We issued a writ of certiorari in this workers’ compensation case for the purpose of reconsidering one particular line of this Court’s opinions which have held that, for an injury to be covered as an “accidental injury” under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 RepLVoL), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article, the injury must result from “unusual activity.” The “unusual activity” requirement is not supported by the language of the Workers’ Compensation Act, is contrary to other opinions by this Court, is a distinct minority view in the nation, and contravenes the liberal purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. We shall overrule the line of cases which injected the “unusual activity” requirement into the definition of “accidental injury.”
I.
In January 1999, the petitioner, Vernell Harris, was fifty-eight years old and had been employed by the respondent, the *25 Howard County Board of Education, for twelve years at Wilde Lake High School, as a “Food and Nutritional Service Assistant I.” Ms. Harris’s duties included preparing lunches for the students, tending to the cash register, cleaning the kitchen area, and laundering all linens used throughout the day. It is undisputed that Ms. Harris’s regular work involved lifting boxes of frozen food weighing approximately thirty-five pounds from the freezer and carrying them to the appropriate food preparation area. 1
On the day that she incurred her injury, January 25, 1999, Ms. Harris was doing laundry with a co-worker, as she typically did at the end of her workday. The two women opened a forty-five pound box of laundry detergent, but they *26 found that the box was full of cockroaches. They immediately closed the box to prevent the insects from contaminating the food preparation area and moved the box outside. Because the box was very heavy, they could not lift it. Instead, Ms. Harris and her assistant dragged the box out of the laundry room by sliding it through the kitchen and out of a side door. Once outside, they removed the bag of soap powder from the box. This required some pulling back and forth on their part. Ms. Harris pulled on the box while her assistant pulled out the soap powder bag. Once the soap powder was out of the box, they took the bag back inside to the laundry room and placed it in a different box that was elevated only about half as high as the original box.
After bending down to scoop some soap detergent into a cup, Ms. Harris bent down a second time to tie up the bag of soap powder. At that point, her back “cracked” and she screamed. Ms. Harris was unable to stand upright, and, when a co-worker brought her a chair, she was unable to sit. She appeared to be in excruciating pain. With the aid of another co-worker, Ms. Harris walked to the cafeteria manager’s office who gave her an incident form authorizing her to see a doctor at a nearby medical office.
Ms. Harris was seen by Dr. Prudence Jackson at the Concentra Medical Center later that afternoon. Dr. Jackson testified that it was her expert medical opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that dragging the heavy box of laundry soap outside caused Ms. Harris’s back injury.
In August 1999, Ms. Harris filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, alleging that she was disabled as a result of her back injury on January 25, 1999. After a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an order finding that Ms. Harris had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and was entitled to compensation.
The employer, the Howard County Board of Education, filed in the Circuit Court for Howard County an action for *27 judicial review. At the jury trial in December 2000, Ms. Harris moved for judgment at the close of the employer’s case-in-chief and at the close of all evidence on the ground that, as a matter of law, her injury was compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial judge denied both motions on the ground that there was sufficient contradictory evidence, as to whether the injury arose out of “unusual activity,” for the issue to go to the jury. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employer. Thereafter, Ms. Harris filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, but the motion was denied.
Ms. Harris took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals which, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. The intermediate appellate court, relying upon
Sargent v. Board of Education, Baltimore County,
“Clearly, there was sufficient evidence to allow appellee’s case to proceed to the jury. Although dragging the detergent box outside of the kitchen was not a task which was performed with regular frequency, the nature of the task was similar to the chores performed by appellant during a typical work day, satisfying the first prong of the Sargent test. During its case-in-chief, appellee presented evidence that lifting boxes, weighing between twenty-seven and thirty-six pounds, was a normal occurrence, even if dragging a soap box was not. Similarly, with regard to the second prong of the test, appellee presented sufficient evidence that the tasks were performed with relative frequency: appellant was to lift the boxes almost every day during the completion of her duties.” 2
*28
Ms. Harris filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, requesting in her first question presented that we “revisit the definition of the word ‘accident’ within the meaning of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act” and that we “restore the use of the meaning this Court originally gave the word: an untoward event which was neither expected nor intended-referring to the injury itself, not the activity which resulted in the injury, and thus consónate Maryland law with that of the vast majority of the states____” In her second question presented, Ms. Harris argued that, if this Court were to retain the “unusual activity” requirement, we should hold that the activity in the case at bar was “unusual.” We granted the petition,
Harris v. Board of Education of Howard County,
II.
