Facts
- Deetra Butcher filed for divorce from John Butcher after 30 years of marriage and was awarded $2,374 per month in spousal support with 45% of corporate distributions from John's landscaping business [lines=“38-44”].
- John later sought to modify or terminate spousal support, accusing Deetra of cohabiting with another man, Brian Acree, despite the couple's lack of a romantic relationship [lines=“21-23”, “87-88”].
- During litigation, Deetra discovered John had hidden $95,000 in company distributions owed to her [lines=“25-26”].
- The magistrate concluded Deetra was not cohabitating with Acree, denied John's motion to modify spousal support, and ordered John to pay the undisclosed $95,000 [lines=“31-32”, “114-115”].
- Testimonies indicated Deetra and Acree shared expenses like roommates, not romantically involved, contradicting John's claims of cohabitation [lines=“199-210”].
Issues
- Did the trial court err by finding that Deetra and Acree did not cohabitate, affecting John’s spousal support obligations? [lines=“122-124”].
- Did the trial court misinterpret the evidence regarding the need for Deetra to cohabitate due to John's failure to pay spousal support? [lines=“253-263”].
Holdings
- The trial court's determination that Deetra and Acree were not cohabitating and that their relationship resembled that of roommates is supported by the evidence [lines=“248-250”].
- The trial court did not find that Deetra needed to cohabitate due to John's failure to pay support; therefore, John's arguments regarding necessity were misplaced [lines=“259-263”].
OPINION
HARRIS v. THE STATE
S24A0999
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
October 15, 2024
PINSON, Justice
Denarius Harris shot and killed Dallas Spruill. At trial, Harris claimed that he killed Spruill in self-defense, but the jury rejected that claim and found Harris guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault. On appeal, Harris contends that a part of the trial court‘s jury instructions about self-defense — that a defendant cannоt claim self-defense if he was in the process of committing a felony when he used force against
1. Harris was convicted of felony murder and a gun charge in connection with the shooting death of Spruill.1 The evidence at trial showed the following.
Around midday on the day of the killing, Spruill was picked up at his house by Christian Boss. Spruill was planning to sell some TVs, and Boss, who had a car, had agreed to give him a ride. The two men loaded the TVs from Spruill‘s house into the trunk of Boss‘s car, then went to another neighborhood to pick up a friend of Spruill‘s, Pamela Blue. The group then went ahead with the plan. They sold a few TVs at different locations around Atlanta, and then they made a stop at an abandoned house so that Spruill and Blue could retrieve more TVs, as well as an assault rifle. When the group had one more TV to sell, Blue said she knew someone who might buy one and directed them to an apartment complex where they could meet him.
The fatal confrontation between Harris and Spruill unfolded when they arrived at that apartment complex. The jury heard three versions of these events: one from Boss, one from a witness who lived at the complex, Daikeisha Watts, and the third from Harris himself, who testified in his own defense. All three accounts agreed that Harris (or a man who could have been Harris) shot Spruill. But the accounts differed about the circumstances of the shooting.
Boss testified that when the group arrived at the apartment complex, Blue called the buyer, and then went to meet him while Spruill and Boss remained in the car. Several minutes later, Blue returned with the buyer: Harris. Everyone got out and went to the trunk to look at the TVs. Then Spruill, Boss, and Blue got back in the car, with Boss in the driver‘s seat, Blue in the front passenger seat, and Spruill in the back. Harris stayed outside the car near the back door. Blue‘s door was open and Spruill‘s window was down, so the group could easily talk. Harris asked the group if they were in a gang. The group said they were not. Blue, in the front seat, then asked to see the assault rifle from the trunk so she could fire a shot for fun. Spruill reached into the trunk (part of the rear seat was folded down to allow access from the cabin) and handed the rifle to Blue. As Spruill did so, Boss saw that he had a handgun “on his waist.” Blue took the rifle and tried to load it. Harris opened Spruill‘s door and the group continued making small talk.
About 30 seconds later, Harris said, “Give it up,” and Spruill said, “Watch out.” Then three quick shots were fired, and Spruill was hit. Boss ran away аnd called the police. After police arrived, Boss returned to the scene and identified himself.
The testimony of the second witness, Watts, was mostly consistent with Boss‘s, but with a few differences — including that she did not identify any of the people in her narrative. Watts said that when the group‘s
The third recounting of Spruill‘s death came from Harris. Harris testified that on the day of the killing, he was walking around a friend‘s aрartment complex when he ran into Blue, whom he knew. Blue said that she had a friend who was trying to sell some TVs, and Harris said he would be interested in buying one. Harris went to get money. When he came back, Blue was in the front passenger seat of the car she had arrived in, holding an AK-47 assault rifle. Boss was in the driver‘s seat and Sрruill was in the back seat. Harris saw that Spruill was holding a gun in his lap.
