Harris v. State

physician, treating rule that a a mentally adult competent circumstances, non-emergency under properly cannot under- perform take to surgery or administer other therapy without prior consent of his patient.”).

Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim is without merit. The “against action lies a person wrongful whose act causes the 3-902(a). death of another.” CJ alleged Here the wrongful act, CPR, Wright caused to live. appears

It in appeal Wright’s this parents have aban- doned their battery they preserved claim. While in the claim certiorari, their cross-petition they have no argu- made ment support the claim their brief to this Court. Further, in their reply Wright’s parents brief have failed to respond to the defendants’ assertion that Wright’s parents “have abandoned claim that the Circuit Court erred its dismissal Wrights’ battery claim.” THE

JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTI- MORE CITY AFFIRMED. BE COSTS TO PAID BY THE CROSS-RESPONDENTS, PETITIONERS AND JEAN- ETTE et al. WRIGHT

728 A.2d 180 Timothy HARRIS Maryland. STATE of 81, Sept. Term, No. 1998. Appeals Maryland.

Court of April Harris, E. Serra, (Stephen Defender Asst. Public Gina M. Baltimore, Defender, brief), Appellant. for on Public (J. Curran, Jr., Ince, Joseph Atty. Ann Asst. Gen Mary brief), Baltimore, Gen., Appellee. Atty. on ELDR1DGE, BELL, C.J., and Argued before RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER CATHELL, JJ.

RAKER, Judge. carjacking, in was convicted of the offense of Appellant (1957, Maryland Repl-Vol., Supp.), Code violation in § we must decide this case is Article 27 348A.1 The issue jury that instructing the trial court erred whether not a intent We conclude that carjacking crime. crime, accordingly, we carjacking is not a trial court. shall affirm the indicated, statutory herein shall be to otherwise all references

1. Unless (1957, Supp.), Repl.VoL, Article 27. Maryland Code

I briefly We shall state the facts. On November Harris, Timothy Tipton Jack and several other Mends were playing drinking cards and alcohol at a Tipton Mend’s house. offered to Tipton drive Harris home. that Harris testified angry Tipton go became when refused to to the District of Columbia, forcibly and that Harris Tipton removed from the car away. and drove Tipton reported the car as stolen.

Appellant by was indicted Jury Grand for Prince George’s County with the crimes of violation of 27, 348A, § Art. taking unlawful of a motor vehicle in violation 342A, § of Art. and second degree assault violation of trial, Art. 12A. At voluntary Harris’s defense was intoxication. He testified that he had consumed alcohol and marijuana throughout smoked evening, and that he leaving get-together. “blacked out” after Appellant requested jury instruction voluntary on intoxi- cation, that arguing he was too intoxicated from drugs and alcohol to form required for the offenses of carjacking and taking unlawful of a motor vehicle. The court declined to jury instruct the that required specific intent. The trial court jury instructed the charged when intent, with an requmng specific offense a defendant cannot if guilty he was so intoxicated drugs alcohol that and/or he was unable to the necessary form intent. The court jury further instructed the that the taking unlawful of a motor only vehicle was the offense that required specific intent. As to the offense of carjacking, the trial court jury instructed the as follows:

An guilty individual is of carjacking when that individual possession obtains unauthorized or control of a motor vehi- cle from another individual in actual by force violence, byor putting individual in fear through intimi- dation or threat of force or violence. jury found Harris not guilty crime unauthorized vehicle,

taking of a motor guilty and assault. Special to the Court timely appeal noted a Appellant to address our own motion certiorari on granted We Appeals. of the crime intent is an element specific of whether the issue carjacking. II statute, 27, § Art. 348A reads carjacking Maryland’s pertinent part:

(b) An individual commits the offense.—(1) Elements of obtains unautho- carjacking when the individual offense from another or control of a motor vehicle rized violence, or possession by in actual force individual intimidation or threat through that individual fear putting of force or violence.

(c) convicted of car- individual Penalty—In general.—An felony ... of a and shall be sentenced jacking guilty is years. for not more than 30 imprisonment (d) im- to other sentence Same—Additional offenses.—The from and posed may imposed separate under this section from any arising consecutive to a sentence for other offense underlying carjacking the conduct the offenses of or armed carjacking.

(e) carjack- is not a defense to the offense of Defenses.—It ing carjacking armed the defendant did intend of motor vehicle. permanently deprive owner §of argues plain language clearly The State that the 348A not a establishes that intent crime. The observes that the trial court’s instruction State 348A(b)(l). tracked the to the language According failure to which Legislature’s language include would ordinarily requirement indicate a refutes Har- carjacking requires ris’s claim that deprive Rather, regard without to duration. Legislature clearly intended that the offense is committed without additional

deliberate purpose design and conscious to accomplish a specific and more remote result.

Appellant argues requires specific intent regard “without to the intended duration of the deprivation.” He argues type that is a of robbery without the prove specific need to a intent to deprive permanently. Alter- natively, that argues equivalent he is the of an vehicle, assault, unauthorized use of a motor preceded by an assault, battery, such, or an aggravated and as requires the prove specific deprive, State intent to without regard to the duration of deprivation. the intended In particular, Ap- pellant argues that is little robbery more than without to prove specific need intent to permanently deprive, and the equivalent of unauthorized use preceded by assault, battery, an or an aggravated assault. main- Appellant tains that the intent requirement carjacking is like that of unauthorized use—that an intent to deprive temporarily is the specific requirement. intent Noting that the standard for “whether, specific intent is in addition general to the intent to act, do the immediate it embraces some additional purpose design act,” accomplished beyond Appel- immediate that, lant reasons that “[cjarjacking requires through force or violence, (the act), or a threat of force or violence immediate person obtains unauthorized or control of a motor (the act).” purpose beyond vehicle the immediate

