9 Mont. 243 | Mont. | 1890
This action was commenced by Harmon to recover damages for the wrongful taking by the appellant, a corporation, of certain horses which are described in the complaint. The cause was tried by the court below without a jury, and the findings of the facts which are pertinent to this hearing are to this effect, to wit: That Harmon commenced an action May 14, 1887, in the Probate Court of Custer County, against one Speelman, upon an account for $200.16; that an attachment was then issued out of said court, and placed in the hands of the sheriff of the county; that the writ of attachment was levied the same day upon said horses, by filing a copy thereof in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county, with a list of said property annexed thereto, and a notice that the said range stock was attached by virtue of the writ; that said horses were then rango stock, and running and roaming at large upon the range; that afterwards the appellant, without the consent of Harmon or the sheriff, took and drove away the horses from their range, and converted them to its use; that a judgment was entered in the Probate Court June 3,1887, for Harmon and against Speelman, for the sum of $255.66, which has not been paid, and is wholly due; that the sheriff, after diligent search, has not been able to find the horses, or any property of Speelman out of which any part of said judgment can be satisfied; and that Harmon has been damaged by these acts of the corporation in the sum of $255.66. The judgment was entered accordingly for Hannon. The motion for a new trial was refused, and the corporation appealed.
No testimony was offered by the company, and the notice of the motion for a new trial specifies the particulars in which the evidence produced on the trial is insufficient to justify the findings. An examination of the transcript satisfies us that none of
The errors of law which are assigned and relied on in the brief of. the appellant will be reviewed. At the trial the appellant made many objections to the introduction of the testimony, which depend upon one legal proposition: that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that it does not appear that the Probate Court had the right to issue the writ of attachment in the case of Harmon v. Speelman. We quote from the pleading the paragraphs which relate to these matters: —
“ That on the fourteenth day of May, A. D. 1887, the plaintiff commenced a suit in the Probate Court of said county against one S. F. Speelman upon an account for the sum of $200, and interest thereon, and then and there procured from said court a writ of attachment in said cause.
“. . . . That on the third day of June, A. D. 1887, the said Probate Court rendered judgment in favor of this plaintiff, and against the said S. F. Speelman, in the sum of $209.56, and costs in the sum of $46.10, amounting in all to the sum of $255.66.”
These allegations are not denied by the answer, and for the purposes of this action must be taken to be true. This court has held in Charlebois v Bourdon, 6 Mont. 376, that “ the Probate Court is of limited jurisdiction.” In pleading at common law the judgment of this inferior tribunal, it is necessary to set forth the facts which confer jurisdiction. (Turner v. Roby, 3 N. Y. 193, and cases cited; Smith v. Andrews, 6 Cal. 652; Townsend v. Gordon, 19 Cal. 188.) The rule has been modified in this State by the enactment of the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure: “ In pleading a judgment or other determination of a court or officer of especial jurisdiction, it shall not be necessary to state the facts conferring jurisdiction, but such judgment or determination may be stated to have been duly given or made. If such allegation be controverted, the party pleading shall be bound to establish on the trial the facts conferring jurisdiction.” (§ 103.) Statutes of the same import have been passed in New York, California, Indiana, Nevada, and other States, and received judicial interpretation.
This court held, in Territory v. Cox, 3 Mont. 205, that an averment is sufficient in a complaint which alleges that letters testamentary which had been granted were “duly revoked” by the Probate Court. In Hootman v. Bray, 3 Mont. 411, Chief Justice Wade says, in'the opinion: “Neither the original answer nor the proposed amendment contain any averment showing that the attachment was regularly issued by a court having jurisdiction ; and this, we hold, is a fatal defect in a case like the one we are considering, where the plaintiff claims the property by a prior sale, and the officer attempts to justify the levy by impeaching such sale for fraud.”
We are not required to state fully the pleadings in this action, but assert that the respondent cannot prevail unless he alleges and proves the issuance of a valid writ of attachment, and the entry of a lawful judgment. The foregoing facts, which are material and relevant, lead to this conclusion. The writ of
Another legal question, which will necessarily arise in the retrial of this action, can be finally decided at this time. It appears that the property was attached under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as “ horses running and roaming at large and commonly known as ‘range stock.” (Title 7, ch. 6.) The law defines what shall constitute a sufficient service of process “between the first day of November and the next succeeding fifteenth day of May,” and that certain copies and notices shall be filed “ with the recorder of the county wherein such property is running at large.” It is conceded that the proper officer made this filing in his office upon the fourteenth day of May, 1887, in the night-time, at 10:30 P. M. The appellant maintains that this hour was too late for the transaction of
One section of the Code under investigation provides that “ it shall be the duty of said county recorder to file all papers deposited with him for that purpose, and required to be filed under this chapter, and preserve the same as other records of his office are preserved.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 226.) “ There shall be kept in the recorder’s office of the county recorder of each county a book called Attachment Book,’ in which shall be entered by such recorder, in alphabetical.form, the names of any person or persons against whom any writ or notice of attachment has been filed in his office. There shall also be entered in said book the time such writ was filed.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 205.) The county recorder has complied in all respects with the laws.
The contention of the appellant cannot be sustained. Blackstone gives this definition: “ In the space of a day all the twenty-four hours are usually reckoned; the law generally rejecting all fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes. (Co. Litt. 135.) Therefore, if I am bound to pay money on any certain day, I discharge the obligation if I pay it before twelve o’clock at night, after which the following day commences.” (2 Blackst. Com. 141.) In National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S. 689, the court says: “For most purposes, the law regards the entire day as an indivisible unit. But when the priority of one legal event over another, depending upon the order of events occurring on the