65 N.J. Eq. 479 | New York Court of Chancery | 1903
Complainant’s bill is for an injunction to restrain defendants’ interference with its rights in the waters of a stream or natural water-course byr the diversion or abstraction of the waters of the stream and of the springs and rivulets which in part supply it. These rights and the defendants’ interference with them have, as complainant claims, been already established by a suit at law, brought by its predecessors in title, against two of the defendants, under whom the third defendant claims by title or right acquired after the suit at law. In its general aspect, therefore, the bill is filed in aid of a legal right, claimed to be sufficiently established, and to restrain by injunction the continued interference with the rights. Defendants deny any interference with complainant’s rights, set up alterations in the operation of their works since the judgment at law and dispute the conclusiveness of that judgment on the question of interference. The substantial facts relating to the water rights claimed, the alleged interference with them and the issues in the suit at law are as follows: Complainant is the owner of a mill-property to which is attached or appurtenant a right to a supply of water from a stream called Green brook, flowing through a valley, sometimes called the .Eeltville vallejq lying west of Summit, between the First and Second mountains. Complainant’s mill is not located on the stream, but water is supplied to it by means of a raceway, beginning at a dam in the brook called the Upper Feltville dam, and running about twenty-four hundred feet to the mill. Complainant’s right, or that of its grantors, to the water of the stream for use at its mill by means of this raceway was established by the suit at law referred to and has not been contested in this suit. About a- mile and a half above the dam the defendants have constructed a water plant which is now used to supply the city of Summit with water. The water supplied is derived altogether by pumping from wells
In this .-respect the case differs from the class of cases where, after a -judgment at law'for nuisance, it is claimed, on the application for injunction, that by reason of subsequent alteration the nuisance itself has been abated. In such cases the court will, as a general rule, on the application for permanent injunction; settle the question'as to the effect of the alteration and determine the rights of the parties without sending the parties to law for another trial as to the effect of the alteration. Carlisle v. Cooper, 6 C. E. Gr. 576, 588 (Errors and Appeals, 1869); Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Broadbent, 7 H. of L. Cas. 600, 609, 614 (1859). But where, as here, the nuisance to the complainant’s rights (if it ever existed) still continues, the preliminary question on this application for injunction is really a question as to the effect of the verdict in the suit at law upon the question of the present existence of the nuisance here complained of.
Upon the point now mooted, viz., the question of fact whether the defendants’ plant (pumping from the lower well being discontinued) does abstract from the stream and from its natural supplies waters to which complainant’s mill is entitled, the precise questions to be decided are — first, is the verdict to be considered a decision that these works (other than the lower well) did then abstract waters from the stream to complainant’s injury, and second, if it is to be so considered, is it now and for the purposes of this application to be taken as conclusive upon this question of fact? In my judgment both these questions must be answered in the affirmative.
The record of tire former suit, including the evidence taken and the arguments of counsel on the application for a new trial, have been put in evidence and, by agreement, the evidence taken in that suit has been considered as taken in this suit.
The declaration contains two counts, the first for a diversion or abstraction of the waters of the stream by enclosing springs which supply it and by the erection of a plant (particularly described) which abstracted the waters of the stream and springs; and the second, a general count for the diversion or abstraction
An examination of the evidence shows that both parties submitted a large amount of evidence as to the effect of the operation of defendants’ plant upon the stream and its ponds, springs and runs above the lower well. The evidence of the .plaintiffs showed, or tended to show, that since the construction of the defendants’ plant the flow of water into the brook had been materially lessened all the way down the Erog pond, and that the bed of the stream below the Erog pond-and above the lower well, and also the bed of the rivulets from the springs above this well, were dried up and at different places the streams disappeared. Evidence was also introduced by the plaintiffs, showing or tending to show, the effect of the operation of defendants’ pumping plant upon the stream, ponds and runs within what was called the scope or “cone” of its influence, and that the appearances on the surface indicated an abstraction of water by such operation of a pumping plant. As to the lower well, the further and additional claim was made by the plaintiffs, and their evidence tended to show, that the, well was located over a spring then existing, called the “Boiling Spring,” whose waters ran down into the stream, and that the waters of this spring were directly drawn away from the stream and into defendants’ works. Upon the part of the defendants evidence was offered that any diminution in the water-supply to the mill was due to natural causes, such as diminished rainfall, due to clearing of woods and other causes, and a's to the abstraction of any water by their works located above the lower well, evidence was offered showing, or tending to show, that the entire bed of the valley at this point, from above the Erog pond to the lower well and across the valley, under the stream, was underlaid by a bed of clay, two feet or more in thickness, entirely impervious to water.
