William S. HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. James E. KOENIG, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 02-618 (GK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Nov. 12, 2010.
722 F.Supp.2d 383
GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge.
The Court notes that Saunders filed an action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which the court dismissed without prejudice, and he has an action pending before the Public Employee Relations Board pertaining to the WTU‘s actions against him. See Saunders v. Wash. Teachers’ Union, Local #6 of the Am. Fed‘n of Teachers, 2010 CA 004845 (D.C.Super.Ct. Sept. 24, 2010) (oral order dismissing without prejudice); WTU‘s Opp‘n to Mot. to Intervene, Ex. D (copy of Saunders‘s Public Employee Relations Board complaint, filed Sept. 29, 2010). Therefore, he is not without recourse to recover the pay and leave status of which he believes the WTU has wrongfully deprived him.
B. The WTU‘s Motion for Dismissals
The WTU seeks to have the Court dismiss the AFT‘s counterclaim as moot and conditionally dismiss its complaint in light of the WTU‘s cooperation with the AFT regarding the administratorship. The AFT has not yet filed a response to the WTU‘s motion for dismissals, but it has filed a [34] Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion to Dismiss. In that consent motion, the AFT asks that the Court extend the time for the AFT to respond to October 29, 2010, after the election has been completed. The AFT indicates that at that time, the parties may be prepared to file a stipulation of dismissal. Because the WTU consents to this extension of time, the Court shall GRANT the AFT‘s motion and hold in abeyance its decision on the WTU‘s motion for dismissals.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY Nathan Saunders‘s [26] Motion for Conditional Intervention, GRANT the AFT‘S [34] Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion to Dismiss, and HOLD IN ABEYANCE the WTU‘s [28] Motion for Dismissals. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Freeman & Salzman, P.C., Lawrence M. Gavin, Nicholas J. Etten, Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, LLC, Phillip L. Stern, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Francis J. Higgins, Peter G. Rush, Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, LLC, Chicago, IL, Abby C. Johnston, Paul B. Salvaty, O‘Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Michael C. Miller, Stuart L. Shapiro, Shapiro Forman Allen & Miller, New York, NY, Daniel A. Curto, Steven W. Kasten, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Gary Steven Tell, Robert N. Eccles, Shannon M. Barrett, O‘Melveny & Myers, LLP, Richard L. Brusca, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Michael J. Schrier, K & L Gates LLP, Charles R. Work, Mark Hunter Churchill, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC, Matthew R. Kipp, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Wilber H. Boies, Kristen C. Klanow, McDermott, Will & Emery, Kristi Nelson, Freeman,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge.
Plaintiffs William S. Harris, Reginald E. Howard, and Peter M. Thornton, Sr. are former employees of Waste Management Holdings, Inc. (“Old Waste” or “the Company“) and participants in the Waste Management Profit Sharing and Savings Plan (“Old Waste Plan” or “Plan“). They bring this action on behalf of the Plan‘s approximately 30,000 participants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA“),
This matter is presently before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Class Certification. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is granted in part, and denied in part.
I. Background
This action arises from Old Waste‘s announcement on February 24, 1998 that it was
On April 1, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court, alleging ten counts of ERISA violations pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(2), codified as
Plaintiffs’ claims were originally divided into three periods. First, Plaintiffs alleged five ERISA violations related to the Plan‘s purchase of inflated shares of company stock in the first claim period between January 1, 1990 and February 24, 1998 (Counts I-V). Second, Plaintiffs alleged four ERISA violations related to the release of claims by the Plan‘s fiduciaries in the Illinois securities litigation in the second claim period between July 15, 1999 and December 1, 1999 (Counts VI-IX). Third, Plaintiffs alleged one ERISA violation in the third claim period between February 7, 2002 and July 15, 2002 related to the release of claims by the New Waste Plan‘s trustee—Defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company—in the Texas securities litigation (Count X). Finally, on December 14, 2009, Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a Substitute Fourth Amended Complaint to add Counts XIII and XIV, which alleged Defendant State Street‘s violation of ERISA § 406(b)(2) in the Illinois and Texas Litigations. Harris v. Koenig, 673 F.Supp.2d 8, 14-15 (D.D.C.2009) [Dkt. No. 279].
On January 15, 2010, Defendants filed three Motions to Dismiss pursuant to
On November 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Fifth Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 403], which was granted. In the Fifth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs withdrew Count X on the basis that the evidence obtained in discovery was insufficient to prove the claim.
