Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Harmony East Condominium Association,
Case No. 24-cv-2048 (SRN/ECW) Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER Falls Lake Fire and Casualty Company,
Defendant. Brenda Sauro and Brock P. Alton, Sauro & Alton, PLLC, 8519 Eagle Point Boulevard, Suite 170, Lake Elmo, MN 55042, for Plaintiff.
Dennis Charles Anderson and Akira Céspedes Gilheany, Zelle LLP, 500 Washington Avenue South, Suite 4000, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Defendant.
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Falls Lake Fire and Casualty Company’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 9] and Plaintiff Harmony East Condominium Association’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and Appoint an Umpire [Doc. 16]. For the reasons below, the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss and grants the Motion to Compel Appraisal and Appoint an Umpire.
I. Background
Harmony is a homeowner association that manages and maintains a community of 176 townhome units within 25 buildings in Rosemount, Minnesota. (Doc. 1–1 at 7 ¶ 1.) It purchased an all-risk insurance policy with Falls Lake, effective May 1, 2022. ( at 8 ¶ 5.) And around May 11, a storm damaged its property. ( at 11 ¶ 21.)
A. Fall 2022
Harmony hired a public adjusting firm to evaluate the extent of the damage. ( Id. ¶ 22.) The adjuster submitted a claim on August 2 and “prepar[ed] an estimate for the replacement cost for damages occasioned by the Storm in the amount of $2,382,132.10.” ( Id. ¶¶ 23–25.)
Two weeks later, an adjuster for Falls Lake inspected the property, and the next week, Falls Lake sent a “reservation of rights letter” highlighting several “potential Policy exclusions.” ( Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) The letter did not mention the Policy’s “Suit Against Company” provision. ( Id. ¶ 28.) That provision reads:
No suit, action or proceeding for the recovery of any claim under this policy shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless [Harmony] shall have fully complied with all the requirements of this policy, nor unless the same be commenced within twelve (12) months next after inception of the loss provided, however, that if under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the property is located such limitation is invalid, then any such claims shall be void unless such action, suit or proceedings be commenced within the shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.
(Doc. 12-1 at 50 ¶ 32.)
In mid-October, Falls Lake sent an engineering firm to conduct a second inspection, and on November 23, Falls Lake officially denied the claim. (Doc. 1-1 at 12 ¶¶ 29, 31.) It found that there was no evidence of hail damage to the shingles; that any damage to metals happened before the policy period; and that any damage to siding, windows, or screens either happened before the policy period or was ordinary wear and tear. ( ¶ 31.) Again, it did not warn Harmony about the Suit Against Company provision. ( ¶¶ 32–33.)
B. Summer 2023
On July 17, 2023—a couple of months after the anniversary of the storm—Harmony demanded appraisal and named an appraiser. ( Id. at 13 ¶ 37.) Falls Lake responded ten days later with a letter naming its own appraiser but stating that it considered the appraisal demand defective without a signature from Harmony’s board. ( Id. ¶¶ 38–39.) The letter also made several requests for information, including information about Harmony’s prior losses. ( Id. ¶ 38.)
This time, Falls Lake cited the Suit Against Company provision, but it provided no explanation as to its impact in this matter. ( Id. at 14 ¶¶ 41–44.) So believing that Minnesota Statute § 65A.01 requires at least two years to file suit, Harmony did not understand Falls Lake to assert that Harmony’s claim was time-barred. ( Id. ) In fact, the letter stated that Falls Lake understood Harmony’s claim was not resolved and that the parties would work “toward resolution of [Harmony’s] insurance claim.” ( Id. ¶ 45.)
Consistent with this understanding, Falls Lake continued to engage with Harmony for several months. ( Id. at 15–19 ¶¶ 51–75.) In a series of August emails, Falls Lake wrote that it was “eager” to move the process along, reminded Harmony about the information it had requested, and warned that the delay might push the appraisal process back to next spring. ( at 15 ¶¶ 51–53.)
