78 Ind. App. 554 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1921
— Complaint by appellant to quiet her title to an eighty-acre farm in Delaware county. William A. Scott, who will hereafter be referred to as the appellee, filed a cross-complaint to recover the value of improvements made by him as an occupying claimant. The court found the facts specially to be in substance as follows: ■
On June 1, 1878, Elizabeth Dunkin, then a widow, being the owner in fee simple and in possession of the real estate in controversy, executed a.warranty deed conveying said real estate to Joseph and Mary L. Remington for life with remainder over to appellant, then about eighteen years old and the wife of Edward Harmon. Mrs. Dunkin was the mother of Mrs. Remington. Appellant is the daughter of the Remingtons. Mr. and Mrs. Remington entered into possession of said real estate under said deed immediately after its execution and remained in possession until August 21,1878, when they executed a warranty deed conveying said real estate to Elizabeth Dunkin. Upon the execution of this last deed Mrs. Dunkin entered into possession of said real estate and remained in possession of same until April 19, 1887, when she executed a warranty deed conveying said real estate to appellee in consideration of $400 paid to her by him. This conveyance to appellee was subject to a life estate in Elizabeth Dunkin and also subject to a life estate in Mary L. Remington after the death of
When Mrs. Dunkin executed her warranty deed to appellee in April, 1887, said real estate was not drained, the fencing, thereon was of little or no value, the valuable timber had been cut ■ and removed, the tops and refuse from trees left thereon, the uncleared portions of said farm had grown up in underbrush, second growth timber and small trees, about fifty acres had never been cleared, all stumps and rocks still remained on the farm, the house that was then on said farm still remains there, the stable that was then on said farm was burned and replaced by another by appellee which
Upon these facts the court concluded as a matter of law that appellant was the owner of said real estate and entitled to have her title quieted thereto; that she was entitled to recover from appellee as a set off to his cross-complaint the rental value of said property from June
Appellant excepted to each of the conclusions of law, after which a decree was entered in accordance with the conclusions.
The errors assigned are that the court erred in each conclusion of law and in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial. The specifications in the motion for a new trial are: (1) That the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) that the decision is contrary to law; and (3) in the admission of certain evidence.
The principal question for our determination is whether appellee as an occupying claimant can recover for the improvements which he placed on the real estate.
It is appellant’s contention that she became the owner in fee of the real estate subject to a life estate in her father and mother, June 1, 1878, by virtue of the deed-from Mrs. Dunkin to Joseph and Mary L. Remington; that the only title conveyed to Mrs. Dunkin by the Remingtons and by Mrs. Dunkin to appellee was the life estates of the Remingtons; that the recording of the deed from Mrs. Dunkin conveying the land to appellant and the Remingtons constituted notice to appellee of
All questions presented and urged for reversal, except the questions relating to the admission of evidence, relate to the right of appellee as an occupying claimant to recover the value of the improvements which he placed on the property. Appellee is not claiming to be the owner of the real estate. He concedes that under the facts appellant is the owner of the real estate. Appellant contends that since appellee was the owner of an estate during the life of Mrs. Remington,' he as a life tenant is not entitled to compensation from the remainderman for the improvements made by him. In support of this contention appellant insists that the registry law not only defeats appellee’s title but that it also defeats his claim for improvements.
Appellee Scott had color of title. §1128 Burns 1914, §1081 R. S. 1881; Philbin v. Carr (1920), 75 Ind. App.
We cannot agree with appellant’s contention that appellee cannot recover for improvements for the reason that an examination of the records would have disclosed the deed from Mrs. Dunkin to appellant. The right of ah occupying claimant to recover for improvements made by him under facts similar to the facts in this case has been frequently before the courts.
In Canal Bank v. Hudson (1884), 111 U. S. 66, 81, 4 Sup. Ct. 303, 28 L. Ed. 354, in discussing the question of constructive notice, the court quotes from Cole v. Johnson (1876), 53 Miss. 94, where it is said: “Our view is that, in order to deprive the occupant of land under color of title, of the value of permanent improvements erected thereon, there must be brought home to him either knowledge of an outstanding paramount title, or some circumstance from which the court or jury may fairly infer that he had cause to suspect the invalidity of his own title, but that this cannot be inferred merely because it‘ could -have been demonstrated by the records of the county.”
The facts in Fee v. Cowdry (1885), 45 Ark. 410, 55 Am. Rep. 560, are very similar to the facts in the instant case. There, as here, was a conveyance by a life tenant and improvements made by the purchaser from the life tenant. The court in that case said: “As a general rule improvements made by life tenants, during the existence of the life estate, are referred .to their interest in the land, and for them they would not be entitled to compensation. But it is different in this case. For a valuable consideration Camp (the life tenant) pretended to convey to Sewell, in fee simple, by warranty deed, the land in controversy. Sewell believed
Appellee was permitted to testify that when he purchased the real estate from Mrs. Dúnkin he in good faith believed she was the owner and that he thereby became the owner of the real estate in question and that when he made the improvements he also believed that he was such owner. Appellant objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground that appellee was bound to take notice of the record of the deed from Mrs. Dunkin to appellant. It follows from what we have heretofore said upon this question that there was no error in the admission of this evidence.
The court committed no error in stating the conclusions of law or in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.