Maryland was the first state in the nation to enact a workers’ compensation statute.
See
Ch. 139 of the Acts of 1902;
Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Development Co.,
The current Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, in § 9-101(b) of the Labor and Employment Article, defines “accidental personal injury” as follows:
“ § 9-101. Definitions.
(a) In general. — In this title the following words have the meanings indicated.
(b) Accidental personal injury. — “Accidental personal injury” means:
*30 (1) an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment;
(2) an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee; or
(3) a disease or infection that naturally results from an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment, including:
(i) an occupational disease; and
(ii) frostbite or sunstroke caused by a weather condition.”
The above-quoted language contains no mention of “unusual activity.” Under the plain language of the statute, what must be “accidental” is the injury and not the activity giving rise to the injury. The activity giving rise to the injury need only “arise[ ] out of and in the course of employment,” and not be otherwise excluded by the Act. See Seidman, “Accidental Means” In Workmen’s Compensation, 18 Md. L.Rev. 131 (1958).
As Judge John J. Parker stated for the federal Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, with regard to the same language in the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the statutory language “says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute.”
Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Clark,
The line of cases in this Court requiring that an accidental personal injury arise out of “unusual activity” for there to be coverage obviously adds a requirement not contained in the statutory language. That line of cases requires
*31
both (1) that the accidental injury arise out of and in the course of employment and (2) that the accidental injury arise out of “unusual activity.” Such cases cannot be reconciled with the often-repeated principle that this Court will “neither add nor delete words in order to give the statute a meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used,”
Blind Industries v. Department of General Services,
III.
A.
The plaintiff in the case at bar primarily relies upon the leading case of
Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks,
The employer in
Victory Sparkler
defended the negligence action on the ground that Ms. Francks’s injury was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, that the employer was ready and able to pay her the compensation to which she was entitled under the Act, and that the Workers’ Compensation Act was her exclusive remedy. The plaintiff replied that her illness “was not an accidental injury but an occupational disease, and so not within the Workers’] Compensation Act.”
“The phosphorus poisoning of the girl was contracted in the course of and arising out of an hazardous employment, at a particular place and within a known and definite particular period of time, and in causal connection with the negligence of the employer, whose neglect and its effect were not foreseen or anticipated by her. She was accordingly entitled to compensation under the act, as is admitted *33 by the appellant, as well as its willingness to pay her compensation.”
Judge Parke for the Court in
Victory Sparkler
began his discussion of the Workers’ Compensation Act by pointing out that prior opinions had established that, aside from specific exceptions, the Act furnishes the remedy “in hazardous employments, in regard to
all injury
arising out of and in the course of employment.” (
“This theory of the statute is at once confronted by the salient purpose of the act, to put an end to private controversy and to litigation. [The plaintiffs theory] splits apart the field of negligence in hazardous employments, and makes futile the law’s pronouncement that it is the exclusive remedy for every phase of extra-hazardous employment, except as by its own terms specified.
* * *
“The statutory definition of injury, which was made compensable without reference to neglect of employer or fault of worker, except when the injury was self-inflicted or the sole result of the intoxication of the employee, and the abolition of the fellow-servant rule, of the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and the substitution of a regulated and certain compensation for damages, contribute convincingly to the conclusion that the legislative intent was to include within the act not only the newly created class of compensable injuries, but also every injury which could be suffered by any worker in the course and arising out of the employment, for which there was then a subsisting right of action. E. Baggot Company v. Industrial Commission,290 Ill. 530 ,125 N.E. 254 . With this conception of the purpose *34 and effect of the act, the Legislature was consistent in making the prescribed liability of the employer and remedy of the employee exclusive with respect to all injuries sustained in the hazardous employment.