C. Fall 2023
In September, Falls Lake asserted for the first time that any lawsuit would be time- barred. ( at 16 ¶ 56.) But it also wrote that Falls Lake would only close the file if it did not receive the requested information, and that it had instructed its appraiser to cease communications with Harmony’s appraiser until its board signed the appraisal demand— implying, of course, that talks would continue if Harmony cooperated. ( Id. ¶¶ 54–55.) On the same day, Harmony responded that it was still trying to find the information. ( Id. ¶ 59.) And when Harmony sent the same update a few weeks later, Falls Lake simply wrote “thank you.” ( Id. at 17 ¶ 51.)
In mid-October, Falls Lake sent a “Notice of File Closure” based on Harmony’s failure to produce the requested information. ( Id. ¶ 62.) But when Harmony once again responded that it was still searching, Falls Lake said it would consider future responses. ( Id. ¶¶ 63–64.) The next week, Harmony provided a letter signed by its president confirming its appraisal demand and explained that it was having trouble finding the requested information because it had changed management companies. ( Id. ¶ 65.) Then a few days later, Harmony gave Falls Lake all the information it could find. ( Id. at 18 ¶ 69.)
On December 19, Falls Lake upheld its denial while again noting that additional information might change its view. ( Id. ¶ 70.)
D. Spring 2024
The parties exchanged several more emails in December, January, and February. Then Falls Lake finally said that Harmony needed to either “provide [the] information or let it go.” ( at 18–19 ¶¶ 71–75.) On March 19, 2024, Falls Lake sent a “Notice of Claim Denial and File closure” stating that it stood by its original denial and re-alleging that the claim was time-barred. ( at 20 ¶ 82).
On May 2, 2024—just under two years after the storm—Harmony sued Falls Lake in state court. (Doc. 1-1.) It sought an order declaring the rights and obligations of the parties, directing Falls Lake to proceed with the appraisal process, estopping Falls Lake from arguing that the suit is time-barred, and reforming the Policy to comply with Minnesota Statute § 65A.01. ( at 21–22, 24–29.) It also sought damages for breach of contract. ( at 23–24, 29.)
After removing the case to federal court, Falls Lake moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Harmony’s claim is time-barred. (Doc. 9.) Harmony then moved to compel appraisal and appoint an umpire. (Doc. 16.) After a full round of briefing, the Court heard oral argument, and the parties followed up with supplemental briefs. (Docs. 11, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39.)
II. Motion to Dismiss
To survive Falls Lake’s Motion to Dismiss, Harmony’s complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
,
Minnesota has a general six-year statute of limitations for all contract actions. Minn.
Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). But parties to an insurance contract “may limit the time within
which an action may be brought to a period less than that fixed by the general statutes of
limitation.”
Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins.
,
Minnesota courts analyze whether a shortened time limit is valid in two steps. First, they “look to see if a specific statute prohibits the use of a different limitation period in the particular case.” Then, if none exists, they ask whether the limitation was “reasonable” under the circumstances.
A. Statutory Analysis
The Court finds that Minnesota’s fire and hail insurance statutes neither prohibit nor require a one-year limitation here, but an administrative rule prohibits a limitation of less than two years.
1. Minnesota Statute § 65A.01 – The Fire Statute
Harmony first argues that the limitation must be two years under Minnesota’s
“Standard Fire Insurance Policy” statute, Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 1. (Doc. 23 at 14–
18.) The Minnesota Supreme Court has already held that “the provisions of [§ 65A.01]
apply only to fire losses, and not nonfire losses, under an all-risk insurance policy.”
Henning
,
The Court disagrees. The second half of the Suit Against Company provision provides “that if under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the property is located [the one- year] limitation is invalid, then any such claims shall be void unless such action, suit or proceedings be commenced within the shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.” (Doc. 12-1 at 50 ¶ 32.) In other words, even if the one-year limitation is unlawful, the Suit Against Company provision reforms itself to match the shortest legal time limit. Thus, it is never “in conflict with the written laws of” Minnesota—not even when it comes to fire losses—and the Conformity to Statute provision never kicks in to “change[]” it. ( ¶ 36.)
