert. However, ment officers. the record reveals denied, 874, 211, 493 U.S. 110 S.Ct. inculpatory, the statements were not but (1989). However, strategy L.Ed.2d 164 “[a] exculpatory. rather The statements were may adopted only silence be after a rea general participation killings denials of investigation mitigating sonable evidence conformity and were in with the investigation or a reasonable decision that an position present at trial that he was not Wainwright, would be fruitless.” v. Tafero during episode. the criminal Counsel testi (11th 1314, Cir.1986), 796 F.2d cert. fied at the hearing at 3277, 483 U.S. 107 S.Ct. the time of he “didn’t [that feel (1987). L.Ed.2d 782 Courts have held coun would become ... if statements] relevant but representation professionally sel’s beneath did, [h]e didn’t mind ... the excul competent sentencing standards when coun patory] part getting appellant in.” The has enough investigation sel did not conduct not strategic demonstrated that this decision profile” formulate an “accurate life of a de performance. counsel was deficient Herring, fendant. Jackson v. 42 F.3d We conclude that appellant has failed - (11th Cir.), dismissed, U.S. allegations

to establish his of ineffective as- (1995). -, 132 L.Ed.2d 919 S.Ct. sistance guilt phase of counsel at the investigation that the extent re We note preponderance of the evidence. critically quired depends upon information supplied by Burger, the defendant. 483 U.S. Penalty II. Phase 795, 107 S.Ct. at 3126. See also Whitmore appellant also contends he was (8th Cir.1993). Lockhart, v. 8 F.3d afforded ineffective assistance of support the facts that a certain line [W]hen sentencing phase Again, of the trial. generally of defense are known to counsel imposing penalties, jury two death found said, because of what the defendant has previously had been con- investigation may for further be the need involving victed of one or more felonies considerably diminished or eliminated alto- person, use or threat of violence gether. given a defendant has And when heinous, especially the murders were atro- pursuing counsel reason to believe that cious, cruel, or and that the murders were investigations or certain would be fruitless engaged committed while the harmful, pursue counsel’s failure to even robbery. § in a Tenn.Code Ann. 39-2- may chal- investigations those not later be 203(i)(2),(5), further found lenged as unreasonable. aggravating these circumstances out- Burger, at 3126. weigh any mitigating factors. The case, not act “in argues failed to ade- In this defense counsel did that defense counsel unjustified in an manner.” quately prepare sentencing phase of a factual void for the (5th 1344, 1350 Knighton Maggio, F.2d Specifically, trial. asserts (1982), background, pursuant, only mitigating, available and his troubled feasible factors defect, 39-2-203(j) § generally, (1982). Ann. to Tenn.Code were mental disease pursuant 39-2-203(j)(8) § to Tenn.Code Ann. *12 denied, may legiti Cir.), family background gate 105 S.Ct. childhood cert. 469 U.S. (1984). respect product tactical mately 83 L.Ed.2d 241 With of a reasoned be background, appellant’s particular Sexton testified circumstances choice. Given the spoke post-conviction hearing that he among things, including, other [a] case appellant “many, many with the times.” thirty-one years defendant] that [a [is] fact interview, early during an Sexton victim], evidence murder[s] [the when he old eight page a to ten form utilized standardized deprived and childhood is enti abusive gather background information from the little, mitigating weight.” any, if tled to appellant. acknowledged Trial that (11th Dugger, 908 F.2d Francis appellant’s familiar limited was with Cir.1990), background and the fact that he educational ap 114 L.Ed.2d 90 had in North Carolina resided institutions approximately thirty pellant in this case was juvenile penal an as a and institutions as age of the murders. years of at the time appellant that adult. Sexton testified appellant’s mental respect With had was “able to outline where he been and health, that he and Goddard Sexton testified why contact ... he was there.” Sexton also psy- possibility requesting discussed the Georgia on ed the mother two appellant, but chological evaluation appel counsel asked the occasions. Defense no was evidence concluded there sentencing testify at lant’s mother to At the any such evaluation was warranted. hearing. participate. refused to She hearing, testified: post-conviction Sexton attempted to Sexton contact other individ- time, during pro- point no this But at supplied uals whose names were Harris client, ceeding I feel like Mr. was did ever but to no avail as could not be always competent. He communi- than post-conviction at the less found. Sexton testified always very coop- somebody us. He was hearing “it to find cated with was hard man, always very He talked take in this and erative with us. that would an interest up understand freely come here and with us. able to would make effort to Was them, it ask questions ... some concern for him. And we would and show when And, frankly, looked it got point give where it like us answers. down was able to Goddard, nobody just cooperative you Bill could was me and ... as as was was give a what going else was hoot about Now there ask him to be. In most areas. this man.” happened to some difficulties things some we had were understanding, as him But as far with. appellant his mother were deficiencies, any I having was mental background informa- primary sources of really an issue ... it never became never sentencing phase relevant to the tion ... with me.9 that the appellant’s trial. Sexton indicated appellant and information obtained from the court also post-conviction that the We note investiga- suggested that further his mother observed, nothing noticed “This court has unproductive. Sexton stated tion would be about anything question to raise indicate thought anything have he “had would that if ability understand these this defendant’s man, it have had helped [he] [at would himself, participate proceedings and defend hearing].” sentencing Finally, testified them.” trial counsel did during any pre-trial interview no time that defense coun admitted Sexton disability. learning mention a appellant investigative request funds sel did not Furthermore, alluded to never However, circum certain “[u]nder services. past treat- any any psychological problems stances, not to investi- trial counsel’s decision Argu- allergic to Thorazine. 9. At the ably, alerted de- would not have these records from the medical records filed as an exhibit suffering appellant was prior fense counsel that County jail which show Sevier Xanax, other than those psychological difficulties given be- Haldol awaiting understandably depres- experienced one suffering anxiety and cause he was some where the two individuals difficulty sleeping. murders of experiencing A for the and was sion seeking penalty. death State was noted of General Health Condition” "Statement psychological ment or pellant institutionalization for was “stabbed the head.” While disorders. County incarcerated at the DeKalb Jail in Georgia, appellant attempted to commit Thus, we conclude that defense Finally, suicide. contends performance constitutionally counsel’s *13 the Western Carolina Center records indi- adequate penalty phase. at the “mentally cate that he is defective” and has appellant prejudice the suffered no as a re 65; that, I.Q. an in 1966 and the performance. sult of counsel’s We base our appellant diagnosed was as “brain dam- findings conclusion the of Robert that, age[d];” and in the Western Car- Steele, investigator an Capital for the Case diagnosed mentally olina Center him as re- Resource Center. At the tarded. that, ap Steele testified after the pointment of Brock Mehler and Paul Mor Assuming accuracy findings, the of Steele’s row, attorneys Capital for the Resource Case findings we conclude that neither these nor Center, began interviewing and'collecting the Western Carolina Center records are attempt in identify mitigating records See, uniformly helpful appellant. e.g., to the In interviewing ap themes. addition to Whitmore, many peo- 8 F.3d 623. While mother, pellant investigator and his con childhoods, ple unhappy brutally have few tacted forty one hundred and individuals State, people. murder two Strouth v. phone twenty-three or letter and received (Tenn.Crim.App.1986). responses. Steele’s conclusions summa are Moreover, the Western Carolina Center rec- affidavit, rized in his in support submitted appellant’s propensity ords document appellant’s support motion for services. engage in violent or antisocial behavior and may they in well have alienated the had

