250 F. 209 | 8th Cir. | 1918
This case presents many questions. The first is the character and extent of the restrictions on the alienation of 160 acres of land, which was formerly the property of the Creek Tribe, and was, on December 4, 1907, allotted by the Dawes Commission in the name of Freeland Francis, a new-born full-blood Creek Indian, who was born on April 30, 1903, was enrolled on June 10, 1905, and died on June 22, 1905. The right of Freeland Francis to an allotment, and to the land when allotted, descended under the Creek Agreements and the acts of Congress to his mother, Annie Francis (who by marriage has become Annie Harris), his brother Amos Francis, his sister Elizabeth Francis, and his half-brother Mack Francis. Annie, Amos, and Elizabeth are full-blood Creek Indians; Mack is a half-blood. On January 15, 1908, Annie made a deed of her interest in the land to I,aura R. McGinnis, which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on July 6, 1910, and the respondents H. R. Rightsey and John R. Taylor have succeeded to the right conveyed by that deed. On January 22, 1912, W. J. Cook, as guardian of Amos and Elizabeth, pursuant to orders of the county court of Okmulgee county, Okl, made his guardian’s deed of their interest in the land to the respondents Rightsey and '1'aylor. The appellants Annie, Amos, and Elizabeth claim that these deeds are void on account of restrictions on their power to alienate these lands by sections 5, 19, and 22 of the Act of April 26, Í906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, and section 9 of the Act of May 27, 1908, c. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
The acts of Congress relating to this class of citizens in effect provide that the lands and moneys to which such citizen would have been entitled if living shall descend to his heirs according to the applicable laws of descent and distribution, and shall be allotted and distributed to them accordingly. 31 Stat. 869, 870, § 28; 32 Stat. 500, 501, § 7; 33 Stat. 1071. It was not as original members of the Creek Tribe, to
"shall operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee’s land: Provided, that no conveyance of any interest of any full-blood Indian heir In such land shall be valid unless approved by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of said deceased allottee.” 35 Stat. 312, 315.
The argument is that the Act of May 27, 1908, repealed the provision of section 22 of the Act of April 26, 1906, regarding the approval by the Secretary and that this deprived him of the power to approve deeds made before the passage of the Act of Miay 27, 1908. But that act declares that:
“Tho Secretary of the Interior shall not be prohibited by this act from continuing to remove restrictions as heretofore, and nothing herein shall be construed to impose restrictions removed from land by or under any law prior to the passage of this act.” 35 Stat. 312.
It makes an express amendment of the Act of April 26, 1906, 35 Stat 315, § 8, and it contains no express repeal of that act or of the provision of section 22 which empowered the Secretary to approve deeds of full-blood heirs. The rational and established rule is that
“That the jurisdiction of the probate courts of the state of Oklahoma over lands of minors and incompetents shall be subject to the foregoing provisions,” which provisions are not material to the issues now under consideration, “and the term minor or minors, as used in this act, shall include all males under the age of twenty-one years and all females under the age of eighteen years.” 35 Stat. 312, § 2.
“That the persons and property of minor allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes shall, except as otherwise specifically provided by law, be subject to the jurisdiction of the probate courts of the state of Oklahoma,” and that the Secretary of the Interior may appoint local representatives to investigate the administration and disposition by any guardian or curator of the estate of any.minpr, and in case of the dissipation, waste, or deterioration thereof through the carelessness of such guardian or curator to report the matter to the proper probate court, and to cause an investigation thereof and the application of the proper remedy. 35 Stat. 313, § 6.
“That the death of any allottee of the' Five Civilized Tribes shall operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee’s land: Provided, that no conveyance of any interest of any full-blood Indian heir in such land shall'be válid unless approved by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of said deceased allottee.” 35 Stat. 315, § 9.
Freeland Francis resided and died on June 24, 1905, in that part of the Indian Territory which, upon the creation of the state of Oklahoma on November 16, 1907, became Wagoner county, and after that date the county court of Wagoner county had power to acquire jurisdiction of the settlement of his estate. Compiled Laws of Oklahoma
The objection to the validity of the guardian’s deed is that it has never been approved, as required by section 9 of the act of 1908, by the county court of Wagoner county, which, after the admission of the state, might have taken jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of Freeland Francis. But is the first proviso of that section applicable to a guardian’s deed made by order of a county court which had plenary jurisdiction of the guardianship of the persons and of the disposition of the property of the minors by a provision of the same law? Was it the intention of Congress that the exercise by the county court of its undoubted jurisdiction of the guardianship of these minors and of the disposition of their estate should be futile, unless some other court of equal rank, which happened to have jurisdiction of the settlement of another Indian’s estate, approved it? Is it not more probable that it was the intention of Congress to grant to a county court, which has jurisdiction of the guardianship of the persons and of the disposition of the lands of minor heirs, unrestricted power to order the sale and conveyance of their property, and does not the true interpretation of the act exclude such sales and conveyances- from the application of the first proviso of section 9 ?