Upon this point Mr. Bassett, called as the manager who built tire works as well as an. expert engineer, testified that, besides the excavations made for the purpose of constructing the
Mr. Chief-Justice Magic, the trial justice, gave to the jury in his directions the instructions which are, as between these parties and for the purpose of the present application, the law of the case. He charged the jury that while the defendants might strike underground streams and abstract underground water that might come to the surface and. might carry this- percolating water off and sell it, yet if by their works they • abstracted the water or reduced the level of springs or streams that had come to the surface, it was an actionable wrong if any appreciable
. On this application for injunction complainant on its part introduces evidence showing that, as to the flow of water in the stream to ,the prill, the same condition exists as at the time of the trial. at • law, and that the defendants are now pumping from the upper well .more water than at the time of the trial was drawn from both wells. Expert ..evidence of the same •character.-produced at the trial at law .is, produced here on the part of the complainants. Defendants,, on their part, show that the lower -well is no longer operated, and as to the operation of tire pumping plant and other works the ultimate fact or defence claimed to be established .is the same as the fact or defence set up at law, viz., that the Frog pond, the bed of the stream, the springs and the rivulets are underlaid by an impervious bed of clay extending down the valley from above the Frog pond to or .below the lower well and across the valley to near the sides of the hills enclosing it. The evidence to prove this ultimate fact is in some- respects different from that produced in the trial at law and it is claimed to be conclusive. Shortly before the hearing on this suit defendants had the Faitoute spring run and the run below it, and also the bed of the stream itself below the Frog pond, dug out and cleaned, and as a result of this it is claimed that a continuous, unbroken bed of impervious clay is disclosed. Samples of the clay are produced, as in the trial, and the evidence of expert witnesses, Mr. Bassett and Mr. Sherrard, that the bed of clay-under the
•■On this applicatioxx the verdict is to.be examined rattier with the view of -determining whether, the fact now. contested was really an issue tried by the parties,, and whether the determination of the jury on the fact is to.be taken as a, sufficient establishment of complainantts- legal, right .and of its violation by defendants. Examining the entire evidence, I conclude that the verdict of the jury must fairly.be taken as deciding that the defendants- did commit the nuisance now complained .of and unlawfully abstract these waters of the stream by .the operation of tlieir plant above the lower well and, as included in this, did decide also that the alleged impervious bed of clay did not .exist. Cases might occur where evidence, subsequently discovered. and not obtainable at the trial, might demonstrate that the verdict of the jury was a mistake and justify the court in sending the case back to another jury for trial to determine the continuance of the nuisance before granting a perpetual injunction, but in the present case the evidence is substantially of the same character as the evidexxce in the trial at law, and is in .effect a second trial with the introduction of additional evidence which-
'Complainant 'having thus sufficiently' established by trial at law its legal right and its violation, and the injury being a substantial one, affecting permanently the use and the value of their property, is, under the general rule applicable to such cases, entitled as of 'course to1 a perpetual injunction 'to prevent the recurrence of the wrong. ' Kerr Inj. *42; Imperial Gas Co. v. Broadbent, 7 II. L. Cas. 600, 609, 612. In Higgins v. Flemington Water Co., 9 Stew. Eq. 538, 546 (Errors and Appeals, 1883), it was held that where the .court of equity itself settled the question of right and its violation, in such cases an injunction should be granted to protect the continued violation of the right, and that the circumstance that the water was withdrawn for the purpose óf a public water-supply was not ground for withholding the injunction. Upon this point the doctrine of Imperial Gas Co. v. Broadbent, supra, was approved. The same rule was applied' by Vice-Chancellor Pitney in Hennessy v. Carmony, 5 Dick. Ch. Rep. 616 (1892), to protect the ownership of land against a continuing injury appreciably affecting its value. The defendants have filed a cross-bill, praying a condemnation