21 S.D. 47 | S.D. | 1906
This was an application to this court, in the name of the state, on the relation of George W. Harris, for a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the defendant, as auditor, to print relator’s name as a candidate for state senator within and for the Twenty-fourth senatorial district, consisting of the counties of Hughes, Hyde, and Sully, on the ballots to be used at the recent general election in Hughes county. It appearing that the Attorney General had neither authorized nor refused to institute the proceedings, the application was amended by substituting the relator as party plaintiff. Smith v. Rawrence, 2 S. D. 185, 49 N. W. 7. It appeared that a petition or certificate, purporting to be signed by.24 electors, naming the plaintiff as a candidate for state senator within and for the Twenty-Fourth district, had been filed with the defendant, as county auditor, within the time prescribed by the statute; that a protest calling attention to certain defects in and obj ections to the certificate had also been filed; and that the defend- and had refused to print the plaintiff’s name on the official ballots.
Numerous objections to the granting of plaintiff’s application were interposed, only one of which was considered by the court in making its decision. It related to a defect appearing on the face of the certificate. It was defendant’s duty to print the name of every candidate whose nomination had been certified or filed "in
What are its requirements with respect to the certificate in question? (1) Such certificate must have been signed by 20 or more persons who were in fact- resident electors of the Twenty-fourth senatorial district; (2) it must have contained the prescribed recitals as to- the name of the candidate, his residence, his business address, the principle he represented and the office for which he was named; and (3) it must have been authenticated by the genuine signatures of the requisite number of electors, each of whom must have added to his signature his residence, his business, and liis postoffice address. It will readily be conceded that nominations should not be made by persons who- are not resident electors of the district or political division in and for which the officer is to be elected. It would be absurd to contend that a person might file a paper containing the required recitals and number of names without the consent of any elector residing within the district, and the county auditor would be compelled to recognize such papér as a valid certificate of nomination. To guard against such an imposition the statute requires that each elector joining in the nomination shall sign his own name, adding thereto- his place of residence, his business and his postoffice address. This is the method provided for determining whether or not the candidate has been named by the'requisite number of electors residing within the district. It affords the only means of ascertaining from an inspection of the certificate whether or not it is genuine. Usually such certificates are required to- be authenticated by affidavits, and -when they are the requirements must be strictly complied with, otherwise there would be no check upon idle o-r unsubstantial candidacies. People v. Board (Sup.) 31 N, Y. Supp. 469; People v. Board (Sup.) 31 N. Y. Supp. 467. Hence, the contention that the statements re
There was a substantial defect apparent on the face of the certificate, and the auditor was entirely justified in- refusing to print the plaintiff’s name as a candidate. It may or may not be true that all the signers were qualified electors of the senatorial district. It may or may not be true that the auditor believed or knew them to be such. All that was immaterial. The question was whether the paper itself afforded the statutory evidence of its own prima facie validity. It clearly did not, and, for that reason, it was properly rejected. It may be argued that citizens should be facilitated in the exercise of their right to present independent candidates. They have been by the extremely liberal rules prescribed by the statute. The rules are so plain, simple, and easily complied with that a departure from their requirements, such as was disclosed by this proceeding, is wholly inexcusable. However regrettable in this instance, the exclusion of plaintiff’s name could not have been avoided without overruling a former decision of this Court (Lucas v. Ringsrud, supra) ; the effect-of which has not been changed by further legislation since 1892, without having established a prece
For these r'easons, the plaintiff’s application was denied,-and- the proceeding dismissed on the merits. - . ■