Harrington v. . GrimesHarrington v. . Grimes
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hoke
after stating the case: Under the old law, the deed in question would have conveyed to N. J. Buckner an estate in fee tail, converted by our statute into a fee simple (Revisal, sec. 1578), and his Honor correctly ruled that plaintiff could make a good title. Decisions in support of this construction of the deed will be found in Perrett v. Bird, 152 N. C., 220; Sessoms v. Sessoms, 144 N. C., 121; Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N. C., 200; Whitfield v. Garris, 134 N. C., 24, and many others could be cited. The well considered cases of Acker v. Pridgen, 158 N. C., 337, and Puckett v. Morgan, 158 N. C., 344, cited and relied upon by defendant, in no way militate against this position. .
„ In those cases it was held that, on a perusal of the entire instrument and by reason of the language in which same was ex *78 pressed, a deed in tbe one case and a will in the other, it plainly-appeared to be the intent of the grantor to convey only a life estate to the first taker, and that the words “bodily heirs” and “heirs of the body” did not refer to these persons as inheritors of such taker, but were used only as a descriptio personarum, carrying to them an estate in remainder and as purchasers from- the grantor. But no such intent can be gathered from this instrument, nor does it contain any words or expressions to qualify or affect the ordinary- meaning of the words “bodily heirs” in connection with ■ the estate limited to N. J. Buckner, and the deed, as stated, has been properly held to convey to such grantee an estate in fee simple.
There is no error, and the judgment of the Superior Court is
Affirmed.