Steele states his affidavit that the father, Harris, penalty phase lant’s Artie been introduced died in an automo- appellant’s Finally, contrary trial. appellant bile accident when the was four assertion, years death, appellant’s Following old. the record before us his father’s mother, appellant’s Harris, investigation by that further establishes Merlene lived man, Turner, appellant’s with a counsel of the mental condition Bob physically who changed jury’s sentencing appellant abused would not have both the and his mother. words, in- appellant and determination. other further his brother were then placed homes, vestigation produced not have facts in foster would where remained tip until sufficient to the scales in favor of a sen- Mrs. Hands a man married named Mel- family vin tence other than death. Nelms. The moved to North Car- time, appellant began olina. At this run- The information contained the Western home, ning away placed from was progress Carolina Center admission and institutions, various foster homes and includ- ambiguous.11 initial admission notes is ing the Western Carolina Center.10 Center, interview the Western Carolina with health, 17, 1969, Concerning appellant’s mental dated March consisted of an inter- mother, appellant’s the affidavit reflects that was his mother was view with the who hospitalized pneumonia place attempting measles and while her son the Center. Furthermore, interview, pregnant appellant. appellant with the At the time of the two, age completed one-year at the was struck had two commitments injury. a car and and was suffered severe head with the Juvenile Center Evaluation school, attending iden- eligible While for release. The records do not placed special agency which tify particular education classes. As an state under health, adult, drugs. operated used incar- either center is i.e. mental While services, education, Georgia ap- correction. The penitentiary, cerated at the social 10. We note pre- testimony, progress were other than Steele's 11. The admission and notes They frequently pared by fail to social workers. proof there is no in this record that the Western cite the source of information included Carolina Center is a state institution for the men (cid:127) provide no documentation to establish notes tally retarded. accuracy information. Prolixin appellant was] on appellant’s place- one time [the records do reflect Center, pur- eyes rolling ment the Juvenile Evaluation with his back reaction to this had order, juvenile to a resulted from However, suant contrary to getting stiff.” frequent attempts appellant’s to run affidavit, nothing the Cen- there is Steele’s away from home. ter’s to indicate records Thorazine, much less ever administered report *14 general. diagnosis quite healthy in His been ... I feel that the unstable home situation damage by was brain Dr. Nale Cullowhee role in played very large a Eddie’s be- has 2)6 They similarly years ago.” contradict the damage’ havior. ... ‘Brain is the alibi she comment, following included in an additional inadequa- her prefers up to use to cover own added). admission report of the Carolina (Emphasis a Western cies as mother.” report psychological from interview: “The report following, “Dr. The same recites indicated that the Juvenile Evaluation Center at the Evaluation Center Western Nale defective, ‘mentally is mild with behav- Eddie University, has told Mr. and Mrs. Carolina I.Q. of 65.” ior He achieved an disorder.’ appellant’s parents] that Eddie’s [the Nelms ” average.’ In the I.Q. ‘approximately report from the Western Carolina The last appel- only documented examination of the Center, by appellant’s social prepared by physician a physician, lant concluded 3,1971, May following: on reveals the worker suffered mental “[m]ild on a basis.” [s]ocio-cultural retardation campus. He Presently, is not on Eddie added). (Emphasis his mother on a recently went home with visit, contrary day staffs trial Only psychological report one is contained This after recommendations. occurred psycholo- A records. school Center’s episode.... July most recent AWOL gist dated, Eddie’s prepared report, this Center, a he psychologist personal conducted 1970. The Eddie’s admission Since Additionally, appellant. many with presented problems. interview He refuses has psychologist.administered a number of routine and fre- to follow scheduled psychological tests determine pleases. doing about as quently wanders psychologist functioning. of lant’s level from taking orders and problem He has a concluded: authority. Running people in relating to style aggression, has a Eddie assumed great prob- away to be a proved has also retaliation, patience lack with others family very is [T]he lem with Eddie.... himself, little which would indicate get- prognosis for Eddie’s and the unstable for structure and formal school toleration day trial ting along on this 30 well at home Rules and other formal environment. very poor. prog- I little is have seen visit regulations good behavior frustrate family my and feel work .with this ress him.... I or reasons to have no facts here, im- too, prognosis for much mentally His suspect that he is retarded. family’s rela- pattern provement this it immature that social behavior so functioning in tionships and the mother’s adjust- functioning poorly as he is seems poor. as wife and mother is her role old_ shows indica- year six He also ed good deal of grasp tions he can accuracy Finally, again assuming once academically on a concrete related material in Steele’s affidavit contained of information develop that he could learn level and aggravating circum considering the skills. moderate academic case, conclude that we stances of added). (Emphasis under to meet his burden has failed 687, 104 Strickland, at 2064. 466 U.S. Summary” the West- from The “Admission cruelty of the gainsaid “It cannot be “[a]t reflect that ern Center does Carolina [murders] made it more difficult petitioner by [the for “a must demonstrate appellant] alter by specific the final proof sentence ad- factual an services of ducing mitigating Elledge expert investigator necessary circumstances.” or an are (11th Cir.1987). Dugger, relief, 823 F.2d ground post-conviction establish a for This issue is without merit. petitioner and that the is unable to establish ground post-conviction relief oth-

