*1 Evenson, economist, Doctor “Plaintiff’s He can show six charts here. Ted HARMON and Ada Jan wife, anywhere Appellants from four the loss is
where husband up (Plaintiffs), nine eighty-nine thousand hundred dollars, I’m sure hundred thousand money time and gave him additional AFTON, municipal TOWN OF a prepare he six more charts could corporation, Appellee up showing range anywhere from zero a (Defendant), dollars. We’ll to five hundred thousand good common sense rely your own (Defendant). damages are in this what the determine No. 86-127. if, fact, you some do find there is case Wyoming. Supreme Court negligence. “There in this case also another effect Nov. which, as finding a little bit my clients are as I’m concerned and far important.
concerned, more even
Now, Florida does crime from doctor compensation police of a to take
not have things He can do other
officer.
living. good and makes He’s writer
money doing that. Win Farns- that. Frey do do
worth and Jim and their living
Their and their livelihood are law en-
professions and their careers added.) (Emphasis
forcement.” coverages from insurance
With available undoubtedly being defenses were
funded, pay, would this statement who ca- argument of
or the intrinsic emotional police risk officers neither
reer or ambit of 1-1-109
within § 1-1-114, read facially true. I cannot
§ permit approve intent or content to
statutory payment responsi- attribution authority financial obli-
bility as to misstate
gations jury. should not be
statutory license to lie.
However, objec- in the of trial absence
tion, specially concur.
3.Whether the district court erred in denying admission of report the accident into evidence. February 15, 1984,
On approximately afternoon, four in the Ted Harmon was driving on Afton, west Sixth Avenue in Wyoming. As he entered the intersection Street, Sixth Avenue and Madison anoth- er traveling vehicle on north Madison Street also entered the intersection. Har- attempted mon brake and swerve right, but the left front of his vehicle struck right front side the second vehicle. Jacobson, Jr., Roy A. and Sharon M. Both Madison Street and Sixth Avenue Yehar, Jacobson, Beppler, Rose of very La are two-lane streets. Traffic is controlled Rose, P.C., Kemmerer, appellants. and yield at the signs facing intersection John A. Kapp Sundahl and Paul northbound and lanes of God- southbound of Madi- frey, son Jorgenson, Cheyenne, Sundahl Street. There are no lights & traffic signs appellee. at the controlling intersection east-
bound and westbound traffic Sixth Ave- accident, nue. At the time BROWN, C.J., THOMAS, Before and streets were packed icy. snow and Snow- CARDINE, MACY, URBIGKIT and JJ. by plows edges banks left lined the of both streets. MACY, Justice. Upon impact, passenger side Appellants Ted and Ada Jan Harmon northbound by Hunting vehicle driven slid brought an against action Hunting into the driver’s side of Harmon’s car. As appellee and Town of Afton collided, sharp pain cars Harmon felt a automobile accident in which Ted Harmon legs. his back and When his car came to injuries suffered legs. his back In and a stop attempted get out, and he proceedings, Hunting course was realized he legs. could not move his Hunt- discharged bankruptcy any liability ing nearby went house and called the arising accident, from the appellants and police. later, A short time an officer
proceeded against appellee. trial At the police department arrived, Afton followed evidence, close of the the jury found that by an ambulance. Harmon was extracted appellee negligent negli- but that its from his hospital. car and taken gence was not the cause of the 27, 1985, February On appellants filed a accident. In jury’s accordance with the against Hunting ap- action and findings, the district judg- court entered pellee. complaint, appellants their al- appellee. ment in favor of leged Hunting failing We affirm. lookout, to keep proper control her ve- Appellants set forth ap- three issues hicle, yield oncoming traffic, and exer- peal: cise care for safety her and that of others. jury’s finding ap- Whether the against appellee, appellants their claim pellee's negligence proxi- was not the alleged generally violated its mate supported cause accident is duty to exercise main- reasonable care in evidence; substantial taining the by creating dangerous streets 2. Whether the district court along erred condition Sixth Avenue and Madison instructing allowing Appellants variety Street. forth a set for appellee dangerous snowbanks; to comment on the including effect conditions liability; inadequate signals; traffic insufficient supervision; Company, Crown Cork & Seal Inc. v. manpower, and equipment, design Beverage Corporation, Wyo., improper Admiral sanding; lack of complaint 1274-75 Appellant’s the intersection. proxi- a direct and further stated recognizing While the existence of these negligence of mate cause review, appellants argue that, standards of inju- sustained appellee, Ted Harmon jury’s finding present wife, Ada legs, his ries back *3 appellee’s proxi- negligence was not the the care and com- was denied