The Court therefore finds that as applied to nonfire losses, Minnesota Statute § 65A.01 does not extend the Policy’s one-year limitation to two years.
2. Minnesota Statute § 65A.26 – The Hail Statute Falls Lake, for its part, argues that the Policy’s one-year limitation is required under Minnesota’s “Hail insurance, policies, loss adjustment” statute, Minn. Stat. § 65A.26. (Doc. 11 at 8; Doc. 31 at 5.) The hails statute provides:
Every policy of insurance against damage by hail issued by any company, however organized, must provide as follows: “ . . . . No suit for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy may be sustained unless commenced within one year after the loss occurred.”
Minn. Stat. § 65A.26. Falls Lake interprets this to mean that “all insurance policies that provide coverage against hail [must] include a one-year suit limitation provision.” (Doc. 31 at 8.)
The Court disagrees. Falls Lake’s interpretation would create a conflict. The fire
statute requires all-risk policies to have a two-year limitation as to fire losses.
See
§ 65A.01;
Henning
,
The more natural interpretation is that the hail statute applies only to hail-specific policies. The fire statute, which was passed in the same 1967 bill, provides a helpful comparison. See 1967 Minn. Laws 762, 777 (c. 395, art. 6, §§ 1, 26). It reads:
The printed form of a policy of fire insurance, as set forth in subdivisions 3 and 3a, shall be known and designated as the “Minnesota standard fire insurance policy” to be used in the state of Minnesota. No policy or contract of fire insurance shall be made, issued or delivered by any insurer including reciprocals or interinsurance exchanges or any agent or representative thereof, on any property in this state, unless it shall provide the specified coverage and conform as to all provisions, stipulations, and conditions, with such form of policy . . . . Any policy or contract . . . which includes either on an unspecified basis as to coverage or for a single premium, coverage against the peril of fire and coverage against other perils may be issued without incorporating the exact language of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy, provided: Such policy or contract shall, with respect to the peril of fire, afford the insured all the rights and benefits of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy and such additional benefits as the policy provides . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 1. The fire statute recognizes that “a policy of fire insurance” is different from an all-risk policy— i.e. , a “policy . . . which includes . . . coverage against the peril and coverage against other peril.” And it specifies that the former must use the language of the Minnesota standard fire insurance policy, while the latter “may be issued without incorporating the exact language” as long as it “afford[s] the insured all the rights and benefits of the” standard policy “with respect to the peril of fire.”
If the Minnesota Legislature had also wanted the hail statute to cover all-risk
policies, it would have likewise applied the statute’s protections to policies
which include
coverage against damage by hail
and
coverage against other peril—not just policies “of
insurance against damage by hail.” § 65A.26. The inference to be drawn from the
Legislature’s decision not to mention other peril in the hail statute is that the Legislature
did not intend for the hail statute to regulate all-risk policies.
Cf. State v. Expose
, 872
N.W.2d 252, 258–59 (Minn. 2015) (Stras, J.) (citing
Burlington N. v. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
2
White
, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006) (“[T]he question is whether Congress intended its
different words to make a legal difference. We normally presume that, where words differ
as they differ here, ‘Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.’”)));
Fore v. Crop Hail Mgmt.
, 270 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam)
(discussing § 65A.26 as applying to an insurance policy against hail damage to crops);
Dorn v. Home Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass’n
,
Because the Policy is an all-risk policy, (Doc. 12-1 at 20,) the Court finds that Minnesota Statute § 65A.26 does not apply.
3. Minnesota Rule § 2700.0300
Finally, Harmony points to a Minnesota Department of Commerce rule that “[n]o
policy, rider, or endorsement form shall be accepted for filing by this department from any
casualty insurance company that contains a provision limiting the time within which legal
proceedings may be instituted against the insurer by the insured to a period less than two
years.” Minn. R. 2700.0300. (Doc. 36 at 2–4.) Falls Lake’s sole argument against
applying Rule 2700.0300 is that it conflicts with the hail statute, and “when an
administrative rule conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute, the statute controls.”