MOTION FOR EX PARTE HEARING available evidence.” Id. “[t]he er AND SUPPORT SERVICES grant court should if ... motion petitioner investigative demonstrates that post-con- contends that the expert necessary services are viction court to ensure the denying erred his motion for protection petitioner’s parte constitutional hearing support ex and for services. added). rights.” (emphasis Id. In other basis of the motion is that his words, context, “claim within the of ineffective assistance of counsel in- support sought implicate services must a con- volves number of areas where the service right. stitutional expert of an single is ‘the means of establish- ing prejudice.’” Specifically, us, In the case before seeks appointment contends that the of a document support protection services to ensure the *15 examiner, a pathologist, forensic a criminal right his Sixth Amendment to the effective investigator, psychologist and a are neces- However, assistance of counsel. -based sary protect to his Sixth right Amendment to us, the already record before we have deter- the effective assistance of counsel. mined that the claim of ineffec- post-conviction

The appel agree the tiveness is without merit. denied We with the Relying upon post-conviction lant’s motion. judgment this court’s court’s deci the rec- State, Teague 915, in adequate sion v. ord 772 is to the task. This S.W.2d issue is (Tenn.Crim.App.1988), perm. without merit. appeal de nied, (Tenn.), 874, 210, (1989), post- 107 L.Ed.2d 163 MOTION TO RECUSE conviction court ruled that “Tenn.Code Ann. post-con- contends that the 40-14-407(b) § does special not authorize judge failing vietion abused his discretion in support post-conviction in proceedi services a proceedings recuse himself from these be- ng-”12 The court added that “[t]he con- (1) judge, cause desig- at the time of his stitutional joint issue raised is whether trial nation, seeking the office of United effectively represented petitioner ac- (2) Senator, judge States awas material cording to constitutional standards. What respect witness with to the issues in raised

trial counsel did or failed to do is of record.” (3) post-conviction proceeding,' impartiality judge might of the trial reason- Payne, Owens and 908 S.W.2d ably questioned. be 928, Supreme Tennessee Court held 40-14-207(b) (1995 First, § Tenn.Code Ann. 10, Tenn.Sup.Ct.Rule Cannon Supp.) applies post-conviction capital 7(A)(3), pertinent part, requires judge in a cases.13 The court further resign held in order his office “when he becomes a candi- parte to obtain an post-convic ex a party primary in general date a or in a petitioner comply tion must proce non-judicial with the election for a office.” The guidelines dural Tenn.Sup.Ct. set forth in correctly argues lant inap- that it would be 13(2)(B)(10). Moreover, Rule Id. propriate seeking for one national office to post-conviction 12. ruling preceded capital court's [I]n cases where the defendant has Supreme indigent by the Tennessee been found to Court's be the court of decision case, having jurisdiction State, record such Payne consolidated cases of Owens and v. parte hearing may 923, (Tenn. court in an ex in 1995), its discre- 908 S.W.2d which ex- investigative expert tion determine that or ser- pressly Teague. overruled the dicta of necessary vices or other similar services are rights ensure that the constitutional the de- 40-14-207(b) § provides Tenn.Code Ann. in properly protected are ... fendant pertinent part: added). (Emphasis preside highly publicized penal- over a questioning judge’s death reasonable basis for State, ty post-conviction However, proceeding. impartiality.” Alley 810, ab- v. 882 S.W.2d allegation by sent appellant, (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). the bald The standard of nothing suggests post- the record review on is whether trial court its judge pri- denying conviction was a abused discretion candidate motion. (Tenn. Cash, 741, mary general State v. position or election for the Crim.App.1993). United States Senator the time of his designation special Rather, judge. as a 10, Tenn.Sup.Ct.Rule Cannon following record contains the facts relevant 3(C) provides, judge disqualify “A should 31, 1993, judge August to this issue: On in a proceeding impar himself which his resigned Judge his office as Circuit for the tiality might reasonably questioned, in be Fourth Judicial District in an- of Tennessee cluding but not limited to where: instances ticipation candidacy for United personal prejudice He bias or has concern However, judge States Senate. subse- ing knowledge disput party, personal quently position reconsidered his and chose evidentiary concerning proceed ed facts Therefore, not seek on elective office. However, ing.” prior knowledge of facts September Supreme when the about the case is not sufficient in and of spe- designated Court of Tennessee him as a require disqualification. Alley, 882 itself to judge preside cial over the S.W.2d at 822. we note case, proceeding judge not way merely judge disqualified be no running the United States Senate. This legal pro participated cause he has other contention is merit. without King ceedings against person. same State, alleges 216 Tenn. appellant also Demodica, No. personal also State v. judge knowledge disputed had See *16 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Knox post- 1990 WL 21233 facts relevant to issues raised the (Tenn.1990). ap- ville), Specifically, perm, to proceeding. conviction the “[¡judi has observed pellant judge supreme was The court contends that the trial may a be significance knowledge upon which decision following cial of the facts: the aware cognizance ... of certain facts testimony is the concern- based of Vastrick’s and Jones’ byof virtue of the letter; judge the becomes aware ing Maggie Valley when defense the plays a neutral legal in procedures and which aware that Vastrick counsel became Ten Shelby Vaughn Williams de- role.” v. testify; and when would whether Jones of (Tenn. Inc., nessee, 813 S.W.2d fense counsel were led believe 1991). Embry in v. appeals handwriting ex- The court of seeking longer no State was 02A01-9305-CV-00116, Chimenti, appellant; No. emplars from and whether 15,1994), citing (TennApp. March consequences of WL 81221 of appellant was advised judge’s a Vaughn, distinguished between exemplars. additional provide his refusal position of his by virtue knowledge obtained recuse is addressed A motion to earlier, knowl proceeding and in an related court. of the trial discretion to the sound Thus, the courtroom. edge outside obtained (Tenn. Parton, State v. “ an stem from disqualify, prejudice ‘must Generally, a trial Crim.App.1991). “[w]hen opinion result in an extrajudicial source ability preside no his judge has doubt of than what basis other merits on some on the there is no fairly presented, the matters over participation ... judge from learned John motion for recusal.” grant a need to ” (cita Alley, case.’ 83-241-III, State, 1988 WL No. son added). omitted) (emphasis tion Nashville, January (Tenn.Crim.App. to Tenn.Code Accordingly, pursuant part, 797 S.W.2d 1988), part, rev’d aff'd judge (1994 Supp.), § 40-30-103 However, Ann. (Tenn.1990). standard is a convic in which at the trial presided is who recusal ultimately objective one. an re although not permitted, is ordinary pru tion occurred person warranted “when pro post-conviction preside over quired, knowing all of judge’s position, dence competency ceedings when find a judge, would to the known facts challenged by appel- counsel has been L.Ed.2d 644 This issue is without Indeed, practice pervasive. lant. This in merit. ease, upon request Supreme MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE Court, judge suspended the trial his retire- 9,1993, preside post-con-

ment in order to over the On November filed a proceedings.14 suggested by post-conviction viction As the motion to continue the evi- State, motion, require dentiary hearing. support recusal whenever a trial of his judge post-conviction proceeding appellant alleged that he had not com- has pleted knowledge disputed investigation of his claims. On facts would wreak 23, 1993, justice post-conviction system. havoc the criminal November denied the motion. It is true judge that a trial cannot 29, 1993, evidentiary On November at the preside both at a proceeding hearing, renewed his motion for proceeding. serve as a witness in that proof a continuance and made offer of 605; Cohen, Paine, See Tenn.R.Evid. testimony. the form of Robert Steele’s Sheppeard, Tennessee Law Evidence investigator litigation spe- Steele is an (1990) 605.1, However, § pp. 247-248. hav Capital cialist with the Case Resource Cen- ing post-convic reviewed the record of the earlier, ter. As mentioned Steele testified proceedings, tion we judge conclude that the coordinating penalty that he had been significant

was not source of information at phase investigation August, of this case since hearing, judge’s nor was the decision and that he had contacted 140 individuals in ultimately influenced information. relating collect order to records Vaughn, 813 S.W.2d at 134. lant. He stated he had received 23 record reflects other witnesses were responses, including report from the available to address the factual issues. Western Carolina Center. Steele stated that approximately it would take 6 to 9 months to nevertheless com complete penalty phase investigation plains judge’s that the trial conduct of the this case. The court denied the renewed post-conviction hearing, including his find motion. ings at the conclusion of the render Additionally, morning post- on the impartiality suspect. Initially, we note *17 conviction the amended that rulings by adverse a court are not usual petition, alleging part grand in his that the ly grounds Alley, sufficient to establish bias. juries petit repre- in this case were not Moreover, 882 S.W.2d at 821. “[t]he issue to community. sentative of the The defense be propriety determined is not the argued require sixty would at least judicial judge, conduct of the but whether he days investigate systematic in order to the committed an error which resulted in an cognizable groups exclusion of certain from Hawk, unjust disposition....” v. State 688 County jury system. motion the Sevier This 467, (Tenn.Crim.App.1985). S.W.2d 472 We for a continuance was also denied. judge’s conclude that the remarks and ac post-conviction hearing, tions at the albeit on It is well established that the ill-advised, grant occasion continuance did not diminish the decision whether a proceeding, ap overall fairness of the even “rests the discretion of the trial within 113, plying heightened pro Morgan, the standards of court.” v. 825 due State S.W.2d capital (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), perm. in applicable appeal cess case.15 See State 117 (Tenn.1992). Cazes, 253, (Tenn.1994), denied, Moreover, v. 875 S.W.2d 260 denial denied, 1086,115 743, 130 not “unless it cert. S.Ct. a continuance will be disturbed post-conviction proceeding, challenged impartiality 14. At the the trial 15. The also remarked, judge Judges judge appeal. "The asked me to hear of this on direct The Tennessee found, thought anything Supreme it. I well we don’t want for Court "An examination of grasp proceedings did someone to at on these ... let entire record establishes that the trial court numbers, showing supreme us do it ... and so the not conduct the trial in a manner bias ” State.", Harris, appointed me to hear it.... favor of the 839 S.W.2d 66. 174

appears upon representation, a continuance of six to the face of the record ous judge preju presented is trial abused his discretion and nine the facts not months under Moreover, dice enured to the accused as direct result warranted. the reasons al- Dykes, judge’s ruling.” discussed, v. ready State court’s 250, (Tenn.Crim.App.1990). 803 S.W.2d 257 appellant’s motions does not denial of post-convic Additionally, trigger in order to process implicate rights. his due This issue relief, tion a motion for continu denial of is merit. without right. implicate ance must a constitutional petitioner the habeas “must demon AND PREMEDITATION strate, first, ... its court abused DELIBERATION and, second, discretion that its action ren that, light next contends fundamentally [proceeding] un dered the Supreme v. Court’s decision State Bowen, 279, 842 fair.” Conner v. F.2d Brown, 530, (Tenn.1992), (11th 840, Cir.), U.S. at trial was insufficient evidence introduced 107, 82, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d and cert. denied premeditation support and deliberation. 864, 164, 102 L.Ed.2d 135 U.S. argues pursu- grant or refusal of We note that the Brown, ant to the trial court’s instruction to “rarely a continuance reaches constitutional may jury, premeditation formed be Knighton, 740 proportions.” F.2d 1351. instant, improper. in an was that the trial court did We conclude Brown, supreme In that “it our court held proof not abuse his discretion. The indicates prudent an instruction that is abandon Capital Resource first Case Center may ‘premeditation be tells the when its became involved this case attor ” Id. 543. Howev formed in instant.’ Mehler, petition ney, filed a for writ of Brock 1, er, on June the Brown case was decided Supreme certiorari to the United States appellant’s trial 1992. The occurred 1993, Supreme February, In Court. applied have held that Brown not be We 1993, June, petition. Court denied the State, retroactively. Lofton Capital appointed Case Resource Center (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), perm. to 249-250 post-convic represent appellant in State, denied, (Tenn.1995); Peters v. time, post-convic proceedings. tion At 03C01-9409-CR-00331, 1995 WL 632346 No. and, record, counsel tion withdrew Knoxville, October (Tenn.Crim.App. at August July, reviewed the record. On 1995). Moreover, supreme court’s hold petition. previ As counsel filed implicate ing in a constitu Brown does not noted, evidentiary ously hearing held Accordingly, right or rule of law. tional new 29,1993. Thus, on November repeatedly held that Brown this court has in this case had access the records may for relief within not be used as a basis prior post-