The Fifth Amended Complaint now includes the following claims.
In the first claim period, Count I alleges that the Old Waste Investment Committee and any remaining Individual Defendants who are or were members of that Committee breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404 by failing to prudently manage the assets of the Plan; Count II alleges that the Old Waste Administrative Committee and any remaining Individual Defendants who are or were members of that Committee breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404 by failing to provide complete and accurate information to Plan participants and beneficiaries; Count III alleges that Old Waste, the Old Waste Administrative Committee, the Old Waste Investment Committee, and any remaining Individual Defendants who are or were members of those Committees engaged in prohibited exchanges of stock between the Plan and Old Waste in violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A); Count IV alleges that Old Waste, its Board of Directors, and any remaining Individual Defendants on the Old Waste Board breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404 by failing to monitor the fiduciaries of the Plan; and Count V alleges that all Old Waste Fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 405(a)(2) and (3) by enabling their co-fiduciaries to commit the ERISA violations in Counts I-IV, and by failing to remedy them.
In the second claim period, Count VI alleges that Defendant State Street breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404 by failing to adequately investigate and preserve the claims in Counts I-V in the Illinois Litigation and by causing the claims to be released; Count VII alleges that Old Waste and State Street engaged in prohibited exchanges of choses in action between the New Waste Plan and Old Waste in violation of ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A) by releasing claims in the Illinois Litigation; Count VIII alleges that the New Waste Investment Committee and any remaining Individual Defendants who are or were members of that Committee breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA § 404 by failing to adequately monitor State Street‘s performance in the Illinois Litigation; and Count IX alleges that State Street, Old Waste, the New Waste Investment Committee, and any remaining Individual Defendants who are or were members of that Committee breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA §§ 405(a)(2) and (a)(3) by enabling their co-fiduciaries to commit the ERISA violations described in Counts VI-VIII, and by failing to remedy them.
On June 30, 2010 Plaintiffs filed their Amended Motion for Class Certification based on the remaining counts in the Fifth Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 356]. The proposed class representatives are William S. Harris, Reginald E. Howard, and Peter M. Thornton, Sr., all Plan participants who were formerly employed by Old Waste as truck drivers. Plaintiffs request that Ellen M. Doyle and the law firm of Stember Feinstein Doyle Payne & Cordes, L.L.C. and J. Brian McTigue and the law firm of McTigue & Veis, L.L.P. be appointed as Co-lead Counsel, and Gregory Yann Porter of Bailey & Glasser, L.L.P. be appointed as Counsel. On July 30, 2010, the Waste Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, which Defen-
II. Standard of Review
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on each element of Rule 23. See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2245, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997); McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d 1406, 1414 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1984). “In considering a motion for class certification, the Court‘s inquiry does not extend to an examination of the merits of the case. Instead, the legal standard is whether the evidence presented by plaintiffs establishes a reasonable basis for crediting plaintiffs’ assertions.” Kifafi v. Hilton Hotel Ret. Plan, 228 F.R.D. 382, 385 (D.D.C.2005) (citation and internal quotations omitted). A district court exercises broad discretion in deciding whether to permit a case to proceed as a class action. Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C.Cir.1994) (citing Bermudez v. Dep‘t of Agric., 490 F.2d 718, 725 (D.C.Cir.1973)); see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2200, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (discussing district court‘s authority to exercise control over a class action).
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class:
All participants (and their beneficiaries) in the Waste Management Retirement Savings Plan and/or its predecessor plans, including the Waste Management Profit Sharing and Savings Plan, for whose accounts the fiduciaries of the plan acquired the following employer securities of Waste Management, Inc.:
A) pre-corporate-merger common stock (NYSE: WMX) on or after January 1, 1990, through and including July 16, 1998; and/or
B) post-corporate-merger common stock (NYSE: WMI) on or after July 16, 1998, through and including November 9, 1999.7
Pls.’ Amd. Mot. for Class Cert. at 1-2.
Defendants raise several arguments against certification of the class of participants for whose accounts the plan fiduciaries acquired pre-corporate-merger common stock. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show that one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b) is satisfied.
A. Rule 23(a) Requirements
Defendants do not dispute that the first requirement of Rule 23(a), numerosity, is satisfied. The Plan‘s Forms 5500 report an estimated class size of 21,000 to 33,000 participants during the relevant period. 5th Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. The Court agrees that this class is so numerous that “joinder of all members is impracticable” and, consequently, that the class action mechanism serves the interests of judicial economy and efficiency.
In opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Defendants now argue that, even if Counts I-V and Counts VI-IX may be brought simultaneously in the Complaint as alternative theories of recovery, the incentives to pursue either the first or the second period claims are not the same for all putative class members. Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden to prove commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a).
1. Commonality
To meet the commonality requirement of
Plaintiffs argue that several questions of law and fact concerning the alleged actions and omissions of the Plan fiduciaries are common to the entire class of Plan participants. Pls.’ Mot. at 18-21. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to “the identity of the Plan fiduciaries during the relevant periods, their responsibilities and duties with respect to investing in Company Stock, the treatment of the Plan‘s claims in the settlement of the Illinois and Texas Securities, whether the Plan and the class members’ accounts suffered losses as a result of the fiduciary breaches claimed, and other matters.” Pls.’ Mot. at 18-19; see also 5th Amd. Compl. ¶ 273.
Defendants respond that the inconsistent legal theories advanced by Plaintiffs in Counts I-V and Counts VI-IX defeat commonality. Because this Court has deferred ruling on the scope of the Illinois release until the record is more fully developed, uncertainty remains as to which, if any, putative class members will be able to pursue Counts I-V and which, if any, will be limited to pursuing Counts VI-IX if it is found that their claims under Counts I-V were released. In short, according to Defendants, “there remains substantial uncertainty about which putative class members will be able to pursue which of Plaintiffs’ conflicting theories of recovery.” Defs.’ Opp‘n at 13. Thus, Defendants argue, because Counts I-V and Counts VI-IX raise no common questions, there would be no common questions among those class members limited to pursuing Counts I-V and those class members limited to pursuing Counts VI-IX.
First, this argument is purely speculative; there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the putative class will be split along these lines. In fact, at this early stage, the scope of the Illinois release is at least one question of law—and it is a crucial question—which is common to the entire putative class.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the existing uncertainty regarding the scope and effect of the Illinois Release does not defeat commonality. Consequently, Plaintiffs have met their burden to demonstrate that there are common issues of law and fact which affect the entire class.
2. Typicality
The claims brought in the Fifth Amended Complaint are all based on alleged actions or omissions which were directed at the Plan. In fact, Counts I-IX are all brought under ERISA § 502(a)(2), which permits plan participants to bring counts on behalf of the plan to recover plan injuries, not individual injuries. See LaRue, 552 U.S. at 256. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts I-IX, as well as the legal arguments in support of the claims, are typical, if not identical, to the claims and arguments of the other Plan participants who are putative class members.
Defendants argue, however, that the specter of a conflict among class members regarding the proper scope of the Illinois release defeats Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of typicality. Defendants argue that there is a conflict among the putative class members because some Plan participants may wish to limit the scope of the Illinois release, whereas others may wish to argue it does not apply at all or even that it applies to the entire first claim period.8
First, as noted above, this scenario is purely speculative; there is no evidence in the record to suggest that a certain number of putative class members have an incentive to
Second, in the event that such a conflict does arise, the Court has discretion to consider creating sub-classes. See
3. Adequacy of Representation
Finally,
Plaintiffs’ proposed representative parties include William S. Harris, Reginald E. Howard, and Peter M. Thornton. These Plaintiffs had Plan accounts which were invested in company stock during the period from January 1, 1990 to November 2, 1994 and throughout the Illinois Class Period (from November 2, 1994 to July 15, 1998). Pls.’ Reply at 8. Specifically, Harris was a participant in the Old Waste and New Waste Plans and had invested in the Waste Management Stock Fund from September 30, 1992 until the filing of the present Motion; Howard was a participant in the Old Waste Plan who had invested in the Waste Management Stock Fund from at least January 1, 1992 through February 1, 1999; and Thornton was a participant in the Old Waste Plan who had invested in the Waste Management Stock Fund and the ESOP Fund from at least January 1, 1992 through February 1, 1999. 5th Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 17-19; Decl. of Ellen M. Doyle in Support of Pls.’ Reply in Support of Amd. Mot. for Class Certification (Ex. A to Pls.’ Mot. at ¶¶ 5-13); Pls.’ Mot. at 7.
