177 Ga. 15 | Ga. | 1933
(After stating the foregoing facts.) Dedication of land is either express or implied. From the allegations of the petition, which must be taken as true on demurrer, there can be no doubt that the 40-foot strip of land was expressly dedicated by deeds for public use to the City of Griffin, 20 feet by AY. H. Moor, and 20 feet by the City of Griffin. This being true, was there an abandonment of Thurmond Street by the City of Griffin ? The defendant insists that there was an express abandonment of the street on the part of the City of Griffin when the city executed the deed to the land to J. E. Powell, which included the strip described. It is also insisted that there was an abandonment of the street on the part of the City of Griffin by nonuser, and that the street was never opened up and worked by the city authorities of Griffin. The peti
It is alleged that the property or street in controversy was surveyed and platted by Moor, one of the dedicators, and the plat was recorded at the time the dedication of the 20-foot strip was granted by Moor, and also that the 20-foot strip dedicated by the City of Griffin was in writing and that that deed was also recorded, and the 40-foot strip of land thus dedicated constituted Thurmond Street. The petition alleges that this was on September 19, 1911, and the dedication was accepted by the governing authorities of the City of Griffin in regular session. In the Ford case, supra, it was said: “ Properly speaking, there can be no dedication to private uses, but only to the public use. However, .if the owner of land lays out streets and alleys and afterwards sells lots bounding upon them, while this does not constitute them public streets, unless the public
In Bayard v. Hargrove, 45 Ga. 342, it was held that when the owner of a tract of land lays it off for a town, publishes a map of the lots, streets, and lanes, and sells out the lots on the street to others, and the town is established as designated on the map, the owner of the land will be presumed to have dedicated the streets and lanes to the public; and if one of them be diverted from the purposes designated, as if under a sale by the city authorities, a house be builded on land that is part of the street, this does not authorize the original owner to sue in ejectment for the land so built upon. The title to the land is in the public, for the uses designated, so long as the town exists. If the street be abandoned by the public, prima facie, the reversion would be in the owner of the abutting lots unless the owner had in express terms reserved the right to himself in his deed conveying the lots, or in his act of dedication. In delivering the opinion Judge McCay said: "If the ground in controversy in ejectment had been dedicated for a particular purpose, and the city authorities had appropriated it to another and entirely different purpose, this might afford ground for a court of chancery to compel the specific execution of the trust by restraining the corporation or by causing the removal of the obstructions. . . All that the owner of the soil sought by the dedication has been accomplished. It was not his purpose to favor the public. His purpose was to benefit himself, and that benefit he has fully secured. . . The public authorities hold it for the uses proper for a street.” In Brown v. East Point, 148 Ga. 85 (2) (95 S. E. 962), it was held: "Where the dedication, express or implied, is made for a specific purpose, the
The petition alleged that on September 19, 1911, W. H. Moor dedicated 20 feet off of his property, and that the City of Griffin .dedicated 20 feet off of the Thurmond property at the same time, thus making the proposed Thurmond Street 40 feet wide; that the city accepted Moor’s dedication on the same date, which contained a dedication of 20 feet also by the City of Griffin in regular session of its council, and later by recording the deed together with the plat showing the streets and alleys including Thurmond Street 40-feet wide. Later, on December 12, 1917 the City of Griffin attempted by deed to convey the said 40 feet dedicated to the City of Griffin for Thurmond Street to J. E. Powell, but the city had accepted the dedication of this land for street purposes, in which the public had an interest in its use as such street; and the City of Griffin could convey no greater title than it had acquired, even if it had power to convey anything. It could not convey the interest of the public in the use of the strip as a street; and therefore, when the City of
Under the allegations of the petition and under application of the principles ruled in the foregoing authorities, the court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. See Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169 Ga. 678 (151 S. E. 349).
The present case is barred neither by laches nor the statute of limitations. Judgment reversed.