Harpal SINGH; Gurdev Kaur; Rajwant Singh; Amanpret Kaur, Petitioners, v. Eric HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 06-71703
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
October 13, 2010
Argued and Submitted July 16, 2010.
Gurdev Kaur, Ceres, CA, pro se.
Ada Elsie Bosque, OIL, Jonathan Aaron Robbins, Esquire, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: HUG and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and TODD, Senior District Judge.*
Harpal Singh and his family, natives and citizens of India, have petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“) denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT“). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
An alien may be granted asylum “if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of [8 U.S.C.] section 1101(a)(42)(A).”
If a petitioner for asylum or withholding of removal establishes past persecution on a protected ground, as in the present case, there is a presumption that the petitioner‘s life or freedom would be threatened upon his return to his home country. See
Singh contends that the BIA erred in finding that the presumption of future persecution against him was rebutted by changed country conditions. In order to find changed conditions, the BIA was required to identify specific improvements in India‘s conditions occurring after Singh‘s persecution and link those improvements to Singh and his ability to return. See Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). The BIA identified the following improvements: (1) people who were not high profile military suspects, such as Singh, were not at risk in Punjab; (2) from 1996 to 2004 the Akali Dal had successfully participated in elections, a Sikh had been sworn in as Prime Minister, and the President had attended a pro-Khalistan rally; and (3) human rights abuses in the Punjab discussed in the most recent State Department country reports described events that had occurred in the past. Given these significant changes, substantial evidence supports the BIA‘s finding that Singh did not have a reasonable fear of future persecution if he returned to India.
The application for withholding of removal also was properly denied, as the change in country circumstance was such that Singh‘s life or freedom would not be threatened on account of any protected ground. As for the CAT claim, because of the changed conditions in India, the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Singh would be tortured if he is removed to India. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005).
PETITION DENIED.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cynthia Marie BARBOZA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-50505
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
October 13, 2010
Submitted Oct. 5, 2010.*
Janet Tung, Kristi A. Hughes, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM **
Cynthia Marie Barboza (“Barboza“) appeals her conviction for importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. She asserts that certain statements she gave to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE“) agents following her arrest were involuntary and thus should not have been admitted at trial.
A trial court‘s conclusion that a statement was made voluntarily “must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” United States v. Brown, 575 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court properly made a determination that Barboza‘s statements were voluntary. See United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964)); see also Sims, 385 U.S. at 544 (holding that the district court “need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion” on voluntariness so long as its conclusion “appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity“). The district court found that Barboza “[had not] offered any evidence to [the court] or any declaration that anything she said was the product of her will being overborne,” Trial Transcript at 191, and the evidence submitted by Barboza, including a declaration from her counsel and a video recording of her ICE interview, was insufficient to show “that anything that was said was the product of coercion or improper tactics by