119 Wash. 436 | Wash. | 1922
— This is an action of ejectment, brought by the appellants Harper against the respondents, Holston and Woodall, to recover possession of a tract of land described as parts of lots two and three, in section twenty-eight, in township eleven, north of range twenty, east of the Willamette Meridian. The
The facts giving rise to the controversy are in substance these: The Yakima river flows through the township of which the land in controversy forms a part, in a general southeasterly direction. This is an unnavigable stream, although it flows a considerable body of water. In extending the interior surveys over the township named, the government treated the river as it usually treats a navigable stream; it caused the parts of the township into which the river divided it to be separately surveyed, projecting the section lines which intersected the stream in the northerly part from north to south and from east to west, and those which intersected it in the southerly part from south to north and from west to east, causing the stream to be meandered on both of its banks. The northerly part of the township was surveyed in 1865, and the southerly part in 1874. The measurements reported by the surveyors show a considerable shifting of the channel of the river between the time of these surveys. Measuring south from the northeast corner of section twenty-eight, the section in which the lands in controversy are situated, the surveyor surveying the northerly part reported that he intersected the north bank of the river at
The recent survey also shows other changes in the channel of the river. Neither of the surveyors making the original surveys reported finding more than one channel, while the recent survey shows three, although two of these practically coincide at the place where
The land described in the complaint was entered with other lands as a homestead in 1899. The government patented the land to the entryman in 1891, and the appellants are his successors in interest. The entry and the patent, of course, described the land according to the survey of 1865.
If we have made ourselves understood by the foregoing statement, it is apparent that the surveys made of the different parts of the township do not connect. Stated more particularly, there is between the meander lines of the two surveys an irregular shaped tract of land something more than the width of the river over which the surveys do not extend. It is in this area that the tract in dispute lies. The respondent contends that, because the government surveys do not close over it, it is unsurveyed public land, subject to settlement in its present condition, and subject to entry when the government chooses to extend the surveys over it; while the appellants contend that it is an accretion to the tract patented to their predecessor in title, and is theirs in virtue of their title deeds.
There is no disagreement between counsel as to the applicable principles of law. Meander lines run in surveying fractional portions of the public lands bordering upon streams, whether navigable or unnavigable, are run not as boundaries of the tract, but are run
Another rule is that, when grants of land border on running water, and the course of the stream is changed by that process known as accretion — that is to say, the gradual washing away on the one side and the gradual building up on the other — -the owner’s boundary changes with the changing course of the stream. As was said by the supreme court of the United States in New Orleans v. United States, 10 Peters (35 U.S.) 662:
“No other rule can be applied, on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded, is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gains. ’ ’
The rule is as much applicable to the government as it is to private individuals. If the government chooses to grant its lands, making a running stream one of the boundaries of the grant, it must expect this part of the boundary to change as time goes on. Ordinarily it gains in one place what it loses in another, and on no principle of justice can it say that it is not to be subjected to the general rule. And such we understand to be the holding of the supreme court in Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178. There the boundary was the Missouri river. The patent to the land made to the individual by the government was made some years after the survey, during which time
On the other hand, it is equally the rule that, when a stream which is a boundary, from any cause, suddenly abandons its old channel and creates a new one, or suddenly washes from one of its hanks a considerable body of land and deposits it on the opposite hank, the boundary does not change with changed course of the stream, hut remains as it was before. This sudden and rapid change is termed in law an avulsion, and differs from an accretion in that the one is violent and visible, while the other is gradual, and perceptible only after a lapse of time.
It is the rule, also, that the appellants must recover on the strength of their own title, and not on the weakness of their adversary’s. And, since the land in controversy is not within the defined boundaries of the conveyances under which they hold, it must appear, if they are to recover, that the disputed land has been added to their original boundaries by accretion. Does the evidence preponderate in favor of this view? It is our conclusion that it does. Some of the salient facts we have hereinbefore set out. In addition, it appears that the river has not, within the memory of the witnesses testifying on the subject, ever been subject to sudden or violent changes. All testify that there has been a drift of the main channel of the river to the south, and all agree that the change has been gradual, not the result of any sudden change. There is, of course, a period between the time of the original surveys and the time when the recollection of the witnesses
It is our conclusion that the land in dispute is a part of the appellant’s holding, rather than a part of the unsurveyed public lands of the United States. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment for the appellants, plaintiffs below.
Parker, O. J., Bridges, Mitchell, and Tolman, JJ., concur.