Ill Generally there are aspects every two crime—the actus reus or guilty act and the mens rea or the culpable mental state accompanying forbidden act. Garnett v. State, (1993). 571, 577-78, 797, 332 Md. Mary 632 A.2d 800 land continues to observe the distinction general between and State, 46, 65, intent v. crimes. Shell 307 Md. 512 A.2d 358, 366-67 particularly significant The distinction is when a defendant claims that his voluntary pre intoxication vents him from forming requisite intent to commit a crime. 65, See id. at 512 A.2d at 367 (noting the distinction “does serve to reconcile fairness the accused with the need to protect the from public intoxicated offenders and to deter such 1, 35, State, 643 A.2d Md.App. v. Wieland persons”); (“It importance (1994) takes on critical distinction that is a intoxi voluntary assessing the effect frequently most mem a certain capacity to entertain on a defendant’s cation Maryland that while rea.”). the law long It has been crime, it to a is a defense voluntary intoxication Shell, 307 Md. intent crime. See to a not a defense Mary review of (conducting extensive A.2d at 367 at intoxi voluntary asserted defense addressing cases land generally). cation intent to simply defined as intent has been Specific and con- act, deliberate but the “additional an. immediate do very specific design accomplishing purpose scious Shell, A.2d at 366 307 Md. more remote result.” 277, 305, State, Md.App. (quoting Smith C., 80, 84, 626 A.2d (1979)); In re Taka 331 Md. see also A.2d (1993); Md. Ford v. 368-69 Gover, 602, 606, 298 A.2d (1993); State (1973). Shell, expla- the approval with quoted we for the by Judge Moylan, writing specific intent nation State, 41 at 305- Md.App. Special Appeals Smith Court 06, 398 A.2d at 442-43: to do the immediate simply not the intent specific

A intent is that the mind be con- requirement act but embraces shall design which purpose of a more remote scious Though immediate act. doing from the eventuate blow, to only general intent strike implies assault murder, rob, or maim a rape, requires to assault with intent con- that those further fully purpose formed and conscious act. of the immediate doing shall flow from the sequences to general a intent but requires To break and enter mere intent of requires specific the additional burglary commit A has been made. felony entry after the committing a general a mere intent but larce- taking requires trespassory (or animus specific ny robbery) requires furandi depriving permanently the owner purpose deliberate intoxication voluntary This is even goods. why the stolen not a thou,gh negate intent it will may negate specific mere intent. general larger class ‘specific intent’ includes such other mem 1) 2) murder,

bers assault with intent to assault with 3) 4) rob, intent to rape, assault with intent assault with 5) 6) 7) 8) maim, larceny, burglary, robbery and the specific-intent-to-inflict-grievous-bodily-harm variety of murder.[2] Each of these requires simply general to do the act particular, with no clear or immediate mind, undifferentiated end but the additional deliberate purpose design and conscious accomplishing very specific and more remote result. 62-63, added).

307 Md. at (emphasis A.2d at 366 Chief California, Traynor, writing Supreme Justice for the Court of explained the difference between intent and general intent crimes:

When the definition of a crime of only descrip- consists act, particular tion of a without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed be one of intent. Hood,

People 1 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. 462 P.2d By way of example, Special the Court of has Appeals held that the common law crime of assault of the intent frighten Wieland, variety intent crime. Md.App. 643 A.2d at 464. That crime has been defined doing as “the of an act places the victim in apprehension murder, Although 2. the common law crimes of assault with intent rob, maim, statute, rape burglary changed by and have been see Art. 27, 27, 28-35B, §§ §§ analysis 12-12A-7 and Art. remains un- State, changed. Md.App. See also Wieland v. 643 A.2d (1994) page noting the distinction between the two infra varieties of assault. such to cause the intent bodily harm with of immediate intent is Id., general A.2d at 464. apprehension.” act, i.e., make intent to the immediate to commit the intent Id., An additional 643 A.2d at 464. gesture. threatening for that immedi- intent specific there be a is that requirement bodily harm. fear of imminent victim in place act to ate contrast, noted, by way Id., The court A.2d at 464. intent general is a battery type attempted an assault Id., A.2d at 464. no intent. requiring crime court, noted: Moylan, writing for the Judge ‘specific designates intent’ the term Accurately employed, purpose above element or intended specific mental some for the mere actus required the mental state beyond so, every it intentional crime itself. reus of the Were crime and there specific intent would be deemed a crime of general as that longer category no even be such a would intent crimes. must reviewed Each crime at A.2d at 464-65.

Id. 37-38, 643 A.2d at Distilled on hoc basis. Id. at an ad essence, particular requires crime determine whether a its whether, intent, in addi- inquire “we must necessary specific act, it embraces intent to do the immediate general tion design accomplished beyond purpose or to be some additional Id., at 464. that immediate act.” 643 A.2d Orth, lines, for writing the Court Along Judge these same (1977), McBurney v. observed: consequences

A mens rea or intent ‘includes those (a) an very for which act is represent purpose which occurrence), (b) are of likelihood of (regardless done (regardless result substantially known to be certain to ed.1969) (2 desire).’ Perkins, 747]. Criminal Law nd. at [R. crimes, however, is an essential some Marshall, A on the Law of ingredient. Clark & Treatise th (7 ed.1987) intent, ‘A when an Crimes 5.06. offense, is some particular of the mens rea of a element reus thereof which is than to do the actus other required guilt.’ specifically [Perkins 762].

IV. consistently We have stated the cardinal rule in statutory is Legislature’s construction to effectuate the broad goal State, 428, or purpose. Gargliano v. 334 Md. 435 639 (1994). 675, primary A.2d legislative source of intent is the text the statute v. itself. Rose Fox Pool Corp., 335 351, 359, 906, (1994). Md. 643 A.2d To determine if a intent, criminal requires specific statute we look first to the State, statute. language 257, the See Richmond v. 326 Md. 483, (1992); Shell, 604 A.2d Md. A.2d at (stating that particular language purpose of each considered). statute must be If the alone language does not provide sufficient intent, information as to the Legislature’s we look to other sources to Legislature’s purpose. discern the State, 255, 261, See v. Jones 336 Md. 647 A.2d 1206-07 intent, determining legislative the key the purpose legislation, of the determined light of the language statute’s and context. look at ‘[W]e statutory context; language we legislative consider histo- available____ ry when it is Our always endeavor is to construe a so to implement statute as legislative goal, not to frustrate it.’ 1238, 1251 (1989) 554 A.2d

Warfield (alteration (citation omitted) in original) (quoting NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 145-46, (1988)). Md. whole, Viewing statute as a language carjacking statute does not an evidence intent on the part Assembly the General to create a intent crime. Words such as “with intent to” are conspicuously absent from the statute.3 “When statute does not contain reference intent, ordinarily implied.” intent is United States Martinez, 1398, 1401(9th Cir.1995). 49 F.3d crimes, Assembly The General has using explic- created language required specific it indicate intent. It is evident that Legislature crime, when the desires to create it knows language plain history as well

The legislative intended to Assembly the General make clear that statute carjacking. offense known as a new criminal create Committee, Report Floor Proceedings Senate Judicial (“This (1993) and defines the bill creates at 1 Bill Senate Pixley v. carjacking.”); armed of and crimes cf. (D.C.1997) States, 438, (carjacking is a A.2d United offense). a new offense created Legislature new criminal or conscious deliberate require any not additional that does obtaining that of unauthorized beyond purpose of a motor vehicle. control First, of the statute. language the initially plain look to

We any unequivocally provided and Legislature clearly separate from and carjacking may be imposed for sentence from arising offense any to for other a sentence consecutive carjacking or armed underlying the offenses the conduct 348A(d). Second, Legislature 27, § Art. carjacking. explicitly provided intent when it clearly specific focused on not intend to did that the defendant that it is not a defense vehicle, and of the motor the owner permanently deprive 27, Art. requirement. See to an intent failed substitute 348A(e). permanently § In intent to eliminating a different intent deprive, Legislature could have included All is the intent requires if so. that the statute it chose do act; no or intent to purpose further proscribed to do the consequence necessary. achieve some additional 1991, a new legislative history. to the turn next We offense, nationally. on “carjacking”, was the rise coined 27, 29(a) See, (A Burglary degree, § e.g., in Art. to do so. first how dwelling of with the

person may enter the another intent not break and violence); degree, Burglary in second Art. commit or a crime of theft (A 27, 30(a)- person may § and enter the storehouse break theft, violence, or arson in with to commit a crime of another the intent 27, (A person § Burglary degree, in degree); third Art. the second dwelling may another with the intent not break and enter the crime). crimes. offenses are commit These Cf. (1989) (examining the Md. 554 A.2d 1238 Warfield concluding they predecessors and were to these crimes crimes). G. Wing, Putting Brakes on Carjacking or Accelerating It? The Anti Car Act 28 U. Rich L.Rev. 385 Theft In response, Congress passed the Anti Car Act Theft many state legislatures, sparked by the violent of Dr. death Pamela County, Basu Howard Maryland, followed the legislation federal lead enacted to address this new twist car thefts. See p. statutes cited 611- infra

In response to the Basu carjacking, Senate Bill 339 and Bill House 415 were Maryland introduced General Assembly as emergency measures Governor Don William ald Schaefer January, legislation, 1993. As emergency Maryland Assembly 348A, General enacted Art. chapter Acts of on April upon effective enactment. (1993); See Bill for Bill File House Bill File Senate Bill (1993) (reflecting legislation that emergency was neces sary for preservation the immediate of the public health and The safety). intent of Legislature the “was to proscribe actions although already crimest[4], i.e., which robbery, were deemed to be of such an aggravated nature as to require specific legislation punishment.” and Price v. 487, 497, (1996).

App. Testifying before Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee on Bill Senate Steven B. Larsen the Governor’s Legislative Office said: separate

While the acts that constitute a carjacking techni- offenses, cally fall within current chargeable existing penalties are wholly for the inadequate gravity of the of- This legislation provides fense. prosecutors with additional bars, place carjackers tools needed to behind a and sends strong signal carjackers to that the penalties for are severe. (1993).

See Bill File for Bill Senate It is clear that the broad aim of the statute was to enhance the penalties applicable to individuals who use force or threat pre-existing These robbery dangerous crimes also include with a theft, vehicle, deadly weapon, use a unauthorized of motor and unlaw- taking ful of a motor vehicle. a or control of to or intimidation obtain

of force to obtain prosecutors it easier for and to make motor vehicle5 looking the statute as By carjacking.6 for convictions introduced, 415 con- Bill House Bill originally Senate 339 and 5. As sentencing mandatory provisions. After considerable minimum tained debate, provisions were deleted. those legislatures intended their 6. Other states have likewise concluded that difficult, easier, carjack- to obtain convictions for it not more to make People Davenport, Mich.App. N.W.2d ing. In concluded, (1998), Appeals Michigan on the based the Court of statute, that, Michigan carjacking with history unlike legislative offenses, carjack- Legislature not intend that robbery or “the did assault proving ing prosecutions the burden of intent." include Agency Analysis, on Fiscal Bill particular, court relied the Senate February part: read which SB try carjackers prosecutors and to it for to The bill would make easier Robbery felony. and assault offender committed a show that an make it difficult typically include elements of intent that can offenses result, many of prosecute charges. those individuals on those As plea robbery into initially charged enter with armed assault and, punished for serious agreements consequently, are less bargain likely be on Carjacking charges more tried their would offenses.... plea bargained, the elements of than because merits rather robbery or prove those of proposed would be easier than offense assault. Id. District, Appeal, concluded that Fifth in California Court just carjacking, legislature created a new crime of California 643, 647-48, Medina, Cal.App.4th robbery. People form of The court the reason Cal.Rptr.2d 113-14 recounted legislative history: explained the new crime as in the the creation of persons number of been considerable increase in the [T]here has abducted, subjected many the violent have been who have been gun taking had a used in of their automobile and some have taking of car. thrill-seeking relatively appears 'new' as much This crime car, simpler If it would be of a car. all the thief wanted was the theft confronting running the automobile without the risk to hot-wire killed, placed People seriously injured, in the driver. have been fear, discourage message great strong for these and this calls a to Additionally, reporting crime is law enforcement is this new crimes. becoming gang initiating aspiring rite for members and drastically increasing. incidents are many per is se and law there no crime Under current charged robbery because it is difficult carjackings cannot be as (to required robbery permanently de- prove the of offense intent a car) prive [many] gang carjackings of are one of the since these thrill seeking prosecute thefts. There is a need to this crime. whole, including penalties carj the enhanced applicable to ack- conduct, ers over and above those penalties the underlying as rejection well as the explicit permanently deprive, it is clear that Legislature did not to require intend intent to achieve some additional consequence beyond taking the immediate of act the vehicle.

Finally, find support we no the nature of itself is indicate that it intent crime. Carjacking requires general to commit the of act obtaining possession unauthorized or control of a motor vehicle from possession violence, another individual in by actual force or by putting that individual fear through intimidation or of threat force or temporary deprivation violence. property result, is substantially certain to regardless of the desire the actor. The Assembly gave General no indication that “the mind the perpetrator] [of be conscious of a more remote purpose design which shall eventuate from the Shell, doing of the immediate act.” 307 Md. at 512 A.2d at Smith, 442). (quoting Md.App. at 398 A.2d at We agree with Legislature’s the State that the clear intent was that, without additional deliberate and conscious purpose design accomplishing very specific and more remote result, stated, the offense is committed. Simply mens “[t]he rea ... in the implicit intentional doing the act.” State Yanez, (R.I.1998).

We hold that the intent element of carjacking is by proof satisfied that the possessed defendant ie., act, criminal intent to commit the general intent to obtain possession unauthorized or control from a person in actual force, Thus, intimidation or threat of force. trial court properly refused instruct the on jury voluntary intoxication requested by Appellant.

