Sаmples sued Harper and University Cab Company, Inc., doing business as Yellow Cab Company of Atlanta, for personal injuries arising out of a collision between a motorcycle operаted by Samples and a taxicab driven by Harper. Samples’ father also sued for recovery of medical expenses and loss of services of his minor son. The jury returned a verdict in favоr of Samples and his father. The trial court denied appellants’ motion for a new trial and they appeal.
1. Appellant University Cab contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion fоr a directed verdict, made at the close of appellees’ case, because appellees produced no evidence to establish an agency relаtionship between the driver, Harper, and University Cab.
Samples testified that he did not see what kind of car collided with his motorcycle. The investigating police officer testified that the cаr involved was a Yellow Cab Company vehicle with decals showing the name “Yellow Cab Company” affixed to the doors on both sides, and that the driver stated that he worked for Yellow Cab Comрany and that Yellow Cab owned the vehicle. The police officer also testified that he requested the driver to call his supervisor over the taxicab radio, and that a person identifying himself as a supervisor for Yellow Cab subsequently arrived at the accident scene. The supervisor acknowledged that the taxicab involved was owned by Yellow Cab, and confirmed that he had come in response to a call from the driver. Appellees presented no other evidence on the issue of agency.
Although appellees urge that agenсy is conclusively established by appellants’ responses to appellees’ interrogatories and requests for admissions, we cannot consider admissions contained therein as evidence, since the interrogatories and admissions were not introduced in evidence at trial. Nat. Bank of Ga. v. Hill,
Nevertheless, the police officer’s testimony was sufficient to raise the inferencе that Yellow Cab owned the taxicab and that it was being operated by an employee of Yellow Cab acting within the scope of his employment. Standing alone, the testimony identifying the vеhicle as a Yellow Cab was insufficient to raise the inference of agency. Studstill v. American Oil Co.,
University Cab contends, however, that appellees failed to establish the connection between Yellow Cab Company and the Georgia corporation, University Cab Company, Inc., against which this action was brought. Appellees submitted no evidence when they put on their case to establish such a connection. However, the relationship between Yellow Cab Company and University Cab Company is sufficiently proven elsewhere. The first paragraph of appellees’ complaint reads in pertinent рart as follows: “The Plaintiffs herein . . . bring this Complaint for Damages against HARPER J. HAROLD [i.e., Harper], ... and UNIVERSITY CAB COMPANY, d/b/a YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF ATLANTA, a Georgia Corporation, having an office, agent and place of doing business at 55 Milton Avenuе S.E., Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia ,. . .” To this paragraph University answered that it was without sufficient knowledge and information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein.
“An answеr is evasive when it refuses either to admit or deny a matter as to which the defendant is necessarily presumed to have knowledge. [Cit.]” Wood v. Noland Credit Co.,
“In reviewing the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict, the proper standard to be utilized by the appellate court is the ‘any evidence’ test. [Cits.] There being evidencе supportive of [appellees’] contentions, the trial court did not err in denying [University Cab’s] motion for a directed verdict.” Speir v. Williams,
2. University Cab also contends that the trial court should have granted its motion for new trial for the same reasons it urges that the trial court should have directed the verdict in its favor. We disagree. As discussed in Division 1 above, appellees presented sufficient еvidence to submit the issue of agency to the jury. This evidence was supplemented by the testimony of the driver when appellants put on their case. Harper stated during cross-examinatiоn that he was responding to a radio dispatch call to go pick up a passenger at the time of the collision. As the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial. See Mayor &c. of Athens v. Gregory,
3. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, a copy of a traffic court record of the driver, Hаrper, showing an adjudication of guilty. Appellees assert that the traffic court record is only a plea of guilty. However, the exhibit in the record clearly reads as appellаnts claim, and it was error to admit it into evidence. Padgett v. Williams,
“The admission of evidenсe over objection..., even if erroneous, will not be cause for reversal since thereafter the same or substantially the same evidence was admitted without objection.” Clemones v. Alabama Power Co.,
4. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, evidence of medical expenses for treatment of Samples’ pneumonia because no foundatiоn was laid to show that these expenses were related to the injuries received in the collision.
Based on our review of the testimony and exhibits, we hold that there was sufficient testimonial fоundation to satisfy the requisites of Code Ann. § 38-706.1 (now OCGA § 24-7-9) for admission of evidence of the medical expenses in question. Samples testified without objection that while hospitalized after the cоllision, he received chest x-rays not only due to his shoulder injury but also because he developed pneumonia. His parents, who were responsibile for his care, identified the medicаl bills and testified that the expenses were incurred for treatment of the injuries resulting from the accident. “[A]ppellant’s counsel in cross examination asked no questions concerning the аmount of the medical expenses or their relation to the injuries sustained, as he had the right to do----[T]he evidence was sufficent to authorize the jury to find that the expense was related tо the injuries.” Glennville Wood Preserving Co. v. Riddlespur,
5,6. Appellants’ remaining enumerations of error pertain to the jury charges given by the trial court. We need not consider the enumeration concerning the instruction addressing the thеory of respondeat superior as counsel for appellants made no objection to it, although given the opportunity to do so. Code Ann. § 70-207(a) (now OCGA § 5-5-24(a)); G.E.C. Corp. v. Levy,
University Cab contends that the trial court erred in failing to give its requested charge that “the employer generally is not responsible for torts committed by his employee when the latter exercises an independеnt business, and it is not subjected to the immediate direction and control of the employer.” Appellant argues that the requested charge was more concise than that given and would have been more effective in informing the jury of the applicable standard. Our review of the instructions actually given shows that the court substantially covered the same principle as thаt contained in the requested charge. See Seaboard C. L. R. Co. v. Davis,
Judgment affirmed.