“The decisions of other appellate tribunals, which have not reached our conclusion, were controlled by the wording of their own respective statutes, which will be found to be substantially different from the Maryland act either in phrasing, or in additional or in omitted provisions in respect to or affecting the subject under discussion. If the decisions of these courts were adopted, the Maryland act would undergo an amendment by judicial construction through engrafting upon it the effect of the particular provisions of the foreign acts.”
Limiting accidental injury coverage to those accidental injuries arising out of unusual conditions cannot be reconciled with the breadth of the statute described in the above-quoted language.
Next, the Court in
Victory Sparkler
dealt with the plaintiffs argument that her illness was an occupational disease. The respondent in the case at bar asserts that the
Victory Sparkler
Court “did not consider ... the breadth or limitations of the term ‘accidental injury’ because it was dealing with the negligent leak of a toxic substance into the work place atmosphere, clearly an extraordinary and unusual situation.” (Respondent’s brief at 10). In the following passage, however, the
Victory Sparkler
Court included an injury arising out of an employee’s “common and regular task[s]” within the ambit of “accidental injuries” covered under the Act. The Court explained (
“An occupation or industry disease is one which arises from causes incident to the profession or labor of the party’s occupation or calling. It has its origin in the inherent nature or mode of work of the profession or industry, and it *35 is the usual result or concomitant. If, therefore, a disease is not a customary or natural result of the profession or industry, per se, but is the consequence of some extrinsic condition or independent agency, the disease or injury cannot be imputed to the occupation or industry, and is in no accurate sense an occupation or industry disease. In this case, the occupation of the girl as an employee in a department of a manufactory of fireworks was simply a condition of her injury, whose cause was the definite negligence charged against the employer. The most that is warranted to be infeired from the allegations of fact in the declaration is that the phosphorus poisoning alleged was the gradual result of the negligence of the employer. As this negligence was a breach of duty to her, it was not to be foreseen or expected by the worker as something which would occur in the course of her employment. The fact that she continued, at her place of labor; in the doing of her common and regular task, makes it clear that the phosphorous poisoning happened without her design or expectation, and so her injury was accidental. Providence Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,82 Md. 310 , 314, 315....
“It was by chance that employer did not use due care, and by chance that the vapor of phosphorus was where its noxious foreign particles could be inhaled by the girl. It was by chance that the inspired air carried these particles into her system, sickening her, and causing a necrosis of the jaw after fortuitously finding a lesion. The injury thus inflicted upon her body was accidental by every test of the word, and its accidental nature is not lost by calling the consequential results a disease. Nor can the fundamentally accidental nature of the injury be altered by the consideration that the infection was gradual throughout an indefinite period, as this simply implies a slow development of the malady, or that, instead of a single accidental injury, there was a succession or series of accidental injuries culminating in the same consequential results.”
*36
It is significant that the one prior Maryland case relied on by the
Victory Sparkler
Court for the above-quoted definition of “accidental injury” was
Providence Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,
“The fact that he slipped and fell in so doing, shows it was an unusual and unexpected result attending the performance of a usual and necessary act. His falling was an event which took place without his foresight or expectation, . and therefore clearly an accident in the common acceptation of the word, and the resulting injury, therefore, within the plain meaning of the terms of his insurance----”
Consequently, what must be unexpected, unintended, or unusual is the resulting injury and not the activity out of which the injury arises.