Spec.
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dunham
,
Because the court finds that the hail statute does not require a one-year suit limitation in all-risk policies, the Court disagrees that Rule 2700.0300 conflicts with it. And because Rule 2700.0300 does not conflict with a statute, it has the force and effect of law. Minn. Stat. § 14.38, subd. 1; Minn. Energy Res. Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue , 886 N.W.2d 786, 801 (2016). Under the Policy’s Suit Against Company provision, the suit limitation is the “shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of” Minnesota. (Doc. 12-1 at 50 ¶ 32.) So the proper suit limitation under the Policy is two years, and Harmony’s suit is not time-barred.
B. Alternative Analysis
Even if a one-year time limit were permissible, dismissal would be inappropriate at this stage. Harmony has plausibly pleaded facts to support claims that the one-year limitation was unreasonable, that Harmony waived the one-year time limit, and that Harmony should be estopped from asserting it.
1. Reasonableness To start, Harmony argues that the one-year time limit is unreasonable under the specific facts of this case. (Doc. 23 at 18–22.) The Court finds that Harmony has plausibly pleaded facts to support this claim.
Even when a limitations period is allowed by statute, it may be invalid because it is
“unreasonably short”—as decided on a “case-by-case basis, looking at the particular facts
of each case.”
Henning
,
The pleadings make clear that Harmony had more than five months between the
initial, non-final denial in November 2022 and the storm’s anniversary in May 2023. And
courts have found similar amounts of time sufficient.
E.g.
,
id.
at *3 (six months);
Minn.
Mut. Fire & Cas. Co. v. N. Lakes Const., Inc.
,
Although there are facts in the record that support Falls Lake’s position, considering that reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry, it would be inappropriate to dismiss Harmony’s unreasonableness claim at the pleadings stage—it will require a full factual record for resolution.
2. Waiver Harmony also argues that Falls Lake waived its rights under the Suit Against Company provision. (Doc. 23 at 24–30.) The Court finds that Harmony has plausibly alleged facts to support this claim.
“Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.”
Pollard v. Southdale
Gardens of Edina Condo. Ass’n, Inc.
,
Taking Harmony’s allegations as true, a reasonable jury could find that Falls Lake
intentionally waived the Suit Against Company provision’s time bar by failing to enforce
it.
See O’Reilly v. Allstate Ins.
,
3. Estoppel For similar reasons, Harmony argues that Falls Lake is equitably estopped from asserting a one-year time bar. (Doc. 23 at 24–30.) Again, the Court finds that Harmony has plausibly alleged facts to support this claim.
“Equitable estoppel prevents the assertion of otherwise valid rights where one has acted in such a way as to induce another party to detrimentally rely on those actions.” Pollard , 698 N.W.2d at 454 (quoting Drake v. Reile’s Transfer & Delivery, Inc. , 613 N.W.2d 428, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)). A party invoking equitable estoppel must show “(1) that promises or inducements were made; (2) that they reasonably relied upon the promises; and (3) that they will be harmed if estoppel is not applied.” (citing Hydra– Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp. , 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 1990)). Equitable estoppel “ordinarily presents a question of fact, unless only one inference can be drawn from the facts.”
Harmony alleges that Falls Lake induced Harmony to refrain from suing by failing to notify it of the impending deadline and requesting unnecessary information. Harmony also alleges that it relied on Falls Lake’s inducements, continuing to search for documents rather than suing. And finally, Harmony will be harmed if estoppel is not applied—it will be unable to seek payment from its insurer to repair the alleged storm damage. These allegations are sufficient. See Eng’g & Const. Innovations, Inc. v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. , No. A12-1785, 2013 WL 2460400, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2013) (holding that the district court erred by denying estoppel where insurance company “was silent when it had the duty to speak,” insured “had the right to rely on its insurance provider to make it aware of possible coverage options,” and insured “would be harmed if estoppel is not applied” because it had “already incurred an unreimbursed loss”); Brenner v. Nordby , 306 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 1981) (holding that trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant where plaintiff “assert[ed] that defendant failed to deny liability” and instead said it “was conducting an investigation that might lead to settlement”).