Jan supported mate cause the accident is not Hunting After panionship of her husband. that, even a scintilla of evidence and any discharged bankruptcy was even upon viewing light the evidence in the filed an com- liability, appellants amended appellee, most favorable to the evidence defend- naming as the sole plaint appellee supports neg- the that appellee’s conclusion ant. ligence proximate was a the cause of acci- specifically, appellants dent. More claim that, Ted jury because the found that Har- jury’s the Appellants contend that negligent, mon not we must assume he appellee’s negligence was not finding that due acted with care would have seen is proximate not the cause accident not been for avoided supported by substantial evidence. failing negligence appellee the properly remove the snowbanks. held: previously We have “ means that the “Proximate cause acci- court, the reviewing assume ‘As a we injury natural dent or must be the true, is party successful evidence the probable consequence negli- of the act of entirely evi out of leave consideration charge gence. per- The does not a law party con dence of the unsuccessful of a son with the therewith, give the evidence of flict act, wrongful ignores remote causes but in party every the favorable successful only the cause.” and looks reasonably may which be drawn
ference
”
State, Wyo., 719 P.2d
DeWald
International,
Huang
from it.’
Inc. v.
omitted).
(1986) (citation
Wyo.,
Company,
Foose Construction
question
is a
of fact to
“Proximate cause
(1987),quoting
734 P.2d
DeJulio
trier
facts unless
be
the
determined
182,185
Foster,
(1986).
Wyo., 715 P.2d
can
drawn from
only one conclusion
be
fact,
questions of
dealing with
“[W]hen
Kirk, Wyo.,
Ely v.
the evidence.”
ordinarily
court will not
substitute
* * *
P.2d
jury.
judgment
its
for that
the
long
So
as there is sufficient evidence
present-
present
evidence
upon
rationally
could
which the
base
susceptible to more than one conclu-
ed was
findings,
findings
not
its
such
will
be
sion;
than one reasonable inference
more
way by
adjusted
this court.” De
testimony as
from it. The
could
drawn
be
Foster,
“INSTRUCTION NO. 16a death in injury person to or property, case “This must be determined on contributory negligence the if the was not as comparative of negligence basis of the great negligence as the of the person parties involved in the occurrence. against recovery sought. whom is Any deciding case, you the will need to know damages allowed shall be diminished in meaning the of ‘negligence’. the term proportion the negligence to amount of “Negligence you has been defined person for recovering. attributed to the mine the any, “It will be earlier instructions. of each of the percentage necessary parties for of involved in the negligence, you to deter- if by any party shall: “(b) The [*] court [*] may, [*] and when [*] [*] requested [*] It necessary occurrence. also will be for “(iii) the conse- Inform of damages to determine the amount of quences its determination by any claiming sustained party dam- percentage negligence.” (Emphasis ages. added.) Wyoming applicable “The law of to this Appellants argue the court’s re- requires case to the Court reduce the provision liance on this is misplaced for the damages you amount have awarded to reason that exclusively 1-1-109 deals § by party percentage negli- comparative with negligence, sepa- which is gence, any, if find is attributa- rate and distinct from party. ble to that liability. Specifically, appellants argue percentage negligence “The of Ted 1-1-109 authorizes the district § Harmon, any, compared if will be to the court inform plain- if the negligence, any, if of the Town and Julia tiff is found more than the de- Hunting. negligence If the of the Town fendant, plaintiff will not recover equal is to or less negligence than the plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced Harmon, plaintiff will not recover by the amount of his negligence. own damages However, from the Town. Appellants’ overlooks negligence greater of the Town is W.S.1977, 1-1-114, provides per- which § negligence than the part: tinent Plaintiffs will recover of the they solely are entitled “In all cases the court shall inform the Town. The Court will reduce the amount of its verdict.” 1. Amended effective June report to use im- Pinedale, Wyo., appellants allowed v. Town Coryell peach a claim or refresh the recollection of Officer (1987), response
745 P.2d
present
There was no error in the dis-
raised in the
Clement.