The
Victory Sparkler
Court later distinguished the noun “accident” from the adjective “accidental,” explaining that “accidental injury” was broader than “accident” (
“It will be observed that the statutory definition of a compensable injury under the Maryland act is not that it is an ‘accident,’ or that it is an injury ‘by accident’ but that it must be ‘accidental injuries.’ The difference is important, as it marks the divergence between the thing or the event (i.e., accident) and a quality or a condition (i.e., accidental) of that thing or event. As the substantive carries the idea of something happening unexpectedly at a time and place, *37 the term ‘accident’ or ‘injury by accident’ has been consistently construed by the courts to embrace two different notions: the first is that of unexpectedness, and the second, that of an injury sustained on some definite occasion, whose date can be fixed with reasonable certainty. The adjective ‘accidental’ is not a technical term but a common one whose popular usage would not necessarily mean that the words ‘accidental injuries’ indicated the existence of an accident, but rather the idea that the injury was either unintended or unexpected. See 25 Harvard Law Review, pp. 338, 342. In the term ‘accidental injuries,’ the substantive ‘injuries’ expresses the notion of the thing or event, i.e., the wrong or damage done to the person; while ‘accidental’ qualifies and describes the noun by ascribing to ‘injuries’ a quality or condition of happening or coming by chance or without design, taking place unexpectedly or unintentionally.”
The Court in the above passage was specifically addressing the employee’s argument that her injuries were outside the scope of the Act because the Act only covers “accidents.” The
Victory Sparkler
Court responded by pointing out that the Act covers “accidental injuries,” not just “accidents.” The Court went on to define the adjective “accidental” in the above-quoted passage. In the case at bar, Ms. Harris’ injuries are clearly within
Victory Sparkler’s
definition of “accidental injuries,” which requires that the
injuries
happen “by chance or without design, taking place unexpectedly or unintentionally.”
Victory Sparkler,
The Court in
Victory Sparkler
concluded as follows (
*38 “The Maryland act is remedial and should receive a liberal construction so as to give to it the most beneficial operation; and when it contains positive direction that should ‘be so interpreted and construed to effectuate its general purpose,’ the Court must act under the compulsion of this mandate, and not disappoint an explicit provision, plainly expressed .... ”
The requirement that an accidental injury, arising out of and in the course of employment, must also arise out of unusual activity for there to be coverage, directly conflicts with this “mandate” set forth in Victory Sparkler. Instead of a “liberal construction so as to give to it the most beneficial operation,” the respondent’s position makes the Maryland Act the most restrictive in the nation.
The first opinion by this Court relied on by the respondent is
Standard Gas Equipment Corp. v. Baldwin,
The employee in
Standard Gas Equipment
“was an iron moulder in the foundry room” of the corporation who worked “under unusual stress owing to the extreme heat,” and who had pre-existing heart disease.
Nothing in the Court’s
Standard Gas Equipment
opinion supports the view that an injury resulting from an unintended event or condition, which arises out of and in the course of employment, is not a covered accidental injury. The issue in
Standard Gas Equipment
was whether the employee died from a pre-existing heart disease or from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The Court in
Standard Gas Equipment
was simply setting forth a theory by which the employee’s death might not entirely be the result of a preexisting disease. As the dissent in
Standard Gas Equipment
pointed out, the Court was willing to allow a jury to find that the employee’s injury was accidental, even though his disease “existed wholly independent of and anterior to the hiring by his employer.”
The next case relied on by the respondent is
Slacum v. Jolley, supra,
*40 “ ‘But to entitle the claimant to compensation, it was essential that there be at least some evidence that her husband died of heat stroke or heat prostration and that such injury was occasioned by some unusual and eoctraordinary condition in his employment not naturally and ordinarily incident thereto and there is no such evidence in this case.’ ”
The Slacum opinion cited no case, in Maryland or elsewhere, for the above-quoted statement. In fact, except for a few cases on unrelated procedural issues, the Slacum opinion cited no case-law whatsoever.
As previously indicated, the decision in
Slacum v. Jolley
represents an extreme minority view and has been criticized.
