Allen C. Harper, one of the personal guarantors of a promissory note secured by property comprised of approximately 110 lots in a subdivision known as Southbridge at Berwick Plantation, Phase III, near Savannah, Georgia, appeals the trial court’s confirmation of the foreclosure of the property by Ameris Bank (“Ameris”). Harper argues (1) that the trial court erred by confirming the sale because (a) Ameris failed to file the post-sale deed under power within the time prescribed by OCGA § 44-14-160; and (b) Ameris failed to correctly advertise the sale; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to exclude Ameris’ experts’ testimony pursuant to former OCGA § 24-9-67.1.
The record establishes that Darby Bank & Trust (“Darby”) issued a loan for $6,548,000 to SB Partners, LLC. The promissory note was secured by a deed to the property, as well as the personal guaranties of Charles K. Werk, Harper, and Roy S. Shiver, Jr.
Finding that SB Partners was in default on the note, Ameris foreclosed on the property in August 2011. Prior to the sale, Ameris procured two appraisals of the property, which valued the property at $2.1 million and $2.81 million. Ameris, however, purchased the property at the sale for $3,372,000, which consisted of a 20 percent increase of the highest appraisal. Thereаfter, Ameris filed the instant confirmation petition.
At the hearing, Ameris presented the testimony of its appraisers, including Joel Crisler, who appraised the property in April 2011 and August 2011. Harper moved to exclude the expert testimony on the ground that it violated
1. Harper first argues that the trial court erred by confirming the sale because Ameris failed to file thе deed under power within the time prescribed by OCGA § 44-14-160. We disagree.
OCGA § 44-14-160 states:
Within 90 days of a foreclosure sale, all deeds under power shall be recorded by the holder of a deed to secure debt or a mortgаge with the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties in which the foreclosed property is located. The clerk shall write in the margin of the page where the deed to secure debt or mortgage foreclosed upon is recorded the word “foreclosed” and the deed book and page number on which is recorded the deed under power conveying the real prоperty; provided, however, that, in counties where the clerk keeps the records affecting real estate on microfilm, the notation provided for in this Code section shall be made in the samе manner in the index or other place where the clerk records transfers and cancellations of deeds to secure debt.
This Court has not addressed whether this Code section provides any remedy for a debtor; however, the plain language of the statute, as the trial court found below, provides for post-foreclosure procedures that would not affect the debtor in any way and insteаd would provide protection for future buyers.
In any event, this Court has explained that “[a] confirmation proceeding is a limited statutory proceeding. . . ”
2. Harper also argues that the trial court erred by allowing Crisler
[Q]uestions concerning the admissibility of expert opinion generally are committed to the sound discretion of the trial courts, and questions of the admissibility of expert opinions under [former] OCGA § 24-9-67.1are no different. Whether an expert opinion ought to be admitted under [former] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 is a question that is especially fit for resolution by a trial court because it requires a consideration of the facts and data upon which the opinion is based, whether the opinion is a product of reliable principles and methods, and whether the opinion was reached by a reliable application of those principles and methods to the facts of the case. 8
In WCI Properties, Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank, this Court addressed a similar argument regarding the admission of an appraiser’s testimony in the face of a Daubert motion. This Court explained that
[a] party seeking to confirm a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is under no obligation to present an expert appraisal of the property. Direct testimony as to market value is in the nature of oрinion evidence. One need not be an expert or dealer but may testify as to its value if he has had an opportunity for forming an opinion. Of course, the opinions of experts as to the true markеt value of property are admissible, and provide sufficient evidence of value to support a trial court’s order of confirmation. As this Court has recently held, moreover, a court sitting as the trier of fact in a confirmation hearing is not required to subject expert testimony as to value to a Daubert hearing.9
Here, Crisler prepared two valuation reports for Ameris, one in April 2011 and one in August 2011. Crisler contacted a D. R. Horton representative, who testified that the company was not performing under the contract, as well as an engineer to survey the four questionable lots, and both individuals supported his conclusions, which were not offered to show that the lots were buildable or that the contract had to be followed, but rather to provide an opinion as to the value of the homes. Crisler is certified as an appraiser in Georgia, has extensive experience performing as such, and his conclusions as to the lot purchase agreement and buildability of certain lots and the effect of those conclusions on his final analysis of the value of the property was subject to thorough and sifting cross-examination.
3. Finally, Harper contends that Ameris’ failures in the advertisement required the trial court to deny confirmation of the sale. Specifically, Harper contends that Ameris’ advertisement of the рroperty incorrectly included two lots that later were released from the security deed prior to the sale.
This Court addressed a similar argument in Dan Woodley Communities, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank,
Not every irregularity or deficiency in a foreclosure advertisement will void a sale.[Harper] has not shown [he] was harmed in any way by the inclusion of two unavailable lots in the foreclosurе ad’s property description. ... As the trial court noted, [Harper] failed to show in any particular how the end result would have been different had [Ameris] not included in the advertisement descriptions of the lоts which had already been sold. 15
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting the petition for confirmation over Harper’s argument.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Only Harper is a party to the appeal.
We note that the legislature revised the statute in 2009 and had the opportunity tо pass a version of the statute enacting fines for late filing under this Code section; however, the measure failed. See Ga. L. 2009, p. 614, § 1/SB 141.
River Walk Farm v. First Citizen Bank & Trust Co.,
(Punctuation omitted.) Howser Mill Homes v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
Cf. id.
Although Harper argues that Ameris’ other expert testimony should have been excluded for similar reasons, we address only Crisler’s testimony because the trial court relied on it when confirming the sale. For the same reаsons, however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Ameris’ other expert to testify.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) WCI Properties v. Community & Southern Bank,
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 674 (1).
“[DJisputes as to an expert’s credentials are properly explored through cross-examination at triаl and go to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility.” (Punctuation omitted.) Village at Lake Lanier v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
See id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
(Footnotes omitted.) Heritage Creek Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank,