146 Mo. App. 524 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1910
Lead Opinion
This is an action for damages accrued to the plaintiff on account of personal injuries received through defendant’s alleged negligence in furnishing him a defective clawbar with which to perform his labors as a section hand. The plaintiff recovered and defendant prosecutes the appeal.
The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff was a farmer of mature years and had recently entered the defendant’s employ as a laborer upon a section of its-railroad. He had been engaged at work on the section about four or five days before his injury. It appears plaintiff had never used a clawbar before the occasion of his injury, and even though such instruments were frequently used by his associates on the section, he said he was entirely unfamiliar therewith. The defendant’s section foreman instructed the plaintiff and his companion to proceed to pull spikes from a pile of ties lying by the roadside, and furnished them with the defective clawbar for the purpose. A clawbar is an iron or steel instrument, about five or sis feet in length, having two' prongs, to be inserted beneath the spike head. The heel of the bar, on which rests the lift, is immediately underneath the turn of the prongs. The clawbar is operated by inserting the prongs beneath the spike head and bearing down on the elevated end of the bar which results in lifting the spike from the ties. The clawbar with which the plaintiff was instructed to work was defective in that the heel thereof was worn and the prongs for
It is argued by defendant that inasmuch as the clawbar was a simple appliance and the mode and manner of its use a simple operation, there was no breach of duty on the part of the master in furnishing the same, that is to say, it is suggested that the obligation to exercise ordinary care to the end of furnishing reasonably safe appliances does not obtain when both the appliance and the work to be performed therewith are simple and commonplace. There may be, and no doubt
It is conceded the clawbar was defective in that the prongs for insertion under the spike head were so battered and worn as to render it an inefficient instrument; that is to say, because of the defective prongs and the worn condition of the heel of the bar, on which rested the lift, it was given to slipping away ¡from the spike when pressure was applied as was necessary .in the process of extracting the spike from the tie. The appli
We decline to accept as true the general proposition that the law does not require the master to exercise ordinary care in furnishing a simple appliance for a simple use, although there may be exceptions to the rule. In Warner v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 62 Mo. App. 184, the Kansas City Court of Appeals expressly denied the doctrine asserted and said that it knew of no principle of law which holds the master to the obligation to provide reasonably safe machinery and appliances where they are dangerous and complex in their nature and at the same time exempts him from such duty when
The case of Blundell v. Miller Elevator Mfg. Co., 189 Mo. 552, 88 S. W. 103, is relied upon by the defendant as supporting the doctrine that there can be no negligence affirmed on the part of the master for furnishing a defective, simple appliance to be used for a simple purpose. The case referred to is not authority for the proposition stated. In that case, the plaintiff received his injury from the. slipping of a ladder on the granitoid floor of a basement while he was engaged on the ladder in constructing an elevator. There is much said in the opinion with respect to simple appliances employed' for simple purposes, etc. The case was finally determined, however, upon the relevant proposition of
“There is a total absence of any evidence in this case showing that the ladder furnished was not a reasonably safe appliance and could not have been safely used for the purposes to which it was applied or intended to be applied.”
So, instead of the case establishing the doctrine that there can be no negligence on the part of the master in furnishing a defective simple appliance for a simple use, it appears to have acquitted the defendant of-liability on the ground that there was no negligence shown for the reasons, first, that the defendant did not furnish the ladder at all, and second, that if it did furnish it, the ladder was reasonably safe for the purpose intended. That is to say, that the ladder was in no respect defective and that therefore the obligation to furnish a reasonably safe appliance was fully met and discharged. We, therefore, feel that, as a general proposition, the obligation of the master to exercise ordinary care to the end of furnishing reasonably safe appliances to be employed in a given work obtains the same in respect to simple appliances and simple work as in any other, unless it be in a case where the appliance and
There are numerous cases in this State wheré the facts having precluded the master’s escape on the grounds of contributory negligence or assumed risk, liability has been affirmed as for a negligent breach of duty in respect of furnishing a reasonably safe, simple appliance for a simple purpose. See the following: Duerst v. St. Louis Stamping Co., 163 Mo. 607, 63 S. W. 827; Robbins v. Mining Co., 105 Mo. App. 78, 79 S. W. 480; Beard v. American Car Co., 72 Mo. App. 583; Warner v. C., B. & K. C. Ry. Co., 62 Mo. App. 184; Huth v. Dohle, 76 Mo. App. 671; Franklin v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. App. 473, 71 S. W. 540.