Id., Cal.Rptr.2d (quoting at 113-14 Safety, Assem. Com. on Pub. (1993-1994 analysis Sess.) Reg. 1.) Sen. Bill No. 60 July p. (second original). alteration

611 Y. states, government, well as the federal Many of our sister § carjacking statutes. 18 U.S.C enacted Anti have (West § 215 1992; Cal.Penal Code Theft Act of Car (1996 & Supp.); § 22-2903 Del. Supp.); D.C.Code Ann. (1995 222(2), 604, 612, Supp.); & 1996 §§ Ann. tit. Code (West Supp.); 1994 & 1998 ch. 812.133 Ind. Fla. Stat. Ann. (Michie Supp.); 1994 & § 35-42-5-2 LaRev. Ann. Code Comp. (West 1997); § 14.64.2 Laws Mich. Ann. Stat. - 97-3-113, -115, (1998 §§ Supp.); § 750.529a Ann. Miss.Code (West § (1994 2C:15-2 Supp.); N.J. & Stat. Ann. 16-3-1075(B) (Law § Co Supp.); 1995 & Ann. S.C.Code (1997); § 39-13-404 Supp.); 1976 & 1997 op Ann. Tenn.Code (Michie Supp.). Sever § 1996 & 18.2-58.1. Ann. VaCode carjacking a statutory is determined that al states have also Davenport, People in example, For intent crime. general (1998), of the Court 583 N.W.2d 919 Mich.App. trial court erred whether the Michigan of considered Appeals where refusing give specific a instruction in violation of Michi charged in defendant was with § The court held that Compiled 750.529a.7 gan Laws rea and not a intent mens a required only statute Following a review Id. intent. 583 N.W.2d history, the court concluded: legislative any purposely omitted Legislature clear that the [I]t seems in order in the element of crime Reading a to make it convict offenders. simpler objective. negate that intent element into the statute would statute, Michigan Compiled Michigan carjacking Laws 7. (1998 750.529a(l) Supp.), provides: § violence, violence, by person threat of force or A who force or robs, steals, putting vehicle as defined byor in fear takes a motor 750.412; person, § from another in 28.644] M.S.A. [M.C.L. passenger presence person presence or in the or the of that presence any person possession of the motor other lawful vehicle, punishable by imprisonment carjacking, felony guilty of is years. of life or for term of The clear language statute indicates beyond itself, no intent the intent required to do the act is, force, using threats, or putting in fear in order to take a from person vehicle lawful and in that person’s presence. such, As carjacking a general intent crime.

Id. 583 Similarly, N.W.2d at 921. the Court for the Appeals District of statutory Columbia held that carjacking gener- is a States, Pixley v. United al intent crime.8 692 A.2d 438 (D.C.1997) (holding carjacking general crime intent based on statutory requirement that a commit person the act or “knowingly recklessly”). statute,

The carjacking 1992, federal initially as enacted in contained no explicit requirement.9 intent Under the federal statute, carjacking has been construed as a consistently gener See, United al intent crime. e.g., Payne, States 346, 83 F.3d th (10 Cir.1996), from, 347 appeal corpus denial habeas dismissed, 172 Martinez, United (1999); F.3d 880 States 49 (9th denied, 1398, cert. Cir.1995), 1401 F.3d 1065, 516 U.S. 116 Oliver, 749, (1996); S.Ct. 133 L.Ed.2d 696 United States v. 60 statute, carjacking 22-2903(a)(l) (2)(b)(l) § 8. The D.C. D.C.Code & (1996), reads: person if, means, by A commits the any offense of violence, person by knowingly recklessly or force or against whether by stealthy resistance or snatching, sudden or by putting seizure or or fear, so, attempts or person do shall take from another immedi- person’s ate actual of a motor vehicle. statute, 2119, original § The federal 18 U.S.C. Anti Car 1992, read: Theft Act of Whoever, possessing title, a firearm as defined in section 921 of this transported, takes a motor vehicle that has shipped, been or received foreign or person presence interstate commerce from or by intimidation, another force and attempts violence or or to do so, shall— (1) imprisoned be fined under title years, this not more than 15 both, (2) bodily injury if serious defined section this title results, be fined imprisoned under this title or not more than both, years, or (3) results, if imprisoned death be fined under this title or life, years up number of or both. Harris, (9th Cir.1995); States v. United F.3d F.3d th denied, (5 Cir.1994), 978, cert. U.S. 1279-80 amended, The was 130 L.Ed.2d 366 statute S.Ct. amendments, version, incorporating the 1994 present and the bodily cause harm.”10 the “intent to death serious requires for the fire “possessing was substituted phrase intent See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce arm” language. 103-322,108 60003(a)(14), § No Pub.L. Stat. ment Act of 1796,1970. language been to render interpreted This new has See, e.g., States v. United 2119 a intent crime. (9th Cir.1996) (concluding that the Randolph, 93 F.3d from a intent new element converted grounds, on other offense), abrogated crime — States, —, 966, 143 Holloway v. United 119 S.Ct. U.S. Rivera-Gomez, (1999); States v. United F.3d L.Ed.2d 1 (1BtCir.1995).11 996 n. 2119, 103-322, 60003(a)(14) by § § 18 amended Pub.L. U.S.C. 10. (1994), reads: Whoever, bodily with the to or harm takes intent cause death serious transported, shipped, or received in a motor vehicle that has been person presence foreign or commerce the or of interstate from intimidation, attempts by do another force and violence or or to so, shall— (1) imprisoned years, title or than 15 be fined under this not more both, or (2) bodily injury as of if serious defined in section 1365 this title results, imprisoned be fined under this title or not more 25 than both, years, or results, (3) imprisoned if death be fined under this title or life, both, years up of to or sentenced to death. number Supreme recently interpreted aspect the 11. another of intent The Court States, requirement Holloway § of v. U.S.C. United 966, 968, - U.S. -, -, (1999), Court 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d the consid phrase “with to death or serious ered whether the intent cause bodily requires prove "that the defendant harm” Government events, had intent to kill or harm in all or whether it an unconditional necessary requires proof merely of an intent to kill or harm if effect carjacking.” requirement that is The Court held "[t]he proves that at moment defen satisfied when Government dant control over the driver's automobile defen demanded took seriously if possessed dant the intent to harm or kill the driver neces-