to that
identical
ruling.
1-1-114 authorizes
trict court’s
held that
§
conse-
inform the
court
“The fact of citation or non-citation of a
cases, including
in all
quences of its verdict
investigating
driver
law enforce-
negligence
comparative
in which
those
officer is inadmissible in an action
ment
Thus,
for the
not error
it was
not an issue.
negligence.” Ingrum
v. Tucson Yel-
on
to instruct
district court
Co.,
low
131 Ariz.
Cab
liability.
several
effect of
Pinedale, ap-
As in
v. Town of
The rationale for this rule is that a citation
court
district
also assert that the
pellants
opinion
evidences the
of the traffic officer
appellee allowing counsel for
erred in
and the cause of the acci-
joint and several
the effect of
comment on
dent.
during closing argument.
“
proper
permit
a witness to
‘It
that, during
in this state
well established
re-
give
questions
on
of fact
may comment
closing argument, counsel
knowledge,
quiring
expert
no
when
given
the court.
the instructions
very
opinion involves the
matter
Inc., 63
Newspapers,
Cheyenne
Spriggs
jury,
determined
and the facts
Annot.,
“Q. Now, do you
[*]
[*]
[*]
recall
[*]
observing any
[*]
sjt
opinion.
URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting
sion,
high
visual
accident?
“A.
“Q. Now,
[*]
snowbanks at the scene of the
I
Yes, correct?
obstructions
H«
did.
fact,
[*]
at the
you
[*]
scene of the
[*]
observed
¡fc
colli-
Afton
closing
(1987),
same final
Town
With the
URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting.
(one
argument,
dissent from this
Pinedale, Wyo.,
same
the two
problem
counsel for the
found
defendants),
packed rect? *6 very icy isn’t that true? “Q. water tion? “Q. And the “A. That’s true. “A. Correct. roads, usually “Q. very icy road conditions at the intersec- “A. “Q. the top [*] And the streets were iced So Did appears gets had been clear that conditions at the [*] you you, because of the warmness and icy, yes? did observe and observe and correct? streets [*] people wintertime, [*] appeared drive over it intersection, day [*] experience experience over, and the get icy snow [*] cor- you (indicating). will work. cause if number, right here, is academic unless happens? happens? Under the instructions that you you find that 100%,from the assume that thetical assumption ant who was Let’s “Okay. have Judge you find that decide, assume he’s responsible, you to come with would have found that the Town Let’s has He find So, really, discharged given you, go through it’s the Town is 99%. gets Town. That's the up [plaintiffs] do then Let’s assume that 100% [the in a of his despite the fact in bankruptcy], zero, you another hypo- other defend- number, know what 0% 1%. sense, zero here damage, and let’s way again. going What this be- “A. Correct.” importance. “So that’s the If there’s 1% Thereafter, negligence, redirect, pays on appellants every- Town elicit- thing. negligence ed the If it’s testimony part additional of Mr. scenario, the officer: in this first all, they the Town is pay it less “Q. Did I say understand 30% that had determined eight these foot snow embankments con- negligence.” stituted a visual par- obstruction at that ticular day? intersection on that The difference from is the clear “A. Yes.” adequate objection In jury-in- made. conference, struction objection joint- to the On the testimony basis and the and-several-liability instruction was assert- presented trial, other evidence it was the ed. jury’s responsibility to decide whether snow conditions were a cause of Okay. just “THE COURT: Let me take the accident. 12. N.O.V., judgment motion for or In their objection
“Now, your I don’t understand trial, plaintiffs for new in the alternative This is a concurrent respect to 12. with again raised the issue: cause instruction. “(3) erroneously when The Court allowed the Right, it states but