There are also many cases where the appliance furnished is simple but the work complicated or dangerous. Those cases will not be noticed as they are not pertinent at this time to the question in judgment.
Mr. Labatt says, if liability is to be escaped on the circumstances of a defective, simple appliance furnished for a simple use, it is preferable and more scientific to predicate the master’s freedom from liability upon the obvious character of the danger and the servant’s presumed acceptance of the risk or capacity for protecting himself in working with the defective appliance. [See Labatt, Master and Servant, 143.]
Notwithstanding the doctrine of our law to the effect that the obligation to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the servant obtains generally with respect •to the furnishing of simple appliances for the performance of contemplated labor, we believe there is a dis
It may be conceded, too, that plaintiff’s right of recovery is not precluded as a matter of law by the general doctrine which obtains with us as to assumed risks, if we are to accept the full significance of language employed in some of the opinions as the rule in every case. It is no doubt true that in many cases involving complicated machinery, complex mechanisms and situations which inhere with dangers of considerable proportions the servant is held not to assume such risks even though the servant is held not to assume such risks, even though state of the law, if such defects threaten imminent peril, they are generally referred for determination to the rule touching- contributory negligence instead of to that concerning assumed risk.
Under modern 'decisions in this State, the substance of the rule touching the risk assumed in the circumstances last above referred to is that the servant assumes only such risks as are ordinarily incident to the employment and regarded as reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract of hire. Indeed, the language employed in these cases indicates that in no circumstances may the servant be declared to have assumed a risk resulting from the negligence of the master. [See Curtis v. McNair, 173 Mo. 270, 73 S. W. 167; Pauck v. St. Louis Dressed Beef Co., 159 Mo. 467, 61 S. W. 806; Wendler v. People’s House Furnishing Co., 165 Mo. 527, 65 S. W. 737; Blundell v. Miller Elevator Mfg. Co., 189 Mo. 552, 88 S. W. 103; Dakan v. Chase & Son Mfg. Co., 197 Mo. 238, 94 S. W. 944.] Be this as it may, there appears to be a number of recent adjudications by our Supreme Court to the contrary even in cases presenting great dangers. It may be stated as a proposition entirely true that the jurisprudence of a state or country is established through the judgments of its courts given upon relevant principles rather than through the words or
Now, let us examine those cases to the end of deducing the principle asserted and acted upon by the court. In Fugler v. Bothe, 117 Mo. 475, 22 S. W. 1113,
In the more recent case of Knorpp v. Wagner, 195 Mo. 627, 93 S. W. 961, it was the plaintiff’s duty to drill holes for, and explode blasts in, a ledge of ore, the face of which was sixty feet in length, in a mine. Although several specifications of fault on the part of the defendant were rejected, it is conceded in the opinion that the master was shown to have been negligent in ordering plaintiff to perform the highly dangerous task of drilling across an old hole in which was lodged a quantity of unexploded dynamite and that this negligent order involved an assurance of reasonable safety to him while so engaged. As a result of performing the work enjoined by the negligent order, partly as directed and
“The only danger to plaintiff arose from the mode and manner of its use; and the mode and manner of using it, on the occasion in question, were within plaintiff’s own control. She had used it with safety before, and, undoubtedly, knew as much about its use for such purposes as did the defendant.
“In my opinion plaintiff cannot recover for an injury arising from the manner in which she saw fit to place the ladder in executing the order of defendant to get the pigeons.”
In Holloran v. Union Iron & Foundry Co., 133 Mo. 470, 35 S. W. 260, the plaintiff was injured by falling from the second story of the building while engaged in assisting his co-employees in moving an upright derrick on loose planks laid for that purpose across the uncovered iron girders of the floor. The plaintiff’s complaint was that the defendant had not furnished enough planks for the purpose. Among other things, the court said, substantially, the appliances to move the derrick and the work being performed were simple and well understood by the plaintiff; he knew better than anyone else whether he could handle himself safely in the position he assumed to aid in the work. And as he slipped and fell while aiding in the performance of such commonplace work, with such simple appliances, he must be regarded as having taken the risk incident thereto. To the same effect, see Lucey v. Hannibal Oil Co., 129 Mo.
