OPINION
On February 8, 1985, the appellant was indefinitely suspended from his duties as a Houston Park Police Officer. He appealed the disciplinary action to the appellee (the Commission), and on March 15, the suspension was upheld. Appellant then sought relief through an аppeal to the District Court. The court dismissed the cause of action for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant appeals in two points of error. We affirm.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction since he was not rеpresented by counsel at the Commission hearing and that this was a deprivation of procedural due process which could have been remedied by the Court. He also сlaims that the Commission erred in denying his Motion for Continuance since he had no counsel. Appellant’s two points of error are similar and will be addressed collectively.
The 1983 lаw (Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1269m, § 14 A(1)) cited by appellant addressed only crossover promotions between specialized departments and “regular” police departments. Its effect was to perpetuate a different treatment of specialized officеrs by restricting promotions to their own class. In 1985, a large portion of the statute was again modified and the definition of “policeman” was changed to include those entitled to Civil Service Status under § 14 B. The section further directed that any city affected by this modification to the Act should reclassify their officers accordingly. These changes became effective September 1, 1985. One month later, the Houston City Council passed an Ordinance which officially transferred the officers serving within the Department of Parks and Recreаtion Municipal Park Police to the Houston Police Department. Appellant’s indеfinite suspension was signed approximately five and one half months prior to the effective date of this 1985 amendment. Therefore, the action against appellant was outside the provisions of art. 1269m, and there was no right of counsel nor a right of appеal from the administrative body to a district court.
As a municipal employee of the City оf Houston, appellant’s employment was governed by the Rules and Regulations of the Civil Sеrvice Commission for the Municipal Employees of the City of Houston and Article V(a) of thе .Home Rule Charter for the City. His suspension was final following the decision of the hearing boаrd, and he had no right to appeal absent clear statutory authorization or a claim that his constitutional rights had been violated.
Amarillo v. Hancock,
In cases where the absence of counsel is urged as grounds for reversal, the appellant must demonstrate that his failure to bе represented was not the result of his own fault or negligence.
State v. Crank,
In a criminal trial a defendant has a right to counsel, but appellant’s disciplinary pro-
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eeedings were civil in nature. Neither the Tеxas nor United States Constitution guarantees a right to counsel in a civil suit.
Fireman’s and Policeman’s Civil Service Commission v. Lockart,
The trial court did not err in finding it lacked jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.