“MS. ROSE: or more of two Defendant to talk to the about the concurring person aspects each injury, prejudicial ‘collection’ of the doc- persons causes regardless plaintiff liability; joint liable to the trine of and several wholly )) * * * which each con- degree to of the relative injury. to the tributes responsive argument post-trial in the Well, the correct that’s “THE COURT: brief, defendant Town of Afton motion the law— statement stated: It is. “MR. JACOBSON: “THE DID NOT ERRONEOUS- COURT TELL exists. LY DEFENDANT TO —as it now ALLOW “THE COURT: THE THE JURY ABOUT ‘COLLEC- you will recall And “MR. JACOBSON: THE TION ASPECTS’ OF DOCTRINE feel that in limine. We didn’t our motion AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. OF JOINT aspects of the collection reference to closing argu- relevant to and several that at joint “The Town concedes understand Jury’s ment, argued deliberations. We Counsel you mentioned that but you’ve ‘joint overruled doctrine of consequences again in another instruction and disagrees liability.’ The Town several is— erroneous- with Plaintiffs that Court trial counsel to do so. Prior to ly allowed “MS. ROSE: matter, for the Defend- of this Now, we can live “MR. JACOBSON: ant, way Jury offered Instruc- of an it needs to be we don’t think with but tion, support of its presented authority again in of those. mentioned both be instructed position that And that’s the last sentence.” of the doctrine of limine, plaintiffs had motion in By earlier argu- liability. Following constraining “any refer- requested an order ment, of Defend- ruled favor Court legal and sever- ence to the effects Defendant will this issue and the ant on liability on the Defendant” and that al authority previously sub- rely on the for the Defendant court “admonish counsel support its mitted to the Court statement, jury by suggest not to ruling was correct. position that said otherwise that the argument, objection, counsel for the closing argument, “At proof sought exclusion from Plaintiffs have pos- informed the Defendant matter set forth herein.” fact or doc- under the effect of its Verdict sible *7 support of Comprehensive memorandum in liability. Said joint trine of and several relating joint- the motion in limine to the jury presented to the argument was filed and-several-liability issue was also for the by counsel objection without raised the pretrial. particular, plaintiffs Plaintiffs. relating argument to of issue evidence Judgment Not- seek a “Plaintiffs now award, con- pay of funds to the source or a New Trial withstanding the Verdict cluding, “Accordingly, Plaintiff submits Defendant that the premised on the claim limiting any reference Order in Limine jury informed the about not have should several aspects joint of the collection aspects’ of their verdict. ‘collection Respon- liability appropriate.” would trial, Nonetheless, of during the course limine, defend- motion in plaintiffs’ sive to re- for Plaintiffs themselves including “[a]ny in limine filed a motion ant jury of the bank- informed the peatedly evidence, testimony, or and all inabili- Hunting and their ruptcy of Julia of the existence concerning the issue Defendant Hunting as a join Julia ty to parties in liability insurance against her. ‘collect’ a verdict 411, or to hereto,” citing W.R.E. Rule 896
“By allowing
argue
however,
the Defendant
room
not a proper place
joint
liability
closing
and several
in
with-
for dissatisfaction with the
joint
law of
objection,
in
out
their
actions
own
liability.”
and several
apprising
bankruptcy
We are faced with the
principle
universal
Hunting, and
their
Julia
therefore
own
should not consider the rela-
problems,
‘collection’
Plaintiffs waived
plaintiffs
tive wealth of the
and defendant
right
argue
their
that the Court erro-
arriving
in
its
at
verdict. Edwards Har-
v.
neously
argue
allowed
Defendant
ris, Wyo.,
(1964);
making
would
repeatedly
going
it
find that
jury.
