Harris v. KennedyHarris v. Kennedy
Plaintiffs-appellants, George Harris and Deborah Williams, appeal the granting of defendants-appellees, Muzongo Kennedy and city of Cleveland’s, motion for summary judgment.
On Jаnuary 2, 1994, George Harris (“plaintiff’) was driving his car south on Superior Avenue. In the car with him was Deborah Williams (“passenger”). The weather conditions on this day were cold and icy due to rеcent accumulations of snow. As plaintiff approached a T-style intersection, he saw flashing lights on his left side and slowed his car down. An ambulance then came sliding through the intеrsection and crashed into the side of plaintiffs car. Plaintiff stated the ambulance was out of control and speeding and had gone right through a stop sign before hitting him. Plaintiff alsо stated he heard no siren or audible sound indicating that an emergency vehicle was approaching. This testimony was corroborated by the passenger.
Muzongo Kennеdy (“Kennedy”), the driver of the ambulance, is an Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”) paramedic for the city of Cleveland (“city”). Kennedy stated he observed a stop sign before entering the T-style intersection. As he approached the stop sign and intersection, Kennedy testified he was unaware of the presence of ice on the road surface so when he applied the brakes the ambulance slid forward on a patch of ice into the intersection. Thereafter, the ambulance collided with the car containing plaintiff and the passenger.
*689 The city and Kennedy submitted a motion for summary judgment based on a city employee’s immunity from liability incurred while working for the city. The motiоn for summary judgment was granted, over the appellant’s objections, and this appeal results therefrom.
The appellant’s three assignments of error collectively raise the issues of whether a city is exempt from liability and whether Muzongo Kennedy exhibited the necessary care while driving the ambulance.
I
STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as to the critical issues. The opposing party has a duty to submit affidavits or other materials permitted by
II
WHETHER THE CITY IS PRECLUDED FROM IMMUNITY
In order for a city to invоke immunity and protect itself from the liability resulting from an accident involving one of its employees, the employee needs to meet the criteria set forth in
“(B) Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the Revised Code, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a government or proprietary function, as follows:
“(1) Except as otherwisе provided in this division, political subdivisions are hable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their еmployees upon the public roads, highways, or streets when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority. The following are full dеfenses to such, liability:
*690 a * * *
“(c) A member of an emergency medical service owned or operated by a political subdivision was operating a motor vehicle while rеsponding to or completing a call for emergency medical care or treatment, the member was holding a valid commercial driver’s license * * *, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with the precautions of 4511.03 of the Revised Code.”
Plaintiff contends that the city is not immune from liability because Kennedy did not comply with
“The driver of any emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, upоn approaching a red or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for the safety to traffic, but may proceed cautiously past such red or stoр sign or signal with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway.”
In the instant case, plaintiff argues that Kennedy did not slow as necessary. However, Kennedy testified he applied the brakes and slowed down to 5 to 10 m.p.h. before entering the intersection in anticipation of the stop sign. Plaintiff and the passenger were not able to state specifically whether Kennedy was speeding or not. They were only able to
assume
that Kennedy was speeding because their car was pushed up onto the curb after being struck by the ambulance. Admittedly, Kennedy did slide on a patch of ice into the intersection; nonetheless he did comply with
Plaintiff also argues that Kennedy failed to proceed cautiously with due regard for the safety of others;
ie.,
that Kennedy did not use ordinary care. Plaintiffs argument is based on the issuе of whether or not Kennedy had his siren on. In
Lipscomb v. Lewis
(1993),
Therefore, construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiffs favor, we find that Kennedy slowed down as necessary and proсeeded cautiously with due regard for the safety of others, thereby complying with
Ill
WHETHER KENNEDY IS PRECLUDED FROM IMMUNITY
Pursuant to
Plaintiffs arguments are based solely on the third criterion listed above, nаmely that liability is imposed on Kennedy by a section of the Revised Code.
First, plaintiff argues that liability is expressly imposed upon Kennedy because he did not comply with
Second, plaintiff alleges that Kennedy did not comply with
“No person shall operate a motor vehicle * * * on any street, highway, or property open to the public for vehicular traffic withоut being in reasonable control of the vehicle * * *.”
However, plaintiff cites no case law which supports his position, and pursuant to
In
Lipscomb, supra,
We find that Kennedy, as an employee of a political subdivision, is immune from any liability resulting from his accident while driving the EMS ambulance. We also find that the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment, as reasonable minds can only come to this conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.