It is argued by the plaintiff that numerous judgments, appearing in our reports, indicate that liability has been affirmed frequently on account of defective, simple appliances and no reference has been made to the effect that plaintiff assumed the risk incident thereto. This is very true, indeed, but it will be discovered on referring to those cases that while the particular appliance involved may have been simple, the use for which it was furnished and in which it was being employed was one which inhered with more or less danger. This fact presents an additional element to repulse the operation of the principle 'which invokes the doctrine precluding a recovery as a matter of law on the ground of assumed risk, unless it appears the servant adopted a particular mode to use the instrumentality and thus occasioned the injury by his voluntary act, when it could have been avoided by the exercise of discretion on his part. The element referred to is not present here. In the case now in judgment, the appliance, although defective, was a simple one, the labor to be performed
It is said that this court recently affirmed a liability on the use of an appliance as simple as a common rope in Dando v. Home Tel. Co., 140 Mo. App. 511, 120 S. W. 644. Such is very true, but to advert a moment to the facts of that case: There the rope, which is said to be a simple appliance, was used for the purpose of suspending a scaffold to a wire cable propably thirty feet above the ground, and the plaintiff was required to work upon the scaffold thus suspended high in the air while mending another cable. The rope broke and occasioned the injury sued for. It does not appear that the plaintiff knew that the rope was defective. This alone eliminates an essential element for the application of the doctrine of assumed risk. Although the appliance was simple, the use intended and for which it was being employed was highly dangerous and in such circumstances, even if the plaintiff knew the rope was slightly defective, his right of recovery was certainly not precluded on the ground of assumed risk, as for a simple appliance employed in commonplace work. The use for which the rope was intended and employed was neither commonplace nor simple; it was highly dangerous. Now, we believe had this identical rope involved in the Dando case been furnished to the plaintiff for the purpose of drawing a small hand sled with a sack of meal thereon, the result would have been otherwise, that is if plaintiff knew of the defect and understood the danger. Suppose the sled had become caught or its progress impeded by an obstruction in the highway and the plaintiff had thrown his whole weight upon the rope to the end of dislodging the same and thus received an injury, we apprehend it would have been declared that he assumed the risk incident to such a mode of performance
It is thought proper, too, to point out that notwithstanding a line of adjudication which is generally believed to have curtailed our law on assumed risk to the extent of casting upon the servant such risks only as are ordinarily incident to the employment, there still remains a parcel of the old doctrine which is frequently, and we believe properly, applied, when the appliance and the labor are simple and the defect is known to the servant. In such circumstances, if the injury complained of results from the mode or manner in which the servant used the appliance, and might have been obviated by using it to the same end in another practical manner, the risk is still treated as one assumed, for, of two modes, one reasonably safe and one unsafe, the servant appears to have voluntarily selected the one appearing unsafe and thereby invoked the application of the doctrine portrayed in the maxim volenti non -fit injuria.
The judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered.
Judge Goode deems the judgment of the court to be in conflict with the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Dakan v. Chase & Son Mercantile Co., 197 Mo. 238, 94 S. W. 944, and requests that the cause be certified to that court for final determination in accordance with the constitutional provision to that effect, wherefore, it is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
I do not feel free to concur in the opinion of the court in this case. From the principles and general reasoning of the opinion, considered as abstract statements of the law, I might not dissent if the question was an open one in Missouri. However, in view of the inexperience of plaintiff in the work he was doing when hurt and his entire ignorance, according to his testimony, of what would be a good and safe clawbar, I doubt if the propositions could be justly applied to him in any event. But it seems to be settled in this State; that an employee does not assume the risk of defective tools negligently furnished for his use by an employer. This has been decided in many recent cases. There might be some question about whether, even if the clawbar was defective, it was the kind of an instrument from which the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, should have anticipated mischief if an employee attempted to use it. But it seems the whole thing occurred under the eye of the foreman and I am not sure such danger from its use would not have been anticipated by an employer of ordinary prudence that plaintiff should be nonsuited on that ground as a matter of law. I deem the opinion in conflict with various decisions of the Supreme Court, including Dakan v. Chase Merc. Co., 197 Mr. 238, 94 S. W. 944, and the cases cited in the opinion in that case on page 267, and still other opinions which are not cited. Wherefore I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority and ask that the case be certified to the Supreme Court for final determination.