First, Defendants argue that the named Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class because of the potentially conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class arising out of the Illinois release. As discussed above, the Court rejects this argument on the basis that it is speculative and, in the event any conflict arises, there are procedural mechanisms for protecting all class members.
Second, Defendants argue that the proposed class representatives are inadequate because they know too little about the litigation. Defendants point to a number of instances where Harris, Howard, and Thornton admitted at their depositions to ignorance of certain details of the case, including the details of the Illinois and Texas Litigations, the precise composition of the class, the outcome of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and even the contents of the Complaint. Defs.’ Opp‘n at 20-22.
However, in complex actions such as this, the named representatives are entitled to rely on counsel to conduct the litigation, and
In addition, Plaintiffs cite to portions of the named representatives’ depositions which indicate that they regularly consult with class counsel and review all legal documents which are forwarded to them. Pls.’ Reply at 16-17. The statements cited in Plaintiffs’ Reply brief also indicate that Harris, Howard, and Thornton share a strong and genuine interest in litigating the suit in order to rectify the alleged injury done to Plan participants. Id. Consequently, the Court concludes that Harris, Howard, and Thornton are adequate class representatives.
Finally, Defendants failed to oppose Plaintiffs’ proposed class counsel, so their adequacy may be treated as conceded. D.D.C. Local Rule 7(b); Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., Civ. No. 02-2069, 2003 WL 21854800, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003), aff‘d, 389 F.3d 1291 (D.C.Cir.2004). Plaintiffs have therefore met their burden to prove the adequacy of both the class representatives and class counsel.
B. Rule 23(b) Requirements
In addition to meeting the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation in Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must show that one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) is met. Plaintiffs seek certification of the class under
prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
1. Rule 23(b)(1)
Both
Defendants argue, however, that neither
a. Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
Defendants first oppose class certification under
Second, Defendants argue that the threat of incompatible standards of conduct is rarely present in suits for monetary damages, and thus certification under
Although there is some precedent that ERISA § 502(a)(2) suits seeking primarily monetary relief are not appropriate for certification under
Those courts which have found certification under
As the court in Stanford, 263 F.R.D. at 173 (citations and internal quotations omitted), explained in language that is applicable to this case:
The issue is not whether plaintiff seeks primarily monetary damages; rather, the focus of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) analysis is on whether separate actions could lead to adjudications that establish incompatible
In addition, although Plaintiffs primarily seek monetary damages in this case, it is not clear why what Defendants term their “perfunctory” requests to enjoin the acts and practices of the Defendants could not result in incompatible standards of conduct if a separate action resulted in a contrary ruling. Defs.’ Opp‘n at 27; see In re Merck & Co., Inc., 2009 WL 331426, at *11 (stating that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) “does not require that the varying adjudications would establish incompatible standards as the exclusive or even primary remedy” but only that “varying adjudications would establish incompatible standards“). For example, this Court could enter a ruling to restore Plan assets, remove Plan fiduciaries, or reform Plan investigative practices and monitoring practices that would directly contradict another Court‘s ruling on the very same issues. In that event, Defendants would be faced with incompatible standards of conduct with respect to their duties and obligations toward the Plan.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that there is a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class” in this case. Thus, certification under
b. Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
As noted above,
Defendants argue, however, that the Supreme Court‘s decision in LaRue, 552 U.S. 248, eliminated the risk that individual class members’ rights or interests would be disposed of by § 502(a)(2) actions. The plaintiff in LaRue sought to bring a § 502(a)(2) claim against his plan‘s fiduciaries for their failure to make certain changes he requested to his individual account, which diminished the value of his interest in the plan. The Supreme Court held that, “although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant‘s individual account.” Id. at 256.
Defendants contend that this holding—that a participant in a defined contribution plan can bring an individual suit for breach of fiduciary duty, in addition to the possibility of bringing a suit on behalf of the entire plan—means that the putative class members can protect their own interests by bringing individual suits, whatever the disposition of this litigation may be, making certification under
In Stanford, the court acknowledged the appeal of Defendants’ argument, but concluded that
[B]ecause Stanford challenges behavior of defendants that allegedly injured the entire Fund, Stanford‘s claims would be identical to any individual account claim that another putative class member may raise. Indeed, a participant‘s individual account is still a part of the Plan, and, therefore, an adjudication as to the Plan will likewise impact a participant‘s individual accounts. Thus, the availability of an individual account claim under § 502(a)(2) does not alleviate the concerns cited by the numerous courts that have certified ERISA class actions pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in situations where claims on behalf of the Plan are identical to those on behalf of an individual account.