Falls Lake responds that “[t]o plead equitable estoppel,” Harmony “would have to
allege that there were communications from Falls Lake” during a specific period—the time
between the initial denial on November 23, 2022, and the anniversary of the storm on May
11, 2023. (Doc. 31 at 12–13.) Not so. In Minnesota, promises or inducements “may
consist of silence or a negative omission to act when [the party had a] duty to speak or act.”
Pollard
,
Falls Lake counters that § 72A.201 cannot support waiver or estoppel because
Minnesota’s Unfair Claims Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 72A.17–.32, does not confer a
private right of action. (Doc. 31 at 6–7, 12–13.)
[1]
,
[2]
In support, Falls Lake cites
O’Reilly
,
The
O’Reilly
court first held that the trial court erred by rejecting the insured’s
estoppel claim.
In
TGA
, the Eighth Circuit addressed an insured’s argument that a policy exclusion
did not bar its claim “because the insurance company failed to identify it [in the denial
letter] as a basis for denying coverage as required by Minnesota law.”
Unlike in
TGA
, Harmony does not seek to expand coverage. Estopping Falls Lake
from arguing that Harmony’s suit is time-barred does not eliminate exclusions from the
Policy.
Cf. Nw. Airlines
,
All told, the Court finds as a matter of law that Harmony’s suit is not time-barred because the proper limitation under the Policy is two years. And regardless, Harmony has plausibly alleged facts to support claims that the one-year limitation was unreasonable, that Falls Lake waived it, and that Falls Lake should be equitably estopped from asserting it. So dismissal is unwarranted.
III. Motion to Compel Appraisal and Appoint an Umpire
Turning to Harmony’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and Appoint an Umpire, the
Court treats it as one for partial summary judgment seeking the remedy of specific
performance.
See McCoy v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins.
,
Falls Lake does not dispute that the Policy is a valid agreement. Nor does it dispute that it has refused to participate in the appraisal process. It only argues that a condition precedent to appraisal has not been met. (Doc. 28 at 20–21.)
The Policy’s “Appraisal” provision reads:
If [Harmony] and the [Falls Lake] fail to agree on the amount of loss, each, upon the written demand either of [Harmony] or of [Falls Lake] made within 60 days after receipt of proof of loss by [Falls Lake], shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser. The appraisers shall then select a competent and disinterested umpire. If they should fail for 15 days to agree upon such umpire, then upon the request of [Harmony] or of [Falls Lake], such umpire shall be selected by a judge of a court of record in the county and state in which such appraisal is pending. Then, at a reasonable time and place, the appraisers shall appraise the loss, stating separately the value at the time of loss and the amount of loss. If the appraisers fail to agree, they shall submit their differences to the umpire.
An award in writing by any two shall determine the amount of loss. [Harmony] and [Falls Lake] shall each pay his or its chosen appraiser and shall bear equally the other expenses of the appraisal and of the umpire.
If there is an appraisal, [Falls Lake] will still retain its right to deny the claim.
(Doc. 12-1 at 48 ¶ 21.) Thus, the Policy seems to require only two conditions to trigger an appraisal—the parties must “fail to agree on the amount of loss” and one of them must demand appraisal in writing “within 60 days after receipt of proof of loss by [Falls Lake].” (Doc. 12-1 at 48 ¶ 21.)
Nonetheless, Falls Lake argues that the Policy contains a third condition— compliance with the “Duties of the ‘Named Insured’” provision in a separate paragraph of the Policy. (Doc. 28 at 20.) [3] Under that provision, “[i]t is a condition precedent to any payment of loss that [Harmony] must see that [several things] are done in the event of loss or damage to insured property as soon as possible.” (Doc. 12-1 at 51 ¶ 35.) Among the ————————————————————————– things that Harmony must do is “[c]ooperate with [Falls Lake] and its retained adjustors and experts in the investigation of the claim by providing requested documents and information as soon as possible.” ( ) And according to Falls Lake, Harmony violated this duty by responding to only two of the thirteen requests for information that Falls Lake made in July 2023. (Doc. 28 at 20.)