for at least five months See, Lofton, e.g., post-conviction context. *18 hearing, including three months conviction Peters, 249-250; 03C01- at No. petition. following filing of the the Slate, 9409-CR-00331; 03C01- State v. No. Moreover,, appellant the has failed iden- (Tenn. 9201-CR-00014, 228751 1994 WL affecting prejudice his conviction or tify any Knoxville, 23,1994). May at Crim.App. continu- undisputed It that a sentence. is purpose of may granted for the ance be Slate, in court No. 03C01-9201- This of identifiable wit- securing presence the CR-00014, sufficiency of the evi held that testimony material if the witnesses’ nesses dence, may pro implicate due generally, the case, However, in the admissible'1. appellant rights of and is therefore cess the in order to sought continuance appellant post-conviction proceed in cognizable claim which, the time of the gather information at §Ann. pursuant 40-30- ings to Tenn.Code entirely motion, largely unknown of (1990). However, that have been issues speculative value. appeal direct can determined on previously post-conviction re Thus, support petition do not wish to douse not we while 40-30-111, -112 § Ann. lief. Tenn.Code post-conviction counsel’s zeal- flames of the (1990). State, Harvey See also premeditated degree v. 749 S.W.2d murder and first mur- der, 479 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987); v. Gribble as to each victim.16 Prior to the sen- State, 02C01-9303-CC-00039, trial, No. tencing 1995 WL phase of the the trial court Jackson), (Tenn.Crim.App. perm. “merged” felony premeditat- the murder and denied, (Tenn.1995); appeal Randolph verdicts, dismissing ed murder effect the State, 03C01-9309-CR-00309, No. felony WL murder verdicts.17 Knoxville), (Tenn.Crim.App. perm. Middlebrooks, In Supreme the Tennessee denied, (Tenn.1994), appeal precluded Court held that the state is from 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. 115 S.Ct. 1699 using felony aggravating murder as an cir- underlying cumstance when the conviction is appellant challenged sufficiency The the of felony holding, murder. Id. at In so Harris, appeal. evidence on direct following: the court stated earlier, 75-76. As noted the Su- [W]hen defendant is convicted of first- preme Court found that the over- “[s]ince degree solely felony murder on the basis of whelming supported evidence the verdict of murder, aggravating circumstance set jury, judgment of conviction must be 13—203(i)(7) § out Tenn.Code Ann. 39— appellant affirmed.” Id. at 76. The con- (1982) 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991), does not in evaluating sufficiency tends of death-eligible narrow class of murder- evidence, supreme court concentrated sufficiently Eighth ers under the Amend- implicating the evidence ment the U.S. Constitution and Article directly the crime and did not address the I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution be- premeditation issues of and deliberation. duplicates cause it the elements of the cites this court’s decision in offense. Slate, 03C01-9201-CR-00014, No. support Id. argument. However, of his on direct asserts, correctly As the state Slate, court, appellate without discuss- “solely lant was not convicted on the basis of merits, ing the held that the issue of suffi- felony jury guilty murder.” The returned ciency entirely of the evidence was waived. premeditated verdicts on counts of both Therefore, post-conviction appellate felony merit. murder. This issue is without previously found that the issue had not been contrast, case, determined. in the instant SEQUENTIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS supreme court addressed the merits of next that “the appellant’s challenge sufficiency contends jury’s unfairly process deliberative pre- the evidence. this issue has been viously by the instruction.” At the subject skewed Court’s determined and is not to re- guilt phase conclusion proceeding. view this judge instructed the on the elements judge degree murder. The then in- first MIDDLEBROOKS ISSUE only jury that it could consider structed the also contends that because degree the lesser included offense of second murder, felony he was the su convicted acquitted if murder it first preme court’s decision in State v. Middle greater offense. brooks, (Tenn.1992), 840 S.W.2d 317 cert. dis missed, upheld giv- repeatedly This court has (1993), *19 “acquittal first” instructions. applied ing should to in of so-called L.Ed.2d 555 be Raines, 376, 381-382 aggravating circumstance of felo See State v. 882 S.W.2d validate denied, jury perm, appeal ny (Tenn.Crim.App.), that the murder. The record reveals McPherson, (Tenn.1994); felony v. 882 S.W.2d appellant guilty of both State found 57, Similarly, Hurley, v. 876 S.W.2d appellant was two counts of in State 16. The indicted on (Tenn.1993), was where the defendant 69-70 premeditated degree first murder and two counts felony premeditat- of both murder and convicted felony murder. All four counts were submit- victim, degree the su- murder of one ed first juiy. ted to the felony count. preme murder court dismissed 176 02C01-9305-CR-00080,