Defendants argue that the reasoning in Stanford is inapplicable because “the claims of each of the class representatives are potentially very different from those available to the other class representatives and to absent members of the putative class.” Defs.’ Opp‘n at 31 n. 19. As has been discussed, the Court is not convinced that the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Illinois release will result in “very different” claims for some putative class members. At most, the effect of the release would be to create two groups of putative class members: those whose claims in Counts I-V were released, and those whose claims were not released. Thus, adjudication of the named representatives’ claims as to the Plan would impact the individual accounts of those participants who are similarly situated.
Thus, the Court concludes that LaRue did not eliminate the risk that the putative class members’ interests and rights in this action will be disposed of if separate litigation on the same subject matter is permitted. Consequently, certification of a mandatory class under
2. Rule 23(b)(2)
Finally, as noted above, a class may be certified under
While Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in this action, their primary goal is, as discussed earlier, to obtain monetary damages for class members. Thus, the Court concludes that certification under
C. Rule 23(g)
Finally, a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel under
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have carried their burden to meet the requirements under
All participants (and their beneficiaries) in the Waste Management Retirement Savings Plan and/or its predecessor plans, including the Waste Management Profit Sharing and Savings Plan, for whose accounts the fiduciaries of the plan acquired the following employer securities of Waste Management, Inc.:
A) pre-corporate-merger common stock (NYSE: WMX) on or after January 1, 1990, through and including July 16, 1998.
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden, however, to certify the class of participants (and their beneficiaries) for whose accounts the fiduciaries of the plan acquired “B) post-corporate-merger common stock (NYSE: WMI) on or after July 16, 1998, through and including November 9, 1999.” In addition, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove that certification under
The Court certifies the following common questions of fact and law for Counts I-IX of the Fifth Amended Complaint:10
- Whether the fiduciaries caused the Plan to acquire shares of company stock at inflated prices, and whether this constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA;
- Whether findings made in other litigation against Defendant James E. Koenig may be used affirmatively for purposes of collateral estoppel in this action;
- Whether the representation of the Plan and its participants by State Street in the Illinois Litigation was adequate and loyal;
- Whether State Street‘s investigation into the claims of the Plan prior to its agreement to release the claims was adequate;
- Whether the representation of the Plan and its participants by the lead plaintiffs in the Illinois Litigation was adequate when they did not have or assert ERISA claims;
- Whether additional claims for a recovery under ERISA could have been but were not made for the Plan during the Illinois Litigation;
- Whether additional claims for a recovery under ERISA had any value and, if so, what additional value the ERISA claims provided;
- Whether any claims for additional recoveries under ERISA were within the scope of the Illinois Litigation settlement release;
- Whether the release in the Illinois Litigation settlement may be enforced against the Plan and its participants;
- Whether State Street caused the Plan to engage in a prohibited transaction in the settlement of its claims in the Illinois Litigation;
- Whether Defendants Koenig and Tobeckson acted to conceal their breaches of fiduciary duty, thereby subjecting the Plaintiffs’ claims to ERISA‘s six-year statute of limitations; and
- Whether Plaintiffs and Class members were injured by the Old Waste Plan Investment Committee Defendants’ alleged failure to conduct an adequate fiduciary review to determine whether it was prudent to continue to acquire Company Stock.
In addition, the Court appoints Harris, Howard, and Thornton as class representatives. Ellen M. Doyle and the law firm of Stember Feinstein Doyle Payne & Cordes, L.L.C. and J. Brian McTigue and the law firm of McTigue & Veis, L.L.P. are appoint-
Venacio Aguasanta ARIAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DYNCORP, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action Nos. 01-1908 RWR, 07-1042
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Dec. 10, 2010.
Natacha H. Thys, Terry Collingsworth, Eric J. Hager, Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Washington, DC, William R. Scherer, III, Conrad & Scherer LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Peter J. Cambs, Parker Waichman Alonso, LLP, Bonita Springs, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Eric Gordon Lasker, Joe Gregory Hollingsworth, Katharine R. Latimer, Hollingsworth LLP, Rosemary Stewart, Spriggs & Hollingsworth, Richard J. Wilson, International Human Rights Law Clinic, American University Washington, College of Law, Washington, DC, Mark E. Baker, Holland & Knight LLP, McLean, VA, for Defendants.