VI. reject Appellant’s We contention that carjacking is little more than aggravated robbery the need prove without specific intent permanently deprive. argument His simply type robbery is another or unauthorized use of vehicle lacks merit. not a Carjacking is necessarily included robbery, offense of or vice Maryland applies versa. an “elements test” to determine one whether offense is a lesser included offense asks another—this test whether all of the elements of the lesser offense must included in the greater Bowers, 710, 722, offense. State v. Md. 1255, 1260(1998). A.2d of carjacking elements differ from the ele

ments of each robbery and offense can be committed without committing the other offense. Robbery is the felonious taking and carrying personal away property from the person of another, accomplished by Gover, force or fear. State (1973). Md. 298 A.2d Robbery 380-81 requires asportation of the Ball property. — (1997), denied,

699 A.2d U.S. —, cert. S.Ct. 139 L.Ed.2d 763 Although reference to the intent requirement begs Court, the question before the we crime, note that robbery is and that specific intent required the intent to permanently deprive Gover, the person property. Md. (1)

at 381. Carjacking requires that the defendant obtain (2) unauthorized possession vehicle; control of a motor the motor vehicle was the actual another (3) time; person at that that the defendant used force or against person, violence put person that or that in fear through violence, intimidation or threat of force or in order to obtain the motor Maryland vehicle. Jury Criminal Pattern Instruction Carjacking. MPJI 4:28A: An essential element of carjacking, robbery, unlike is the a taking of type of (or, sary alternatively, car).” to unnecessary steal the car if to steal the at-,

Id.-U.S. 119 S.Ct. at 972.

615 robbery, carjacking the ie. a motor vehicle. Unlike property, only unautho asportation, no or requires movement statute Simply robbery can be put, or control.12 possession rized carjacking and committing carjacking, accomplished without robbery. People committing without accomplished can be Cf. (1998); Parker, 340 Mich.App. 584 N.W.2d requirement, support finding dissent for a intent the 12. As aspect none exists. Dissent- asportation an into the statute where reads ing op. the view: at 624. In dissent's that, having gone so to accost victim for far as the It is inconceivable taking having purpose his and to take control of it to the of or her car not, goal, or complete the a defendant would the crime realize contemplate possibility legislature that the that he even a would Moreover, not, anyone why had move the would who she would car. car, person of a order a out the car and even take a example supports absurdity The of this common then not move it? a creating reading the statute a sense offense. Contrary assertions, dissent's it is not absurd believe that the to the Legislature perpetrator actually the intended that the need move Although may slight, asportation guilty carjacking. it is car to be (kidnapping); required a element other offenses. Art. State, Md.App. n. A.2d n. 1 Beard movement, (1979) simply (robbery). offenses are Without some these Beard, Md.App. at n. at 1386 n. not committed. See A.2d required Asportation carjacking. is is not a element 1. This not true the under statute. "inconceivable," suggests, legislature that a It is not as the dissent contemplate possibility perpetrator would the that the would not move Legislature consciously language "ob- car. chose to use the the language or control” instead of tains unauthorized asportation Omitting have an element the statute. an would added asportation requirement expand scope the does criminal conduct encompassed by examples the statute. Several illustrate this Take, example, approaches open point. perpetrator an a who window, knife, driver, displays grabs orders out of driver’s him vehicle, ignition car. the driver the he hits an "kill'' the As leaves knee, perpetrator the with his and the switch hidden under dash readily imagine the One other unable move motor vehicle. can devices, involving perpetrator or cases where scenarios anti-theft operating might difficulty has Another scenario that arise vehicle. perpetrator ejects person by gains is where a force and control over car, victim, events, bystanders who inter- witnessed but driving prevent person away. from The dissent’s criticism cede gaining car perpetrator would not choose to move the after fails to take into account those circumstances where an control over it thereof, dispositive asportation requirement, or could be the factor lack in conviction. 616 States, 438,

Pixley (D.C.1997); v. United 692 A.2d 440 People Green, 1076, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.App.4th 50 (Cal.Ct.App.1996). reject Appellant’s

We also argument equivalent preceded is the of an by unauthorized use an assault, battery, aggravated 27, § or an assault. Art. 349. vehicle, robbery, requires Unauthorized use of like that the away. Shope vehicle be taken carried 472, 476, 730, Md.App. A.2d Actual movement vehicle, the slight, said, however is required. Otherwise asportation out, required. As we have pointed not so for force, violence, carjacking. Carjacking requires also intimi dation, Hence, threat of force violence. each offense can be accomplished committing without the other offense.13 Cf. States, (D.C.1997). 1, Allen v. United A.2d sum, In nothing there is in the language of the statute, legislative history, or the nature crime itself suggest Legislature that the intended to make Because crime. is not a specific crime, intoxication voluntary is not a defense. trial properly give court an refused instruction that voluntary may intoxication the intent negate element carjacking. statute, support 13. of its that under statement the unauthorized use “[tjhere requirement prove is no that the state exact duration of the deprivation,” quotes Judge intended Moylan’s opinion the dissent from P., 401, Special Appeals for 425, Lakeysha the Court of Md.App. In Re (1995), granted, 665 A.2d cert. Md. cert. improvidently granted, dismissed as 684 A.2d 5 (1996). Dissenting op. Moylan posited at 626-27 Judge n. 16. in that case that the use unauthorized statute does not contain an affirmative deprive element temporarily. of an intent to Id. at 665 A.2d at support position, variety 275. In of that he described scenarios "in culprit might question.” which the mens rea of the be in somehow Id. 665 A.2d at It is those quotes scenarios that the dissent support prove its statement that state need not the exact duration of deprivation. Judge Moylan intended only offered these scenarios prove point requirement, his statute lacked an affirmative intent support proposition "prove that the state need not deprivation.” exact duration of the intended PRINCE FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JUDGMENT BE PAID TO AFFIRMED. COSTS COUNTY GEORGE’S BY APPELLANT. BELL, C.J., in which ELDRIDGE

Dissenting opinion CHASANOW, JJ., join. and

BELL, dissenting: Judge, Chief carjacking, see the offense of majority The holds (1957, Cum.Supp.) Article Repl.Vol., Maryland Code and, agree I 348A,1 § a intent crime. do is not so, dissent. type than a nothing “particular more

