Harper v. RunnerHarper v. Runner
This is an action for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of a quarter, section of land in Lincoln county. A subsequent purchaser was .joined with the original obligor as defendant. Plaintiff prevailed, and the subsequent purchaser apрeals.
Defendant Runner, ivlio resides in Kentucky and owned the land, in March, 190G, executed a written lease to plaintiff therefor. The contract provided: “Said Harper (plaintiff) lias the option to purchase said land during the term of this lease at any price offеred by third party satisfactory to said Runner.” Plaintiff inclosed the land with five other quarter sections, and was using the tract as a pasture for his cattle in April, 1908, when defendant Reagan, who resides in Colorado,- called upon plaintiff with a view to examining the latter’s ranch. Harрer and Reagan drove over the land in controversy. The litigants do not agree concerning their conversation during that trip. Plaintiff tеstified that he told Reagan that he owned by deed or contract all of the land in the inclosure; Avhereas Reagan says that plаintiff spoke generally about the land in two pastures, saying that he owned part of the real estate, leased a fraction thеreof, and had no right to the remainder. The price demanded by plaintiff was unsatisfactory to Reagan, and he conferred with Runner’s аgent and purchased the land for $400 less than plaintiff asked for it. Subsequently plain
1. Reagan argues that the option is collateral to the lease, did not create an estate in the land, and that the tenant’s possession was not constructive notice of the right asserted in this suit. The district court found “that defendant Reagan; at the time of and prior to his purchase, knew of plaintiff’s possession of the land in question, but did not know of his option to buy,” and that рlaintiff’s possession put Reagan upon inquiry to ascertain Harper’s rights. We are of opinion that the findings should be expanded. The еvidence is satisfactory that, while plaintiff did not state that he held an option to purchase the land in suit, he did say that he owned it. It seems reasonable and probable that plaintiff told Reagan just what Harper testified that he did say. When Reagan knew that the quarter sеction he inspected and proposed purchasing was in Harper’s possession under a claim of title, it was incumbent upon Reagan to inquire of Harper concerning the nature of that title or equity. Reagan does not claim that he understood or was told that Harper was a mere tenant and that he was misled thereby. Reagan’s
2. Reagan contends that, аs Harper’s acceptance was conditional, he rejected the option; that a tender has not been made, аnd that this action cannot be maintained. The option was not an offer to be accepted unconditionally in order to complete an executory contract, but it gave Harper a completed right to a conveyance if he elected to pay the amount of the third party’s bid. That privilege continued during the term of the lease, and a counter proposal by Harper did not destroy the right he had theretofore paid for. Runner had not notified Harper of Reagan’s
It is argued that Harper ratified the transaction by offering to trade Reagan other land for the real estate involved herein. The offers, we are satisfied, were mаde for the purpose of compromising the conflicting claims of the litigants, and cannot be considered as a defense to this suit.
The judgment of the district court is right, and is
Affirmed.