365, ap WL 568433 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. 375-376 1994 denied, Jackson, (Tenn.1994); 19, peal (Tenn.Crim.App. State v. Ruther October (Tenn.1995). 118, (Tenn.Crim. 1994), ford, granted, perm. appeal 876 S.W.2d 119-120 (Tenn. denied, Smith, 561, App.1993), perm. generally v. 868 See State S.W.2d 1994); Beckham, (Tenn.1993), denied, 960, v. No. State 02C01-9406- 513 cert. U.S. CR-00107, (Tenn.Crim.App. (1994); 1996 WL 389321 130 L.Ed.2d 333 State 115 S.Ct. Jackson, 27,1995). September According Cauthern, (Tenn.1989), v. 1922,109 denied, 904,110 ly, this issue is without merit. S.Ct. cert. U.S. (1990). This issue has no merit. L.Ed.2d 286 THE TENNESSEE DEATH (i)(5) The also claims that PENALTY STATUTE vague and over- aggravating circumstance is The raises constitu- numerous Again, supreme court has held broad. our penal- challenges to tional Tennessee’s death statutory aggravating circumstance that this ty Although acknowledges statute. he Black, v. constitutional. State See rejected Supreme the Tennessee Court has (Tenn.1991). This issue S.W.2d 181-182 arguments past, each of these is without merit. preserve nevertheless them in order to raises (i)(6) ag- contends by for later review the federal the issues gravating has been construed circumstance appellate courts. applied dupli- as to be in such a manner Tennes- first contends that (i)(7) circumstance. aggravating cative of the meaning- penalty death statute fails to see’s however, conclude, that this issue need We fully eligible defen- narrow class death addressed, did not find not be since Specifically, maintains dants. (i)(6) aggravating circumstance is combination, that, aggravating circum- applicable in this case. (7)21 (i)(2),18 (6),20 (5),19 apply stances majority of homicides committed ap following arguments raised possessed He if he Tennessee. submits Smith, pellant rejected in v. State were investigate and obtain statis- the resources (Tenn.), denied, 510 U.S. cert. evidence, “it is the tical he could show that (1993), L.Ed.2d 461 exception than the rule that a homi- rather 682, 126 1040, 114S.Ct. (i)(7) felony cide does not involve collateral (1994): L.Ed.2d 650 and, killing consequently, vic- (1) be- statute is unconstitutional (i)(6), felony or does not to that tim/witness imposed penalty has been cause the death mental or the infliction of severe involve discriminatory manner based in a (i)(5), person physical pain or that who race, gender, economics, geography, and prior not have commits the homicide does 23; Id. any felony ‘whose or conviction assault (2) man- procedures uniform the lack of the use of violence statutory elements involve sequestered voir dire (i)(2).” dating individual argument This was person’ imposi- Odom, during jury renders the selection No. rejected this court State with, (1982) 39-2-203(i)(2) terfering preventing the lawful arrest or or § sets 18. Tenn.Code Ann. aggravating or another.” prosecution "[t]he circumstance of the defendant forth the of one or previously was convicted defendant felonies, present charge, than the more other 39-2-203(9(7) (1982) § sets Ann. 21.Tenn.Code use or threat of violence to which involve the murder aggravating “[t]he factor that forth person.” engaged the defendant was committed while accomplice committing, the com- or was an (1982) 39-2-203(0(5) § sets Ann. 19. Tenn.Code commit, of, attempting or was or was mission fleeing aggravating factor that murder “[t]he forth the committing attempting to com- after heinous, atrocious, especially or cruel in that arson, murder, mit, rape, degree rob- first depravity of mind.” torture or it involved pira- bery, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft burglary, 39-2-203(0(6) (1982) § sets discharging 20. Tenn.Code Ann. throwing, placing or cy, or unlawful *20 aggravating factor that murder "[t]he forth the or bomb." a destructive device of avoiding, purpose in- the was committed for tion of the death penalty arbitrary and to the existence of mitigating circum- capricious, 20; Id. at stances.

(3) penalty the death statute is unconsti- argues The also that electrocu- tutional because it limits the consideration tion punishment, is a cruel and unusual mitigating by requiring evidence thereby violating constitution- jury unanimously agree on a life sen- rights. argument al specifically This tence, 18; Id. at Black, and rejected in 815 S.W.2d at 178-179. (4) penalty the death statute is unconsti- Finally, appellant argues ap- jury tutional because the required is not pellate process review in Tennessee is consti- make the ultimate determination that the tutionally inadequate. Specifically, he ar- penalty death appropriate, is Id. at 22. gues appellate review Tennessee is meaningful following not for the reasons: following arguments The by ap raised uniform, procedure there is no state-wide pellant rejected by were supreme court collecting evaluating concerning and data Caughron, in State v. 855 S.W.2d cases; disposition of homicide the cases of (Tenn.), denied, cert. 510 U.S. 114 S.Ct. degree defendants convicted of some 475, 126 (1993): L.Ed.2d 426 degree homicide less than first murder (1) by jurors excluding who have scru- the cases of defendants who received and/or ples against penalty, jury the death imprisonment a sentence of less than life are process make-up selection skews the court; reported supreme not the infor- jury prosecution-prone to make it and by judges mation collected the trial thereby violates the defendant’s constitu- Tenn.Sup.Ct.Rule inadequate; 12 form is rights; tional and jury by verdict form mandated Tenn.Code (2) penalty arbitrarily the death is 39-2-203(f) (1982) § require Ann. did not capriciously imposed because the State has jury mitigating report circumstances and right closing argument of final at the thereby appellate renders review of these penalty phase. impossible; published circumstances and no proportionality is standard for review following arguments ap raised short, available. asserts rejected pellant supreme were court meaningful body that “there is no of collect- Brimmer, in State v. 86-87 ed data to can refer and which defendant (Tenn.), 115 S.Ct. no which the defendant can standard 585, 130 (1994): L.Ed.2d 499 rely plead argument This his case.” (1) penalty imposed the death in an is Odom, specifically rejected by court in this arbitrary capricious manner because Cazes, No. 02C01-9305-CR-00080. See also the defendant is not allowed to address at 270-271. parole eligibility, issues such as cost of execution, incarceration versus cost of de- CONCLUSION terrence, execution; and method of fully supports post-eonvic- record (2) imposed in an the death sentence is findings and conclusions. The tion court’s arbitrary capricious manner because clearly not met his burden of appellant has is not instructed as to the effect petition for proof. We conclude verdict; a non-unanimous properly denied. post-conviction relief was (3) penalty arbitrarily and the death stated, judg- have For the reasons we prosecu- capriciously imposed because the affirmed. post-conviction court is ment of the deciding wheth- tor is allowed discretion penalty; and er to seek the death BARKER, JJ., concur. SUMMERS (4) unconsti- penalty statute is death PETITION DENYING ORDER is a reasonable like- tutional because there REHEAR TO Jury Pattern the Tennessee lihood that to Re- filed a Petition appellant has jurors to believe Instructions lead reconsider requesting that agree hear unanimously as required to are *21 178 to further position re- that defense counsel failed opinion holding that the our 20, 1987, by explore report a doc- November of counsel at ceived the effective assistance Kelly, Kelly in which ument examiner James sentencing phases of his trial. guilt and “Comparison writing of the of indicated opinion incor- He contends that the court’s Doby writing in [the Rufus Edward with by rectly the material facts established states similarities, Valley Maggie letter] discloses record, is and forth in the

the evidence set a enough positive are for iden- but there not decisions, prior and overlooks conflict with report Kelly suggested in his tification.” Tenn. propositions material facts of law. and Maggie Valley original copy of the that the 39(a)(1), (2), Having thor- R.App.P. submitted, along with additional letter be record, we conclude oughly re-examined samples Doby. from writing assistance of the issue of ineffective Ac- adequately clarification, considered. counsel has been of we purpose For will concerning appellant’s Petition to Rehear coun- cordingly, events defense outline the Nevertheless, Valley recognizing investigation Maggie of let- is denied. sel’s ter, scrutiny in the record. Defense heightened applicable standard of reflected as Valley copy Maggie a and to received a the review of sentence of death counsel 2, They February received sufficiently 1988. our conclusions are letter on insure that handwriting record, samples appellant’s on on the we elect to address reflected 26, February On or about February appellant in his points certain raised 29, 1988, Sexton defense counsel Charles § Ann. 39-13- Petition. See Tenn.Code Kelly. Kelly apparently (c)(1)(C)(1994 206(c)(1)(B), communicated with Supp.). had eliminated co- informed Sexton that he First, contests as Doby, Pelley, DeModica defendants v. Caspiri, Dees 904 F.2d court’s citation to Valley Maggie letter. De- the author of the (8th denied, 452, Cir.), 970, 498 U.S. cert. Kelly’s report ap- on fense counsel received (1990), 436, 112 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 11, the same proximately March 1988. On support proposition that trial counsel’s reports day, received defense counsel also investigate authorship failure to further examiner, completed by the State’s document a Maggie Valley letter was reasonable Vastrick, that nei- Thomas which indicated acknowledge, cor strategic as decision. We DeModica, Pelley, Doby had ther nor written rectly un pointed appellant, out reports Maggie Valley letter. Vastriek’s trial not der Tennessee law counsel would possibility that the also reflected a required have been to disclose the State letter, required had written the but Vastriek expert opinion by an whom unfavorable handwriting samples. Notes re- additional call he did not intend to or whose file of counsel Wil- covered from the defense report he did not intend to introduce trial. Goddard, 15, 1988, indicat- liam dated March 16(b)(1)(B) (b)(2). See Tenn.R.Crim.P. contemplated ed that Sexton Goddard Nichols, 722, 729- v. 877 S.W.2d also State handwriting expert, consulting Bust- another (Tenn.1994), 1114, er At the Brown. (1995); L.Ed.2d 791 State spoke testified that defense Sexton (Tenn. Vilvarajah, v. 735 S.W.2d request analy- an did with Mr. Brown but not Bell, Crim.App.1987); State submitted April sis. the State On (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. samples motion for additional denied, (Tenn.1985). However, submit- handwriting. Counsel lant's Defense our of trial incorrectly infers that evaluation a certificate of need requesting ted motion Valley investigation Maggie counsel’s subpoena the appellant which allow would Dees, 904 F.2d at 452. Letter relied 7, 1988, Kelly April trial. On James Initially, opinion report in our we noted from defense counsel received by refusing to appellant, indicating submit additional that he was still Thomas Vastrick State, handwriting rejected an was the samples to the unable to establish opportunity Maggie Valley April the au- On to exonerate himself as author letter. 11, 1988, Valley discussed with the Maggie thor of the letter. defense counsel opinion from support to obtain the record does not their efforts

