Donna M. HARMS, Petitioner, Appellant, v. OAK MEADOWS, Respondent, Commissioner of Economic Security, Respondent.
No. CX-00-298.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Nov. 30, 2000.
619 N.W.2d 201
GILBERT, Justice.
Petitioner, Lyn M. Ducloux, sought review by the court of appeals of the Commissioner of Economic Security‘s (Commissioner) decision to deny her reemployment insurance benefits. The court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because Ducloux failed to timely serve the Commissioner and other parties involved with the petition for the writ of certiorari as required by
The issues presented are identical to those decided today in Harms v. Oak Meadows, 619 N.W.2d 201 (Minn.2000). Based on our decision in Harms, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to discharge the writ of certiorari and dismiss Ducloux‘s appeal.
Affirmed.
PAGE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result with reluctance. I write separately to note that, in addition to elevating form over substance, see Harms v. Oak Meadows, 619 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.2000) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially), it is counterintuitive that service of the petition for a writ of certiorari triggers review while service of a copy of the writ itself does not.
Empire Executive Coaches, Inc., St. Paul, respondent/employer—Pro Se.
Kent E. Todd, Minn. Dept. of Econ. Sec., St. Paul, for Respondent-Commissioner.
OPINION
GILBERT, Justice.
Petitioner, Donna M. Harms, sought review by the court of appeals of the Commissioner of Economic Security‘s (Commissioner) decision to deny her reemployment insurance benefits. The court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because Harms failed to timely serve the Commissioner and other relevant parties with the petition for a writ of certiorari as required by
The issue presented is whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over petitioner‘s appeal. Jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. See Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn.2000). This case also involves statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. See Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 108-09 (Minn.1999).
Harms worked as a cook for Oak Meadows for approximately one month before she quit. Harms could not physically perform all of the duties required by her job, and stress and depression were causing her to be ill. After a series of appeals, the Commissioner‘s representative denied Harms’ reemployment insurance benefits. Notice of the decision was mailed on January 28, 2000. Harms filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Minnesota Court of Appeals on February 23, 2000, and a writ of certiorari was issued that same day. Harms mailed copies of the conformed writ and a statement of the case to the Commissioner‘s office on February 24, 2000. On March 9, 2000, the Commissioner filed a motion to discharge the writ on the grounds that Harms did not timely serve the Commissioner with the petition for writ of certiorari as required by
The Minnesota court of appeals shall, by writ of certiorari to the commissioner, review the decision of the commissioner[,] provided a petition for the writ is filed with the court and a copy is served upon the commissioner and any other involved party within 30 calendar days of the mailing of the commissioner‘s decision.
The word “shall” in the statute indicates that review by the court of appeals is not discretionary. See
Harms argues that timely serving the Commissioner with the actual writ issued satisfies the same purpose that serving the Commissioner with the petition for the writ would serve. In particular, Harms argues that the Commissioner and other parties were provided adequate notice of the appeal.
In support of her argument, Harms has cited several cases involving various statutes and court rules concerning appeal procedures in reemployment insurance cases.1 All of the cases cited are distinguishable from the case at hand, and none of them involve a violation of the particular statute at issue here.
We conclude that
In that Harms did not serve the Commissioner with the petition for writ of certiorari within 30 days of the mailing of the Commissioner‘s decision, we hold that the court of appeals’ dismissal of Harms’ petition was proper.
Affirmed.
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the reasoning and the result reached by the majority. Under the rules we must apply to the interpretation of statutes,
PAGE, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the special concurrence of Justice Paul H. Anderson.