argue
front of
Co.,
payment obligation
Cf. Gammon v.
attribution
Equipment
Clark
to a liti-
Wash.App.
gant,
897
(1978); Annot.,
of
P.2d 423
33 A.L.R.2d
content
580
ly relating
philosophic
to the
Annot.,
556,
459;
93
involving
v. Fisher
A.L.R.3d
comments in Burton
these two
1214,
P.2d
Company, Wyo.,
taxpayer
jurors
723
interest of
as a defense
Controls
case,
(1986), reversing
first
uniformly
technique
1222 fn. 6
and also as
condemned
analyzed:
further
the court
by appellate
by
cases. No case was cited
here,
party
by
none found
inquiry
cases is
either
for future
“An academic
appropri-
anything
more
similar to
as to whether the
writer where
created
by
classify
invoking
arrangement
argument
would be to
ate
this case
obvious
designate
given name or
by
appealed,
actor
was ever
let alone af-
prejudice
early
clarify
otherwise
somehow
appropriate
A most
case is
firmed.
Lufkin
jury verdict as to who
part
21,
of the
Bakersfield,
CahApp.
20
City
v.
of
who is an actual defendant.
an actor and
(1933),
appealed
where defendant
P.2d
require-
present statutory
In view of
plaintiff’s
argument
on the basis
of the
advised
ments
be
city was
after defendant
that the
insured
verdict,
forthcom-
of their
and the
effect
closing argu-
the subject
had initiated
l-l-109(b)(i),
W.S.
ing provision
§
ment:
“ * * *
conse-
‘Inform the
brought
if
a
[T]hat
[per-
quences of its determination of
case,
plaintiff
for the
in this
verdict
fault,’
seem that
centage] of
it would
damage
lead to
actions
would
other
or the
through the verdict form
either
city
taking
taxpay-
against the
and the
jury should
of the issues the
statement
over to oth-
turning
ers’ funds and
them
among
actors
advised as to who
be
people.” Id.
er
20 P.2d at
in-
pockets’ and who was
had ‘available
Although
approving
not
of the conduct of
only for
of the com-
cluded
determination
litigant,
appellate
court denied
either
responsibility.”
putation
error.
reversible
changed my
from that
I
not
have
accurate advice
The standard
full and
contending
discussion
law where in
Wyoming
is not unnoticed
responsi-
going
talk about who
bears
early comparative-negligence case it
open
to all
bility
payment,
issue
was said:
litigants
accurately present-
and should be
“ * * *
informed
If the
is to be
If we are
ed if invoked
instruction.
verdict,
ought to be
of its
the effect
litigative parameters by
going to define
fullest extent.”
correctly informed to the
payment,
then we should
responsibility
Wyo., 564 P.2d
Haney,
v.
Woodward
factfinder
accurately communicate to the
844, 847,
fn.
rested.1
where that burden will be
thought-
agreement
By complete
with
the com-
subject
This
unrelated to
ordinance,
reject
prejudicial
infu-
ful
litigant
jurors as
parable
appeal
cases of
argument,
would reverse
in final
sion
City
Myers,
v.
taxpayers.
Columbia
for a
remand
new trial.
(1982); Byrns
(1974), grounds, sub overruled other Inc., Co., Superior Sales
nom. Lollis Annot., may demand parties in often actual A.L.R.3d 560: 1. It is stated preserva- perfection in the less than technical "Attorneys in mak- well schooled and careful appeal right contend tion objections ing prompt clearly stated in the prejudicial made trial evidence, saving improperly and in offered appealing jurors’ self-interest or may court rulings, possibly exceptions to adverse taxpayers, make should prejudice as degree of not to observe the same inclined applicable every to observe the letter upon hearing improper argu- effort care meticulous course, Thus, complete to raise although failure opposing Of rules. proper counsel. ments many fatal, may courts, objection may well be appellate of exer- interest in the ruling." upon definitive degree to insist cising every possible failure fairness