Carjacking is — States, U.S. —, —, Holloway v. United robbery,” (1999), 971-72, thing the 143 L.Ed.2d one which S.Ct. See also Price Md.App. taken is an automobile. (1996), the Court of 1210-11 which stated, legislature of the [in Special Appeals “[t]he proscribe was to actions which enacting carjacking statute] the crimes, ie. robbery, were deemed to be already although (1957, Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.) Article 27 Maryland Code provides: § 348A section, "(a) meaning stated in 11- "motor vehicle” has the In this Transportation 135 of the "(b) (1) Article. carjacking when the An commits the offense of individual a motor unauthorized or control of individual obtains possession by force or vehicle from another individual in actual violence, through intimidation or putting that individual in fear violence. threat of force or “(2) carjacking offense of armed when An individual commits the weapon employs displays deadly dangerous a the individual during carjacking. the commission "(c) carjacking carjacking is An convicted of or armed individual imprisonment guilty felony be sentenced to for not of a and shall years. more than "(d) imposed sepa- imposed may be The sentence under this section arising other offense rate from and consecutive to a sentence carjacking underlying offenses of or armed from the conduct the carjacking. "(e) carjacking carjack- or armed It is not a defense to the offense of permanently deprive ing did not intend to defendant owner of the motor vehicle.” such an aggravated require specific legislation nature as and, thus, punishment” and “is little more than robbery prove without the need to intent to perma- is, truth, nently deprive property.” the owner of his That legislative history also all that the shows. statute was enacted as a result of the

public’s outrage over the of a County brutal murder Howard woman, Basu, dragged Dr. Pamela who was miles to her two death, during carjacking.2 outcry addition to the from public despite recognition carjack- act that the statutes, ing charged could under already existing fact specifically clearly communicated to the General Assem- see, Larsen, bly, e.g., Testimony of Steven B. Governor’s Office, Legislative “Carjacking,” (1993), HB 415 and SB 339 “[wjhile separate that constitute a fall acts offenses, chargeable within current are existing penalties offense,” id., wholly inadequate gravity for the urged Assembly Governor the General to create a separate statutory robbery offense for the act of in an which automobile in a person’s possession Legislature is taken. The quickly and enacted the carjacking emergency debated statute as an measure. legislative history,

From the it is purpose clear that the of the enactment of the carjacking provide statute was to addi- penalties tional than those already available order to “send strong signal carjackers a thát penalties carjacking for are severe.” Id. It also to “provide[ prosecutors was with ] ..., Sun, 15, 'Together', Legislators January, 2. See Tells Balt. Schaefer 14A; James, Carjack Emerging; 1993 at Michael Patterns State Police Sun, 23, IB.; Suggest Steps, Common-Sense Balt. December 1992 at Commuter; Sun, Intrepid Carjacking Big Worry, is Commuters Balt. 21, IB; Powder, September Community 1992 at Jackie Residents Sun, 20, Meeting Penalty Carjacking, September Seek Death Balt. 2; Powder, Carjack 1992 at Jackie Emptiness’ Death Leaves “Void and Sun, IB; September Balt. 1992 at Andrew Brownstein and Michael York, Terrorism, Attack, Calling Carjacking Area Coordinate Officials Post, Dl; September Mary Corey, Wash. Carjackings 1992 at Give Fear, Sun, Passenger: September Md. Drivers a New Balt. 1992 at 1A; Post, Wilgoren, Carjackers Defensive, Debbi Put Drivers on Wash. August 1992 at Al. Id. carjackers bars.” behind place tools needed additional mandated introduced, provision contained bill As eventual was Though bill mandatory minimum sentence.3 over it dominated debate provision, to delete this ly amended Bill 415 for House Bill Files generally, the deliberations. enacted, Maryland, see 1993 Laws Bill As and 339. Senate for prescribed penalty § ch. the statute (1957, RepLVoL, Code years. Maryland to 30 up (c).4 greater penalty This is a § Art. 27 348A Cum.Supp.) offenses—theft, rob already existing similar than that addition, In the statute made bery robbery.5 and armed purpose circumstance for the aggravating an 413(d)(10).6 Further, § sentencing procedure. penalty death 441(e)7, violence,” § see classifying “crimes of the statutes (c) provided: § proposed, 3. As "(c) (1) felony guilty of a is An individual convicted years imprisonment less than fifteen for not shall be sentenced years. not more than 30 "(2) carjacking, it is manda- individual convicted of armed For an sentence tory upon impose not less than the minimum the Court to person may suspended, and the years, part of which of 15 no except years may eligible parole in less than 15 not be 3IB, § provisions 11 of the Code.” of Article accordance with

See Senate Bill 339. indicated, Maryland be to all future references will 4. Unless otherwise (1957, Cum.Supp.) Repl.Vol., Art. 27. Code 342(f)(1). years. Robbery § Felony punishable by up is theft is 5. robbery punishable by by up years. § punishable to 15 486. Armed up years. to 20 413(d)(10) provides: 6. Section sentence, "(d) jury, may determining as the case the court doubt,