Blue got out of the car, showed Harris the TV in the trunk, and then went back to the front passenger door. But at this point Harris was no longer interested in buying a TV. He was afraid. He thought about “a way to get out of this situation safely.” He told Spruill he did not want to buy the TV and begаn backing away from the car.
As Harris started to step back, he saw Spruill‘s right arm — the one holding the gun — rise up as Spruill appeared to turn toward him. Fearing for his life, Harris pulled out his own gun and shot at Spruill. When he was a safe distance away, Harris ran.
Several months later, Harris was arrested after the policе got his name from another resident of the apartment complex.
2. Harris contends that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury about self-defense. He points to the court‘s instruction that a defendant cannot claim that he used force in self-defense if he was committing a felony at the time. In Harris‘s view, that instruction was incomplete because it omitted the key point that committing a felony does not disqualify a defendant from claiming self-defense if that felony was itself justified.
(a) At the charge conference, the trial court, the State, and Harris‘s counsel consulted the pattern jury instructions to craft a jury instruction about self-defense. The parties agreed that the jury should be instructed that a person may not claim self-defense if he was attempting to commit or was committing a felony at the time. And they agreed that the jury should be told that the “arguable felony” that Harris may have been committing hеre was attempted armed robbery.
The court‘s jury instructions on self-defense were consistent with what was discussed at the charge conference. The court told the jury that self-defense is an affirmative defense, and that once a defendant raises it, the burden is on the State to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The court explained that the use of force could be justified “to the extent that [the defendant] reasonably believed that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself against the other‘s imminent use of unlawful force.” And the court instructed the jury that the use of deadly force could be justified “only if [the defendant] reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.”
The court then told the jury that a person cannot claim self-defense if he is in the process of committing a felony, as follows:
A person is not justified in using force if that person is attempting to commit or is committing a felony. Criminal attempt to commit armed robbery as previously defined is a felony[.]
Counsel did not object to this instruction and confirmed later that it was what was agreed to at the charge conference.
Assuming that Harris did not affirmatively waive his claim of plain error, the claim still fаils because Harris has not shown that the trial court‘s jury instruction was wrong beyond reasonable dispute. A strong indication the instruction was not clearly wrong is that it was a correct statement of the law. The Code section dealing with the defense of justification provides that “A person is not justified in using force . . . if he . . . [i]s attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony.”
Nevertheless, Harris argues that the court‘s instruction was obviously wrong. In his view, the instruction could have caused the jury to believe, wrongly, that committing a felony would disquаlify him from claiming self-defense even if the felony was the very one he claimed was justified. Harris relies for this argument on a footnote in our recent opinion in Taylor v. State, 316 Ga. 17, 21 (2) n.4 (885 SE2d 787) (2023), in which we suggested that the trial court‘s instruction on the disqualifying-felony rule of
But the instruction in Taylor was different than the one here. In Taylor, the defendant was charged with felony murder predicated on aggravated assault for his role in a drive-by shooting, and he claimed self-defense. See Taylor, 316 Ga. at 18 (1). The trial court‘s charge to the jury included the following instruction: “A person is not justified in using force if that person . . . is attempting to commit, is committing or is fleeing after the commission of a felony. And in this case, the arguable felony has been alleged to be aggravated assault.” See id. at 19 (1). The potential problem was that aggravated assault was identified as the felony that could disqualify Taylor from claiming self-defense under
By contrast, the instructions here cannot be understood to identify the shooting itself as the felony that could preclude Harris‘s justification defense. Immediately after telling the jury that Harris could not claim self-defense if he was committing a felony, the court said, “Criminal attempt to commit armed robbery as previously defined is a felony.” The court thus identified attempted armed robbery, not the shooting of Spruill, as the felony that could disqualify Harris from claiming self-defense. That makes this case different from Taylor, and a lot more like State v. Brown, 314 Ga. 588 (878 SE2d 445) (2022), which we cited in Taylor as an example of how
Harris points out that the trial court did not specify that the jury should not apply the disqualifying-felony rule of
In sum, the jury instructions correctly stated the law and tracked the pattern jury instructions. The issue we identified in Taylor is not present in this case, and Harris has not cited any other authority supporting his contention that the court should have given a different instruction. His clаim of plain error therefore fails. See Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 286 (3) (b) (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (trial court did not clearly err in failing to give more detailed jury instruction when appellant cited no precedent requiring it).
3. Harris also contends that the trial court plainly erred by placing too much emphasis on the use of deadly force when instructing the jury оn self-defense. He argues that as a result, the jury may not have understood that self-defense can be a defense to any felony. But that argument is simply not supported by the record. The trial court explained to the jury the circumstances when a person can be justified in using force, and then it separаtely explained when a person can be justified in using deadly force. The court‘s instructions tracked both the affirmative-defense statute and the applicable pattern jury instruction. See
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.