This act must be read and construed in the light of the general laws upon the same subject in force at the time of its passage. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 58 Fed. 58, 7 C. C. A. 15, 24 L. R. A. 73. Prior to its passage Congress had adopted the settled policy of conferring plenary jurisdiction of the disposition of leases of restricted lands of minors upon the trial courts in the Indian territory, and the jurisdiction of the approval of leases of such lands of adults up
It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statutes that specific legislation in relation to a particular class or subject is not affected by general legislation in regard to many classes or subjects, of which that covered by the specific legislation is one, unless it clearly appears that the general legislation is so repugnant to the special legislation that the legislators must be presumed to have intended thereby to modify or repeal it; but the special and the general legislation must stand together, the former as the law of the particular class or subject, and the latter as the general law upon other subjects or classes within its terms. State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, 436, 21 L. Ed. 650; Washington v. Miller, 235 U. S. 422, 427, 428, 35 Sup. Ct. 119, 59 L. Ed. 295; Priddy v. Thompson, 204 Fed. 955, 958, 959, 123 C. C. A. 277, 280, 281; Board of Commissioners v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 32 C. C. A. 585, 590, 90 Fed. 222, 227; Christie-Street Commission Co. v. United States, 136 Fed. 326, 333, 69 C. C. A. 464, 471.
Section 6 of the act of 1908 provides for the minor allottees and their property. It declares that the persons and property of minor al-lottees of the Five Civilized Tribes shall be subject to the jurisdiction, of the probate courts of the state of Oklahoma. The proviso of section 9 by its terms treats of all full-blood Indian heirs of allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes, including both adults and minors. It does not, however, specifically enact that the deeds of guardians of minors made by the order of the probate courts of Oklahoma pursuant to section 6 shall be invalid unless approved by the courts having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate' of the respective deceased allot-tees. It does not show that in the enactment of this section there ever came to the minds of the legislators the question of the approval of such conveyances, and the probability is that that question never did arise in their minds. When the entire act is read and thoughtfully considered, it does not clearly appear from the provisions of sections 2, 6, and 9
Again, the purpose of this legislation was not to place vexatious and useless obstructions to the disposition of their lands by the full-blood minor heirs, such as the subjection of their guardians’ conveyances to the adjudication of two courts of equal rank, neither of which would have the power to reverse the other, or to effect a conveyance without the consent of the other, would be. On the other hand, it was to assure to such minors a plenary investigation, trial and decision by a competent court, of the advisability of sales of their lands and of the amounts for which they ought, to be sold, and to secure to them adequate prices and a wise use or disposition of the proceeds they obtained, that this law was enacted. All this is completely accomplished and with unusual care by the provisions of section 6. Not only is a competent court thereby given plenary power and charged with the duty to accomplish this purpose, but provision is made for the appointment by the Secretary of special representatives to investigate the cases, to report to the county court, and to see that the end sought is attained. Nothing but delay, expense, and vexation could result from making the action of the court having jurisdiction of the guardianship, sale, and conveyance subject to the approval of another court of equal rank, which has no power to review the evidence before the former court and no authority to order or effect the sale itself.
Every statute should have a reasonable, sensible construction, in preference to an irrational one, which renders it, or a substantial part of it, useless or deleterious. The intention of the legislative body must be presumed to have been to benefit, not to injure, those interested in the subject of the law, and in the light of the considerations to which reference has been made it is incredible that the Congress ever intended to subject guardian’s deeds of the lands of full-blood minor heirs, made pursuant to the orders of the only courts which had jurisdiction to direct their making, to the approval of any other court of equal rank, which had no appellate jurisdiction; and the conclusion is that the true interpretation of the Act of May 27, 1908, is that conveyances of adult full-blood Indian-heirs are subject to the first proviso of section 9, but that that proviso is inapplicable to guardian’s conveyances of the interests of minor full-blood Indian heirs which have been regularly made pursuant to the orders of the county courts of Oklahoma which had jurisdiction of the subject-matters and the parties to the proceedings before them in which they were ordered, and that the guardian’s deed of the interest of the minors, Amos Erancis and Elizabeth Francis, was a valid conveyance without the approval of the county court which might have had jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of Freeland Erancis, whose heirs they are.
That decision was in favor of Lightsey and Taylor, who now hold the interests of Annie, Amos, and Elizabeth; and so it is that that question is not longer here for determination'; and the decree below is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.