be, whether, beyond a reasonable shall first consider following aggravating circumstances exist: "(10) committing the murder while or The defendant committed carjacking, carjacking, robbery attempting commit a armed arson, degree.” rape or sexual offense in the first 441(e) provides: 7. Section son; abduction; burglary; means ar "The term ‘crime violence’ statutory including forms of common-law and all and storehouse offenses; housebreaking; kidnapping; manslaugh- burglary escape; 643(B)(a)8 (1957, Maryland Repl.Vol., § and Code 4-501(12)(XII),9 Cum.Supp.) Art. 41 were amended to in- carjacking. clude and armed sure, address, Assembly To be the General did to some extent, carjacking; by providing the intent element of of an intent proof permanently deprive the owner of the ter; murder; excepting involuntary manslaughter; mayhem; rape; robbery; robbery deadly weapon; carjacking with a or armed car- jacking; degree; sodomy; sexual offense in the first or an offenses; attempt any to commit of the aforesaid or assault with any punishable imprisonment intent to commit other offense for year.” more than one (a) provides; 8. Section 643B section, "As used in this the term "crime of violence” means abduc- tion; degree; kidnapping; manslaughter, except arson in the first manslaughter; involuntary mayhem maiming, previously pro- article; murder; §§ rape; scribed under and 386 of this robbery; robbery deadly weapon; carjacking with a or armed car- jacking; degree; sexual offense in the first sexual offense in the degree; handgun felony second use of a in the commission of a violence; attempt any other crime of offenses; an to commit of the aforesaid degree; assault in the first and assault with intent murder, rob, rape, assault with intent to assault with intent to assault degree, with commit a sexual offense in the first and assault degree.” with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second section, By being included under this and armed subject mandatory prescribed by were made to the sentences this section. 9. Under this section: " attempt any "Violent crime” means the commission or to commit following offenses: "(i) Abduction; Arson; "(ii) "(iii) form; Burglary, including any statutory common law or "(iv) Escape; "(v) Housebreaking; "(vi) Kidnapping; "(vii) Manslaughter involuntary manslaughter; other than "(viii) Mayhem; "(ix) Murder; "(x) Rape; "(xi) Robbery, including robbery "(xii) Carjacking deadly weapon; with a Carjacking; or Armed "(xiii) crimes; any Assault with intent to commit of these “(xiv) handgun deadly weapon Use of a or other in the commission attempt to commit crime.” (e), Legisla- the carjacking, to 848A is not a defense vehicle offense as carjacking to be the identical did not define ture of the Legisla- the indication only theft. That is robbery or seen, by As we have of the intent issue. ture’s awareness of contrast, amount time Legislature spent the a considerable enacting of penalty impact the and collateral debating proper statute. deprive to as a defense permanently the intent negating But requirement the eliminating altogether equate does not deprive temporarily intent to the owner the prove fact, appear would to be point opposite vehicle. In the intent that is a de case—by specifying another, fense, recognized that Legislature inferentially The fact that the may be a defense. lesser required noted that the State was not Legislature specifically implies that some deprive permanently prove deprive, deprivation intent to even if the intended is proof of Legislature intended to necessary. is Had temporary, proving deprive of the burden of intent to relieve the State have, time, have, I would it could submit any period word, using qualifying “permanently,” refrained from (e). basis, statute, on as not interpret To subsection any specific deprive, intent to would render requiring proof that, It is well settled “permanently” superfluous. the word contrary, a clear intent to the a statute is to be read “absent word, clause, phrase is rendered so that no sentence nugatory.” Mont surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, Buckman, 523-24, County v. 333 Md. 636 A.2d gomery (1994). Admin., 448, 452 v. 348 Md. Hyle See Motor Vehicle (1997); 143, 149, v. Baltimore 702 A.2d Blondell (1996); Police, 680, 691, 341 Md. 672 A.2d Warsame State, 513, 519, 1271, 1273 338Md. A.2d (e) event, ambiguous; it certain- subsection is best dealing clear and with a crimi- ly unambiguous. is not When ambiguous, Lenity applies, nal statute that the Rule ambiguity. to the entitling the defendant benefit (1997), State, 642, 651, Gardner 344 Md. a court “Lenity expressly prohibits which this Court stated: interpreting from a criminal statute to increase the it penalty places interpretation on a defendant “when such an can be guess Legislature] based on no more than a as to what [the ” quoting Monoker v. intended,’ 214, 222, Ladner v. (1990), United A.2d which in turn quotes States, 209, 214, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d U.S. (1958). majority

The a of federal interpreting cites number cases statute, 199210, as carjacking originally the federal enacted support Maryland prescribes its conclusion that the statute See, States v. e.g., Payne, United intent crime. 83 general Martinez, (10th v. 346, Cir.1996); United States 347 49 F.3d th(9 Cir.1995), denied, cert. 1398, 1065, F.3d 1401 516 116 U.S. Oliver, 749, (1996); United States v. L.Ed.2d 696 S.Ct. 133 60 Harris, (9th United States v. 547, Cir.1995); F.3d 551 25 F.3d denied, (5th cert. 1275, Cir.1994), 978, 1279-80 513 115 U.S. 458, cases, 366 I S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d These as will explain, actually support my position.

Martinez into provides insight why interpreted the courts carjacking general the federal statute as a intent crime. There, structure, the 9th out that pointed language, Circuit 1992, carjacking originally 10. as federal statute enacted in read: "Whoever, title, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 this transported, shipped takes motor vehicle that has been or received foreign person presence in interstate or commerce from the or intimidation, attempts so, another force or violence or to do shall— "(1) imprisoned years, be fined under this title or not more than 15 both, "(2) bodily injury if serious as defined in section 1365 of this title results, imprisoned years be fined under this title or not more than both, and results, "(3) imprisoned if death be fined under this title or life, years up number of or both.” § 18 U.S.C. Anti Car Theft Act of 2119, 1994, "possessing In the statute was amended and the a firearm” language replaced bodily was with "with the intent to cause death or harm". See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 60003(a)(14), Subsequent interpret Pub.L. 103-322. decisions have changing carjacking ed the new statute to a intent crime. th 656, (9 Cir.1996): Randolph, United States v. 93 F.3d United Rivera-Gomez, 993, (1st Cir.1995). States v. 67 F.3d 996 n. 1 indicated that statute history legislative robbery. analogous was the offense of 102— Martinez, H.R.Rep. No. 49 F.3d at 1401. It referenced nd 13-17, 851(1), Cong., reprinted 2d Sess. 2833, Judiciary 2829, of Representatives House U.S.C.C.A.N. of [car stated that “the definition Report which Committee robbery federal language used other jacking] tracks stated, no reason to The court then see “[w]e statutes.” carjacking statutes robbery the bank distinguish between significant Id. It is that Federal bank to intent.” respect with v. intent offense. See United States robbery general is a (9th Cir.1988) 623, (citing United States v. 857 F.2d Darby, th(9 Cir.1975)). The court reasoned 513 F.2d Hartfield, law, federal is a robbery, under since offense, should be as well. it follows offense, robbery Jupiter is a common law Maryland, 412, (1992); State, 328 Md. 616 A.2d West (1988), requiring 312 Md. Jupiter, intent to steal. proof of a case, in the instant applied A.2d at 414. If that rationale were that, Maryland law is a robbery since under it would follow carjacking negates only intent offense and the statute of carjacking requires proof permanently deprive, the intent intent well. as is a majority support position of its by Also cited decision, of v. Daven Michigan Appeals People recent Court case, In that Mich.App. 583 N.W.2d 919 port, carjacking requir Michigan the court construed the statute In stark contrast to the ing proof only general of intent.11 statute, legisla- history Maryland’s carjacking legislative statute, Michigan Compiled Michigan carjacking Laws 11. The 750.529(a)(l)(1998 Supp.) provides: violence, violence, by person by threat of force or who force or “A robs, steals, by putting from vehicle!] in fear or takes a motor person presence person, presence or the of a another in the of that presence any person passenger oilier in lawful or in vehicle, felony punishable by guilty carjacking, of the motor imprisonment any years.” of life or for term of history Michigan tive statute confirms that carjacking construction. A of that legislative history review reveals that intended, Michigan Legislature enactment of the car statute, jacking prosecutor to make it easier for a to obtain a conviction; the analysis bill leaves no doubt that act, Legislature, by passing intended to lower the Thus, different it had an proof.12 entirely State’s burden Maryland than did the Legislature. Michigan concluded, “it Appeals Legisla Court seems clear that the ture omitted element of purposely specific intent crime of it simpler order make to. convict offenders. intent element Reading into the statute negate objective.” would 230 Mich.App. 583 N.W.2d 919, 921. majority’s