See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Clark, supra,
The first case after
Slacum v. Jolley
to apply the
Slacum
holding was
Miskowiak v. Bethlehem Steel Co., supra,
The initial Maryland case to apply the “unusual condition or strain” requirement to an injury similar to that in the present case was
Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v. Stasiak,
The opinions in
Slacum, Miskowiak,
and
Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v. Stasiak,
have spawned a line of cases holding that, to be an accidental personal injury covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, the injury must not only arise out of and in the course of employment, but it must also result from an “unusual condition or strain.”
See, e.g., Rieger v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm.,
B.
If the decisions of this Court had uniformly required that an injury, arising out of and in the course of employment, must also result from unusual activity in order to be covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, a not unreasonable argument could be made that our erroneous insertion of language into the statute had become too ingrained to be corrected by judicial decision and that any correction should be made by the Legislature. Our decisions, however, have not been uniform or consistent. We have on numerous occasions held that accidental injuries were compensable even though they did not result from unusual activities.
The decision in
Baltimore v. Schwind,
*43 “was an untoward event ivhich she neither expected nor intended. The unforeseen mishap took place in the course of her employment as janitress. Her duties required her ... to do the common work of a janitress. It was while she was so engaged that she found it necessary, on account of the delay of the janitor in coming to do the work, and the immediate need of the women teachers to go to the dressing room, to act in the emergency thus created by attempting to raise the ladder and put it out of the way. Although this was not strictly within the ordinary duties of her service, yet this sphere must be determined upon a general survey of the nature of the employment, its conditions, obligations and incidents. She was hired to keep the premises fit for use, and, although the fall of the ladder, and its breaking the glass of the transom and scattering the fragments on the floor, were an unusual occurrence, it was unquestionably her work to remove the glass and get the room in condition for use, and it was in natural and reasonable connection with the proper performance of this work for the janitress to move the ladder, and the court cannot say as a matter of law that her act was in any way inconsistent with her continuing within her employment. The act was not done for the servant’s purpose, but her conduct was on her master’s account, and as janitress, and any peril which she thereby encountered, even if in consequence of her negligence or carelessness, if directly or indirectly involved by her contract of service, would be an incident of and within the scope of her employment. At the time of the accident, the claimant had hardening of the arteries and her physical condition was not good. Although the paralysis might not have happened if it had not been for her physical condition, yet this does not bar compensation, as there are facts and circumstances which tend to prove that she was not made ill or sustained the paralysis from natural causes, but that the paralysis was the result of an unusual and sudden strain or wrench unexpectedly suffered by her in the course and arising out of her employment.”
*44 It is noteworthy that the Court in Schwind used the words “unusual and sudden strain or wrench” to describe the injury suffered by Ms. Schwind and not the activity of moving the ladder.
If the words “Ms. Harris” are substituted for the word “janitress,” the above-quoted passage would be applicable to this case. Like the employee in
Schwind,
Ms. Harris’s injury was an “untoward event which she neither expected nor intended.”
Schwind,
Under
Schwind,
an injury is an “accidental injury” if it is the result of an “untoward event which [the employee] neither expected nor intended.”
Schwind,
Another case affirming an accidental injury award of compensation, even though the employee’s injury did not result from unusual activity, was
Foble v. Knefely,
In
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Zapf,
“ ‘The many cases in which the question has been considered afford no more definite or sufficient basis for that construction than that the rule is one of policy rather than law, and results from an effort to construe all parts of the statute so as to harmonize them and carry out its general intent. The word “accident” is usually considered in connection with the phrase “arising out of,” and, where it seems clear that the injury arose “out of the employment,” the tendency of the courts has been to give to the word “accidental” a liberal construction in harmony with the general intent of the act, so as to find the injury compensable.’ See also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Schwind....”
This Court has, on numerous occasions, upheld coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act for accidental injuries incurred in the course of work-related activities which were not “unusual.”
See, e.g., Suburban Hosp. v. Kirson,
C.
