143 N.W. 898 | S.D. | 1913
The conclusions of law by the trial court were as follows:
“I. As conclusions of law the court finds that it is the duty of the defendant to furnish financial provision in lieu of transportation for the ¡plaintiff’s three children during their actual attendance at public school in' Township School District No. 45, at the rate of 25 cents per day.
‘‘II. That the plaintiff is entitled to have and recover of and from the defendant transportation for his three children in the sum of 25 cents per day for each, during their actual attendance at public school in Township School District No. 45,' during the school year of 1911-1912, amounting to $66.50.”
Judgment was thereupon rendered against the. defendant for said amount, with costs. From the judgment and order denying a new trial defendant appeals.
The decision in this case depends entitrely upon the construction to be placed upon said chapter 141 of th,e Daws of 19x1, which law is as follows:
“When pupils reside more than two and one-half miles from the nearest school-house in the school district and not to- exceed three miles, then the parent, guardian or pupil shall receive from his school district ten cents per day for each pupil, if more than three miles and not to exceed four miles, twenty-five cents per day. If four miles and not to exceed five miles, thirty-five cents per day. If five miles and not to exceed six miles, forty-five cents per da}r. Provided, that such financial provision shall be only for actual attendance at public school and conditioned that the district in no way furnish means of conveyance. Provided, that when*550 pupils reside nearer some school in another school township or district then the school board or board of education can make arrangements for the schooling of such pupils at such other school by paying tuition and such transportation as previously provided for in this section. Provided, further, in determining the distance to be traveled to get to any school, the most direct route by section lines shall be the basis of the computation. This act to apply only to schools operating under the- township school system.
“Sec. 2. All acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”
It is the contention of respondent that the duty to make the payment devolves upon District 48 whether the pupils attended school in District 48 or elsewhere. It is appellants’ contention that the portion of the act down to the second proviso’ applies only to cases where the pupils attended school in the district sought to be held liable. In passing we may state that nowhere in the agreed statement of facts, nor in the findings, does it appear that District 48 did not furnish means of conveyance for the pupils to the school in District 48. But we will not rest our decision upon this point.
Section 112 of chapter 135 of the Laws of 1907 says: “It shall be the duty of the board at the annual July meeting, each year, to make the assignment and distribution of pupils to and among the schools in the district, and in such assignment and distribution the board shall take into consideration the wishes of the patrons and the best interests of the pupils and district.” It will be presumed therefore, that at the July, 1911, meeting the board of District 48 made an assignment of the pupils of respondent to one of the schools in that district. Had respondent the right to ignore such assignment, and, without notice to or consent by that board, take his children to another district and still hold a valid claim against the former district for money in lieu of transportation? We think not. Schools must be run under some sort of system and under some responsible head. It respondent could do this, all of the residents of the district could do likewise, and chaos in school management would be the result.
Inasmuch as the distinct was not liable, the judgment and order denying a new trial were erroneously entered, and they are hereby reversed, with direction to dismiss the action.