97 Ga. 465 | Ga. | 1895
This was an action by Harris & Mitchell against the Amoskeag Lumber Company for the price of the timber-on certain lots of land, which the plaintiffs claimed they had sold to the defendant and which the latter had cut and used. The declaration alleged that the contract of sale was in writing, evidenced by a correspondence which had taken place between the plaintiffs and the defendant. It is unnecessary to set out in full the letters constituting this correspondence. It is sufficient to say that those written by the defendant’s general manager unmistakably indicated a purpose on the part of the writer to purchase for the company he represented the timber in question. Indeed, the correspondence, as a whole, amounted to almost a complete contract. It did not, however, quite accomplish this result, for the reason that it never reached such a point as to show that the parties had distinctly, definitely and finally agreed upon precisely the same thing; although it is manifest from the evidence as a whole that both parties treated this correspondence as a complete and binding contract between them, and that the defendant acted upon it by taking and using the timber in pursuance of its terms.
During the progress of the trial, the latter offered in evidence the record of an action brought against the plaintiffs by one McArthur, which had resulted in a verdict in the latter’s favor. This action involved the liability of the plaintiffs to McArthur for some or all of the timber which is the subject-matter of the present suit. Some portions of this record do not appear to have been relevant evidence in this case, but at the same time, other portions of the same were both relevant and material. The court
There was a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs excepted to, the overruling of their motion for a new trial. Omitting minor points presented by this motion, we will briefly discuss the more important questions it brings before us for review.
This court will certainly not reverse the action of a trial judge either in admitting or in rejecting evidence offered as a whole, some of which is competent and other portions of which are incompetent, when the complaining party has utterly failed to meet the requirements imposed upon him by law as to the manner in which he shall state and insist upon his rights in the premises. In a word, it is the duty of counsel, and not of the presiding judge, to properly