20 Neb. 625 | Neb. | 1886
In June, 1885, the defendant Coverdale executed and delivered to Barhydt a chattel mortgage upon certain household furniture, to secure the payment of nine promissory notes, which will be referred tó hereafter. The mortgage contained the following provision: “And I, the said Thomas Coverdale, do hereby covenant and agree to and with the said A. G. Barhydt, that in case of default made in the payment of the above mentioned promissory notes or any of them, or in case of my attempting to dispose of or remove from said county of Cass and city of Plattsmouth the aforesaid goods and chattels or any part thereof, or in case the mortgagee shall at any time deem himself unsafe, then and in that case it shall be lawful for said mortgagee or his assignors by himself or agent to take immediate possession of said goods and chattels * * * * and sell the' same at public auction.”
On March 5th, 1886, Barhydt filed an affidavit and petition in replevin in the county court of Cass county, to recover possession of the mortgaged property. The goods were taken under the order of replevin, but as they were appraised by the sheriff and two appraisers at the sum of $3,275, the cause was certified to the district court, where on the 25th day of April, 1886, Harman filed a petition to intervene and supported the same by an affidavit as follows:
“Frederick A. Harman, being duly sworn, on oath deposes and says, that on or about the 22d day of June, A.i>. 1885, the above named defendant executed and delivered to said plaintiff the chattel mortgage exhibited in the petition or affidavit for replevin herein, for the purpose of securing the payment of nine several promissory notes of the defendant to said plaintiff of even date with said mortgage, as follows: One for $100 due in thirty days, one for $100 due in sixty days, one for $100 due in ninety days, one for*627 $100 due in four months, one for $100 due in five months, one for $100 due in six months, one for $1,600 due in one year, one for $2,200 due in two years, and one for $2,100 due in three years after date.
“That on or about the 4th day of February, a.d. 1886, the said plaintiff for a valuable consideration sold, endorsed, .and delivered to this affiant two of the above named promissory notes, to-wit: Oúe for $2,200 due iu two years and ■one for $2,100 due in three years a!fter date, and this affiant is now in good faith the owner and holder thereof; that no part of the same, either of principal or interest, has ever been paid; that as affiant is'advised by counsel learned in the law, the said assignment and delivery of said notes to him as aforesaid operated as a transfer and assignment to him of a ratable proportion of the security for the payment ■of said notes created by said chattel mortgage, and this affiant avers that said plaintiff did then and there and thereby assign, transfer, and set over to this affiant such a proportion of said mortgage as is represented by the proportion the face of'said affiant’s said notes bears to the face value of all of the above mentioned notes which still remain unpaid. Affiant is informed and verily belives, and therefore alleges, that all of the notes secured by said chattel mortgage have been paid except one for $1,600, due in one year, and the two so assigned and delivered to this affiant; that said plaintiff is insolvent and has no property liable to seizure. This affiant now here-elects under the clause contained in said chattel mortgage to declare his said promissory notes now due and payable, and to make operative the powers of sale therein contained.”
Coverd'ale filed an answer in the replevin action, denying the facts stated in the petition.
Barhydt filed an affidavit, as follows* “Aaron G. Barhydt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in the above entitled action; that he resides in Plattsmouth, Nebraska, and is the owner of the furniture
“ EXHIBIT ‘ A.’
“ $100. Plattsmouth, Neb., June 22,1885.
“ Six months after date we jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of A. G. Barhydt, one hundred and no dollars, for value received, with interest at -the rate of ten per cent per annum from date until paid. And if -collected by suit we hereby agree to pay reasonable attorney’s fees, and consent that the same shall be taxed as costs .and entered up as a part of the judgment.
“ Negotiable and payable at the First National Bank of Plattsmouth.
“ (Signed.) T. Coverdale.”
“ EXHIBIT ‘ B.’
“ DeWitt, Neb., Feb. 3d, 1886.
“ Received of A. G. Barhydt, as collateral to any indebtedness F. A. Harman may have or will have against A. G. Barhydt, the following notes secured by chattel mortgage: one note for twenty-two hundred dollars, dated June 22d, 1885, due two years after date, signed, by T. Cover-•dale; one for twenty-one hundred dollars, dated June 22d, 1885, due three years after date, signed by T. Coverdale; -each of the above notes bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent from date.
“ (Signed) F. A. Harman.”
On the 30th of April, 1886, the court overruled the application of Harman to intervene, to which he excepted,, and now brings the cause into this court by petition in error.
The attorneys for Barhydt claim that as there is no final order and that a judgment has not been rendered in the action, this proceeding in error is premature. An order in the progress of an action, to be final, must be such as determines the action and prevents a judgment. Hobbs v. Beckwith, 6 O. S., 262. An order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, is a final order. Powers v. Reed, 19 O. S., 189. Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb., 321.
In the case lastcited, the discharge of a garnishee before judgment was held to be a final .order, and subject to review on error before judgment, citing Watson v. Sullivan, 5 O. S.,43. The reason is, the discharge of the garnishee would deprive the plaintiff of the lien acquired by his attachment upon the moneys and credits in the hands of the garnishee, and thereby deprive him of a substantial right. So in the case at bar, Harman had some interest in the-goods in question and some right to the possession apparently. The extent of that right is a question for the jury; but sufficient was shown prima fade to entitle him to intervene to protect his right in the premises. Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279. Summers v. Hutson, 48 Ind., 228. Stich v. Dickinson, 38 Cal., 608. Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo., 432.
Whether Harman took the notes in question absolutely, or as collateral security, can make no difference so far as his right to protect his interest in the property is concerned. A transfer of notes secured by mortgage is a transfer of the mortgage pro tanto. Studebaker Manfg. Co. v. McCargur, ante p. 501, and cases cited. Harman therefore had an equitable assignment of so much of the chattel mortgage in question as was necessary to secure the notes held by him, and should have been permitted to protect that interest. The court therefore erred in excluding him. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.