There is another line of Maryland cases which hold that the “unusual activity” requirement is pertinent only when there is no apparent causal connection between the accidental injury and the employment. In other words, under the opinions, the presence or absence of “unusual activity” is an aspect in the “arising out of the course of employment” analysis. Judge Markell for the Court in the often-cited opinion,
Perdue v. Brittingham,
“It must always be shown that the injury arose not only ‘in the course of [the] employment’ but also ‘out of the employment.’ ... There must be a ‘causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.’ ... The causal connection may relate either (a) to the act or event, e.g., a fall, which produces the injury or (b) to the consequences of the particular act or event. If there is other evidence that the work causes the act or event, then it is immaterial how usual or trivial the act or event is, or how unusual or abnormal the consequence.... If, however, there is no apparent causal connection between the work and the event, e.g., a cerebral hemorrhage or an epileptic fit, then unusual *48 or extraordinary conditions of the employment, constituting a risk peculiar to the work, may establish the causal connection between the work and the injury....”
For other cases reflecting this limited role of the “unusual activity” requirement,
see, e.g., Montgomery County v. Wade, supra,
*49 D.
In still other cases, purporting to require that an injury arise out of unusual activity, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have strained to label as “unusual” activities which appear to be entirely normal in the particular employments, and thus have upheld coverage.
See, e.g., Fisher Body Division v. Alston,
E.
As one text has pointed out, “[determining whether a strain, exertion or condition of employment was ‘unusual’ constitutes one of the greatest legal battlegrounds in workers’ *50 compensation litigation. In these frays, the word ‘unusual’ is pulled and tugged by the opposing sides in an effort to make it more or less elastic to suit the particular facts of the claim.” Gilbert and Humphreys, Maryland Workers’ Compensation Handbook, § 5.1-1, at 77 (1993).
In other areas of the law, where a judicially created standard has not been uniformly followed, has been inconsistently applied, and has treated differently persons who were similarly situated, this Court has not hesitated to change or abandon the standard.
See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,
The erroneous judicial insertion into the Workers’ Compensation Act of the “unusual activity” requirement has not been uniformly followed by this Court, has been inconsistently applied, and has treated differently employees who were injured under similar circumstances. There are at least four different lines of Maryland Court of Appeals cases concerning the issue, each line conflicting with the others. Like the *51 judicially created standards that were overruled or changed in the above-cited cases, the “unusual activity” requirement for workers’ compensation coverage should be abandoned.
IV.
This Court has previously recognized that the line of Maryland cases, requiring that an injury arise out of “unusual activity” to be covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act, is peculiar to Maryland. In
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Daniels, supra,
“This broad rule, which has been adopted quite generally in the United States following the decisions in England, has not been fully accepted in Maryland. In this State the sudden and unexpected rupture of some portion of the internal structure of the body, or the failure of some essential function of the body, is held to be [an] accidental injury only when it results from some unusual strain or exertion of the employee or some unusual condition in the employment.”
See also, e.g., Stancliff v. H.B. Davis Co.,
The wording of Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act is essentially the same as the wording of most workers’ compensation statutes throughout this country. The American workers’ compensation statutes, in turn, were based upon the English Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897, and, therefore, it is generally held that the English cases under that Act are entitled to great weight. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, §§ 3.06 n. 5, 150.01[1] n. 1.
With regard to injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, based on particular unintended events or conditions, the leading case is Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] *52 Law Rep.App. Cas. 443. In that case, Fenton injured himself while trying to turn a wheel in the course of his ordinary work. There was no slip, wrench or sudden jerk. In holding that the resulting injury was a compensable accident within the meaning of the English Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897, 6 Lord MacNaghten stated (id- at 448):
“[T]he expression ‘accident’ is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed.”
At another point in the opinion, Lord MacNaghten explained (id. at 446-447):
“If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to -move something not easily moved, were to strain a muscle, or rick his back, or rupture himself, the mishap, in ordinary parlance, would be described as an accident. Anybody would say that the man had met with an accident in lifting a weight or trying to move something too heavy for him.
