160 So. 687 | Ala. | 1935
Complainants seek to invalidate the special school district tax of 30 cents on each $100 worth of taxable property in special school tax district A of Elmore county.
The primary and essential condition upon which an election for such a tax is authorized to be ordered and held is the fact that the county is already levying and collecting such a tax. Ala. School Code, 1927, § 262, Acts 1919, p. 607. Third Amendment to Ala. Const., vol. 1, Code 1923, p. 429; Gantt v. Court of County Commissioners,
On November 10, 1931, an election was held in Elmore county, and as a result a special 3-mill county tax for public school purposes was voted, and the result thereof duly declared.
Upon the face of the proceedings there appears no irregularity, and since said election the tax authorized thereby has been continuously levied and assessed. But complainants attack this county-wide school tax for matter dehors the record, insisting that the published notice of the election was so defective as to render the same void, and that, therefore, there is no such county tax. The argument is that the election notice fails to properly state "the rate of such proposed tax," as provided by section 263 of the Alabama School Code 1927, and much reliance is had upon Shanks v. Winkler,
In the Winkler Case, supra, the notice was not published a sufficient length of time, a matter considered of vital importance in view of the fact that the election was a special *262
one, with no time fixed for holding the same except that provided in the published notice; and the conclusion here was that the emphatic and mandatory provision of the statute in this regard must be given effect, the opinion in placing emphasis upon the language of the statute requiring at least the thirty days notice, saying: "If the notice for less than 30 days be made to suffice, to what end and with what effect did the Legislature prescribe that 'the sheriff must give notice at least thirty (30) days before any election to be held under this Act?' " The opinion expressly disavows any inclination "to interfere with the result of this election on any narrow or technical ground," but observes further that "the language of the statute controlling the matter of notice is unusual, exclusive, emphatic, mandatory," and the cases of Commissioners' Court v. State,
The irregularity as to the notice here in question is of this latter class. The published notice is as follows:
"10-10-31. J. H. Golden,
"Sheriff of Elmore County."
Complainants argue as if the notice read a tax of three mills on each hundred dollars. But the language is, "a three mill tax on each hundred dollars." We are in accord with the chancellor, as disclosed in his opinion accompanying the decree, that the expression, "three mill tax," has in this state a well-defined meaning, connoting a tax of 30 cents on each $100 worth of taxable property, and in our decisions it is referred to as a "three mill tax." City of Birmingham v. Hawkins,
Having so well defined a meaning, the expression used in the notice is readily understandable, and in no manner calculated to mislead the voters. True, as argued by complainants, the rate of 30 cents on the $100 of taxable property is the maximum rate and a lesser rate could be voted. But we think the above-noted expression suffices to put the electors on notice that the usual and maximum rate is what is proposed; such being the well-defined meaning of the words.
In any event, however, if it be conceded the wording of the notice in this respect is irregular or ambiguous, this would not suffice to invalidate the election in the absence of anything indicating that the result was affected thereby. The required length of time as to the notice of the election in the Winkler Case, supra, was considered of vital importance in view of the language of the statute in that regard; and Gantt v. Court of County Commissioners, and McCormick v. County Board, supra, dealt with the primary and essential condition of a district tax, all of which was fundamental.
But the matter here complained of is an incidental detail, irregularity as to which will not suffice to invalidate an election unless it appears the result was thereby influenced. We are persuaded the conclusion of the court below was in this regard well founded.
Moreover, the lawmaking body, prior to the rendition of this decree, took notice of such irregularities, and expressly validated the elections had on defective notice in this regard. Gen. Acts 1935, approved January 24, 1935. This act was in substance and effect the same as that considered in Johnson v. Rice,
The discussion of a like statute and its effect as found in Wall-Hay-Wall Lumber Co. v. Mathews,
It results that all other matters aside, we see no sufficient reason for a disturbance of the election held or any pronouncement of *263 invalidity of the tax levied. The decree is correct, and will accordingly be here affirmed.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and BOULDIN and FOSTER, JJ., concur.