83 Wash. App. 596 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1996
Lead Opinion
Appellant Harmon’s minor stepchildren voluntarily left his home. Under the common law, that event would end his duty to support them. But under the family support statute, a stepparent’s duty of support continues until dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, or death. Because the statute has clearly and unambiguously changed the common law as to the events that will terminate a stepparent’s obligation, we affirm an order requiring Harmon to pay child support.
Edward Harmon’s wife, Darlene, divorced Tom Dooley in 1984. She was awarded custody of their two daughters, who were six and seven at the time. Darlene married Edward Harmon in 1985. The Harmons and the girls lived together as a family for the next seven years. The girls moved out of the Harmon home in 1992 and moved in with Tom Dooley and his new wife, Linda. Later that same year, the court granted custody of the girls to Tom Dooley, their natural father. The custody order did not set child support.
After he was awarded custody, Dooley asked the Depart
The statutory support duty of stepparents arose when, in 1969, the Legislature added the words "including stepchildren” to the family support statute, RCW 26.16.205.
The expenses of the family and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and they may be sued jointly or separately. When a petition for dissolution of marriage or a petition for legal separation is filed, the court may, upon motion of the stepparent, terminate the obligation to support the stepchildren. The obligation to support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of a decree of dissolution, decree of legal separation, or death!21
Notwithstanding the statute’s plain language, a 1992 decision of this court, In re Marriage of Farrell,
The Farrell court first considered the common-law rule. Under the common law, a stepparent becomes obligated by establishing an in loco parentis relationship with the child. The support obligation thus assumed is temporary, lasting only so long as the in loco parentis relationship continues.
The Farrell court next considered whether the statute had displaced the common law, and concluded that it had not. Accordingly, the court ruled that Edward Spencer, though still married to Michelle’s mother, no longer had a duty to support Michelle. In determining that the common law remained in effect, the court relied on the
Pivotal in Van Dyke was the rule that the Legislature must choose clear and unambiguous language in order to depart from the common law. In that case, the Department of Social and Health Services argued that, under the statute as amended, a stepparent who had never resided with his spouse’s children had become liable for their support. In order to become obligated for support under the common law, a stepparent must intentionally and factually assume the role of parent.
But the statute does, in clear and unambiguous language, redefine the events that terminate the duty of support once it has arisen: "entry of a decree of dissolution, decree of legal separation, or death.”
Farrell reasons that RCW 26.16.205 "does not evidence an intent to change the common law with respect to the
It is enough that the statute forthrightly and affirmatively lists the events that will terminate the obligation.
We confronted a similar issue in State v. Gillaspie.
The statutorily required event has not occurred in the Harmon household, either. And it had not occurred in two cases that followed Gillaspie: Groves v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs.
Farrell cannot be reconciled with Gillaspie, Groves, and Stahl on this point because there is no reason to distinguish between a stepchild’s departure and a stepparent’s
Harmon urges that, as a matter of policy, requiring him to pay continued support is a result lacking in common sense and fairness. His wife’s minor children have ceased to be functional members of the Harmon family, and he expresses the concern that the only way he can avoid having to support them is by legally ending his happy marriage. But, as usual with matters of public policy, there is more than one concern to consider. The Legislature may well have found it sensible to maintain an existing source of financial support for children whose original family unit is no longer intact. The Legislature may have deemed it fair to hold stepparents to a responsibility that they voluntarily undertook along with the privilege and benefits of marriage. The Legislature may also have preferred a bright-line rule for its ease in administration and adjudication of child support obligations. The Legislature may have decided that compared to these benefits, the risk of sham divorces is slight.
Respect for the Legislature’s powers requires that we read the statute to ascertain legislative intent rather than trying to decide what public policy should prevail. Legislative intent to abrogate the common-law rule is evident from the plain language of RCW 26.16.205. A stepparent who has incurred a duty of support can be relieved of it only as the statute provides.
In a related statute, the Legislature has said the same thing. RCW Chapter 74.20A expresses a legislative intent to see that children are supported by responsible parents.
We conclude that RCW 26.16.205 indeed means custodial stepparents must continue to support their stepchildren until one of the statutory events occurs. If either the stepparent or the child leaves the family home, that alone does not terminate the duty of support. To the extent that Farrell holds otherwise, we respectfully decline to follow it.
The decision of the superior court is affirmed.
Baker, C.J., concurs.
Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, § 1, at 1549.
RCW 26.16.205.
In re Marriage of Farrell, 67 Wn. App. 361, 835 P.2d 267 (1992).
Farrell, 67 Wn. App. at 363-64.
Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wn. 2d 510, 512, 364 P.2d 444 (1961).
Taylor, 58 Wn.2d at 512-513.
Farrell, 67 Wn. App. at 365-66.
Van Dyke v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981).
Taylor, 58 Wn.2d at 512-513.
RCW 26.16.205.
Farrell, 67 Wn. App. at 366.
See In re McLaughlin’s Estate, 4 Wash. 570, 591-92, 30 P. 651 (1892) (the marriage statute renders a common-law marriage invalid, even though the statute does not expressly so provide).
Snohomish County v. Anderson, 123 Wn.2d 151, 157, 868 P.2d 116 (1994).
Taylor, 58 Wn.2d at 512.
State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973).
La-ws 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, §§ 1-2, at 1549.
Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. at 562.
Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. at 562 (citing Taylor).
Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. at 562-63.
Groves v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 42 Wn. App. 84, 709 P.2d 1213 (1985).
Stahl v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 43 Wn. App. 401, 717 P.2d 320, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1009 (1986).
Laws 1990, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 2, § 13.
RCW 74.20A.010.
RCW 74.20A.020(7).
RCW 74.20A.020(8).
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in the result) — I concur with the conclusion the majority has reached because I think the legislative intent on this issue is entirely unclear. In my view, the Legislature did not even consider this circumstance when it enacted RCW 26.16.205. Thus, the conclusion we reached in In re Marriage of Farrell, 67 Wn. App. 361, 835 P.2d 267 (1992), is just as likely to accurately reflect the interplay between the statute and the common law as is the conclusion we reach today.
In an era of frequent divorce and remarriage, the stepparent’s obligation to support a spouse’s children impacts many Washington parents. I write separately to urge the Legislature to make the policy decision about this important issue that is its right and obligation to make.
Review granted at 131 Wn.2d 1008 (1997).