Neither is the reliance upon Pixley United States, 692 A.2d 438 (D.C.App.1997) persuasive. Pixley is easily distinguishable from the instant case the lan because guage of the District of explicitly Columbia statute specifically contains an intent requirement.13 As the out, pointed District of Court of Appeals “carjacking Columbia requires only taking that the performed ‘recklessly’[there utterly heedless alcohol [perhaps fore][a]n mistaken induced] portion analysis 12. The of the bill reads: prosecutors try carjackers "The bill would make it easier for and to felony. Robbery show that an offender committed and assault typically offenses include elements of intent that can make it difficult result, prosecute charges. many individuals on those aAs of those initially charged robbery plea with armed assault or enter into and, bargain agreements consequently, punished are for less serious Carjacking charges likely offenses ... would more be tried on their plea bargained, merits rather than because the elements of the proposed prove robbery offense would be easier to than those of assault.” Agency Analysis, February Senate Fiscal Bill SB statute, 22-2903(a)(l), carjacking 13. The District of Columbia reads: if, means, person carjacking by any person "A commits the act of violence, knowingly recklessly by against force or whether resis- stealthy snatching, by putting tance or sudden or seizure or in fear, so, attempts person do shall take from another immediate added) possession person's (emphasis actual of a motor vehicle.” for pos- forcible demand a ownership accompanying in belief Id. at 440. Unlike statute.” satisfy the would thus session ambiguous.14 Pixley, statute, is not case, the instant penalty intent and carjacking statute’s looking at the When carjacking, the related to element, those crimes together with produces requirement of the majority’s interpretation is a of an automobile use anomalous result. Unauthorized an statute, in order to be Under intent offense. automobile, the State use of an of unauthorized convicted taken with the car was required prove automobile, although the owner of the deprive P. Lakeysha In Re Md.App. permanently. (1995), 671 A.2d granted, cert. 341 Md. 665 A.2d granted, improvidently dismissed as (1996).15 minimum penalty a Unauthorized use carries A.2d 5 penalty years. of four of six months and a maximum robbery, the stat majority's that "[u]nlike 14. The assertion asportation, only unauthorized requires movement or ute no accomplished without can be [therefore] or control .... carjack committing robbery,” Maj. op. the definition at 615 stretches States, Pixley ing beyond reasonable limits. v. United all relies, 1997), majority states that a (D.C.App. upon which the by putting gun robbery to the carjacking without "can be committed ordering Under our theft person, and him out of the car.” head of a view, statute, sufficient, my over to obtain control this would not be car; person, certainly but that suffices to obtain control over the it required, very Something must be at the least is not the test. more that, having getting It is inconceivable behind the wheel of the car. purpose taking her gone for the his or so far as to accost the victim complete having the crime or realize the car and to take control of it to not, legislature would contem goal, would or even that a a defendant not, Moreover, car. plate possibility that he or she would move the car, anyone order a why would who had even a intent to take absurdity person of this out of the car and then not move it? reading example supports statute as a common sense creating specific intent offense. prove requirement state the exact duration 15. There is no that the Judge speaking deprivation. Moylan, for the Court the intended As Special Appeals put it: that, Legislature enacted the Unauthorized Use "It follows when the law, larceny so that it simply the animus it eliminated furandi only number of circumstances which could handle not one but a Theft, 27, 342, § as defined in Art. may be committed State, ways. 21, 30, several different See Cicoria 332 Md. (1993)(“The 742, 629 A.2d theft statute prescribes five committed.”) ways which the crime theft can be Howev- committed, er it 341; § is it is a specific intent crime. State, (1985); Jones v. Md. 493 A.2d 1062 Brown State, (1964); State, 236 Md. 204 A.2d 532 Fletcher v. (1963); Md. 189 A.2d 641 Putinski v. (1960).

161 A.2d 117 A person convicted of theft where the value of goods $300.00, the or services is may under be imprisoned months, 342(f)(2), for up if while the theft, felony conviction is for where the value of the property $300, greater services is than he or may imprisoned she be 342(f)(1). years. § for to 15 up theft, The crime of coupled with the use of violence or intimidation, robbery. creates the offense of again, Once for conviction, the State is required prove that the defendant intent, Gover, had a specific the intent to steal. State v. (1973). 602, 606, Md. 298 A.2d A person convicted of robbery may be sentenced to imprisonment for toup fifteen years. § A person 486. convicted of armed robbery may be imprisonment sentenced to for up twenty years. § 488. Carjacking obviously has been deemed by Legislature the be the most serious of the offenses. Accordingly logically, and it punishable by up years. is to 30 majority’s Under the however, interpretation, required only state is to prove intent, Legislature withofit the clearly evidencing its so; intention that it it is also much prove.16 easier to 1) culprit might the mens rea question: somehow be in clearly depriva- situation in which it is established that the intended 2) only temporary, tion was the situation in which the intended deprivation probably permanent was but where there is a failure to carry 3) persuasion regard, the burden of in that the situation in actually persuaded which the fact finder depriva- that the intended tion was still of uncertain and undetermined duration in the mind of 4) culprit, simply situation in which there was no bearing evidence deprivation.” at all on the duration of the intended P., Lakeysha Md.App. In Re am, course, proof I aware that the of the offense of circumstantial, consisting proving related offenses will be majority’s decision that the scheme evidences statutory This prosecuted A defendant result. an anomalous produces use, theft, punish- faces a less severe robbery unauthorized and, in those with charged than a defendant ment itself, the to the act cases, prove, must addition the State acted, deprive i.e. to the defendant with which permanently. temporarily either property of the owner require prosecu- is to majority’s decision result of the punishment though potential less even prove tor is no clear when there greater, are consequences other This it desired that result. Legislature that by the expressed sense, unfair, and common logic defies fundamentally result is adopted we have Lenity. Rule of Since and is violative of the produced of the result that “unreasonableness principle the statute is interpretations of possible alternative among one of another favor rejecting interpretation reason for D&Y, result,” Inc. v. Win- a reasonable produce which would 1179-80, A ston, (quoting A.2d (4th Construction, Ed.1984)), § 45.12 Statutory Sutherland interpreted requiring proof carjacking should be intent, deprive the owner temporarily, at least the car. and CHASONOW share the views

Judges ELDRIDGE expressed herein. long how than the offer of direct evidence of circumstances rather keep The difference is more than intended to the car. defendant semantics, intent, prove the State’s burden is to however. If jury to that effect. would be entitled to a instruction

the defendant

Case Details

Case Name: Harris v. State

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Apr 20, 1999

Citation: 728 A.2d 180

Docket Number: 81, September Term, 1998

Court Abbreviation: Md.