It does seem to me extraordinary that anybody should suppose that when the advantage of insurance against accident at their Employers’ expense was being conferred on workmen, Parliament could have intended to exclude from the benefit of the Act some injuries ordinarily described as ‘accidents’ which beyond all others merit favorable consideration in the interest of workmen and employers alike. A man injures himself by doing some stupid thing, and it is called an accident, and he gets the benefit of the insurance. It may even be his own fault and yet compensation is not to be disallowed unless the injury is attributable to ‘serious and wilful misconduct’ on his part. A man injures himself *53 suddenly and unexpectedly by throwing all his might and all his strength and all his energy into his work by doing his very best and utmost for his employer, not sparing himself or taking thought of what may come upon him, and then he is told that his case is outside the Act because he exerted himself deliberately, and there was an entire lack of fortuitous element! I cannot think that that is right.”
The above-described concept has been adopted throughout the United States. Professor Francis H. Bohlen, in his oft-cited article, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L.Rev. 328, 340, 343 (1912), stated:
“Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, nothing more is required than that the harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected. It is no longer required that the causes external to the plaintiff himself, which contribute to bring about his injury, shall be in any way unusual; it is enough that the causes, themselves known and usual, should produce a result which on a particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. The test as to whether an injury is unexpected and so if received on a single occasion occurs ‘by accident’ is that the sufferer did not intend or expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was doing. * * * The element of unexpectedness, inherent in the word ‘accident’ is sufficiently supplied either if the incident itself is unusual, the act or conditions encountered abnormal, or if, though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him who suffers it.” 7
Only a small minority of other jurisdictions have adopted the “unusual activity” requirement with regard to continuing conditions in the workplace such as involved in
Slacum v. Jolley
and
Miskowiak v. Bethlehem Steel Co.
8
With regard to
*54
injuries of the type involved in the present case, namely injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and
*55
based on specific, sudden, unexpected and unintended events, the line of Maryland cases following
Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v. Stasiak,
requiring “unusual activity,” seems to constitute a minority of one. A review of decisions under the workers’ compensation statutes of the other states, as well as the federal workers’ compensation acts, indicates that no other jurisdictions presently require that an accidental injury of the type here involved arise out of “unusual activity” for there to be coverage.
9
. For a sampling of some of the cases,
see, e.g., Alabama Textile Products Corp. v. Grantham,
V.
A particular rule of statutory construction, which is reflected in the Workers’ Compensation Act itself, is applicable to this case. We have frequently repeated and applied the statutory mandate that “[t]he Workers’ Compensation Act ... should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.”
Baltimore v. Cassidy,
*58
In fact, the broad scope of the term “accidental personal injury” set forth in
Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, supra,
In
DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins,
“Employees who follow the procedural rules of the Act and can prove they were injured while working can almost certainly recover compensation to prevent undue hardships caused by loss of wages and medical expenses. Employers who purchase workers’ compensation insurance and otherwise comply with the law of workers’ compensation can likewise count on avoiding a negligence lawsuit.”
*59 The haphazard application of the judicially invented “unusual activity” requirement renders it impossible to meet the statutory goals set forth in the DeBusk opinion.
Ms. Harris, both as a matter of common sense and as a matter of law, suffered a covered accidental personal injury. This was recognized by the administrative agency charged with the duty of applying the statute. Thus, we reverse the judgments of both courts below and direct that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission be affirmed. In addition, we overrule the holdings in
Slacum v. Jolley, supra,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.
Notes
. The Howard County Public School System’s job description for a “Food and Nutrition Service Assistant I” provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"JOB TITLE: FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE ASSISTANT I
"DEFINITION
“An employee in this classification is required to:
a. Assemble, set-up and serve high quality nutritious meals to students and adults at an elementary or secondary school
b. Clean and sanitize all kitchen equipment at the work facility at the completion of meal service
c. Perform all duties as assigned and work as scheduled.