179 Kelly Doby, appellant, respect investigation that rather than at With to counsel’s penalty phase They was the author of of the we acknowl the letter. indicated State, edge Cooper court in that this v. 847 original would like to send (Tenn.Crim.App.1992), S.W.2d 529 indi Maggie Valley samples letter and additional greater placed a cated that there is burden Doby’s handwriting Kelly. April of to On investigate possible on defense counsel 1988, the court provide ordered the State to mitigating penalty phase at the of a evidence counsel, requested materials to defense However, capital Cooper, trial. exception original Maggie with the 525-526, S.W.2d at the defendant’s sister told Valley However, letter. the court indicated counsel about “the defendant’s de defense that, original prove should letter indis- suicide, pression, attempted seeing [a and his pensable, the State and defense counsel days psychologist] ninety clinical before own, might, arrange on their to send the killing.... attorney about the she told Kelly, letter to or defense counsel could sub- involuntary commitment order which she had mit additional motions to the court. Sexton day defendant] obtained for on the of [the testified hearing at the killing.” This court that the attor found specifically hap- he could not recall what ney’s investigate failure to further the defen pened hearing after respect this with to Mr. psychological background dant’s and condi However, state, Kelly. he did “I believe at tion was ineffective assistance of counsel. time, point, some additional information State, Similarly, in v. Adkins S.W.2d obtained, I [was] do believe that (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), perm. appeal proceedings course of the those were eventu- dismissed, (Tenn.1995), defense counsel ally provided Kelly.” to Mr. He also testified family learned from members and friends engage that defense counsel did in further that the defendant’s father was an alcoholic However, Kelly. communication with he appellant. who had abused the This court could not recall the outcome of those commu- forgo found that defense counsel’s decision to nications. Sexton also stated that defense investigation mitigating further evidence spoke counsel with Vastrick and determined present mitigating and his failure to evidence testify that Vastrick was unable to that the In were ineffective assistance of counsel. Maggie Valley wrote the letter. State, 03C01-9210-CR-00364, Bell v. No. (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995 WL at Knox the record does not reveal whether ville), denied, (Tenn.1995), perm, appeal Kelly provided or not was ever with the investigation this court found that counsel’s original Valley letter, Maggie additional sam preparation penalty phase for ples Doby’s handwriting, samples trial, including request counsel’s failure to appellant’s handwriting. As to “elev defendant, psychological examination of the request expert enth-hour for an on the eve constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. trial,” request necessarily was not a re case, As in the instant counsel failed to ob “haphazard” investigation, flection of but juvenile arguably tain revealed records pro rather a reaction to the “eleventh-hour” However, Bell, I.Q. the defendant’s low duction the State of an additional witness 03C01-9210-CR-00364, person counsel No. prepared testify handwriting that the ally believed that the defendant was suffer Maggie Valley letter was that of the ing psychological difficulties. appellant. The burden is on the post-conviction hearing, counsel conceded post-conviction proceeding prove the al preparation penal that less was done for legations petition preponderance in his ty guilt/inno- phase of the trial than for the State, of the evidence. McBee v. phase. eenee Counsel described the investi (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). also See gative overwhelming.” effort as “not (Tenn. Buford, State case, Crim.App.1983), perm. the record does not the instant (Tenn.1984). admittedly support While issue assertion defense only began prepare ineffective assistance of counsel this ease sen- counsel one, trial. tencing phase the weekend before is a close we conclude Rather, post-convic- at the simply proof. meet burden of Sexton testified did not ran childhood, weekend, the fact that, prior to that hearing tion remaining early age, away at an from home on that-” worked “had looked appellant’s role concerning the doubt opinion, defense in our stated As two murders, appellant has the fact that many on occasions. interviewed *23 during the children, testimony adduced interview, used an early counsel During an concerning various the trial guilt phase of gather background page form to eight to ten “help[ people.” ] by appellant to attempts the appellant. Defense the from information appellant asked the counsel and Defense on appellant’s mother contacted the counsel mercy. jury exercise the attempted They to also several occasions. by appel named individuals presence contact other suggests the appellant also lant, ob largely without success. Sexton and Fourteenth Eighth Amendment somebody find was hard to al- stemming that “it served from claims Amendment in this man....” an interest would take This leged of his trial counsel. errors not could recall testified that he has Supreme Sexton also Court acknowledges that family Eighth either an abusive being informed of it a held that is violation state, mental difficul psychological a stat- situation or Amendments Fourteenth jury in the record ute, preclude There no evidence from judge ties. to or a any psychologi capital aware of in a considering mitigating counsel was evidence defense Indeed, See, Dugger, Sexton 481 difficulties. v. e.g., cal or mental Hitchcock case. 1821, 1822, appear 393, 394, to 95 not that the did 107 S.Ct. testified U.S. ap (1987); Skipper v. South Car suffer “mental deficiencies.”1 L.Ed.2d 347 1669, olina, 1, sentencing 4, pellant phase that 1670- at the 476 106 S.Ct. testified U.S. 1671, (1986); Eddings v. resulted from 1 Okla poor performance school 90 L.Ed.2d his 869, homa, 104, 111-114, motivation, lack of 102 S.Ct. rather than a 455 U.S. lack of 875-876, (1982); v. 1 Lockett intelligence. respect to medication ad 71 L.Ed.2d With Ohio, 604, 2954, 586, 2964- 98 S.Ct. to while he was 438 U.S. ministered (1978). However, 2965, jail awaiting simply note that 57 L.Ed.2d 973 we would analyzed consistently 1439, Supreme has Court Dugger, F.2d 1444- Elledge v. 823 (11th denied, present mitigating evi- Cir.1987), failure to 485 counsel’s 1445 n. cert. 10 1487, against the standards of Sixth 1014, dence 715 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d U.S. See, e.g., Burger Kemp, 483 (1988), Amendment. v. counsel the court found that 3122-3126, 776, 788-795, 3114, 107 U.S. S.Ct. pursued of the defen should have the issue (1987); v. Strickland Wash condition, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 upon learning that dant’s mental 687-692, 668, 698-699, ington, 104 466 U.S. being antipsychotic med he was treated with 2052, 2065-2066, 2070-2071, 80 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. jail, ications while in because of trial coun 674 personal sel’s conviction that the defendant case, “crazy.” In Sexton the instant respect prejudice to at the With during proceed testified at no time Strickland, phase, sentencing under 466 U.S. ings, was suf did feel 695, 2069, at 104 we must consider S.Ct. at fering psychological difficulties. concluded whether sentencer would have argues jury mitigat also aggravating that the balance had no choice but return a verdict of ing circumstances did not warrant death. Adkins, assertion, death. 911 at 356. dis- contrary appellant’s We agree. During phase, in penalty defense noting the brutal nature of the crimes emphasized jury volved, implied appel appel- way we in no education, “unmitigatable.” lant’s limited diffi- lant’s crimes are relationship parents prejudice cult during evaluating possible with his 991, (7th Cir.), 1. When counsel has no reason to know of a F.2d 314 cert. 588, (1986), problems, client’s mental does the Sixth Amendment 107 93 L.Ed.2d 590 and Clan S.Ct. not.impose general duty explore Bair, (4th Cir.1987), 1354 ton v. 826 F.2d See, capacity. e.g., Riley defendant's mental v. denied, 484 U.S. 108 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed.2d (D.Del.1993) Snyder, F.Supp. 1027 (1988)). Franzen, (citing United ex States rel. Rivera lant, mitigating our review is limited to those Therefore,

factors reflected in the record. concerning mitigating

our ev- observation arguably

idence available only intended describe evidence conclusion,

reflected record.2 we

agree right that it is neither court’s nor

prerogative impose any on limitation miti-

gating may evidence that be considered Hitchcock, capital in a case. 1822; Skipper, at

U.S. S.Ct. 1670-1671; Eddings,

U.S. *24 111-114, 875-876; U.S. 102 S.Ct.

Lockett, 438 U.S. at at 2964-

2965. above, appel-

For the reasons stated

lant’s Petition to Rehear is denied. Tennessee, Appellee,

STATE

Timothy HALL, Sr., Appellant. Wade Tennessee, Appeals

Court Criminal

at Jackson.

Jan. Appeal Applied

No Permission to Supreme

for to the Court. mitigating argued possible pursu- factors defense prejudice and other 2. Our consideration of encompassed ant to Strickland has during penalty phase. difficulties, background, possible lant’s mental An initial notes verbal, 11-year boy the entire time.” ambulatory, fully “an old “medicated with thorazine problem.” with a serious The social behavior fol- conclusions contradict the The above observed, “Mrs. services worker further lowing observation undocumented told me that [the Nelms mother] clinical record: “Eddie has Western Carolina damage’ has ‘brain and is ‘disturbed.’ Eddie

Case Details

Case Name: Harris v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date Published: Feb 28, 1996
Citation: 947 S.W.2d 156
Court Abbreviation: Tenn. Crim. App.
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