The Court disagrees with the premise that fulfilling the Duties provision is a
condition precedent to appraisal. The Duties provision does not reference the Appraisal
provision. (
Compare
Doc. 12-1 at 51 ¶ 35,
with id.
¶ 21.)
Cf. Silverado Park Ass’n v.
Country Mut. Ins.
, No. 23-cv-3687, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
The cases that Falls Lake cites to the contrary are not on point. In
St. Panteleimon
Russian Orthodox Church v. Church Mutual Insurance
, this Court adopted the report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Jeffrey J. Keyes after no objections were filed. No.
13-cv-1977,
The Honorable John R. Tunheim followed suit in
Darmer v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company
, No. 17-cv-4309,
Here, by contrast, both parties reached a conclusion as to the amount of loss, so it is
beyond dispute that the parties “fail[ed] to agree on the amount of loss.” (Doc. 12-1 at 48
¶ 21.)
Cf. Silverado Park
,
All told, there is no genuine dispute that the Appraisal provision’s conditions have been met, so the Court grants partial summary judgment on that issue and compels appraisal.
As for appointing an umpire, neither party disputes that the appraisers have failed to agree on one, and the record shows a stalemate. (Doc. 19-13 at 2.) Still, the Court believes they should have a second opportunity to agree on an umpire now that Falls Lake is compelled to participate in the appraisal process. The Court therefore orders the appraisers to meet and confer to “select a competent and disinterested umpire” within fifteen business days. (Doc. 12-1 at 48 ¶ 21.) If they still cannot agree, the parties shall each submit to the Court a new list of preferred umpires along with evidence of their competence and disinterest, including evidence of their experience as a neutral umpire, reputation in the industry for fairness and neutrality, affiliations with either party (if any), and prior work involving either party (if any).
IV. Order
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED ;
2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and Appoint an Umpire is GRANTED ;
3. Defendant is COMPELLED to participate in the appraisal process as described in Paragraph 21 of the Policy; and
4. The appraisers shall meet and confer to select a competent and disinterested umpire by Monday, January 13, 2025. If the appraisers are unable to agree, the parties shall submit their lists of preferred umpires to the Court by Friday, January 24, 2025.
Dated: December 19, 2024 /s/ Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON United States District Judge
Notes
[1] In addition, Falls Lake asserts in a footnote that “[e]quitable estoppel requires a
wrongful
act by the party
to be estopped.” (Doc. 31 at 13 n.6.) Falls Lake is incorrect. Wrongfulness is required only if the government is the
party to be estopped.
Compare City of North Oaks v. Sarpal
,
[2] Falls Lake also argues that § 72A.201, subd. 4(8), only applies to statutes of limitations, not suit limitation provisions in policies. (Doc. 37 at 1–2.) The Court agrees with Harmony’s counterargument that “[s]uit limitations clauses in insurance policies cannot be separated from the statutes authorizing them” (Doc. 36 at 6)—particularly where, as here, their length depends on the length of the applicable statute of limitations.
[3] Falls Lake also argues that Harmony’s demands are invalid because they do not “clearly state what issues
[Harmony] seeks to appraise,” and thus “it is unclear whether the issues [Harmony] seeks to appraise are appraisable.”
(Doc. 28 at 19.) This argument is unpersuasive. By its very nature, an appraisal is designed to resolve a disagreement
about the amount of loss. Falls Lake concluded that the amount of loss is zero because the storm did not cause any of
the damage, while Harmony claimed it was $2,382,132.10. (
Compare
Doc. 1-1 at 11 ¶ 25,
with id.
at 20 ¶ 81.) To
the extent that Falls Lake argues that the issue of causation is outside the scope of an appraisal, it is incorrect.
See,
e.g.
,
Quade v. Secura Ins.
,