“EXAMPLES OF WORK
“Assists with the preparation of hot and cold foods and beverages; sets up hot and cold food counter for serving; pre-portions food items; properly supplies counter with food, plates, utensils, napkins and condiments; serves food to students and faculty, maintaining correct portioning; may act as cashier and receives money for food served in cafeteria; maintains an accurate account of cash collected and lunches/milk served; sweeps floors; washes and sanitizes dishes, pots, pans and other utensils; cleans kitchen equipment and work areas; assists in the receiving, unpacking and storage of food and supplies; operates all kitchen equipment; and performs other duties as assigned.
“REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITIES
“Ability to:
a. ...
b. assist with preparation of hot and cold foods and beverages ...
d. use and clean all kitchen equipment ...
g. lift bulk weight of up to 55 lbs.... ”
. As pointed out above, the Court of Special Appeals in this case primarily relied upon that court’s earlier opinion in the
Sargent
case. We note that the Court of Special Appeals in
Sargent,
as well as in other opinions by the intermediate appellate court, was simply endeavoring to apply principles set forth in Court of Appeals' opinions. Judge Wilner
*28
for the Court of Special Appeals in
Sargent
thus explained (
"While the majority of jurisdictions consider an injury to be accidental if it was the unexpected result of the routine performance of the employee’s duties, the Maryland Court of Appeals has chosen to adhere to a much narrower view. Under this more restrictive view, in order for an injury sustained during the course of his employment to be 'accidental,' and thus compensable, it must result ‘from some unusual strain, exertion or condition in the employment.' (Emphasis added.) Stancliff v. H.B. Davis Co.,208 Md. 191 , 198,117 A.2d 577 , 581 (1955). See Geipe, Inc. v. Collett,172 Md. 165 ,190 A. 836 (1937); Schemmel v. Gatch & Sons,164 Md. 671 ,166 A. 39 (1933); State Roads Commission v. Reynolds,164 Md. 539 ,165 A. 475 (1933).... We, of course, are not at liberty to depart from that restrictive view, which was established by the Court of Appeals."
. The Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, a trial court, held that the 1902 statute violated Article 5 and Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Franklin v. United Railways and Electric Compa *29 ny, 2 Baltimore City Reports 309 (1904). Apparently no appeal to this Court was prosecuted in the Franklin case.
The General Assembly, by Ch. 153 of the Acts of 1910, enacted a limited workers' compensation statute for the coal mining and clay mining industries. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1910 statute in
American Coal Co. v. Allegany County,
. The statute went on to delineate numerous types of employment which were deemed “extra-hazardous.”
. With regard to the coverage of occupational diseases, Judge Karwacki for the Court in
Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
"twenty-five years of experience brought inevitable maturity to the Act, and the Legislature eventually recognized that accidents were not the sole cause of employee harm. By Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1939, certain occupational diseases were deemed compensable if contracted during the course of employment. The 1939 amendments to the Act entitled employees disabled or killed by specific enumerated occupational diseases to compensation 'as if such disablement or death were an injury by accident.’ ... Prior to that time, occupational diseases were not compensable.... Eventually, the practice of enumerating specific diseases was abandoned, and all occupational diseases were, subject to certain conditions not here relevant, deemed compensable.”
. Section 1 of the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 provided that an employer would be liable to pay compensation "if in any employment to which this act applies personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman.”
. It is noteworthy that Professor Bohlen’s article was cited with approval in
Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, supra,
. The following cases are typical of those following the majority rule and holding that there is coverage for usual continuing conditions.
See,
*54
e.g.,
Diamelio v. Royal Castle,
For cases adopting the minority rule, and in accord with
Slacum
and
Miskowiak, see, e.g., Joyce v. Luse-Stevenson Co.,
. At one time Michigan also imposed this requirement, but the recent Michigan cases take the position that unusual activity is not required.
See, e.g., Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc.,